Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2002

Palestine after the Algiers resolutions

· Socialist Outlook no. 12, February 1989 · pp 13-17 · 3,969 words

Algiers resolutions as a tuming point in order to justify a U-tum in its The US decision to reopen official talks- not negotiations- with the PLO has thrown the Is- tunity, and after further clarification - in par- to negotiate withdrawal from the occupied ter- ritories, Washington did not miss this oppor- policy of not dealing with the PLO seated on the leadership bodies: tives which may be achieved in the medium believes that the popular uprising on its own in settlers. But most people see die untiladah as The PLO leadership outside Palestine were given to tasks by the leaders of the intifadah: ment, which may eventually lead to a For this to happen, the PLD Icadership cer). Nobody in the occupied territories sufficient to drive out the Isruch army and the leverage for permanent pressure on Isracti society as well as on international public tem (as a result of this mew relationship of for should target a set of concrete political objec opinion, that may lead to negotiations: break in the post-1967 log jam.

dangerous and perhaps counter productive to ready fora civil war that would make the zionist Teadership fully realise that the establishmentof Page 11 objectives, and to accept as transitory the parti- tion of Palestine and thie principle of negotia- hons with the zionist povemment, it remains Eitherthe Palestinian Icaders wanteffective- ly to contine the outcome of the struggle to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza (in which care they must he occupation scem like a picnic); or cise the concede the long-tem objectives of the strug gle of the Palestinian people. was quick to request an end in every form of raeli niling class into a panic. The Palestinian theless the rcal intention of the US remains to prise out further concessions from he PLO leadership. As soon as Yasser Arafat denounced terrorism, the US administration There has been no sign that the PLO leaders intend to put a stop to the uprising, bearing in mind that Arafat relics on it for ammunition to pursuc his manoeuvres. The leadership outside masses saw it as a resounding victory. Never- anned struggle, and even demanded the wind ing up of the intifadah. leadership. As SOCIALIST OUTLOOKno 12 February 1989 the PLO, without which the uprisung would run bined pressures of the imperialist states, the Arab bourgenisie and the Soviet Union, the PNC strived to keep close to its mandate. The main political resclution accepted the principle of the partition of Palestine, and throught ae- knowledging UN resolutions 242 and 33K, ders. The PLO further declared its readiness to to draw up a political agenda for the popular struggle; and to preserve at any cost the unity helween the different political currents within At the meeting in Algiers, under the com- recognised the Israeli state in its prc-1967 bor- into serious danger.

Michel Warschuwsky perialist powers and the Arab bourgeoisie, The Revolutionary Communist League calls for a concerted effort lo pressunse governments Palestinian state unconditionally, and demand that Israel withdraw from the occupied ter- mense pressures piled onto the PLO by the im- in imporialist countrios to recognise the new rocking a hreak in the struggle for liberation. needed is a series of concrete proposals making u bridge between the immediate objectives of Two major tasks remain central. The popular uprising must be strengthened; the popular committees are the only bodies capable of resisting a sell-out. Intemational solidarity must play an important role in minimising the im- the diplomatic offensive and the long-tem ob- jectives for the Palestinian people to achieve na- -E S UR The strength of the fional self-determination. - m If this latter is the case, they are mistaken in mis- leading international public opinion, and public To declare, us the PNC did in Algiers, that resolution 242 was accepted jointly with all the other UN resolutions dcaling with the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the right to retum is not adequate. What is a state on the West Bank and Gaza can only revolve part of the Palestinian national question. opinion in Isracl in particular.

popularising the need for cooperatives and a: international parties in solving the regional Regardless of our political attitude towards the superpowers (for us the ElS is the head of problem for the Palestinians to solve. This choice. No solution could be imposed on us As for the Arab regimes, they either con- spired against the P'alestinian national problem, or were sient or gave inadequale support that sacrifices of our people. Libya gives some material support, and Iraq adopted familics of The Arah Gulf states paid billions of dollars crumbs to the Palestinians, Ax we are paying in blood to defend Arab dignity and land, we have the right for oil money to he directed towards SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 12 February 1989 strikes. Today an increasing number of workers: cachi farms and factories, and helpe with the ness has developed on this new material basis is another striking example. As soon as a leader to replace him or her. A new morality of the casions; there is conscious solidarity, a con- scious commitment to being a Palestinian, lo Each and every citizen has a role 1o play in the What is the role of the Soviet Union and offer problema? What about the stand of Syria und Libya. which despite expectations piayed no the imperialist camp. while the USSR is afriend and ally) the l'alestinian national question is n means that our choice of a solution is not a Soviel choice, nor American indeed, but our dad not measwe up to the uprising and the to support Iraq's war, while they pay only refuse to work in settlements, fanus or fac- The burgeoning home economy is the key to the growing conscious support for creating al- tematives to dependence on employment in Is- haycolt of Israeli produce. A new conscious- The case of the United National Leadership is jailed or deported, a dozen others spring up uprising has also developed. Wedding ceremonies and funerals become national oc- the love of the land, and a readiness to sacnifice. while we still retain our leadership and inde- tories. The leadership of the uprising is martyrs nd wounded, hut this is not enough. Palestinian resistance to Israeli attack role during or after the PNC7. of people's power. retum to the land. The Israeli authorities have worked essen- cludes around 120,000 workers from the West 60,000 workers without perits. It was clear to the leadership of the intifadah that to stop this large workforce from working an alternative However there were other ways of crippling the Israeli cconomy, including the organisatann of the labour forue and several days of general tinuity and escalation, and its development to In the same context we look towards increar- ing the involvement of the 850,000 Palestinians subjected in 1948, including those living under occupation for 20 or 40 years, those under the diaspora. We must think not only of short term objectives but of longer term strategic ones, in which the main framework of our struggle is the Can you tell us something abow the leadership of the uprising and the character of the change of conscioumess that has taken pluce, and the tially to annex the Palestinian economy to the zionist one. The Palestinian workforce In zionist factories, fanus and settlements in- Bank and Gaza Strip. In addition there are 40- - but this was yet to be compromise in order to maintain it. But how do while the right wing is going its own way? Do you see a breaking point somewhere, and will there he a time when this unity is threatened by We do not understand unity ar a means for keeping us silent. What we sce is a dialectic of unity and struggle. There is no struggle withour The strength of the intifadah is its unity - a: unity that goes beyond mere coordination of the It is important now not to shake this internal onity, and we think any cleavage in the exter- nal unity will be reflected in the struggle inside. The course of the intifadah is towards con- repression of the Arab regimes, or in the war different from threat of the PNC, which as- sociated them with the right to self-determina- The PFLP was very keen that smity shouid be a number one question, and in face made a you explain the 'unity until victory" slogan different political organisations in the struggle. the way the leadership is going politically? partial and then general insurrection. unity and we struggle through unity and the Amb peoples, and has heen Third, the form in which resolu- tions 242 and 338 were introduced by Arafat to the press conference engaged in international terrorism. tien and other UN resolutions. role of the working class? institutions of the PLO. intifadah is unity should be created commits daily terrorist acts against our people perialist stooge in the region, the zionist state, Second, the question of terrorism as explained terrorism, and as a people we have been and still are victims of terrorism. On the other hand the by Arafat at the PNC meeting was correct and very different from what he stuled al the press Weas a liberation movement do not practice USA has carried out terrorist acts against world- wide liberation movements, and the im- porting national unity, but this in no way means meeting with regard to the policy of Ardfat and ference in Geneva war coherent with the PNC meeling. Laterat the press conference he intro Arafat's speech in front of the LN con- duced some points which I consider to be con- tradictory. First, rogarding the right of the Is raeli state to exist, there was nothing that referred to it as such in the PNC resolutions. were important disagreements it should resolutions 242 and 338, was the subject of The opposition achieved 46 votes against and ten abstentions. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was the main The PFLP has always helieved that if there withdraw from the PLO Exccutive Committee, By staying inside the Exocutive we are sup- that we are ready to cover up our differences, On the contrary, we see that in this very impor- tant period of our people's struggle it is more How do you analyse what happened at the PNC What do you think the last Palestine National Council (PNC) achieved, and what are its implications for the uprising in the West Bank tifadah, and its preparation centred on how to support it Two main issues were raised First, the resolutions concerning the uprising, which were adopted unanimously, emphasised the im- portance of unity, the continuity and escalation of the intifadah, and the armed struggle. The sues: the declaration of independence and the declaration of a state - both unanimousiy passed - while the third point, the political com- moniquc, and particularly its reference to UN core of the opposition. However, while oppos BESHIR KHAIRI spoke to Socialist The last PNC was the council of the in- second point on the agenda dealt with thee is ing. it also raised the slogan of national unity. while remaining in all other PLO institutions. necessary to upliold our convictions. major disagreement. and Gaza Strip? the right wing? Page 12

CENTRAL AMERICA Guatemala, though not so openly. president; however he cannot disguise The army is also in power in since it can still hide behind a civilian poverished population and the the huge problenis of a tembly im strength of the revolutionary move Counter-revolution in Central America detaled in the article: Revolution and peaceful end to massive injustices and inequalities. There in power would destroy everything before they give it up, as Somoza dill in Nicaragua in process born on the 19th July 1979 has been crippled by natural disasters (the In Nicaragua, the revolutionary 1979. right-wing guerrilla movement of Angola at a time when the Cuban troops are withdrawing. Bush was also involved in the frangate scandal, and has al- In mid-January, President Bush reiterated his support to the Piers Cavendish/Reflex

"Central raises many issues America them. It raises fundamental but often Contral America ruses many is- sues about revolution, revolutionary leaderships, thei problems and ability to win in the face of a massive military and repressive machinery set against ment. ricane of October 1988) and hmught goverment but has had some success most recent being the dramatic hur- US "destabilisation'. This has Tailed militarily to overthrow the Sandinista in destroying the fragile and depend. by the its knees. to Should we expect asy chanes in American policy on Central America afler Reagan, or wy evolution in a on the hrink of heing submerged cither wass been a hawk on the ques- regin that for Tong has looked to he tion of Central America.

leaderships" about and revol- utionary revolution and understand revolutionary theory, ignored questions, such as women's liheration or the struggles and par- It offers living examples to apply showing the complexity of real life, in which political weaknesses can cost thousands of lives. Above all, it licipation of indigenons peoples. millions of US dollars, are reflected in Salvador, the "acceprable face of Christian Democracy has crumbled, The economic problems of the other countries, kept afloat only by increasing political polarisation In El and has opened space for the only al ent economy, now in absolute chans: by revalutionary tides ur by floods of For the millions of poor people hard and the future very grim. Most countnes lace repression, Jorture or rilying death squode: To struggle in living in the isthmus, Life remains very murder in varying degroes, from ler- repression?

Page 13 demonstrates the value ol Marxist of their destiny and move towards faith in the oppressed to take control Maria Astorga socialism rather than barbarity. temative: the fascist AKENA party. timustic that victory is possible, as is likely to win the next elections, and posing a dilemma for George Bush. However the Salvadoran revolution ary forces of the FMLN ae quite op SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 12 February 1989 those circumstances represents a much greater act of courage and futh Hunger and poverty do their deadly work, even more anwly and mor painfully; there in no hope of any than in nur "democralic than in nur

EN EM P

that it felt a creeping decapitalisation in the whole country, and its land was The company was known for its ditions, food guarantees, wages and amongst the workers at the plant about whether.or not the nationalisation was a good idea. The Frente explained that despite help from MIDINKA (the department responsible for agricul- ture) thie complex had failed to come up to expected production levels and the end of July, could barely afford to appeared, begging began to reappear The second example occurred at the beginning of July 1988. The FSLN tonie Sugar Processing Complex; not only the plant itself but a ruilway line and thousands of hectures of land. in- cluding virtually the whole town of San Antonio which was the property of the family that owned the plant. This was the largest private enterpnse part owned by the technicians who ran liheral patron-client relationships with its workers in terms of work con- housing. There was fierce debate SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 12 February 1989 porarily. The average Nicaraguan, by cat, and while queucs had all but dis on the streets as a result. At the sume time, during the ninth anniversary celebrations, Daniel Orega an- nounced that the revolutien was now decided to natiomalise the San An- socialist in character. revolution? the plant. encourage the peasants to grow more. lapse in the incomes of urban workers: which the reform halted only tem- fect on the speculators, but this tured out to be a side issue compared to what followed. The freeing up of prices did the shortages in supply were over- come; but only at the price of a col and many of the poorer peasantry, who have no surplus to sell, and lost ground lo the general inflationary effects strengthening the petty-bourgeoisie, The motive for this policy was to ing in the supplice of basic grains, and to legalise what was an enormous black market. Included in this move rency rate which, by being introduced overight, ambushed thousands of speculators and, bocause there was a limit set on the amount to be ex- ment "contra forces all the funds they Initially, these reforms were very - especially in the poor neighhour- hoods (barrios). The long term closure of the stores, in addition to the more recent economic changes, bave had the effect of encouraging and the bourgcoisic and the capitalist end the shortages that were develop- was a more populist change in the cur- porters of the US-hacked anti-govern- popular because of the short ten ef changed, denied the internal sup had built up in old currency. market place. scen a disappearance of the popular the SIN implemented a series of economic reforms which have led to a decline in the living standards of most sal were withdrawn for all but govem- ment workers, whilst the prices of hasic grains were no longer controlled ly and demand. The past few years had stores* which had guaranteed a decent supply of all basic goods to everyone and those who doubt the inten- tions of the ruling Frente San- dinista Liberacion Nacional This can be shown at an economic level by two examples where the direction of Sandinista policies has al- lowed the development of two con- In the first care, in February 1988 workers and peasants. Food guaran ices that had previously been univer- and left to the so called laws of supp- As the Nicaraguan Revolution reaches the end of its first decade a series of questions about its nature still remain in the balance. The revolution remains a profoundly con- tradictory phenomenon which by its bare facts is able to supp- ly evidence For both those who see it as a socialist revolution tradictory class tendencies. (FSLN). disappeared, could barely the streets" Nicaraguan, reappear on queues had by the end began to afford to begging eat, and average of July, all but while Page 14 "The

----- pull-quotes on this page ----- el F. S. L. N. es el Partido - de los Trabajadores Nicaragua 10 years on Which way for the FSLN banner: is it really the 'party of the workers'? RACHE

political determinate; the key how." "The economic question is crucial but not question is who holds power and Z m P L U P 'Re Flers T021 Lavenda Frente's long term was in progress. Since the plant was Nicaragua its nationalisation was a real warning to the bourgeoisie, but How we read these apparently con- tradictory events depends on our over- all analysis of the regime. One might produced both the price reform and the cause the dominant bioc in the Frente of the mixed economy and wanted to support market conditions in the carry out wholesale nationalisations in the largest private company in one that was not based on the social commitment to the mixed economy nationalisation. The price reform be- was not prepared to see the elimination agricultural sector, the nationalisation because it is not unusual for anti-im- peralist petty-bourgeois regimes to vanous sectors to guarantee the over- all reproduction of the mixed economy. This analysis would put the Frente clearly in the historical tradi- struggles of the oppressed. suggest that the

they they do not hold power; proletarians occasion, in it." "Where there are but on participate Page 15 A regime of sacrifice: young women under arms to fight the contras pressed to take part and construct a revolutionary democracy when fac- крсия by their absence and the building blocks of the revolution are peasants, artisans, workers in small shops, street sellers and agricultural The worker peasant alliance as the basis of socialist democracy does not exist as an uban-rural axis but as a centres of power. Where there arc but, on occasion, they participate in it. This problem is reflected at a mans supportive of the revolution, found While this is by no means a serious rural-rural axis, outside the urban proletarians they do not hold power. political level where there is now a Indency to distinguish between the Frente and the revolution. An opinion poll conducted by Envio, a magazine that while over 80% in Managua sup port any party with 30% supporting the Frente and 3% supporting all four- problem for the FSLN per se, it does pose real problems for the formation of a mass participatory socialist At both economic and political levels there are significant problems for the revolution, the resolution of which will depend to a great degree on the character of the leadership and its on which the seizure of power was hased, Either the revolution remains and a populist project is about to enter port the revolution, 67% did not sup- teen opposition partiex put together. relationship to the revolationary bloc in a lengthy transtion period or the revolutionary dynamic has been lost a period of severe crisis cither via a reabsorption into the world capitalist system or a qualitative break to the tory-based proletarians are con proletarians. and in every mass organisation the Frente has a monopoly of power. The National Assembly is simply a Con- revolutionaries crealed because of dominance within it, and because of the political space this would give them in national and intemational This situation does not indicate that the working class and its allies hold power in Nicaragua; it does indicate is that perhaps the FSLN hold power on theirbehalf The overthrow of Somoza was a rapid affuir and the workers and peasants had little experience of self organisation. They were thrown into a situation where they had immense responsibilities with little practical ex- perience. This problem implied a mas- sive cultural revolution in order that own lives. Part of this process was the literacy campaign. Yet just as the revolutionary war which has lasted for revolutionary elan of the people. This to centralise power and resources into the machinery of the FSLN. Many of In every arca of the state machinery stitutional Assembly which the expected overwhelming the oppressed could begin to run their process was gaining hold, the revolu- tion was faced by a massive counter- the last seven years and has effective- ly drained the resources and the Economic hardship and war have acted to demobilise the oppressed and the local Sandinista Defence Commit- tees (CDSs) whilst functioning are at- tended mainly by Frente militants; many workers and peasants are oc- cupied by keeping their heads above water hecause of the price increases. The everyday struggle to survive in Nicaragua makes it difficult for the op- should not be underestimated. their SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 12 February 1989 in the lineage of Mexico rather than nationalisation is another calculated geoisie and the socialisation of the economy, Price reforms in themselves do not indicate the anti working class nature of the regime itself given the Economic Policy after the Russian dication of a leadership of bourgeois The FLN argues that the will of tion of the 'third way', the revolution Another view is that the step in the expropriation of the bour- economic difficulties that it is facing. The Frente have decided to ex- propriate the part of the economy they fecl ahle to run in a period of war, leav- ing the petty-bourgeois sector to ac- cumulate and stimulate the economy in the style of the Bolshevik New It is not possible to reduce the ques. tion to one of economics, Nationalisa- Lion is no morc indicative of a socialist state or govemment than the

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