Eastern Europe. This is particularly true in Hungary, SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 20, Dec-Jan 1989-90
where the reform movement has existed longer than anywhere else. The existence of small independent unions in some countries doesn't alter this fact. Writing of Hungary in March 1988, Janos Kis suggested that:
"the only chance for workers to shoulder the burden of economic revival would be an open agreement between the government and the genuine leaders of the workers... The main trouble is that there is no one with whom to enter into a contract. The masses who hold the key to political peace and quiet are unorganised".
Much has happened since then and the mass of the workers were clearly involved in the revolutions in the GDR, Romania and Czechos lovakia. But the absence of genuinely representative working class ganisations on the political scene remains an important factor.
This, then, is the general framework in Eastem Europe within which has to consider the prospects for the development of some form of socialist movement. Let us look now in some more detail at what actually exists in these countries, looking first at what has happened in the communist parties.
The Communist Parties
There will be free clections in all of these countries this year. There is little doubt that the communist parties will be reduced to small minorities. In the meantime, they still hold on to a considerable amount of power in most of the transitional regimes. They are trying to preserve the (CP-dominated) repressive apparatus (Stasi in East Germany) and are using their dominant position in the media (the CPs still own most of the papers, publishing houses, and the like) to keep as much control as possible. But a repeat of the Polish outcome is unavoidable in most, if not all, of these countries.
The transformation of Eastern Europe, either through revolutions from below (GDR, Czechoslovakia, Romania) or through reforms from above resulting from growing mass pressure (Hungary, Bulgaria), has split all of these parties, although the split was fully consummated only in Hungary, with the majority of the HSWP reforming themselves in the social democratic Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP). An openly SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 21, February 1990
SUPPLEMENT East German workers ask awkward questions of the new SED perty boss Stalinist rump with an allegedly 'proworker' and anti-reform demagogy is completely marginalised. The HSP has about 14% support in the polls.
In Bulgaria, the old Zhivkov regime paid lip-service to Gorbachev-style reforms while carrying out a brutal repression of the rapidly growing opposition movement. The latter included a large ecological component. When Zhivkov overthrown, with Moscow's support, in November 1989, the reform current, under Mladenov, who had been foreign minister for 18 years, announced a programme of liberalisation which includes free elections later this year. But the anti-reformist wing of the BCP has been openly stirring up anti-Turkish sentiment to destabilise the Mladenov
In the GDR the old leadership was swept out of office by the mass movement and, although the party presents a new face under Gysi and Modrow, the old guard still operates
background. There suspicion that some sections of the SED might have a finger in some of the more spectacular examples of fascist graffiti that have led to calls for the retention of the hated security police (the Stasi). The partiallyrenamed party, which still proclaims its adherence to 'socialism'. minority after the elections.
With their marginalisation in the elections later this year we can expect these communist parties, much reduced in size (the SED in East Germany has already lost nearly half its members), to emerge eventually as a component in the minority socialist
ISTES BiE' SED-SASI GYSI-STASI-NASI- •....?
The Opposition
Except for the GDR, the vast majority of the organised opposition currents and parties that developed in Eastern Europe defend a programme of liberal democracy (democratic process, rule of law, private enterprise, market, adequate social welfare system) and are hostile to the traditional socialist left.
In Hungary, where this process is most developed, the main opposition groups that could expect to play a major role after March 25 are all liberal democratic in orientation, The Democratic Forum (MDF), adopted in October 1989, called for a democratic society and a competitive but socially aware market economy. (SZDSZ), although it appears to contain a democratic socialist current within it, called in its Programme of March 1989, for the denationalisation of the economy" and rejected the "utopia of reform communism". The Smallholders' Party, a major party before the communist takeover, has been re-established and could have a lot of support in the countryside. A number of small leftist groups exist. one of the more interesting among them being the Hungarian October Party, led, among others, by Gyorgy Krasso and committed to the ideals of the Hungarian revolution of 1956. It is, however, quite small.
Bulgaria, the Union Democratic Forces, set up in Decem ber 1989, brought together a number of different opposition groups (Dis
Glasnost and Democracy. Ecoglasnost, varioux human rights groups and a small So
"there is little
doubt that the
communist
parties will be
reduced to small minorities.
They are using
their dominant
position in the
media (the CPs still own most of
the papers, publishing houses, and the like) to keep as much control as
possible. But a
repeat of the Polish outcome
is unavoidable
in most, if not
Tall, of these countries" "in Hungary, the main opposition
groups that could expect to
play a major role after March 25 are all liberal
democratic in
orientation"
Page 17
*in Czechoslovakia, explicitly left-oriented groups, such as the group associated with Petr Uhl, appear to be very small, as is also the PPS(RD) group in Poland" "the reformed communist parties have themselves all put forward programes which envisage large-scale dismantling of the central planning mechanism, enterprise autonomy, private ownership and foreign investment... Page 18
cial Democratic Party, among others). The Glasnost Club, started in November 1988, held meetings of over 1000 in early November before the overthrow of Zhivkov. It has a membership mostly of academics, writers, artists and prominent cultural figures. It plans to become a political party. Agrarian and Muslim parties would win a lot of support in Bulgaria. An independent trade union movement (Podkrepa) has issued a policy statement which calls for a market economy of a socialist type and demands an end to "the bankrupt ideas of central distribution of the national product". It is quite small, organises mainly intellectuals, and has close ties with Solidarity in Poland. The ecological movement is very strong in Bulgaria and a green party would do well in the elections scheduled for this year.
In Czechoslovakia, organisation of political currents is at a very early stage but the organised popular movement in New Forum seems very similar to the East German groups -committed to democracy, pluralism, economic opening to the West. Explicitly left-oriented groups, such as the group associated with Petr Uhl, appear to be very small, as is also the PPS(RD) group in Poland.
In Romania, although a small op position group functioned among the Hungarian minority and some dissident communists were known sup porters of Gorbachev-style reforms, the opposition was not able to organise as in the other countries. Since the overthrow of the regime the Na-
Peasant Party and National Liberal Party have begun to play a prominent role. There is no socialist group of any significance, and the reform communists are fighting what seems like a losing battle to hold on (quite undemocratically) to positions
Social Democracy
Social democratic parties been formed in most of the countries of Easter Europe. In a number of cases (Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria) these have been established by exmembers of the old pre-war socialist parties. In Hungary, Andras Revesz was deputy general-secretary of the SDP under Anna Kethley in 1956 and the new party's programme is based on the programme adopted in 1903!
Bulgaria the old SDP was revived in November 1989. It claimed to have 1000 members within a day of its relaunch, one of its leaders being the 86-year old Atanas Moskov from the leadership of the old party. In
SUPPLEMENT Poland the PPS claimed continuity with the pre-war PPS. This has led to inter-generational disputes in Poland (resulting in the formation of the PPS(RD)), and in Hungary, where the old guard, under Revesz, tried to keep control of the party by ruling that only those who had been members in 1945 could be considered for the leadership! The general secretary, Mihaly Bihari, resigned within a week of taking over the post.
The East German SDP has the support of the West German SPD and, in its political statements, appears to be somewhat to the right of the other main oppositional groups. An opinion poll in November gave the East German SDP 10 per cent support.
In all of those countries where social-democratic parties have been formed, basing their legitimacy on the older pre-war socialist parties and traditions, they remain at present quite small. But these parties will undoubtedly play an important role in the future of Eastern Europe. Given their tradition and ideology, they will relate more readily to the concerns of the workers; and they will also have the support of the international social democratic movement.
The West German SPD, until recently preferring its links with the established communist parties, used to oppose the acceptance of the small oppositional socialist parties by the Socialist International. But since the popular uprising in East Germany, and the formation of the East German SDP, SPD leader Willy Brandt has changed his position and has opened the way for the full integration of the East European parties into the social democratic movement: the Hungarian SDP took part in the Congress of the Socialist International in June 1989.
In their programmes or statements, these parties favour westem-style freedoms and political pluralism and place emphasis on the need for strong social welfare provisions and on the traditional values of social justice and social egalitarianism.
The Struggle over Capitalisation
The economies of Eastem Europe are a disaster. Even when growth rates were relatively high, they were characterised by abysmally low levels of productivity, low quality products, chronic shortages of consumer goods, long working hours, unhealthy working conditions and technological backwardness. To the waste and distortions caused by bureaucratic mis management and corruption were added the dysfunctions caused by
economic autarky and by being cut off from world technological develop-
Thus we had such economically irrational and wasteful phenomena as East Germany investing massively in the technology to produce its own microchip when they were already being produced quite cheaply a few hundred kilometers away Germany. Similarly, Romania built up a massive petro-chemical industry while the people starved and had no
Fundamental to any strategy for the future of Europe is the acceptance of the overwhelming need for new
European (East-West) economic integration, technological transfer, trade and investment which will improve the lives of the people of Central and Easter Europe. The economic argument is unassailable. The question posed, however, is the political one: how will this integration be managed ? What forms of popular making are called for ? This will be one of, if not the central issue in Eastem Europe in the next decade.
This, therefore, is a key issue
confronting the popular movements, new opposition groups and parties emerging from the recent upheavals. It is also an issue which is of immediate concem to socialists in Western Europe as well. What is at stake now, for the first time since the war, is the real possibility and genuine need for Europe-wide socialist co-operation.
There is universal acceptance in Eastem Europe that their economies have failed and that new internal mechanisms as well as new relations with the capitalist West are needed. The reformed communist parties have themselves all put forward programes which envisage large-scale dismanmechanism, enterprise private ownership, foreign investment and ownership. price and currency refor and greater reliance on the
While some, like the GDR economic minister, Christa Luft, may stress the continued role of planning and the compatibility of this programme with socialism, the Polish leaders speak openly of the introduction of capitalism. The actual differences in strategy, however, are not substantial
This strategy is, in fact, the common currency of the vast majority of the opposition groups, although there are important nuances. For instance, SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 20, Dec-Jan 1989-90
the Hungarian Democratic Forum, concered about the absence private Hungarian capital and the threat of foreign ownership. has called for a *programmed privatisation" which would various mechanisms to encourage "group ownership' (for example employee stock ownership). They propose that state funds should be used to assist such a programme since domestic savings (312.7 billion forint) cannot match the estimated value of state enterprises (2,000 billion forint).
The opposition groups, like the Forum and the Free Democrats, face a real dilemma here. Although favouring marketisation and privatisation, they see the need for some form of social control over the process, control which is completely absent at present.
In Hungary, the Forum of Independent Lawyers wrote a letter to the press in September 1989 calling for the suspension of further privatisation. The Democratic Forum and Free Democrats have also made protests. What they are finding is that the previous managers are being given ownership rights by the state, and state property is being sold below its value. One Hungarian sociologist, Elmer Hankiss, has written that the conversion of economic and political power in Hungary is taking place within the country's present elite.
It should come as no surprise that the nomenklatura in those states would prefer capitalisation socialisation and workers" control. In a recent study of Poland, Jacek Rostowski suggests that what is happening in that country is la buy-out by the nomenklatura itself. He agrees that:
"privatisation is an easier solution for the reformist communist leaderships than is reform of the socialised sector ... [It] has the advantage of ensuring the economic independence of the enterprises without giving power to workers' councils".
The Polish nomenklatura operating various forms "interpenetration" with the private sector, through bribes, scats on boards of trustees of new companies, and so on. Rostowski calls the emerging system a 'mixed economy kleptocracy". Whatever the validity of this analysis SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 21, February 1990
SUPPLEMENT for Eastem Europe in the present of situation, it does point to the kind of
problem that the new political opposition will have to confront almost immediately. USC The PPS in Poland, as well as all
Cof the major opposition groups in East Germany, have expressed growing opposition to the threat of uncontrolled privatisation and ownership. The austerity which international capitalist institutions are calling for as a precondition for aid as well as the real threats to egalitarian wage structures, employment and social security rights will make the nomenklatura's plans for (partial or СВОБОДУ УКЛОВА, ПЕЛАТИ А МОНТРАЦИИ HE КРОВАВ Us too! Soviet workers demand their share of free speech
wholesale) capitalisation, without any form of social control, difficult to implement. A policy of *socialist autarky", however, is a dead end and would only lead to greater misery and, eventually, a complete embrace of capitalism. to
Pan-European Strategy None of the opposition groups, either liberal-democratic or left-wing. have developed a strategy for solving this problem. Democracy, pluralism and economic reform are strategy for social renewal, but a precondition for such a strategy. There is one element of such a strategy. however, which is common to all the East European political movements, namely, that this problem can only be solved on an all-European basis, is through the creation of the ap of propriate pan-European political and
economic institutions. Gorbachev's concept of the 'common European home has been inscribed on the banners of all the East European revolutions, And it is this which provides the basis for and makes necessary a genuine co-opera-
Ation of Eastern and Western European socialist movements. It must be said that Easter European democratic and socialist oppositions have, for some time, realised European solutions, but Western European socialists, especially in Britain, have generally failed to make the imaginative leap. In fact, it was foreign the peace movement, especially END.
which developed an awareness of this problem in Britain and END was more active in its contacts with Eastem European oppositions than was the socialist left. This is not the place to go into all
the European implications of
revolutions ПРЕВУСИ LENDATARED outline
these БЕЗСВОБОД the new situation, НЕ ВОЗМОЖН tions
destroyed coherence of Easter
tionale for the Wester alliance. The
CMEA (Comecon) has achieved an
even lower level of economic integra-
tion than that achieved by capitalist
Western Europe, and the signs of its
disintegration were clear at its meet-
ing in January.
Secondly, the EC, the capitalist
club of Western Europe, is patently
incapable of providing the institution-
al framework for the integration of
East and West Europe, Any strategy not a of expanding or democratising the EC
is completely unrealistic. What is
needed is a new
economic framework for the integra-
tion of the continent, a new set of
pan-European political institutions
which are democratic, which respect
the rights of people to control and
determine their own forms of produc-
tion and economic life and which
breaks down all the barriers to
economic exchange, co-operation and
trade. The development
programme to this end is the task con-
fronting European socialists.
the need for pan- the that have happened in the East. But it is essential to at least the framework which revolutions have created for socialists in both parts of Europe. Ig- noring, for the mo ment, the military, security and disar- mament aspects of the first thing that has to be said is that these revolu- have the the bloc and undermined the ra- "opposition groups, like the Forum and the Free Democrats, face a dilemma: although favouring marketisation and privatisation, political and they see the need for some form of social control over the process, control which is completely of absent at present" Page 19