Readers of Socialist Outlook can scarcely have avoided the huge barrage of media hype commemorating the 50th Anniver- sary of the outbreak of World War 2.
A deluge of more and less serious material on the War has of- fered old patriots fresh opportunitles for flag-waving, and the British capitalist class, now the authors of some of the most repressive anti-union and anti-immigration laws in the world, a chance to posture in the fraudulent role of historic defenders of democracy.
Though It Is still not fashionable to oppose the general line that World War Two was a 'war for democracy', it is relatively easy 50 years later to make correct points exposing the Im- perialist lies and the positions of the Labour and Communist Parly leaders who threw themselves Into promoting the war ef- fort.
What tends to be overlooked is that a small but committed minority of marxist class fighters, mostly around the political banner of Trotskyism and the young Fourth International (founded 1938) took up the fight on many of these issues at the time and upheld the line of socialist principle throughout the war years.
As a tribute to their fight, we reproduce here the marxist answers to some of the key questions that arise: what caused the war? what was the correct line for socialists in relation to It what was the development of class struggle during and after the war? and what were the lasting consequences?
Behind the patriotic
ballyhoo Whose war was
it, anyway?
The immediate causes
As early as 1931 Trotsky had predicted: if Hitler takes power, he will un- leash a war agaist the Soviet Union With hindsight, the British his- torian Trevor-Roper wrote in 1964: "in order to realise his ultimate aim, the res- toration and extension of the lost German empire in the East, Hitler had always recognised that diplomacy
zould not be enough. Ul- timately there must be war: war against Russia."
A large mass of historical evidence confirms that judge. ment. Practically from the mo- ment of becoming Chancellor, Hitler started to reum Ger- many. From the beginning, his programme had a double ob jective: to make possible the immediate pump-priming of a crisis-ridden German industry, under conditions of a sharp
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 18, October 1989
Page 25
upward rush of profits (both of the mass of profit and of the rate of profit; and to prepare at some point in the future - not later than within ten years - an onslaught against the Soviet Union, in order to conquer for German
ol lhe mass ol
und w prepare
•ar than
rainst the uct for Cctmial ihe cauvaimt
INT In Ca» of Britain's Indian empire.
The Lebensraum in question was by and
large already mapped out by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and the general annexationist trends of radical German imperialists and big buxiness interests at the time of World War One. The greater knowledge which the German bour- geoisie had acquired since then about Russia's natural resources, and the very progress of in- dustrialisation in the USSR, could only make these objectives both broader and more tan- talising:
Of course a war of imperialist conquest and plunder against the HISSR did not automatically imply a full-scale Furopean war, let alone a world war, at least not from the point of view of the particular economic logic of German impenalism. or even within the framework of the particular political logic of the Nazis, The latter would certainly have preferred to maintain their various adversaries divided, and knock them out or neutralise them one by one. To coax Czochoslovakia and Poland into becoming reluctant allies of the Hungarian type in a war against Russia would have been less costly for German im- perialism than to have to subdue them militarily first.
But that war only possible if important changes of bourgeois leading personnel oc curred in these countries, and if they ceased to be client states of French (and to a lesser ex tent British) impenalism This in tum was possible only through the consent or passive resignation of Paris or London to fiermias hegemony on the continent
Hitler tried to achieve that objective step by step between 1935 and 1939, through a pragmatic combination of threats and entice. ments, of blackmail and military pressure. These manoeuvres scored a series of succes scs between 1934 and 1938 (remilitarisation of the Rhineland, Anschluss with Austria, an- nexation of the Sudetenland). But their failure was ensured once the German army occupied Prague in March 1939.
From that point onwards, Bntish im- perialism (taking a reluctant French ally into tow) was determined to resist by force any further German expansion in Easter Europe. Hitler knew this. But he did not want to forego the advance in modern weapons he still enjoyed for a couple uf years. He deliberately risked war with Britain by attacking Poland on 1 September 1939. From 3 September
Septer"ner 1939 onwards, he found himself at war with Britain and France, as a result of that con- scious decision. ...
British imperialism was committed to the long-term objective of preventing a hostile
of Britain's Indian empire.
The Lenensraur™ Lape already mapped our mr...
The Lebensraum in question was by and
himselt
›stile
Page 26
FEATURES
Hitler: "quite deliberately chose to attack USSR"
power from completely donunating the con- tinent of Europe, be- valise it understood and correctly so from the point of view of its own interests - that such
a domination would only be an interlude hefore an all out onslaught by German imperialism against the British Empire as such.
Had not Hitler claimed that he would guarantee Crecheslovakia inde- pendence. once the question of the German minority was resolved?
London knew what had become of that pledge.
Any promise Hitler made to respect the British Empire was not worth the paper it was written on...
Likewise, Hitler quite deliberately chose to launch an attack on the USSR even before Britain was eliminated, ie., lo spread the war geographically and militarily on a qualitative ly new scale. This decision was taken as early as July 1940. It was hix. No outside force was accountable for it, although other powers in- fluenced and facilitated there decisions through their own actions and reactions.
The responsibility of German imperialism in the outbreak and extension of the Second World War was overwhelming - in contrast to the situation in July-August 1914, when all the major powers more or less blundered into a world war without really knowing what they were doing.
German imperialism's option in favour of open and large-scale aggression can only be understood against the hackgound of the profound economic, social, political and moral crisis which shook German bourgoois socicty from 1914 on. There is no need to recount that history here. For our purposes, it is sufficient la recall that the uptum of the German cconomy engineered by the Nazi-led cabinet was from the start decisively weighted in favour of heavy industry, machine tools and road-building. All available foreign exchange wax uned to amass stocks of raw material for the eventuality of war. At the same time chemical industries were developed with the aim nf substituting man-made for war
materia.
Such measures unambiguously pointed to the growing prubability, if not inevitability of war. As early as 1935 they were combined
step by-step liquidation of the
provisions of the Versailles Treaty - in a
build up of military power tochnically much
in advance of that of the Westem powers (al-
though less ahead of the USSK than Hitler
could realise)....
But the race towards an all-out rearma- ment was not only reckless from a diplomatic and military point of view. It also represented a desperate gambie with the German cconomy itself. In 1938-39, the economy slid into a grave financial crisis. A huge budgetary deficit emerged: public expenditure of 55 bil- Lion RM in 1938-39 (which was to becomc 63 billion in 1939-401 was offset by tax and cus- toms receipts of only 18 billion RM that year and 25 billion the next. A colossal build-up of public debt ensued. Inflation could less and less be contained.
Timothy Mason suggests that there was a direct link between this crisis and the option in favour of Blitzkrieg in 1938. 39. For as in terest payments on the national debt became a grave problem, and exports stagnated in spite of increased recourse to barter, the laws of reproduction of capital reasserted themselves, A severe contraction of the economy threatened unless a new and massive stream of materias grinds was brought into circula-
tion. But German output capacities were al- ready streiched to the utmost. No more could easily be extorted from the working class, the lower middle classes or the Jews within the
Third Reich. The only solution wax to exlend the scale of physical production through mas-
sive plunder outside of Germany's frontiers. This meant war of conquest. And that type of war was unleashed.
Wond SOutra
Ernest Mandel (from his book The Meaning of the Second World War, Verso 1986, £6.95: this is also the
1g extract)
of the frow!
ООК по 18. October 1989