Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2009

Sharon Atkin was right!

· Socialist Outlook no. 3, September–October 1987 · pp 25-29 · 3,268 words

Racism and anti-fascism Labour Party Britain

Ashford remand centre

deportation block

Carlin GeoritorRelle:

Why Sharon Atkin was right!

Just before the election. Sharon Atkin's speech

over the top. But. says RICHARD at a black section meeting in Birmingham. in

HATCHER, black people are riglit to call the

which she denounced the racist Labour

1 abour Party racist: Ir is not a question of Party' caused a furore. Even many on the left

overt racism in Labour's ranks. bur of die of the party thought that the term racist was

blaun

whic

arty cau:

if the part

SOCIALIST OUTIOOK no 3 September/Occher 1997

HH:1 overall practice of the party:

23

FARL WILLAND

SONI ON

it am ar ar vich oet, Simen Teele lohe u s gre sope

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK ne 3 September/@nuber 198/

Harwich. Left, Sit , an Iranian christ them asylum?

LABOUR'S RACISM

years ago established the premises which governed subsequent WHAT DOES it mean to say that the Labour Party is racist? Tr

pulicy on black immigrarion by all governments, Labour and means that in spite of its formal commitment to racial equality Labour has failed to effectively challenge racism in practice. By

racism we mean nor simply individual discriminatory acts, bur the racial discrimination thar is institutionalised in the struc- tures of British society, in particular those of the economy and the state. The charge of racism that we bring against the Labour Party is based on the policies pursucd by the national leadership of the Labour Party, especially when in oflice. Notwithstanding a mumber of progressive positions that Labour has tiken. the overall balance sheet of its record is one of support for policies which have condoned and reinforced racial discrimination, and both traded on and fostered popular idenlogies of"race. the charge. For the evidence we shall examine the records öf the

des.

aken "ne SEBUG 3E

That is

The Attlee government: selting the racist agenda

THE ROOTS of Tabour's racism he in its complicity in Britain's

imperial role, The Labour Parry never had a position of prin-

cipied opposition to empire. On the contrary, Tabour's reforms

were to he paid for our of the super-prosits of British im-

attitude to decolonisarion was consoquenrly

governed by what was most expedient for Britin, not by an in

cernarionalist principle of self-determination. Thus the Aulee

government conceded independence to India under pressure.

granted it to Malaya vuce a bloody colonial war had ensured a

pro British succession, and opposed it in Africa. (These sen-

were stared by the Labour left. Ar Inbune said (20/8/1948): We do not need to apologise for our mission in Africa. Wharever the reasons which wok our forchears there we

As Labour shouldered its share of the white man's burden abroad, it also inherired the mantle of patriotic antipathy to

The racist chat had earlier greeted Irish and jewish immigrants, in which lahour movement leaders had joined, was now transferred to black immigrants. T

....er n in the cur the

attitude to decolonisarion was consoquenrly

.: BEu....

....alun.

..111

i RS

foreign immigrants to Britain.

is often thought that the Tabour Party only capinulated to racism against black immigration in the wake of Tory immigration con trols in the early 1960s subsequent racist policies were laid under tle poss-1915 Attler goverment.

From the very beginning of pust-war black immigration, leading figures in the Atiee government were constructing it as a problem. As early as 1916 Chuter-Ede, the home serretary. said at a meeting of the cabiner foreign labour committee that he would be much happier if the intake could be limited to on- trans from the western countries, whose traditions and social

In 1948 Tsaacs, the minister of lahour, questioned in parliamest

work, ar a time of labour shorrage in Bricain, said T hope no en- couragement will be given to others to follow their example. * In 1949 a roval commission reported on future possible labour shortages and said immigration on a large scale into a fully established society like ours would only be welcomed without reserve if the immigrants were of good stock and were not

host population and becoming merged in ir

In fact the foundations of Labour's

• moo * Aller

From the very beginning of pust-war black immigration, leading figures in the Atiee government were constructing it as a problem. As early as 1916 Chuter-Ede, the home serretary. said at a meeting of the cabiner foreign labour committee that

te much happier i inc

the western countrie

backgrounds were more nearly equal to nur own and in whose case it would be possible to apply the sanction of deporration.! In 1948 Tsaacs, the minister of lahour, questioned in parliamest abut the arrival of a few hundred West Indians in search of work, ar a time of labour shorrage in Bricain, said T hope no en-

14.

111214-

immittes

be amnsted n.eol- atinons as-saral - mim ane ..HEI OI JEDOITATI

18201/* 0-41

Thone no en-

mpe - In

sla

4.ia- • TOs

prevented by their religion or race from intermarrying with the

In 1950 the Labour government first posed the possibility

for ta review to be made of the furber means which might be adopted to check the immigration into this country of coloured people frum the British colonial territories'* The "problems" in question were unemployment, illegal immigrants and welfare 'scroungers". The review concluded that controls were not ad visable ar that time, but might become so in the future.

From the ahove examples, we can see it was the Attlee government, supposedly the most radical ever, which forty

of restricting black immigration.

Ir set up a cabinet committee

ch might be

try of colaute

bronuctisi

• and welfare

were not ad

Bidi

SOCIALIST OUTIOOK.no 3 SecenteriOcrober 1987

the Alce

Those premises were as follows. lack immigration was a

was cowoged by the Artice government. I was a probicor bocause they were of alien race", not of good sock", and ther fore a threat to the social cohesiveness and stahiliry of the Brinish

bur immigratiou by curopean and Irich workers

The overriding issue for government policy was not comharing racial discrimination, or ensuring good conditions of housing, etc., lor inunigrant blacks, but controlling the numbers. These were the themes of the bipartisan apprach to black im- migration that hoth Labour and Tones implemented in the six

arios Gearita Kelie

Diane Abbott, first black woman MP; Sharon Atkin

could have joined Iner but for Labour's leadership

The 1964-70 Wilson government: appeasing racism THE CLIMATE of racisen hegan to worsen appreciably in the lanc 1950s, but die Labour leadership intially resisted pressure for

Gaitskell strongly arracked the Tory government's commonwealth immigrarion bill in the house of commons in 1061, in the name of the righr of frec entry of com- nonwealth cinzens and of the racist narure of the proposed con trul (the Trish were excluded). This was to he the last time a

By 1963. Corn before Sethwirk. Labour ander Wilson had capitulated to popular pressure and bad switched to suppor for unemigration controb. The sarcess of the racist Tory election campaign in Smethwick in 1961 dramatically confirmed thr strength of racism among Labour's traditional supporters. Tabour was faced with a choice. It could have stood firm, at

The 1964-70 Wilson THF CLIMATE U....

n.. batUle.-m immigration cuntrols.

.emme.

Labour leadership took its stand on these principles

Icast on the ground of free entry for commonwealth citizens, and waged a campaign against racism, including in its own ranks.

There is no evidence that the Labour leadership even considered

this option. Everyling was sacrificed to elecioral experienry, as Richard Crossmani, a leading Cabinet minister, made clear. In

1962 hr wrote: 1 an proud the Lahour Party is leading the fight

waged a campaign against racism, including in its own ranks. There is no evidence that the Labour leadership even considered this option. Everyling was sacrificed to elecioral experienry, as Richard Crossmani, a leading Cabinet minister, made clear. In

ate: '1

against the governmichr's immigration bill. We oppose it as a shameful piece of colour bar legislation'.?

25

But after Smethwick he wrote in his Diaries: "Ever since the Smethwick election it has been quite clear that immigration can be the greatest potential vote loser for the Labour Party if we are seen to be permiting a flood of immigrants to come in and hlight the central areas of our cities'"

RIV

Having decided thar black immigration was a vote loser for Labour, the Wilson government attempted to nullily. not racism but this "political disadvantage", by entering into what became a Dutch auction with the Tories over immigration con-

Insriture in 1984, which concluded that discrimmation con tinued to have a powerful imparr on the lives of black people. and that there was no evidence of any real improvement in the cconomic situation of black people since similar studies a decade

carlier.? The same picture is reflected in the Runnymede Trust

The second authoritative source is the Views of bläck people themselves, demonstrated most graphically in the riots of 1980 and 1981

trols, with Powell calling the bids. It would be wrong however to say that they were trying to steal the Tories' clothes, They were simply resurrecting the themes of British lahourism that we havr identified under the Attlee government, now put into mo- tich by the logic uf electoralist.

The Wilson government pursued a two-pronged strategy sometimes described as keep them out, but Ircal the ones who've got be nicely. Each bitter pill of further restrictions on black immigration was sugared with a measure to counter racial

the race relations acts, the CRU, section 11.

We assess their effectiveness below

There is nor space here to deal with the full record of the Wilson goverment, from its first act

To complete the record of the last Labour government, one other issue needs to be mentioned: that of the police. During this period they combined the persistent burassment of black people with militaristic operations against anti-racists (culminating it Southall in 1979 when some 350 were arrested and Blair Peach was killed) and a calculated idological offensive aimed ar criminalising black youth. All this took place under a Labour

cutumitted to.

Picket in support of Winston Silcott outside the Old Bailey

WINSTON

In

cris

chal

discrimination the urban and programme.

the renewal of the Tories 1962 act — to its last — the 1909 migration appals

kil government discrimination

Pick

supposedly nsupport of

cading racial

Old

art, which deliberacely placed burcaucratic delays in the way of those entitled to enter, often of three, four or five years. But it is worth mentioning perhaps the nadir of Labours policy of ap- peasing racisen, the 1968 mommonwealth immigrants act respunse to racist agitation by the Tories and the popular press about a move by several thousand Asians who were British passport hoiders living in Kroya to come to Britain, the Labour government, with Callaghan is bume secretary, rushed a new bill thrugh parliament in three days to deprive them of the right of entry. This act was explicitly racist, introducing the new concepe of "putriality" to deny the right of entry to all those who did not have a parent or grandparent born in Britain, Parrialiry became the basis of the Tories" 1971 Immigration art.

•Wilson capitulated to popular pressure

and switched to supporting immigration

control

ALTHOUGH OPPOSED to the 1971 Act, the scond Wilson goverment made no moves to aholish it it began by making a number of minor concessions in entry procedures, but retreated nnce more in the lace of the rising wave of racism in the socond half of the decade. In 1976 Alex Lyon, the home office minister

The 1974-79 Labour Government

in charge of immigration, way sacked for being too liberal. In 1977 the Callaghan government published a green paper on na tonality law, proposing two classes of Briush cuizenship propusal that was taken up by the Torick and used as the basis of

their notorious 1981 nationality act.

As we have said, since the mid sixties Tahour had pursued a wo-pronged strategy, in which strict control of black in- migration, the procondition of good race relations", was accom- panied by a hattery of measures to achieve them: the race rela- tions act, the urban programme; section 11, de Commission for Racial Equality and the CRCs. They reached their apogee

under the 1971-79 Labour government: the 1976 race relations

act, the 1977 enhanced urban programme, the 1979 ethnic groups bill. There is not the space here to describe these measures in detail or to asess their shortcomings: the paucity of

* ethn senbe th

tively, the tendency to marginalise. ethnic" provision. accident that the Tories were able to vore for all these measures. strategy to cradicate racism simply by asking if by the end of the

tina Casin

-the waucity of -ace people effe provision. It is no an these measure

1970s racial discrimination had significandy diminished? The answer is no, and we have two authorirative sources for it. The first is surveys such as that condurted by the Policy Studies

14704 cortal A150 26

electaveness of tnis

th- end of the ¿ diminished? The

ex lore The

SILCOTT

BEING

FRAMED

Neil Kinnock working on another ha

which drew s

Labour under Thatcher DURING THE first team of the Thatcher government, the Labour leadership adopted a mure explicitly anri-rarist stance in three mam pulicy ureas. In 1980 the SEC circulated an advice note to all Cils — labiar and the blark electorate highly crimical halance-sheet of the 197479 Labour govern- ment. Roy Hamersley herame shadow houre secretary, made a self-criterm for having supported the 1968 commonwealth im- migrants art, and launched a strong offensive against the Tors

non-sexist natunality act when Labour returned to power.

all-erin

government's new natonality bill,

The the cois SEttie Ine

promising a non-racist.

The second issuc that the Labour leadership took up was the riots of 1980 and 1981. On this issue they were less prepared to acknowledge the centrality of racism, choosing instead to sub- sume the specific oppression of black youth in a more general, and traditionally Labourist, critique of inner city deprivation.

The third issue was that of positive action policies, mainly in employment, housing and education. Here the lead was taken by a number of labour councils, most notably the CLC. A programme drawing on these initiatives was included in Labour's programme in 1982, and formed the hasis of the pro- posals in the 1983 clertion manifesro. They included a senior

BEC TracE

hel

taken hv program Labours pasais

all

in tras

prograr S0I V4I

SOCIALIST OUTLOCK so 3 September/October: 198/

UR'S RACISM rarial disadvantagr unice in

The

retreated.

fair immigration control

equality.

Carlos Guarisa/Rollex

hard-hitting speech in defence of black people's rights?

Irom the black clectorate. A number of developmenis, in par-

ucular the nots and the nationality act, served to plare race at

Ule top of the political ngenda. Labour had done disastrously in

the general election, but the most loyal section of Labour's sup

port proved to be hlack voters, who now assumed a greater pro

governeat departments, positive action programmes with in- creased respuring, stronger laws against racist activity, and a major public education campaign against racial prejudice. The manifesto abu included a commitment to repeal the 1971 im migration act and the 1981 nationality act (although, sharing the Tories" premise of strict control of black immigrarion, they proposed to replace them with legislation that was not that

Labour's policies on race in the carly righties were no more radical than those of the Alliance, which they closely paralleled Yer in is true to say that this was the most explicitly anti-racist stance that Labour had yet taken. What were the reasons for Labour raising the profile of racial incquality in this period! The fundamental reason was the same as that which triggered Lahour's shift to the right in the carly 1960s wlien it espoused

- the cadculation of cinctoral advantage.

In the early 1980s Labour came under creased pressure

minister for racial dissimilar).

immigration controls

Jevelalat.

the treater emphasis to policies for racial equalty.

ins x "tor

Allanc

voters. Labour responded to this complex of tartors by giving

This shift rurned out to he short lived. The watershed was

MA S

the 1983 general election. Defeat for Labour led to a general retreat to the right by the Kinnock leadership on all policy issues, including racial equality. In addition, there were lour

fartors specific to race. The first was a reassessment of the black

overwhelmingiy vote

vote. The 1983 clection demonstrared thar black votets would

Labour on class grounds.

regardless of its pulicies on race." The second -- the other side of this coin — was that anti-racist policies risked losing white vores

politics of electoral arthuctic

almost

for Labour. moderation

The

This calculation was powerfully affected by two other fac tors The frst was the association of anti-racism with the hard SOCIAUST OUTLOOK no? Sapromber/Dorober 1982

dictated

left, particularly with coumrits such as the GIC. Brent and Lambeth. The other, related, factor was the rise of black sec tions, demanding more radical policies on racism and power to black people within the Labour Parry

combination of these. factors provoked a rarist response front a section of the electorate, relentlessly fomented by the Tories and the modia, Once again the Labour leadership

Its current pusition is cellected in che 1987| clection manifesto which has abandoned virtually every one of the com mirments contained in the 1983 manifesto on rare (except for an unspecilied strengthening of the law on racull hatred, and the addition of a vague though wricome cocouragement for contract cumpliance clauscs); Norahly, it stresses the nood for firm and

and abunduns the commitment to

1 Quoted in S Joshi and B Carter, "Labour and the crcation of rade

3. Quoted in R Miles anil A Phiakha War Min Levito. Plato

i Quoted in Jest and Cret Po Alic at Kar in Writin his l

failed to deliver the pinomised changes in the living ani working condi tone of Fritain e almir mintities. We failed to replace the tacon and migration laws: urto make immigranion laws more fesibir in oneration:

tv. Sor example.

and dishaming the Special Patrol Group on to take adequate steps to markle racial ilisadvantage and give a cinar iran in the

"Opposnion Parries and

in Ram, Guwant and Politics in Rosam. ed. 2

from MILITANCY

to MARXISM

repeal the 1971 and 1981 uts.?

Britain'. Rarend Cau vut XXV no J. p 50. 2 Jod p: 57 1985. p 24 5. Quoted in & Lavion Hear.

Unwin 1981. p 00. 6. Thi 8. It sail thi Labour larry had

repealing

Race Policies 1979-83

Brown, Hiat and Wane Britan, Heinemann 158=

or to end the harassment of blacks by toe police promotion of equal unguntunity policies especially in eniplimen Quoted in M Fitzgeratif amd 7. Layton-Henry, Lavion Tienry and P Rich, Marmilian 1980, p.102 9. Sre Fitzgerald and Lavton Llenry p129 10. Thanks to Walid Haddad for his comments on dis article

Irom

by ALAN THORNETT

personal and political

of organising car

account workers

This, the first of three books planned by ALAN THORNETT on trade union organisation and political work in the Cowley car plants, is a unique account of such work from someone directly involved

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27

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