Gorbachev tendency
for how we should proceed. Continuity or discontinuity? er is it all cosmetic? cleti
thin
mittale
• the idea that the existing sncio-cconomic mechanism and the corresponding political mechanism was the cor- rect model for any socialist socicty. It may need reforms. specially econnmic reforms to generate greater cconunne denamism, bur such reforms would improve the perfor- mance of the existing mechanism, not scrap it
The first idea came crashing down while Brezhner was
still in office. He had presided over the achievement of
Sovict ICEMs could
the USA - 20VI
guarantee an overwhelming second strike in the wake of a
Ls attack, and this will continue to give the Soviet Union a
measure of military socurity into the 1090g. But military
protection is only one aspect of the political security of a
state. The real core of Brezhnevite security policy was the
political goal of achieving a stable, co-operative relation-
ship with the USA through arms control, mutual recogni-
tion of each others vital interests, and co-opcration in
towards communism.
HOTTE
stall strategic parity with
•r the
lulle. "vemc
neas
time Due Esc.
tal merests ane.
managing regional wars and revolutions.
In this drive, the Brezhney leadership ignored any
serious active policy towards China, Western Europe,
Japan or the third world: everything was subordinated to
the drive for a strategic political deal with Washington, 10
a craving for recognition and acceptance by Washington.
Th 1979, Washington opened its jaws and sank its teeth
into Brezhnev's dithering hand of superpower friendship.
Suddenly the political impotence of the Brezhney strategy
was exposed: Western Furope, Japan and China all
seemed to be swinging into a new anti-Soviet alliance led by the USA and Washington was laying seige to a number of Soviet allies in the third world.
serious active policy towards China, Western Europe,
URSk's irreversibic escape from external threat had turned into something like a new encirclement in the 1980s. This. was a terrible shock to the Soviet leadership. By 1983 there
'nt
ith
adership as (p" sternat thrca hadrurned
"gent in the 1980s wadersnip. Bv 1985 enere thc Kremlin: a belief that
irving to destro.
was through
the star wars project.
This collapse of Brezhnev's foreign strategy exposed the hollownes of talk about thr USS& being an 'advanced socialist soviety. The explosive: crisis in Poland burst forth in 1980 dramatically exposing the lundamenzal weakencss and backwardness of the USSR: its cultural intluenre in Poland was nun existent, is ideological intluence negative and the attractive pull of the Soviet economy on the Polish cconomy infinitely weaker than that of the west. In terms of sheer quantitative weight. the preluctive power of the Soviet economy is less than that of Japan and only about a filth that of the OECD cogniries Technologically the picture is almost as grim, in terms ol living standards it is worse still
Social relations within the LSSR ar markeil by a gap liewcen town and country far greater than in most of Wester Europe north of the Mediterranean: by a fierce
and in large part illegal struggir for sarce gouds and services. by corruption. drunkenness. between the sexes with great strains placed upon women.
There arr still backward welfare services ourside the main cities, an only semi-predictable legal system and o brutally primitive, authoritarian political style in relasions between the regime and individual citizens - worse, of
course: for critcial clements. And all these lensions, scarcely masked by the bland official ideological rode. expresed themselves in the luxuriant growth of chauvin- istic, mystical, authoritarian and obsrurantist ideologies as well as in the crudest fascinations for the latest Suis and gadgets of our capitalist culture-industries.
It is possible to view this Soviet world ofthe 1980s as in many ways a great advance on what had existed before in that vast ocean of Russian cural backwardness. Therc is no doubt that very many Russians do view Soviet life in this way. It is also the case that this catalogue of problems is not the same as the problems faced in the capitalist world — and it is by no means the case that thr life of Sovier workery is, in a qualitative sense, "worsc than that of workers in the west - we will return to this important issue later. The point is that Sovict society 5 present torm is not only not adranced socialism: it is not even a secure basis for the Sovict state's efforts into the 1990s. leave alone the next century; it cannot secure a genuinels
organic relationship with Eastern Europe, or exen a pull
on the imagination of working poople in the advanced!
sapuali the lif
12T
Icav-
unch
. puil
advanced]
inday in much mor
•l an ul serlas a
still
on wtith...
capitalist countries. And even in the third world today. the
UsSk is admired by progressive movements much more
for its foreign policy posture than as a model of an advanced social order, It remains in world terms a
ile ind went •ments
backward, primitive state in transition 1o socialism, still isolated within a far stronger capitalist world system. All this led a group within the Soviet leadership to challenge the ideas of the Brezhnev period, an idea to which the Brezhnev generation of leaders had been committed all their adult lives. Perestroika involves a real attempt to remodel the entire system as it was established
*111.2 dership to an iden.to
tLa0e
real
she..
real
- 10
vexa • establis
over the last fifty years since the Stalin period. It is a real break in continuity with the orthodoxy of Stalinism. Tr is a
break which we have not been adequately prepared for
break which we have not been adequately prepared for
Stalinism or Trotskyism, bureaucratic rule or working TROTSKY'S GREAL contribution to the Marxis theory of the transition to socialism was his insistence that it is possible to have a proletarian date which is very far from bring paradise on carth. Such is ated has been the situation an
InCOR 01
that it
sar from
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no. Novembar/December 1987
I SS R
the (XYR Yet many who claim to subscribe to Trousky's theoretical legacy find it hard to defend or even explain the
roots of the Soviet state in the October revolution: others say it simply means a formal characterstic of the cconomy
starisation of the means of production - which involves no real benefit for the workers except full employ-
is more a by-
ment, and even that, they often argue. product of chronic labour shortages deriving from over- investment than a consequence of the nature of the state.
closer to the mark when they wrote that the working class is the most privileged class in the USSR and that the reason for so few strikes has been less to do with the police than with the sense of security and well being among key groups of industrial workers, The Shachtmanites also got it right in their polemic with Trotsky when they wrot that they would accept his analysis if events demonstrated two trends: an end to the terror and a reversal of the growing incquulities berween managers and workers. In the 1950%, both these trends appeared and developed, they continued vo do so up to the last years of Brezhnev.
arresting and imprisoning dissidents for no more than
(tra-reactionaries like the late L.conard Schapiro are What about the atrocious behaviour of the KEB in
12: c0:1511
ote thir Hed tave
19I14
-8l ..
perteedly legitimate political activity? And whar abour the
psychiatric hospitals and the appalling conditions in
places like Vladimir prison or the Mordovian camps' Asolutely. but all of this demonstrates that the USSR has been a very authoritaran and intolerant shute given to treating certain kinds of dissent very brutaily.
Asolutely. but all of this demonstrates that the USSR has doesn't mean the USSR is a terrorist state as it was in large degree under Stalin. As Trotsky argued, you can have
brutally authoritarian proletarian states.
But how can one say that the working class is the most privileget class when you look at the privileges of the burcaucracy? But which bureaucrats; the top party and
government officials? Their privileges are indeed chor-
- one is tempted to say they live in communism. with the compiete salislartion of every need (ant want!) without any mediation of money. Bur what about plant managers, what about the Soviet equivalent of what we
what aboul
teachers, academics? These groups in general (leaving
aside the political chiefs amongst them) carn very little
more than a skilled worker — some of them considerably
Fishermore they eum their living: there is no renticr
THOUS
would call professionale, or icachers aires bets
less.
i plant writers,
class, no bourgeoisie of private property owners. Where in
the capitalise world could you find plant managers carning onls filty per cent more than skilled workers in the plant! And under Khrushihey and Brezhney great efforts were made to make the industrial workers in a real sense better off and more secure than surrounding social groups. This dues not need to be explaned in terms of socialise idealism: it is product of the mormous power of the working class within the Soviet socio-cconomic system.
the No.
Does this mean that Soviet industrial workers were happy and contended, withou grierances or probies?
The Soviet workers are discontented abour many aspects of their lives and in many ways deeply frustrated The indices of alcoholism tell a terrible story of the barrenness and boredom of the lises of many. There is
(vidence of yearning for a freer society and for much greater democratic control among Soviet workers. The huge and corrupt privileges of the politcial elite have been
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK 104 November/December Novenber/December198/
making is u diflerent one: namely that the Soviet working class has fell itself to be much better off and far more influential in every sphere of life than any other social class in the Sovies Union: than employed industrial workers in Germany or France: qualitatively their lives influener on public policy is far greater.
Quantitatively they are far worse off than employed industrial workers in Germany or France:
far more secure and their influener on public policy is far greater.
A political caste of bureaucrats
dominates the Sovict state.
FOR SOME COMRADES no doul, what we have said above seemax in contradict the idea that the Soviet side is dominated by a bureancracy. I don't consider that whar we have said in the slighies negates the idca that the 'SSR is government by a political caste of burcaucrats. The
problem lies elsewhere: in the replaceniem of Trotsky's conception of bureaucracy by that of Weher a reacton-
ary German imperialist theoris whose ihought bas been a
system of the advanced capitalist corld for decades.
For Weber the burcaucracy is the administrative
modern organisations
SEEDIC aDita
bureaucrats aressimply the desk workerin the hierarchy. They are roverned only with means, oblivious of ends; they are timid, narrow-minded. obsessed with starus petty privileges, with increasing their own power and consumption resources
On this view of burcaucracy, everybody in enterprise administration, in Incal and rentral government adminis- tration, inderd every desk worker in the USSR belongs 10 the burcaucratic class"
Trotsky's concept of burcuacracy in the USSK was merly different from Weber's bourgeois sociology. It had nothing to do with work procrses ur the psychologisl characteristics of desk workers It was a reit-selecting caste. like the officer caste in the Prussian army. And it opcrated in the sphere of politics: it is a form of political rule whose central meaning is the political expropriation of the
like 1 in
and its replacement by an authuritarian form of state.
al
In short, the suppression of democrac
gramue. I involves what might be cailed the Soviet road
In other words a swig to "Soviet Liberalism'. We can summarise the main cle- mensas fellows. As lar asthe economy is concerned there commodity production and various co operative forms of Hungary ür Poland. But it is likely to expand conside-
Second there is the development uf marker relations
decentralising cconomic
allowed to
29
to Hungarian communism.
"Soviet Liberalism'. We can summarise the main cle-
mensas fellows. As lar asthe economy is concerned there ia NE element: ending nationalised property relations in some spheres and replacing them with both perry
pmperty. The actual scope of such changes is extremely murow in comparison. say, with the GOR, never mind
aniton the sate sector of the cconomy. This will go much
the down the
decision-making to the market and enterprises than the
Kosygin reforms of the 1960s and it will be combined with an element of enterprise self-management. But it will nor
go su far as a capitalist-type of labour market plus significant unemployment: nor will it be
goncrate anything approaching the social differentiation
and incqualities in the capitalist system. Bur it will be a
qualitative shock to the cconomic and social system.
Tis •i=÷ mamagers will be significant gainers. sections of the
working class, thar were previously privileged will be substantial losers. On the other hand the peasant pupula
tion, hitherto the poorest section of at any rare the Russian population, will very likely gain.
There is a lot of nonsense being talked in the West about
principles: this
Gorbaches adopting "Thatcherite" partly the result of picking up the writings of radical markctisers within the Soviet intelligensia whose views are not reflected in the party leadership and partly the result of an inability to distinguish form from content people have to pay a fee for certain gradles of social service this is nor cyalitarian but it iv also not Thatcherism Ior the
is cal
Thus, it
simple reason that Soviet workers are not. on the whole short of cash: their position is the reverse of that of workers here.
The problem for British workers is that there is a vast
array of goods and services in front of their noses but they don't happen to have enough money to buy them. The problem for Soviet workers isthat they have plenty of cash hat can't use it to acquire goods and services they want. Getting such things has to be via the mediation cither of
ther of
politics, or via the blark market and bribes. But there is no doubr about it: Gorbachev, like the Duboekites in Czechoslovakia, is combatting levelling egalitarianism as it's caller!.
The profoul worry in the leadership converns hostility from the working class. The lower level bureaucrats you
can fire: Gorbacher did it to thousands of them in the agro comples in the autumn of 1985. He suddenly presented them with two weeks notice, and off they had to go! He can lie very 'anti-burcaucratic. But he can't fire the working class!
It is important to realise that perestroika involves very
mal and not simply cosmetic changes in the political
system. The old political system did entail a lot of vertical political communiration upwards as well as downwards
Brezhnev in the Kremlin — Washington's turn to cold war po Brezhnev's international strategy
risks: when things porwrong the party leaderslap is ultimately alcavy scen as responsile, whether its a shortage ol tomatoes or a rise in the price of culir. Let them turn to enterprise managements, to the local sosmis etc, thereby freeing the parry leadership fiom responsibil- ity for people's daily problems.
Along with this their must be the development if chie great liberal ideas of fredom and the rights of the individual. quality before the law and so on. Of course plainest is popular in wide ordes, opecally amongst workers whos unlike intellectuals can't get the informa sion they want from sources apart from the mass media.
between the smallest political unit and the Mosrow centre (This is something that bourgeois theorists simply cannot
grasp because they cannot conceive of vertical political communication bring possible escept via crimpetitive elections and the operations of autonomous" pressure
groups)
This is not to say that such vertical commumication was pure — of course there was a lot of noise and static but ar both ends people can become very skilled at screening that out. But what the old system absolutely did nor allow was horizontal political communications workers in one plant or intellectuals in one local organi tion communicating across socicty to their colleagues
sIOn was
natu that
for campic.
As the rule changes a the 270h party congress made clear, the Communist Parry is no longer in hearen as the core of all state institutions with the state itself as singl an appendage if the party. Insicad the state is to te milerstood as a constitutional, legal -vstem to which the party itsell is subordinated. It will be a Simmed dese party — for the first time since 1953 the post-Stalin trem!
to greatly enlarge the party anil especially to enlarge its DECHIN
working dass component was reversed an the 27th party sition. congress.
But the key point is than there is no question of
undermning the party's leading role
open conflict in the local sovict or party organsation.
Gorbacher would like to reverse this: greatly increase horizontal communication ton's what he means when he says that without democracy we cannot breath. But he
aiso wants:to create some harriers to vertical communca tine upwands to the Moscow centre. He wants to end the situation where the workers with an economic or social or political problem automatically take that problem up wards first to the plant party exccutive, then to the regional party executive. then up to oblast and finally to
That lad created an cnormous weight of political merload on the central political autho- rities and one which always presented huge potential
the reniral committee. 30
I will lie the
but it will be the sole representative: railer like a Lockean oligarchy of
he short. Soute polite till rentiner to or controlled bra pecial restrif
prupie ar very far from the perchological tape af Weber> bureaucrats they are very tough. energetic types with a
Nor are thes necessarily obsessed with consumption privileges: many
of them are rather ascetic types. puritans. in lact Others of course are rather giver tuxury, but in any case. thisas
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK not Navenba/Decembe:1997
representative of the poople.
sovereign parliament in 18ch century Britain. professional polinicians chat Trucks vallet a Barcourtac) formidable capacity for political stengele
I SS R
silicies in the late 1970s exposed the political impotence of
neither hen mur there as far as the analysis of the Sovict system is concerned. They are committed to a type of authoritarian state, though a very different one from the Breainerite ideal.
This brings us finally to the new conception of the relationship berwren the Soviet state and the world. The new leadership has in one senio chorughly rejected the idend seidism an one countro repudiating the notion thar the fissk can deselop deno micily and withoot internal contradictions in solation
Thes are completel
is a descramation to participare on the world makerand let its persure openly appear wahm the Sover system. attempting to acp cronomic. technological. idcolo- gical and caliral muscles strong enough to westh as one sTate among others in a smyle word. with the chor mons birki that lus errone the Soviet population from
Bitte tout tom Salest autark, dors not at alf entail a ture
Crimatel. ax Trisky
the caperatist world!
poredot de internal comradictions of the Soviet state can be restond onis on the plane of the incernational class struggie onls through the victory of sorialism in some of the ardvanced capitalist countries. Thus hustorwally, there must be a dialectical monation: on the one hand the Soviet state must indeed opcrate within the cxisting relationships al states end coonimes in the world: ver um the other hand the socialis workers and intellectuals of the
Soxim Union must be politicalls organising their links
with the international socialis forces to oxerthrow this
No such dialecural concepton seems in dise slighest degree to muriyate the new Sovas leadership. More than (erin the past their horizons seem to be bounded be their own purely sure diplomatir interests, Their interest in a
capitalist dominatiot of the world.
SOCIALSE OUTLOOK it. Noiceba/December 198/
revival of the international communist movememt scems less even than Brezhnev's, far less than Khrushcher's,
THERF IS VERY great political hostility in the tactic of the Gorbacher leadership within the Soviet political elite and also a wide degree of hostility to his programmatic aims. Surveys of working class opinion indicate strong support
for glamost but deep suspicion of the basic programme of perestroika. The reform minded intelligensia is only half: mobilised behind Gorbachev's drive - there is still a
sing wait-and-scc-it-he-can-pull it-off anitude despite
There is an cmenging socialise Ieft-wing of the Gorkarhevite reform movement, giving cricial support to the Gorbacher group against its enc-
mies within the party clite. And their is the growth of a
It would be a big mistake to espect the rise of st Solidarnosc-type movemem within the Sovict working
thr In the first place. the authoriy of the CESt is infinitcly greater amongst Soviet workers than that of the PPR the Polish C# — hasever been in Poland. Furthermore as a result of this fart, the workers are hardly likely to feel ihe nerd to cake the enormous risks of creating such an autonomous move ment when there are evidently su many potential evers for
sahotaging the reform within the CPSU insell.
Thirds, it is very possible that the bulk of the Soviet working class wauld be prepare to remain houtral on the economic and social changes or even go along with them in exchange for what they considered a real and sulstan- tial measure of political freedom — what happened in
Czechoslovakia in 1968, for exampir The working class throughout the world has shown itself oxer and over again to be prepared to pay an astonishingly fagh economic price tor grater political freedom — far more than am
bourgeois wull dream of doing. The tint when a Solidarnose rope of movement could appear on the agerla would be in the subscquent historical plone: after thir working class and their milant leaders in the party base helped their 'Gherek. Gorbacher, to victory, have par their both in him and then have batter leone through an decade of experimer that the hope and the vision hay! Turned to asles to a new tope of corrupt. marea tche society awash with dollars and Swiss band arount and mally oblivious of the disgusting inequalines and in rusticesol daily social life
Aglunst this background, two guestions romain: dors Gorbacherism represent. possible nest step for the development of the production forces in the OSSR — ons vin die vietce of Gorla besism
in distorted form. the anis
the only possible kes to an adsince
to to with
31
over Brezhnevi will tie trotskso of the Sust latere establish urself as a genuine force! It the answer is ves then our comrades in the Moscow socialist clubs are right: we should be the let wing of thr Gorbachevites, critically supporting its leaders roday, unconcealk opposing as enrines in the burcaucracy and preparmy to transcend Gorbacherism tomorrou
Second: imair democrary — a formal sancture ol political pluralism towari socialism in the Usk and in other words the bottom line when we consider anshing critcalk supporting political currents in the sorkers" stares! •