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"the generals, have acquired considerable influence because of the crushing of the Securitate. Yet the fighting was carried out by rank and file soldiers, while the generals were appointed to key positions enforcing the power of the old regime, and were clearly part of it"
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More than any other of the
East Buropean revolutions of 1989, the overthrow of the Causescu regime in
Romania showed the power of the mass movement.
All of these revolutions have exposed the complete isolation of the stalinist bureaucracies from mass support. Their strength has always rested first and foremost on their control of the repressive apparatus of the state, coupled with their links with the Moscow bureaucracy and the threat of Soviet inter- vention if the masses went beyond the limits permitted by the Kremlin leaders.
Causescu's was a regime that even played the "China card' - at- tempting its own Tienanmen mas-
sacre - and lost. The slaughter in Timisoara and Bucharest represented a policy only narrowly rejected by Honecker's East German regime, which instead opted to concede reforms. Though the Romanian regime appeared more firmly under the grip of the secret police and repressive forces, the advantage of the Romanian masses was that they knew of, and drew confidence from, the huge events rocking the rest of Eastem Europe (indeed even though the detailed news was heavily cen- sored in the Romanian press, Causescu himself confirmed the scale and importance of the events when he came out and publicly denounced them). The Romanians also knew that after years of estrange- ment from Moscow, and especially now in the period of Gorbachev, there was no way Soviet troops would ar- rive to bale out Causescu. The regime came under such pressure that even its conscript army eventually rebelled.
Of course there were the dark days in which Causescu tried to cling to power through brute force. On Sun- day December 17 thousands were shot dead in Timisoara: but the
A revolutionary Invades Causescu's study
escu's study
people of the town continued to demonstrate, and on December 19 the workers went on strike. On the Wed- nesday they marched from their fac- tories to join the other demonstrators; this time the soldiers did not fire. The masses had control of the streets of Timisoara.
In Bucharest that evening. Causescu spoke to a Communist Party rally, trying to isolate the op- position movement: he was shouted down by the crowd, howling "Timisoara". That night hundreds of demonstrators were killed in Bucharest, but the power of the regime had clearly crumbled: fear and bewilderment could be seen alongside anger on Causescu's face as the heckling broke out in what he ex- pected to be yet another stage- managed official rally - before the of- ficial television coverage was abruptly cut off.
The following morning mass strike action broke out in Bucharest, and the streets were awash with people heading for the Central Com- mittee building, containing Nicolae and Elena Causescu. Panorama has shown the film, taken by a Romanian cameraman living opposite the Central Committee building, of what must be the decisive moments in a spontaneous revolution. His film
showed both the shootings during the night and the masses storming the building the next day. It shows Causescu get- tinginto an overloaded helicopter on the roof, and the crowds half-way across to him when it takes off, escaping by seconds. Later the Ceauscescus were caught and handed over to the army.
Once they had taken over the building, the leaders ad- dressed the masses outside. The Panorama coverage showed clearly that it was only at this stage that the army generals came over to the side of the revolutionary movement, in order to gain control. The very
first thing they asked the crowd to do was hand over the arms that they had taken from the vicious "Securitate".
Though the army then bore the brunt of the fighting against the Securitate over the next few days, the mass movement had been the decisive factor in swaying their al- legiance. Only the courage and per- sistence of the masses ensured that the army refused to carry out its nor- mal role of gunning down demonstrators.
Once the masses had taken control of Bucharest, they suddenly found they had support not only from army generals, but also from various "politicians', many of them one-time allies of Causescu. The "National Salvation Front was formed, includ ing several genuine and long-stand- ing opponents of Causescu, but also some obviously dubious forces.
The generals, after declaring themselves late in the day to be on the side of the masses, have acquired considerable influence because of the crushing of the Securitate. Yet the fighting was carried out by rank and file soldiers, while the generals were appointed to key positions enforcing the power of the old regime, and were clearly part of it. The conscript sol- diers who genuinely supported the
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 20, Dec-Jan 1989-90
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mass movement now have no influence over events. There has been no development of
democracy - soldiers" councils or similar bodies - within the army.
On Christmas Day the army chiefs announced that after a military trial behind closed doors thay had shot Nicolae and Elena Causescu. Under- standably, most Romanians celebrated: there had been a long queue of volunteers to fire the fatal bullets.
There is no question that these bloodstained dictators deserved to be shot. But why did the army chiefs press through with such a quick trial and execution? Why did they not stage a full-scale public trial?
The official story was that after holding them captive for two days the army was afraid that there might be a bid to rescue them, and that their execution might end further resistance from desperate, hard-line Securitate forces seeking to restore the old regime. But by that point the resistance had already almost ended: the display of the captured couple on television, and the announcement of details for a full trial would have been just as effective.
In fact, by quickly executing the two Causescus and