workers voted Tury because they be- lieved that their living
to increase under Thatcher. But the regional pattern of vute makes such a conclusion incicap- able. If the working class votes for the Tories were explicable mercly by iden logical factors, and nor by materia ones as well, then the rebuff for the
-dur millions
standards
acute capitalist would continuc
Tories in the arcas of high unemploy- ment, and its relarive success in the mure prospersis inexplicahic. throughout the
class -
soutle would be
It is worth remembering in thes context that something like 10 per cent of the working class have voted for
twentieth century Thatcher in this election was able to limit Tahnur's inroads by deepening divisions inside ihe working class — a process which the Labour campaign was unable to overcome.
Labour's election campaign was a culminarion of the last four years in which Labour and FUC leaders have
consistently opposed any working
thallenge 10 Thate According to new realism', strikes and mass action are soon as a threar rather than the mainstay of resistance
Thatcher Had
clections to consolidate a material base of support among tie middle class and
id o
Margaret
through: conscious
some employed
pressed. outlook
rall increase of one per cent in its vote there), the Tories were wiped our in major cities like Manchester, castle, Liverpool and Leicester, and suffered a complete rebuff in Wales and especially, Scotland. Seventy four per cent of Labour MPs now from constituencies north of the Mid- lands, as opposed to only 21 per cent of
alllue:
3ap0Eis New- Durin.
despite the rise
ble
TE P vatives.
come maintained
living stanc
tions (from
Tory MP's.
This regional divide will itself have important political conse-
quences, which we can discuss below.
some sections of the working class have
maintained and even increased their living standards. Income tax reduc-
tne uvel u watt-sectio
That Scen papur. of workers.
tions (from 33 percent to 27 per cent since Thatcher came to power) have been popular among important groups of workers. The Tory policy of giving
set out
action between
workers; Labour's leaders had no comparable strategy 10
mobilise and organise the most up THE ELECION'S biggest losers are the Alliance, whose scats were reduced
from 26 to 22, with the sDP reduced to a rump of only five seats in parlia- ment. Only one of the original gang of four - David Owen → is still in
parliament. The mam architect of the
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK to 2 July/August 1987
SDP split from Labour, Roy Jenkins, was soundly defeated in Glasgow Hill- head and will not stand for parliament again. Fur an alliance which sought to hold the balance of power in a hung
parliament, which had equal television time with the other two main parties. and which proclaimed that "the time has come, it is a massive defeat that purs in question their whole political future. Why did this defeat occur?
The Alliance were victims of the class pularisation. Before the clection
the ruling class cranked up an enor- mous reactionary offensive, and pur its resources into securing a Conservative victory at any cost. Despite the Labour leadership's shift of policy to the right
"respectable'
alternative goverument. nonetbeless no section of ruling class
opinion favoured a Labour govern-
The reasons for this are ob-
involved in
vious. Vital sections nf the capitalist rass, especially those finance and banking, have been doing
well under the Tories: Industrial pro- ductivity has increased from its low point in 1981-2, as the rate of exploita- cion of the working class has risen.
Labour is still tainted, in the eyes of
the bourgeoisic, by the recent expe rience of Bennism, by its anti-nuclear policy and by the overall impression of
the strength of the Labour left. serious bourgeuis commentator will
back a party which puts in question
No
that On the
Britain's nuclear deterrent, a central
part of British capitalism's foreign po- licy and world status. Most of all, in a
reliable
period of economic and social instabil- ity, the ruling class wants a stable and
Such was the scale of the reactionary offensive, that a substantial part of the Alliance vote shifted to the Tories. On the other hand, Labour was able to
government means Thatcher'x Tories.
and
sear
present itself, successfully, as the only credible alternative govemment. in hundreds of seats there was a swing away frum the Alliance either to the Tories or Labour, depending on the
This clection dis-
region and the previous character of proved, however, the thesis that ihr Alliance vore was basically an 'anti-
Alli
thesis r
Tory" or 'left of centre' vote - the thesis employed by pro-coalitionist ad- vocates of "tactical voting'- contrary, in many places where the Alhance vote declined, it went dispro- portionately to the Tories. There are real grounds for doubting, therefore,
Allar
tion had there been a straight run-off
There will now be a wide debate about the future of the Alliance. In the Alliance itself, the debate is centering on whether the SDP and the Liberals should fuse into one party. For the miling class, the debate is more funda-
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 2 July/August 1987
that Labour might have won the elec- with the Tories
ne lut - 1isel
C ION
muge mecha hype an
to me Alliance when ar
-aflectro as lune
.*.: the Allian
a mietnaDisH iO e ol powr
Jeadersn.
mitta rit
move to the right. The similarity of
many Alliance policies
on maniesto has rec comment. Has thr All
the SDP component
milfuea its urpose After all. i
" iberale woul
inminated band
ire stronger both m
on the ground. Wor
amply in a return co sus
Liberals ac a small third
fusion
ch-
party?
Dar
tion
latora
in pranoved betore the i Labour had ditched ane horoughly purged
have won the
would
clection comfortably. This pressure is, of course, exactly the project of the ruling class in relation to the Labour
If this project were to be successlul, then the possibility for the ruling class of ditching the Alliance and returing to a stable two-party
system would be posed. That prospect
remains a long way off. However, the political polarisation of the dealt such a heavy blow to the Alliance that a destablisation of its strategy to
I1. How
political polarisation of the
clection • MOW ***nA Alliance
• Adulae ser go
Time for a solo - but from whom?
become a major third party seems
inevitable.
*ral
vote of a sus and the arease ~. amentarv scats. reflects
Lavour pune up votes in
rived areas whem»... was
onE. creased mayoritic
Latungr
the
al- in
ELECTIO N
18
Scotland after Doomsday
THE TORIES' icgitimacy in governing Scotland collapsed dramalically, con-
firming "
Labour surged ahead. electorn. geciarr Tories, whos tel uc Labour but three to ran ex the Alliance. T
The Scottish
season on tir
-15,
Nº and thrito The Torics now have
only a rump of 10 scats in Scotland to Labour's 50 out of 72
Had the suP vote increased more substantially, strong pressure would have developed on Labour In the event, a certain breathing space exists for Labour to press for limited devolu- tionary concessions from the Tories. Bur if the Nationalists have been held
ar hay (for the time being) the real
problem for Labour is its own success: wwwwill it use us increased support to prutect the Scorrish working class from Thatcherism?
Meering three days after the elec- tion, Labour's Scottish executive res ponded by moving some way towards real labour movement-ied cam- paign. Centrally placed were demands for a Scottish Assembly, for dropping the community charge spoll tax), sur
an end to privatisation measures in
Scotland and for increased funding for health and education.
An Assembly bill to be presented to parliament after the summer recess will provide the focal point. A mass -allies also planned for Glasgow tireen, Saturday 29 August, involving trades unions, local authorities and other opposition parties. Bill Speirs, chairperson of the executive, pledged: *I a satisfactory response is not going to be made by the government, the Labour Party will initiate a program- me of action aimed at making the government come to terms with their
minickin position. Round the
impossible assertion that there are wide forms of political activity to demonstrate the people of Scotland's wish for constitu- tional reform and a ruling-our of civil disobedience', no further measures were proposed.
Campbell. Christic, STUC General Secretary, went a little further in his call for la radical campaign of res- istance to Conservative policies im posed by London. It's also likely that several of the new influx of Scottish Labour MPs will be more prepared than their predecessors to cake a harder pro-devolution line.
When similar positions were put after the 1983 clection, the right-wing Icadership of the Scottish Labour Par- ry sat it our and made no effective oppostion to Thatcher as government policies continuo to devastine. employment and the social scivices. Those local authorities that took a stand in Stirling and Edinburgh col lapsed as the tot moved right after the miners' strike.
Today, however, Labour has won this election in Scotland on their pro- mise to establish an Assembly imme- diately. Inactivity by the leadership on that promise would provoke a revolt in the ranks, or a complete loss of credi- bility for labour leading to a resur- gence of support for the SNP.
The spectre of separation has haunted the Scottish Labour Party ever since the sudden growth of the SNP vote in the 1974. The right wing responded by levering the Party into line behind strictly limited objectives: a Scorrish parliament should have its powers curtailed; legislative control should be confined to areas such as education. health, local authority finance and fishing. These positions were reaffirmed by the cxecutive's post-election meeting
It is absolutely precluded, however, that the Tories will concede even these measures of devolution unless the Par- ty organises a mass campaign on Scot- land's right to its own Parliament and yuch a campaign for sell determin- ation cannot be limited to secondary issues. Home rule is meaningless withe out responsibility for policy on the economy, deferice or forcign relations. Alternative education, health and local finance policies for instance, are only possible as part of an alternative cconomic policy
When the Glasgow Herald in its