action. Instead the miners were still out. among black trade пошу- Dau in this key industry was bound to pro- ment would not have permitted the It was also clear that a prolonged strike duce state intervention. Gold sales con- tribute half of South Africa's foreign exchange earnings. The Botha govern- The NUM, only five years old, suc- ceeded in brioging nut over 300,000 mi- ners, and keeping them out for 21 days, state and the thugs mobilised by the in South Africa's history, hitting at the durability shook the bosses. As Jay Nai- union federation pur it: The strike has transformed the face of labour relations should we understand the sudden deci- sion of the leadership to call it off? The further information will help us assess despite the brutal intimidation of the mine-owners. This was the biggest strike very heart of the cconomy. Its size and doo, general secretary of the COSATU Why then did the strike fail? And how discussion will go on over this, and that the strike had shown. in South Africa.
13 more struggles by the South African mi- ners. The end of the strike has not bro- But there can be little doabr that the abrupt ending of the dis- many questions unanswered is a long way short of an orderly return to work. The miners did not go into this battic as a went in to win. Socialists have a respon- sibility to examine and explain why they: In South Africa it is illegal to build upo strike Tunds. But for future struggles, shering up the NUM and other CosATU dress rehearsal for later events: they clandestine methods of doing this must be found. The international solidarity movement must direct its attention to 30,000 victimised unions financially. ken the NUM. pute, leaving banking on it, which was why they so However one problem in the conduct tactical and in thir actions — that it was simply a rations for it in their strategy, this was a But it appears that the NUM leaders" of the strike was the NUM leadership's in- went into the strike thinking that a con- avoided, and therefore making no prepa- strike to threaten this. The nuners knew that: and the chamber of mines were sistence — as shown both in their public wages issue. If the NUM leaders really Of course it was correct for the NUM to use every possible loophole and avenue to establish the basis for a legal strike. stubbornly resisted the wage demand. with the state big problem from the outset. statements (possibly the situation that faced Cyril Kamaphosa However some The employers had this time prepared for a real battle. After years of cushion- ing themselves in the belief that the black workers in the company-controlled com- ognised a change in the strength and mood of the NUM. They stock-piled anprocessed gold ore underground to be used when production was cut. They were ready for potential losses of C100m or more, secured by the bumper profits from the rising gold price (in much the same way as British Coal and the Thatcher government were prepared to The South African NuM had no finan- pounds could not be unionised, they rec- SOCIADSTOUTICOK iJ SeptemberiOctober 1997 lose billions to con