Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2009

The politics of Post War Stalinism

· Socialist Viewpoint no. 14, November 1986 · pp 22-24 · 2,001 words

Stalinism Russia and the USSR Trotsky Racism and anti-fascism

politics of Post

War Stalinism

While thousands recoiled in disgust from the repressive face of Stalinism, it was not so simple to arrive at a scientific understanding of the apparently contradictory role of the Moscow leadership before, during, and after the war. This could not be done simply on a superficial view of events.

The starting point had to be Trotsky's analysis of the bureaucratic degeneration of the Russian revolution after 1923-24, and the emergence of a distinct, privileged, parasitic ruling caste resting on the basis of the nationalised property

established following relations October 1917. This conception of a bureaucracy counterposed to the interests and independent organisations of the working class, and excluding it trom all the levers of political power, balancing between the power of the workers on the one hand and the power of imperialism encircling the USSR on the other, is

indispensible to understand the twists and turns of Stalinists politics before and after World War 2. But it remained a hard one to swallow for many of the CP members who were appalled by the events of 1956.

However it was sufficient to enable both wings of the divided Trotskyist movement in that year to arrive at a broadly • common view of the Hungarian struggle, side unequivocally with the workers against the Moscow bureaucrats, and intervene in the outcry and turmoil of the time. On the basis of this line important forces were won from the CPs - particularly in Britain - to Trotskyism.

This was possible despite serious weaknesses and confusion on both sides of the Trotskyist movement on the nature and role of Stalinism in the post-war period. That confusion had already led to a breakaway by one wing convinced that the USSR was "state capitalist" , and brought a further split in the Trotskyist movement in 1953. It was later to

create further disorientation least in the assessment of the Revolution and the protracted Vietnam.

A coherent view of Stalinism and the contradictions within it is indispensible for the development of a perspective and programme for the political revolution which must overthrow the breuaucracy; the crucial starting point for this must be defending the political independence of the working class from all wings of the ruling Stalinist bureaucracies.

The Trotskyist movement had

distinct founded itself as international grouping, rather than fighting on to assert its status as a

Communist faction of the International, only after the actions of the Stalinist bureaucracies had brought historic defeats in Britain, China, and most decisively in Germanywhere the CP's ultra- sectarian line of denouncing the Social Democrats paved the way for Hitler's rise to power in 1933). The lack of self-critical response to these

- not Cuban war in

disasters confirmed that remained of the Comintern "dead for the purposes reovlution"

Trotsky emphasised that the Kremlin leaders did not act from ideological motives: rather they tailored their ideology to the latest twists and turns of opportunist foreign policy or moves to crush a particular current of opposition inside the USSR and then imposed and upheld their "theories" by brute force.

The Moscow leadership's overriding concern was - and still is - to detend its own power and privileges by striking a balance of forces between the Soviet working class, defending the nationalised property relations establised in 1917, and world imperialism.

Under Stalin's ledership, and in the isolation that suffocated the healthy development of the Russian revolution, a conservative, nationalist bureaucracy had emerged that saw its task as preserving the status quo with capitalism, at the expense of workers' struggles. In this sense, as well as in its brutish

The Allied isolation of the USSR gave the Red Army a

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repression of working class opposition inside the USSR itself, the Kremlin leadership had by 1933 become counter-revolutionary.

These basic points were argued by Trotsky even while the Comintern stil held onto the crazy sectarian line of Stalin's "Third period" that brought the catastrophe in Germany. But they were borne out unmistakeably during the next phase of Comintern policy, the "Popular Front" turn to alliances with the so-called "democratic" or "progressive" sections of the bourgeoisie, which led up, most chillingly, to Stalin's pact with Hitler in 1939.

Trotsky's analysis of the political essence of Stalinism did not depend upon the particular line being put forward at any given moment, but upon an analysis of the material base and contradictions of the Soviet bureaucracy, and the regime it imposed through purges, terror and corruption upon the Comintern and its parties.

From this starting point. essential features arise:

free hand in East Europe

*The Soviet bureaucracy is not a lass, but an unstable, parasitic aste feeding off the nationlised roperty relations in the USSR; ¡ternationally it seeks to balance etween the strength of the Soviet roletariat and the encircling ower of imperialism.

*It is for this reason that talinism as a bureaucratic force ands in fundamental intradiction to the interests of the 'orking class in the Soviet Union. nd opposes any development 'hich might strengthen the iternational working class and opardise the existing balance of ices with imperialism. *Stalinism is distinct from social emocracy in that it arises and is irced to defend non-capitalist undations. It is not tied to seeking forms within a particular Ipitalist economy; and from its ery outset it has been forced to perate on a global level in stablishing its relations with nperialism. In conditions where le balance of power with nperialism is disturbed by other

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factors, it is by no means excluded that Stalinism could employ anti- capitalist measures to improve its own relative position: what is excluded is any policies which further the independent interests of the working class.

None of these basic elements of Stalinism has changed in the post-war period, though the picture has of course become much more complex, and additional basic elements have to be added for a full understanding of events. Among these:

*The treachery

Stalin's imperialist "allies" in leaving the Red Army to shoulder almost the whole of the military struggle against German fascism in Europe produced an ironic pay off when the Red Army moved westwards into a ring of Eastern European

leaving

countries, imperialism with effectively no voice or leverage in that area of the world. Stalin, on the other hand, having at the cost of 20 million dead clawed his way back from the brink of (self- inflicted) military defeat, had good reason to seek ways of keeping imperialist armies and future threats at arm's length.

*While the terms of the post-war settlement hatched up in 1944 between Stalin and the imperialists recognised the already extended Soviet influence over Romania, Bulagaria, Poland and Czechoslovakia, it sought to share influence 50-50 in Hungary and Yugoslavia; and the most significant aspect was the commitment to restore capitalist control over Greece and the rest of Western Europe at the expense of mass Communist-led resistance movements which had dominated the fight against fascism. Even in victory, Stalin's instinctive reactions were counter-revolutionary

towards a consolidation of capitalism in Western Europe, and the • establishment of Kremlin-

capitalist coalition influenced governments in Eastern Europe. In Romania and Bulgaria the monarchy was preserved; throughout Eastern Europe, reactionary capitalist and peasant parties were revived be incorporated into coalitions.

* As direct levers of power in these countries, Stalin could not rely simply on the Red Army; he needed national Communist parties, many of which had been very small until the final stages of the war. The rapid expansion of these parties with an influx of careerists and even ex- fascists, and their eventual forced merger with the old social democratic parties (to wipe out any alternative political focus for workers and strengthen the bureaucratic apparatus of the CPs) ran alongside the penetration by the CPs of the key positions in the often rickety state machinery. Strategic targets for CP domination were the Ministries of the

Stalin Interior, controlling the police and secret police forces.

*While these remodelled CPs were in the main headed by old Stalinist die-hards who slipped back into their countries after years of exile in Moscow, they also tended to include elements that had a real record of struggle in the resistance movements, and a base of popular support in their own right. Yugoslavian leader Tito, in particular, had led a civil war in which his CP-led partisans had mobilised hundreds of thousands and held de facto state power in whole areas prior to driving out the fascist occupiers without the assistance of the Red Army. In seeking to use these CPs as a device to control events, rather than maintain a military occupation or attempt annexations, Stalin was creating a potential contradiction between the interests of new national bureaucracies and the demands and needs of the Kremlin.

*In all the East European countries, nationalisations were needed in order to re-establish a working economy, after many pro-Nazi employers had fled the country. In other instances nationalisations were used as a means to end workers' occupations and break up factory committees that had taken control. In Yugoslavia in particular almost the whole bourgeoisie had fled, and wholesale nationalisations were the only way to restart production.

* Elsewhere the more advanced of the East European economies were plundered for manufacturing plant and materials, with whole factories uprooted and transported to the Soviet Union as part of a colossal programme of war reparations. "Joint Stock" companies were often set up by Moscow as a cover for this bureaucratic looting.

*Stalin's initial notion of stabilising capitalist coalition governments and effectively using the East European countries as a "buffer" between the

USSR and any future imperialist military threat was disrupted by the imperialist Cold War offensive beginning in 1946-7. The same capitalist parties which Stalin's men had so carefully retrieved from the dustbin of history were suddently seen as a potential threat. Their leaders were harassed, imprisoned or driven into exile by an increasingly confident use of the state machinery by well-placed cadres. Remaining capitalist holdings were nationalised, and the transformation into a new type of state was evenly completed at slightly different times and tempos across Eastern Europe.

*These states appeared in many respects to echo the structure of the bureaucratised Soviet Union; but while in the USSR capitalist power had been overturned by the revolutionary mobilisation of the working class, in Eastern Europe the overturn had been acomplished through bureaucratic and administrative action over the heads of workers. While in Russia the armed workers and their organs of power — the soviets - had held power in their hands, this was not the case in Eastern Europe.

These states had not degenerated from revolution to bureaucratism, they were a different type of state, deformed from the very outset, and qualitatively different trom a healthy workers' state. The only real point of comparison was with the monstrously degenerated regime under Stalin.

*In this way the experience in Eastern Europe bears out the insistence by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky that it is impossble for the working class to transform a bourgeois state gradually into a workers' state;

"The working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery and wield it for its own purposes." (Marx).

In eastern Europe, of course, the state machinery was seized not by the workers themselves

but by bureaucratised travesties of "workers' parties", and wielded in such a way as to produce a deformed caricature of a workers' state. Hungarian Stalinist leader Rakosi summed up the difference in a candid statement in 1949 that:

"A People's according to dictatorship of the the Soviet form."

In other words, the workers have had no say in the running or planning of the nationalised economy or the social or foreign policies of the repressive regimes that have emerged balancing not only between imperialism and their own working class, but also between their own national bureaucratic interests and the demands of the Kremlin.

Democracy is its function d proletariat without

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