FEATURES
USSR: All Power to the President?
By David Shepherd and Patrick Baker
"In moving along the path of perestroika, we saw the crisis batter- ing the country was immeasurably deeper and more serious than ex- pected. Problems and contradictions, piling up within the social system for decades, have burst into the open ... We hoped to mount the peak of the crisis in 1989, but recent events have shown that there has been no change for the better."
(Mikhail Gorbachev, speaking to the central committee, February 5, 1990.)
IT WAS enshrined in Article 6 of the Soviet constitution. It was imposed through a mixture of patronage, corrup tion and brute force; it was the theoreti- cal justification for the existence of a parallel government at all levels of the state which makes all the decisions and controls all appointments; it has been the central political mechanism through which the Soviet Union's bureaucratic rulers have kept power since the days of Stalin, and it was formally abandoned by the central committee in February. What is the significance of the end of the Communist Party's "leading role"?
Of course the Communist Party's monopoly of politics has been de facto undermined by the endemic growth of political opposition over a period of years. In that sense the decision to aban- don it de jure is simply a recognition of the existing situation. It was taken in the run-up to local elections in which (at the time of writing) all indications are that the Communist Party's candidates in many areas are in for a real trouncing. It was nevertheless the most dramatic yet of the reforms carried out under the rubric of glasnost.
The decision came in the context of a deepening economic crisis and the failure of perestroika to even begin to resolve it - a fact recognised by Gorbachev in February (see quote above).
It also came in the wake of the continuing rise of mass movements of the oppressed nationalities in the republics (most recently in the central Asian republic of Tajikistan) and the continuing mobilisations for change in the heart of the Russian federation itself (most dramatically expressed in the 2 - 300,000- strong demonstration outside the Kremlin on the eve of February's central committee plenum).
But in order to understand it one must look
at the further proposals for changes in the Soviet political system with which it was combined. These include increased repre- sentation for the republican communist parties at the highest level of the party. But, most im- portantly, the centrepiece of the proposals is the allocation of enormously increased powers to a new super-presidency.
Ironically enough for the standard bearer of glasnost, President Gorbachev's latest political reforms could lead - at least in theory - to a concentration of political power in the hands of a single individual (himself) not seen since the days of Stalin.
The difference of course is that whereas Stalin's accumulation of political power oc- cured during the period of the establishment of the political rule of the bureaucracy, Gorbachev's attempts at the creation of a powerful executive presidency are occurring in the period of its collapse.
His aim is for much of the power that has been taken from the Party to go to himself. This would include powers to appoint mini- sters, to dissolve the Congress of People's Deputies, to impose states of emergency and so on. The refusal of the Supreme Soviet to call an early session of the Congress to elect
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 22, March 1990
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FEATURES
the new super-president reflects doubts not I since no other force had an alternative /
only within the bureaucre but also in programme.
In a general sense, what Gorbachev has in
society at large as to whether Gorbachev has
irrelevance - that in Lithuania, for example, secession is now inevitable.
Second: the crisis of the Soviet economy. Glasnost has not provided the desired tech- nological revolution; limited adjustments to the functioning of the economy have, on the whole, produced the reverse of Gorbachev's carly promises: a decline in the availability of goods (particularly foodstuffs), and increased social differentiation, particularly through the relative self-enrichment of "co-operatives" (or legal private sector). Any significant tum in the economy would require infinitely greater austerity measures, producing further poverty (as the working class in Poland is beginning to discover).
Third: the mushrooming opposition. Most significantly, this involves the Popular Fronts, now organised from one end of the Union to the other; but also the Inter-Regional group of Deputies, including figures such as Boris Yeltsin; and finally, an embryonic inde- pendent socialist opposition (in the form of the Socialist Party and the trades union federa- tion SOTSPROF).. Clearly Gorbachev believes that his best chance lies in attempting to give himself the greatest flexibility possible - hence the super-presidency. But this is no answer. Gorbachev - or indeed some other representative of the bureaucracy - may be able to cobble together a solution to the crisis.
However it is difficult to imagine how this could be anything other than a short-term, temporary postponement of the demise of the bureaucracy - either through the overthrow of the socio-economic system upon which it is based, or through a political revolution of the Soviet working class..
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 22, March 1990
society at go as so ma democracy in mind or personal dictatorship.
What does Gorbachev have in mind? In a sense this is a question which has progressive- ly been reduced in importance in recent months. He is certainly not the master of events - either in eastem Europe or in the Soviet Union itself. The current many-sided crisis has objective dynamics which Gor- bachev is powerless to control.
He is forced to play a balancing act: be- tween the exigencies of market-oriented economic reforms (which require austerity) and the working class; between the conserva- tive wing of the bureaucracy (which is in creasingly organised and public in its ac- tivities) and the radical reformers.
It is this which explains both the "U-tum factor" (for example on the abolition of Ar- ticle 6, a proposal of the radical reformers which he ruled out one day and adopted the next) and the attempts at the creation of a super-presidency: a position from which it will be easier to play a bonapartist role, balancing between contending forces and fac- tions.
Despite pretensions to the contrary, no fac- tion of the bureaucracy has any real altema- tive - and Ligachev, Gadaspov et al know it. A representative of the army union "Shield" recently warned (on Channel 4) of the pos
sibility of a coup, emanating from the upper
echelons of the military; but veteran Czech oppositionist Jan Urban, now a collaborator of
Vaclav Havel, expressed doubts, making the
mind, first and foremost, is the interests of the bureaucratic caste of which he is the current leader. However, the question as to what course best satisfies this general criterion is not an easy one to answer. As Trotsky said long ago, in an historic sense the bureaucracy is "a caste without a future"; this statement now appears much less a long-term prognosis.
Though there are important similarities, in the Soviet Union we are not on the verge of seeing a collapse of the Stalinist regime similar to recent examples in its satellites. Quite apart from the historic role of the Com- munist Party - a not insignificant factor - Gorbachev retains more room for manoeuvre than a Honecker or a Jaruzelski. However, Gorbachev - and the bureaucracy in general - are faced with objective threats of truly his- toric proportions to their existence as a social formation. Among these are: the explosion of the powder-keg of the "prison-house of nations*; the failure, thus far, of perestroika; and the growth of the radical opposition.
The answer to the first of these problems - the national question - has been, despite the rhetoric, traditional: brute force. Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan were clear signals to the in- surgent nationalist movements: secession is beyond the pale. Yet in the context of the mass support that the Popular Fronts com mand - in the Baltic states, the Ukraine, and the Eastem republics - this poses a problem: glasnost or brute force? Gorbachev cannot have his cake and eat it. On another level, one
telling point that there would be little point, | could judge that cordaner s acuons are ar Page 12