Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2009

Gorbachev cuts his losses

· Socialist Outlook no. 13, March 1989 · p 12 · 513 words

Russia and the USSR United States Afghanistan

Why were Soviet troops sent into Afghanistan in the first place? Why was it correct to demand their withdrawal? Why is the USA sponsoring Islamic fundamentalist' guerrillas while denouncing Khomeini's regime in Iran? What are the implications for other Soviet-backed regimes? What will happen next? JOHN LISTER discusses some of the issues and offers some answers.

Leonid Brezhnev's decision in 1979 to send troops to prop up the weak pro- Moscow regime in Kabul was a gamble which brought serious setbacks to the

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ponents of the invasion, were always wide of the mark. Brezhnev went in to support a client regime in trouble, not as part of a global strategy forexpansion to "warm water ports'. The troops

Trotskyist movement, some of whom grotesquely (and from the safety of long dis- tance) "hailed the Red Army', arguing with typical white petty bourgeois arrogance thai the

which brought serious setbacks to the Soviet bureaucracy.

Hostility to the intervention poisoned the ground for Soviet diplomatic initiatives in much of the "Third World", especially the mustim stales.

Though the troops were secking to preserve an existing pro-Moscow regime in a country that had been for decades in the Soviel "sphere of influence, their intervention gave the US warmongers a golden opportunity to step up their cold war propaganda, backed by an economic boycolt Reagan quoted the "evil empire as a pretext for his massive military build-up and the new Thatcher government was also able to cash in on the interven- tion as a reserve weapon in its argu- ments for siting Cruise and Pershing g In both Washington and London a

in both Washington and London a S touching new concern was dix- covered for the self-determination of the Afghan people' - who had pre- viously been completely ignored. Courtesy and whose nationalities had been crudely carved up by the arbitrary imposition of borders by British imperialists.

Reagan, still smarting from the US humilia- tion at the hands of Khomeini's fundamen- talism in Iran, lost no time in starting to funnel aid to the fundamentalist mujahedin, soon making them the best-financed guerrillas in his tory. The effectiveness of their guerrilla warfare is open to considerable doubt, and their impact for many years was much greater on naive westem joumalists than on the Soviet forces.

The intervention also brought the USSR the huge domestic cost of what proved to be not a Limited and straightforward policing action but a prolonged and unwinnable guerrilla war, taxing the morale of Soviet troops, breaking the myth of their invincibility, and offering the Moscow leaders no plausible easy escape. While an escalation of Soviet involvement could have struck heavier blows at the mujahedin, in the absence of popular support for the regime in Kabul, this could only have been at the expense of virtual genocide. Es timates of Soviet losses are unreliable: however the figure of 15,000 Soviet dead is not apparent- ly contested - with many more injuries.

However there was never any indication that the Soviet troops were sent in to "sovietise", an- nexe or 'assimilate'

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