SPAIN
AFTER A SPRING which saw the highest level of mass action hy students, workers and pea- sants since the death of Franco in 1975, the
10 June European, local and provincial elec. tons saw a sharp fall in the ruling ISOE (Spanish Socialisr Workers Party) share of
the vote. It losr five percentage points and 40 percent of its local councillors thereby losing its overall majority in many big citics. This
government's austerity politics.
In areas
was clearly a sanction by a part of the social democratic party's electoral base against the
particlariy struggles and tough police reaction its vote went down even further: in provincial elec cions in Cantabria it fell nine points and in Asturias fourteen points. The Communist
Party led-il (Izquierda Unida) gained one
and a half points in the European elections and increased its representation even more ar local level. Significantly the CP got its biggest increase in the Asturias region. burgeois force, the CDS (Social and Democratic Centre) led by fornic prime minister Suarez and moderare regional 'nationalist partics took most of the support lost by the PSOE. The biggest bourgeois op- position party, the right wing AP (Popular
lost onc
So after uninterrupred success xince 1982 ir seems that the triumphant onward march of'one of the most right-wing social democra- tie parties has been halted. Today it has to
hit by
workers"
and a half points in the European elections
the JDS
The centrist St..
jp. and a half
discuss coalitions to govern the towns with forces to both its right (CDS, regionalists) and left (tul) and to fine tune its vicious anti- working class connmic policy through na- tional negotiations with the trades unions and employers organisations for a three year social contract up to the 1990 parliamentary
Early this vear the government faced a student revolt partly inspired by the French example. This was followed by militant ac-
hy steelworkers, tions lax workers and others whose jobs were directly threatened by the second wave of industrial reconversion being steadfastly pursued by the government. Nearly 30,000 jobs were lo go in the two worst-hir sectors. Occupations. the temporary kidnapping directors, the harricading of roads and town-
wini ...r wide or regional general strikes led to serious Clashes with the police and in the first wock of May a young worker died of injuries su- scuined in carlier clashes ar the hands of the police. Airport workers, railway workers,
shipyard
a wete wu
of managing
bank workers, medical staff also began to take militant action against the government's policy of a five per cent wage limit, its attacks on working conditions and cutbacks in the welfare and state scctors.
Pressure built up particularly inside the
led Workers Commissions (CCO) for a state-wide general strike to get the government to change course. A vote on
thanks to the opposition of forces from both
the eurocommunist and stalinist wings of the
Spanish Communist movement. To an ex-
rent, sections of the Workers Commissions 34 had wupported these struggles in order to
the CODO executive
factories Spanish social democracy and its unpopular austerity programme.
DAVE KELLAWAY looks at
CHORS were a considerable setback for
the alternatives for the workers'
movement.
establish a more favourable relationship of
forces with a government that has delibe- rately marginalised left forces outside the PSOE. The endemic coro faction fighting
* facton agnunc betwren pro-Camacho forces who still sup- port the mainstream CP and pro-Carrillo for- ces who have split is an obstacle to chicctive unity. It is boiling up today over who is mo replace Camacho, when he retires.
*the triumphant onward march of one of the most
right-wing social
democratic parties has been
halted'
a victory for the COO in the decisive larger
Nicholas Rodondo and the UGT leadership
Ine ich.
the government. Much talk ensued in the Spanish press of a rapture in the Spanish
Before the however, Redondo called for a vote for the PSOE saying ir was the only "solid political
At the
same time the UCT leadership conrinued to
reject any effective unity of action with thie
in the
family. force for progress in Spain today."
elections.
same time the UCT leadership conrinued to reject any effective unity of action with thie
other trade unions. Redondo rejects the five
per cent wäge limit hut does not exclude: sacrifices and austerity in any new social pact
as long as all social forces share in it and some
concessions are made (Conco Dias, 1 May
.clo
The Spanish press is now full of Gonza- lez's proposed threc-ycar social rontract. He has defended his coonomic model as well worked out and well implemented' bur ac- cepted "some modifications were necessary" (Cince Dias, 15 June 1987). Redondo and Camacho express doubts about such an agrcement unless the government makes a
sel ted
ve talesti
nitract have indeed signed them in
the past
(Moncloa Pact, Ats pact) but the recent struggles ublige them to adopt a tougher
make
Regional and nationalist divisions also
workers' unity difficult to achieve.
ill anu workers so is also stokca up
a Use its power aud
•. •ne UCT (Gener, W.
acial cemocratic dominar eucration. gainst the
Now-mie 1986 mit sons held in every we
negotiating position, particularly in the case of the COo whose Icadership voices its scep
ticisin much more strongly. Nevertheless a
few coxmetic concessions could lead one or other or both of thesc leaders to try and sell a new social contract to their membership
Despite the announcement of negotiations for a new social pact many labour conflicts
remain unresolved — bankworkers have
impost 198/
SPAIN
he Bas
leadership.
been out and action will "cool down the situation.
Government spokespeople are downplay- ing the significance of the fall in irs support on 10 June. pointing to its still substantial load and the weakness of any crodible gor- ernmental alternative back, the ISE's national vote at 40% dwarfs che it's 5.43 per cent. The rise of the CDS in this election to 10.12 per cent is compensated by the more rightist AP's Jecline to 24.5 per cent.
There is no guarantee that the pact
The PSOR's strong position today has been helped on its left by the collapse and frag- mentation of the Communist Party and mi- stakes of the revolutionary left since 1975, and on its right by the bourgeois parties' division, weakness and lack of a post-Franco
During the elec- tion, calls were made for a bloc or unity
between the Al and the CDS reflecting con-
medical stall continuc their
A th
lez.
Even with thix set-
'modernising apprach.
in. walls wen setween th
between the Al and the CDS reflecting con- corn in bourgenis ruling circles that a conti- nued crosion or sudden cullapse of the PSOE
am Ill sniTe0
saisn
Spain today shows that even after years of
social peace with only struggles there can be sudden explosions of
relative workers" resistance.
1101387
2110
isolated Furthermore a social
democratic government will use both repres-
sion and attempts to incorporare the trade
union burcaucracies into social contracts in
order to end any resistance. The wave of
struggles do provide a busis for developing a
more structured left challenge to the PSOE
Despite the bitterness hundreds of PSOE cadre who have lost their johs in local councils as a result of the party's
of
decline, however, and the calls from Izquier
da Socialista (a left social democratic current) for cerrain party leaders" hears to roll there is
still no effective challenge yet developing in- side the PSOE (Republica. 17 June). Realign- ment outside the PSOr is hampered by the fragmentation of the Communist movement and the wcakness of the revolutionary left.
Sure-
Situ
does not leave a dangerous vacuum.
This explains why unlike in France or even in Britain, the Spanish social democrats. with a tough austerity policy, have won two
successive elections, brought Spain into the ERC. and, for good measure, kept it in NATO.
*a student revolt partly
inspired by the French
example
No wonder a leading banker, Pedm Toledo, has appreciatively commented: "I have to say thar the socialist government's economic management on the major questions has pro- ved sound. I do not think any government to the right of the PSOE would have carried out
rtly
any other cconomic policy' (Cinco Dias.
April 1987). This policy has meant a rise of 35.6 per cent in profits in 1986 over 1985.
30
well over thren million unemployed (20 per cent, the highest in Europe), eight million
people officially defined as poor, and a dete moration in workers" conditions and statu-
ignes International investors have placed Spain second in the table of the must profitable places to invest.
Another source of difficulty for the PSOE arising from the elections is toe further con solidation in support for Herr Batasuna which won 1.88 per cent of the vote and git a
20.
arising from the elections is toe further con solidation in support for Herr Batasuna
Furopean Mi elected with a third of its votes coming from outside Fuskadi. It increased the number of councilions in towns like Bil bao (+ 2), Pamplona (+ 2). Vitoria (+1) and San Sebastian (+ 1). This is a positive result too for the sectors of the revolutionary left like the tCu (section of the Fourth Inter- natinal) which actively supported the Fierri Batasuna (HB) campaign throughour the Spanish state in the teeth of a boycott by the mamstream left. Perhaps this result was helped by un holding meetings outside Eus- kadi in support of workers struggles like the
one held in Reinusa — the town where the police killed a striker — which attrarted 300 peopie. Along with I.EX'e continued military capacity — during the election it blew up the
SOCIALIST GUTLOOK no 2 July/Augn 1987)
The legacy of
Antonio Gramsci
INTERNATIONAL MARXIST
35
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