Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2009

After the miners' strike

· Socialist Outlook no. 3, September–October 1987 · p 15 · 1,185 words

Miners South Africa

SOUTH AFRICA

SOCIALISTS who were united in their solidarity behind the heroic strike of the black miners in South Africa will now be debating the outcome of the dispute.

Te would be casy but mistaken to write off the strike in the coal and gold fields as simply a defeat.

Defeat it certainly was. The miners arc back down the mines. 30,000 of them have been sacked with no other means of livelibood to fall back on, although re- ports suggest thar some are being rehired. They did not get the per percent across the board wage increase they de- manded.

The chamber of mines, headed by the Anglo-American colossus, was prepared to make some concessions

an im- proved package on holidays and death benefits. With the death of more than 60 black workers in the Welkom mining dis- aster the day after the return to work, this latter concession may bring some small compensation to the surviving relatives. But the abrupt way in which the strike came to an end by decision of the NUM leaders and without, it seems, reference back to the rank and file has not helped to consolidate the strengths that the strike had shown.

The NUM, only five years old, suc- ceeded in bringing out over 300,000 mi- ners, and keeping them out for 21 days, despite the brutal intimidation of the state and the thugs mobilised by the mine-owners. This was the biggest strike in South Africa's history, bitting at the very heart of the cconomy. Its size and durability shook the bosses. As Jay Nai- doo. general secretary of the COSATU union federation put it: The strike has transformed the face of labour relations in South Africa'.

Why then did the strike fail? And how should we understand the sudden deci- sion of the leadership to call it off? The discussion will go on over this. and further information will help us assess the situation that faced Cyril Ramaplosa and the NUM leaders. However some factors are already clear.

The employers had this time prepared for a real battle. After years of cushion- ing themselves in the belief that the black workers in the company-controlled com- pounds could not be unionised, they rec ognised a change in the strength and mood of the NUM. They stock-piled unprocessed gold ore underground to be used when production was cut. Ther were ready for potential losses of C100m or more, secured by the bumper profits trom the rising gold price fin much the same way as British Coal and the Thatcher government were prepared to lose billions to confront the NUM).

The South African NUM had no finan-

cial reserves. Striking miners got no strike pay. The Reserve Bank had taken steps to block any forcign financial aid to. the strikers. Also hanging over their heads was the threat of the sack, and the knowledge that there were tens of thou- sands of poverty-stricken unemployed in Lesotho, Botswana and the "homelands'. among them many ex-miners with the necessary skills, rcady to take their jobs.

Despite its growth, and its ability to pull out 100,000 miners over and above its sigued-up membership, the NUM has only organised about half the mine work- force. It has great difficulty in organising the Gold Fields and Anglovaal mines. But even Anglo-American managed to produce between 10-40 per cent of their normal output during the strike.

abrupt decision to call off the strike arose from the threat of state intervention. foll lowing the anjunction ordering the strikers to leave the occupicd dormitory buildings.

There is little doubt that to have chal- lenged that injunction would have led to the usc of the army. It is not possible from this distance to judge the situation precisely: there may be factors we are not aware of. However, reports here did not show the strike fragmenting at the point when the injunction was issued, and the army had not yet been called in.

Yet the NuM leaders called off the strike without explanation, accepting without any improvement an employers offer which they had only a few days be- fore ridiculed and scen overwhelmingly rejected by a vote of the membership. NUM members who had solidly backed the union were given no say on the re- turn te work — in breach of the NUM's own constitution.

Obviouslv it is not easy to dely thie armed power of the South African state. But only recently the rail workers in an even longer dispute did so: they su- stained heavy losses, but made real gains. If it is really impossible to dely the state then it is impossible at the present time ta win such major strikcs in such sensitive sectors of the South African cco-

One crucial factor was, as in the Brit-

ish miners' strike, breaking the isolation 8 of the striking miners, and thus hamp- E cring the state's ability to intervene. The strike must have had a radicalising cffect among black trade unionists. COSATU leaders kept saying they were in favour of spreading the strike. But the NUM Icaders did not put this to the test by ask- ing for supporting action. Instead another section of workers — postal workers — called off their dispute while the miners were still out.

There is no doubt that there will be more struggles by the South African mi- ners. The end of the strike has not bro- ken the NUM. But there can be little doabs that the abrupt ending of the dis- pute, Icaving 30,000 victimised and many questions unanswered is a long way short of an orderly return to work. The miners did not go into this battle as a dress rehearsal for later events: they went in to win. Socialists have a respon- sibility to examine and explain why they didn't.

In South Africa it is illegal to build upo strike funds. But for future struggles, clandestine methods of doing this must be found. The international solidarity movement must direct its attention to shoring up the NUM and other COSATU unions financially.

13

ilt was also clear that a prolonged strike in this key industry was bound to pro- duce state intervention. Gold sales con- tribute half of South Africa's foreign cxchange earnings. The Botha govern- ment would not have permitted the strike to threaten this. The miners knew that: and the chamber of mines were banking on it, which was why they so stubbornly resisted the wage demand.

However one problem in the conduct of the strike was the NUM leadership's in- sistence — as shown both in their public statements possibly tacticall and in their actions — that it was simply a wager issue. If the NUM leaders really went into the strike thinking that a con- frontation with the state could be avoided, and therefore making no prepa- rations for it in their strategy, this was a big problem from the outset.

Of course it was correct for the NUM to use every possible loophole and avenue to establish the basis for a legal strike. But it appears that the NUM leaders'

← Time of destiny · Miners' agenda for action →

Something wrong on this page?