Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2009

Eastern Europe: Where is the left?

· Socialist Outlook no. 21, February 1990 · pp 18-21 · 3,886 words

Germany Russia and the USSR Privatisation

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"socialist movements will inevitably develop in these countries, but these will be minority movements. Just like

"communism',

'socialism' is also tainted in the popular mind in Eastern Europe"

Page 16

There are quite a few people in Eastern Europe - Christa Wolf In East Germany and Alexander Dubcek in Czechoslovakia, to name but two of the most prominent - who see the present revolutions there as offering once more the possibility of creating what Wolf calls 'real socialism' and what Dubcek would still call 'socialism with a human face'. Such people seem to be in a minority. In this article GUS FAGAN looks briefly, and very tentatively, at the new polltical formations in Eastern Europe and makes some initial assessment of the prospects for socialist movements there in the wake of the overthrow of communism.

The General Framework Any assessment has to be very tentative because the political revolutions in Eastem Europe are not over. The repressive apparatus is still largely intact in most of these countries (security police and army); in all of them the old political elite and the broader nomenklatura still have a lot of power; the formation of political

parties, political currents, programmes and class/group in- terest organisations is still in its initial stages.

I will look only at the countries of Eastem Central Europe, although what is happening in the Baltic states, in Moldavia and elsewhere in the USSR, bears striking similarity to what has happened elsewhere.

The first and most obvious conse- quence of these revolutions is that "communism" as a political regime is finished, as is also the international "communist movement, certainly in Europe. With the holding of genuine- ly free elections for the first time in over four decades, the communist parties of Eastern Europe will become minority parties and, in many cases, mere rumps.

After the horrors of the Causescu dictatorship the Romanian Com- munist Party will be lucky to survive at all. The dominant currents and par- ties that have emerged out of these revolutions look back to pre-war traditions of national and peasant movements and the church (Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary to some extent). There are also important liberal-

New Czech President Vaclav Havel

democratic currents that have a lot of support among urban intellectuals and youth (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany).

The existence of these repressive communist regimes in the East has traumatised the socialist movement in Europe for more than half a century. The political revolutions, therefore, although not carried out under the banner of socialism and, in fact, hos- tile to that tradition, have altered fun- damentally, and in a positive way, the framework in which socialist ideas will be debated in Europe.

Socialist movements will inevitab- ly develop in these countries, but these will be minority movements. Just like "communism", "socialism' is also tainted in the popular mind in Eastem Europe. It's not just the political link hetween the two that matters (common language, like the official designation, describes these

countries as socialist) but the fact that socialists seem to be offering an cconomic system which doesn't work as well as capitalism.

This is not just a theoretical con- sideration. The average worker in the West eats better, has a better and cheaper supply of consumer goods, has better wages, more and better living space and an ecologically heal- thier environment. This is obvious to the millions of East Germans who visited the West since November 9. And, despite the widespread belief to the contrary, the average Wester

European worker enjoys a

better health service and a

better social welfare system

than the average Russian or

Pole. Talk of a "third way" or

"genuine socialism' (Stefan

Heym) doesn't cut much ice

against such harsh realities,

as interviews with East Ger-

man workers in recent

months have demonstrated.

In all these revolutions

the intellectuals (professional

middle classes, writers, tech-

nocrats) play an important

role, exemplified by Vaclay

Havel in Czechoslovakia.

And it is true that in the last

decade the majority of these

intellectuals, generally or-

ganised in the communist parties, have come over to the view that only some form of capitalist/market mechanism and in- tegration with the capitalist West can bring prosperity. East Gennany may be a partial exception to this, but the extent of this difference shouldn't be exaggerated: the views of many young demonstrators and of writers like Christa Wolf and Stefan Heym reflect a real commitment to socialism as a more humane and emancipated form of society, but in- tellectuals in the various economics institutes of East Berlin are more in- clined to talk about joint ventures, private enterprise and abolition of subsidies.

Apart from the Solidarity trade union in Poland, no significant inde- pendent working class organisations have appeared in Eastern Europe. This is particularly true in Hungary,

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 20, Dec-Jan 1989-90

1

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where the reform movement has existed longer than anywhere else. The existence of small independent unions in some countries doesn't alter this fact. Writing of Hungary in March 1988, Janos Kis suggested that:

"the only chance for workers to shoulder the bur- den of economic revival would be an open agreement between the government and the genuine leaders of the workers... The main trouble is that there is no one with whom to enter into a con- tract. The masses who hold the key to political peace and quiet are unorganised".

Much has happened since then and the mass of the workers were clearly in- volved in the revolutions in

the GDR, Romania and Czechos lovakia. But the absence of genuinely representative working class or- ganisations on the political scene remains an important factor.

This, then, is the general framework in Eastem Europe within which the prospects for the development of some form of socialist movement. Let us look now in some more detail at what actually exists in these countries, looking first at what has happened in the communist parties.

The Communist Parties

There will be free clections in all of these countries this year. There is

ties will be reduced to small minorities. In the meantime, they still hold on to a considerable amount of power in most of the transitional regimes. They are trying to preserve the (CP-dominated) repressive ap- paratus (Stasi in East Germany) and are using their dominant position in the media (the CPs still own most of the papers, publishing houses, and the like) to keep as much control as possible. But a repeat of the Polish outcome is unavoidable in most, if not all, of these countries.

The transformation of Eastern Europe, either through revolutions from below (GDR, Czechoslovakia, Romania) or through reforms from above resulting from growing mass pressure (Hungary, Bulgaria), has split all of these parties, although the split was fully consummated only in Hungary, with the majority of the HSWP reforming themselves in the

Hungarian social democratic Socialist Party (HSP). An openly

ISTES BiE'

SED-SASI

GYSI-STASI-NASI- •....?

*001?

East German workers ask awkward questions of the new SED perty boss

Stalinist rump with an allegedly 'pro- worker' and anti-reform demagogy is completely marginalised. The HSP has about 14% support in the polls.

In Bulgaria, the old Zhivkov regime paid lip-service to Gor- bachev-style reforms while carrying out a brutal repression of the rapidly growing opposition movement. The latter included a large ecological component. When Zhivkov was overthrown, with Moscow's support, in November 1989, the reform cur- rent, under Mladenov, who had been foreign minister for 18 years, an- nounced a programme of liberalisa- tion which includes free elections later this year. But the anti-reformist wing of the BCP has been openly stirring up anti-Turkish sentiment to destabilise the Mladenov govern- ment.

In the GDR the old leadership was swept out of office by the mass movement and, although the party presents a new face under Gysi and Modrow, the old guard still operates in the background. There is a suspicion that some sections of the SED might have a finger in some of the more spectacular examples of fascist graffiti that have led to calls for the retention of the hated security police (the Stasi). The partially- renamed party, which still proclaims its adherence to "socialism', will be a minority after the elections.

With their marginalisation in the elections later this year we can ex- pect these communist parties, much reduced in size (the SED in East Ger- many has already lost nearly half its members), to emerge eventually as a component in the minority socialist movement.

The Opposition

Except for the GDR, the vast majority of the organised opposition currents and parties that have developed in Eastern Europe defend a programme of liberal democracy (democratic process, rule of law, private enterprise, market, adequate social welfare system) and are hostile to the traditional socialist left.

In Hungary, where this process is most developed, the main opposition groups that could expect to play a major role after March 25 are all liberal democratic in orientation, The economic programme of the Democratic Forum (MDF), adopted in October 1989, called for a democratic society and a competitive but socially aware market economy. The Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), although it appears to con- tain a democratic socialist current within it, called in its Programme of March 1989, for the denationalisa- tion of the economy" and rejected the "utopia of reform communism". The Smallholders' Party, a major party before the communist takeover, has been re-established and could have a lot of support in the countryside. A number of small leftist groups exist. one of the more interesting among them being the Hungarian October Party, led, among others, by Gyorgy Krasso and committed to the ideals of the Hungarian revolution of 1956. It is, however, quite small.

In Bulgaria, the Union Democratic Forces, set up in Decem ber 1989, brought together a number of different opposition groups (Dis cussion Club for Glasnost and Democracy. Ecoglasnost, varioux human rights groups and a small So

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 21, February 1990

"there is little

doubt that the

communist

parties will be

reduced to

small

minorities. They are using

their dominant

position in the media (the CPs still own most of

the papers,

publishing houses, and the like) to keep as much control as possible. But a

repeat of the Polish outcome

is unavoidable

in most, if not

all, of these

countries"

"in Hungary, the

main opposition

groups that

could expect to

play a major role after March 25 are all liberal

democratic in

orientation"

Page 17

*in Czechoslovakia, explicitly left-oriented groups, such as the group associated with Petr Uhl, appear to be very small, as is also the PPS(RD) group in Poland"

"the reformed communist parties have themselves all put forward programes which envisage large-scale dismantling of the central planning mechanism, enterprise autonomy, private ownership and foreign investment...

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cial Democratic Party, among others).

The Glasnost Club, started in Novem-

ber 1988, held meetings of over 1000 in early November before the over-

throw of Zhivkov. It has a member-

ship mostly of academics, writers, ar- tists and prominent cultural figures. It

plans to become a political party.

Agrarian and Muslim parties would

win a lot of support in Bulgaria. An independent trade union movement (Podkrepa) has issued a policy state- ment which calls for a market

economy of a socialist type and

demands an end to "the bankrupt ideas of central distribution of the na- tional product". It is quite small, or- ganises mainly intellectuals, and has close ties with Solidarity in Poland. The ecological movement is very strong in Bulgaria and a green party would do well in the elections scheduled for this year.

In Czechoslovakia, organisation of political currents is at a very early stage but the organised popular move- ment in New Forum seems very similar to the East German groups - committed to democracy, pluralism, economic opening to the West. Ex- plicitly left-oriented groups, such as the group associated with Petr Uhl, appear to be very small, as is also the PPS(RD) group in Poland.

In Romania, although a small op position group functioned among the Hungarian minority and some dissi- dent communists were known sup porters of Gorbachev-style reforms, the opposition was not able to or- ganise as in the other countries. Since the overthrow of the regime the Na- tional Peasant Party and National Liberal Party have begun to play a prominent role. There is no socialist group of any significance, and the reform communists are fighting what seems like a losing battle to hold on (quite undemocratically) to positions of power.

Social Democracy

Social democratic parties have been formed in most of the countries of Easter Europe. In a number of cases (Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria) these have been established by ex- members of the old pre-war socialist parties. In Hungary, Andras Revesz was deputy general-secretary of the SDP under Anna Kethley in 1956 and the new party's programme is based on the programme adopted in 1903!

In Bulgaria the old SDP was revived in November 1989. It claimed to have 1000 members within a day of its relaunch, one of its leaders being the 86-year old Atanas Moskov from the leadership of the old party. In

Poland the PPS claimed continuity

with the pre-war PPS. This has led to inter-generational disputes in Poland (resulting in the formation of the PPS(RD)), and in Hungary, where the old guard, under Revesz, tried to keep control of the party by ruling that only those who had been members in 1945 could be considered for the leader- ship! The general secretary, Mihaly

Bihari, resigned within a week of taking over the post.

The East German SDP has the support of the West German SPD and, in its political statements, appears to be somewhat to the right of the other main oppositional groups. An opinion poll in November gave the East Ger- man SDP 10 per cent support.

In all of those countries where so- cial-democratic parties have been formed, basing their legitimacy on the older pre-war socialist parties and traditions, they remain at present quite small. But these parties will undoub- tedly play an important role in the fu- ture of Eastern Europe. Given their tradition and ideology, they will relate more readily to the concerns of the workers; and they will also have the support of the international social democratic movement.

The West German SPD, until recently preferring its links with the established communist parties, used to oppose the acceptance of the small oppositional socialist parties by the Socialist International. But since the popular uprising in East Germany, and the formation of the East German SDP, SPD leader Willy Brandt has changed his position and has opened the way for the full integration of the East European parties into the social democratic movement: the Hungarian SDP took part in the Congress of the Socialist International in June 1989.

In their programmes or statements, these parties favour westem-style freedoms and political pluralism and place emphasis on the need for strong social welfare provisions and on the traditional values of social justice and social egalitarianism.

The Struggle over

Capitalisation

The economies of Eastem Europe are a disaster. Even when growth rates were relatively high, they were characterised by abysmally low levels of productivity, low quality products, chronic shortages of consumer goods, long working hours, unhealthy work- ing conditions and technological backwardness. To the waste and dis- tortions caused by bureaucratic mis management and corruption were added the dysfunctions caused by

economic autarky and by being cut off from world technological develop- ment.

Thus we had such economically irrational and wasteful phenomena as East Germany investing massively in the technology to produce its own microchip when they were already being produced quite cheaply a few hundred kilometers away in West

Germany. Similarly, Romania built

up a massive petro-chemical industry while the people starved and had no heating in their homes.

Fundamental to any strategy for the future of Europe is the acceptance of the overwhelming need for new forms of European (Bast-West) economic integration, technological transfer, trade and investment which will improve the lives of the people of

Central and Easter Europe. The economic argument is unassailable. The question posed, however, is the political one: how will this integration be managed ? What forms of popular control and democratic decision- making are called for ? This will be one of, if not the central issue in Eastem Europe in the next decade.

This, therefore, is a key issue which is aready confronting the popular movements, new opposition groups and parties emerging from the recent upheavals. It is also an issue which is of immediate concem to socialists in Western Europe as well. What is at stake now, for the first time since the war, is the real possibility and genuine need for Europe-wide socialist co-operation.

There is universal acceptance in Eastem Europe that their economies have failed and that new internal mechanisms as well as new relations with the capitalist West are needed. The reformed communist parties have themselves all put forward programes which envisage large-scale disman- tling of the central planning mechanism, enterprise autonomy. private ownership, foreign investment and ownership. price and currency reform and greater reliance on the market.

While some, like the GDR economic minister, Christa Luft, may stress the continued role of planning and the compatibility of this programme with socialism, the Polish leaders speak openly of the introduc- tion of capitalism. The actual dif- ferences in strategy, however, are not substantial

This strategy is, in fact, the com- mon currency of the vast majority of the opposition groups, although there are important nuances. For instance,

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 20, Dec-Jan 1989-90

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the Hungarian Democratic Forum, concemned about the absence of private Hungarian capital and the threat of foreign ownership. has called for a 'programmed privatisation" which would use various mechanisms to encourage "group ownership* (for exampic employee stock ownership). They propose that state funds should be used to assist such a programme since domestic savings (312.7 billion forint) cannot match the estimated value of state enterprises (2,000 bil- lion forint).

The opposition groups, like the Forum and the Free Democrats, face a real dilemma here. Although favouring marketisation and privatisation, they see the need for some form of social control over the process, control which is completely absent at present.

In Hungary, the Forum of Independent Lawyers wrote a letter to the press in Sep- tember 1989 calling for the suspension of further privatisation. The Democratic Forum and Free Democrats have also made protests. What they are find- ing is that the previous managers are being given ownership rights by the state, and state property is being sold below its value.

One Hungarian sociologist, Us too!S Elmer Hankiss, has written that the conversion of economic and political power in Hungary is taking place within the country's present elite.

It should come as no surprise that the nomenklatura in those states would prefer capitalisation to socialisation and workers" control. In a recent study of Poland, Jacek Ros- towski suggests that what is happen- ing in that country is la buy-out by the nomenklatura itself. He agrees that:

"privatisation is an easier solution for the reformist communist leader- ships than is reform of the socialised sector ... [It] has the advantage of en- suring the economic independence of the enterprises without giving power to workers' councils".

The Polish nomenklatura 1s operating various fomms of "interpenetration" with the private sector, through bribes, scats on boards of trustees of new companies, and so on. Rostowski calls the emerging sys- tem a 'mixed economy kleptocracy". Whatever the validity of this analysis

for Eastem Europe in the present situation, it does point to the kind of problem that the new political opposi- tion will have to confront almost im- mediately.

The PPS in Poland, as well as all of the major opposition groups in East Germany, have expressed grow- ing opposition to the threat of uncon- trolled privatisation and foreign ownership. The austerity which inter- national capitalist institutions are call- ing for as a precondition for aid as well as the real threats to egalitarian wage structures, employment and so- cial security rights will make the nomenklatura's plans for (partial or

tion of Eastern and Western European socialist movements. It must be said that Easter European democratic and socialist oppositions have, for some time, realised the need for pan- European solutions, but Western European socialists, especially in Britain, have generally failed to make the imaginative leap. In fact, it was the peace movement, especially END. which developed an awareness of this problem in Britain and END was more active in its contacts with Eastem European oppositions than was the socialist left.

This is not the place to go into all

the European implications of

revolutions that

have happened in

the East. But it is

essential to at least

outline the

LENDATARED

framework which

these revolutions

have created for

socialists in both

parts of Europe. Ig-

noring, for the mo

ment, the military,

security and disar-

mament aspects of

3СВОБ0A the new situation,

the first thing that

has to be said is

that these revolu-

В03/0жН) tons have

destroyed the

coherence of the

Easter bloc and

undermined the ra- tionale for the Western alliance. The CMEA (Comecon) has achieved an even lower level of economic integra- tion than that achieved by capitalist Western Europe, and the signs of its disintegration were clear at its meet- ing in January.

Secondly, the EC, the capitalist club of Western Europe, is patently incapable of providing the institution- al framework for the integration of East and West Europe, Any strategy of expanding or democratising the EC is completely unrealistic. What is needed is a new political and economic framework for the integra- tion of the continent, a new set of pan-European political institutions which are democratic, which respect the rights of people to control and determine their own forms of produc- tion and economic life and which breaks down all the barriers to economic exchange, co-operation and trade. The development of programme to this end is the task con- fronting European socialists.

EM

Sovlet workers demand their share of free:

wholesale) capitalisation, without any form of social control, difficult to im- plement. A policy of *socialist autarky", however, is a dead end and would only lead to greater misery and, eventually, a complete embrace of capitalism.

Pan-European Strategy

None of the opposition groups, either liberal-democratic or left-wing. have developed a strategy for solving this problem. Democracy, pluralism and economic reform are not a strategy for social renewal, but a pre- condition for such a strategy. There is one element of such a strategy. however, which is common to all the East European political movements, namely, that this problem can only be solved on an all-Buropean basis, through the creation of the ap propriate pan-European political and economic institutions.

Gorbachev's concept of the 'com- mon European home has been in- scribed on the banners of all the East European revolutions, And it is this which provides the basis for and makes necessary a genuine co-opera-

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 21, February 1990

"opposition groups, like the

Forum and the

Free

Democrats, face a dilemma:

although

favouring

marketisation

and

privatisation,

they see the

need for some

form of social control over the

process, control which is

completely

absent at

present"

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