Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2009

Palestine after the Algiers resolutions

· Socialist Outlook no. 12, February 1989 · pp 13-17 · 4,179 words

Palestine Latin America United States

FEATUR S

Palestine National Council:

Backtracking on

programme

The continued uprising on the West Bank and Gaza Strip has put forward the objective of full and unconditional sovereignty for the Palestinian people as an immediate demand.

However, the Palestinian National Council's last meeting held in December, and which was conridered to be the council of the uprising, adopted resolutions controversial among Palestinian political organisations and activists.

Thismeeting addresseditself to two audien- ces. On the one hand, it appesled to immediate aspirations for an independent and sovereign state by adopting the decluration of a state of independence.

On the other hand, il addressed the American administration's long demanded condition for recognizing the PLO by accept- ing UN Resolutions 242 and 338. These resolutions had always been rejected by all Palestinian organisations, and had radicalised

political opinion against the Arab regimes who

accepted them in 1967 and the carly 1970k.

The reasons for rejecting 242 and 338 still clearly apply today.

For they ignore and exelude any Yasser Arafat natonal rights for the Palestinian people. They policy will affect the struggle un the immediate: call for recognition and acceptance of the is and long term future is discussed below in two maeli state, while over a million Palestinians sticles. who were expelled from their homes and

The first is by Michel Warschawsky, a lend- homeland in 1948 have no right to retum. ing member of the Revolutionary Communin|

League in the Israeli state, an organisation af Their status is rocognised only as "refugees.

Later in a press conference Yanser Arafar filiated to the Fourth International. PLO head, went further in explicitly accepting

The second is an interview with Beshir the two-state solution.

Khairi, member of the Popular Front for the

This last PNC meeting is no doube one st Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), who was the most important turing points in the hrstors. deported from the West Bank in January 1988 of the PLO. It changes the original PEO polit- by the Isnieu authorities. accusing him of cal platform of liberation of Palestine: and being a leading figute in the unsung- secking a democratic secular state.

Sana Samer

It ende the PLO's continuous previous rejection of 242 and 338 as a framework for solving the Palestinian national problem.

How this PNC meeting and the PLO present

Palestine have limited powers to impose any.

thing on the popular movement inside

militical

The following two articles have been translated by Socialist Outlook and edited slightly for reasons of space.

new balan‹

Thirteen months of the popular upris- ing have successfully created a new balance of forces between the Israeli state and the Palestinian national move- ment. which may eventually lead to a break in the post-1967 log jam.

For this to happen, the PIO leadership

A new balance of

should target a set of concrete political objec tives which may he achieved in the medium term (us a result of this new relationship of for cer). Nobody in the occupied territories believes that the popular uprixing on its own is sufficient to drive out the Israel ammy and the settlers. But most people see tie intifadah as leverage fos permanent pressure on Israeli society as well as on international public opinion, that may lead to negotiations.

The P'LO Leadership outside Palestine were given two tasks by the leaders of the intifadah:

to draw up a political agenda for the popular struggle; and to preserve at any cost the unity hetween the different political currents within the PLO. without which the uprising would run into serious danger.

At the meeting in Algiers, under the com-

bined pressures of the imperialist states, the Arab bourgenisie and the Soviet Union, the PNC strived to keep close to its mandate. The

of the paitition of P'alestine, and through ac- knowledging UN resolutions 242 and 33%, recognised the Israeli state in its pre- 1967 bor-

ders. The PLO further declared its readinces to

main political resolution accepted the principle of the paitition of P'alestine, and through ac-

sua

forces

negotiate with Isruel, through un international conference, a concrete peace formula.

Despite open differences, especially on the question of resolutions 242 and 338, the politi-

cal currents within the PLO kept to their word

and maintained unity at all custs, remaining

seated on the leadership bodies.

The real aim of the Algiers PNC was to find a way to get through to Washington, underlined by the perception that only US imperialism can roll back Israel's intransigence and push them to negotiate withdrawal from the occupied ter- ritories, Washington did not miss this oppor- tunity, and after further clarification - in par- ticular on the question of terrorism — was ready to take on board the Algiers resolutions as a tuming point in order to justify a U-tom in its policy of not dealing with the PLO.

The US decision to reopen officialtalks- not negotiations - with the PLO has thrwn the Is raeli riling class into a panic. The Palestinian masses saw it as a resounding victory. Never- theless the real intention of the US remains to prise out further concessions from the PLO leadership. As soon as Yasser Arafat denounced terrorism, the US administration was quick to request an end to every form of armed struggle, and even demanded the wind ing up of the intifadich.

There has heen no sign that the PLO leaders intend to put a stop to the uprising, bearing in mind that Arafat relies on it for ammunition to pursue his manneuvres. The leadership outside

alministran wed the wu

dun... ...

nude While rocognising the necessity for certain

concessions to allow negotiations to take pince, there are real dangers al every stage of Arafat's

diplomacy. Washington will cleaticssly squeeze the PLO for more concessions, includ

stage of A

ing a request for Arafat to assent himself hy

wen him:

о шапол тра 11 It were a new civil war within ti

Paleste

Palestinian national movement.

Currents within the leadership of Entah and

the PLO have declared their readiness to accept

the compromises necessary to satisfy the US as well as the Arab bourgenis regimes. The PNC

resolutions leave an important gup between the

immediate need to end the occupation and

achieve Palestinian sovereignty on the West

Bank and Gaza, and the achievement of full

self-determination for the Palestinian people.

While it is correct, under the short and

medium term relationship of forces, lo separate

the immediate aim from the long term strategie

objectives, and to accept as transitory the parti-

tion of Palestine and the principle of negotia- tions with the zionist goverment, it reminin

dangerous and perhaps counter productive to

concede the long-term objectives of the strug- gle of the Palestinian people.

Eitherthe Palestinian Icaders wanteffective.

ly to confine the outcome of the struggle to the

establishment of a Palestinian state in the West

Bank and Gaza (in which care they must he

ready for a civil war that would make the zionist occupation scem like a picnic); or else the Teadership fully realise that the establishment of

SOCIALIST.

Page 11

FE A T U RES

a stase on tr West Bank un renolve part of the Parm. If this latter w ue case.thet.ue leading internati opinion in Israci in particular.

To deciare, un renolution 242 was ac other UN Tes....... the Palestinian neope»: the to rehm

needed is a series of concrete proposals making a bridge between the immediate objectives of the diplomatic offensive and the long-rean on jectives for the Palestinian people to uchieve na- tional self-determination.

Two major tasks remain central. The popular uprising must be strengthened; the popular committees are the only bodies capable of resisting a sell-out. Inte mational solidarity must play an important rule in minimising the im-

- mistaken in n

leading international public opinion, and public

888 788Ee was To declare, as the PNC did in Algiers, that

-. rumers, mat

I the

mense pressures piled onto the PLO by the im-

penalist powers and the Arab bourgeoisic,

seeking a hreak in the struggle for liberation.

meanst powers

seeking a hreak in the struggle for liberation.

The Revolutionary Communist League calls

158 w talitiases

-dal

in imperialist countries to recognise the new Palestinian state unconditionally, and demand that Israel withdraw from the occupied ter-

• detamunation and

Lemmate What 1s

ritories.

Michel Warschuwsky

unity

and the Arab peoples, and has heen engaged in international terrorism.

Third, the form in which resolu- tions 242 and 338 were intmoduced by Arafat to the press conference Palestinian resistance to Israeli altack was different from threat of the PNC, which ar- strikes. Toor, ... increasung number of workers sociated them with the right to self-determina- refuse . work ottlements, fanus or fas

tories. The leadership of the uprising is tion and other UN resolutions.

The PFLP was very keen that unity should be a

popularising the need for cooperatives and a number one question, and in fact made a retum to the land. compromise in order to maintain it. But how do you explain the 'unity until wctory slogan while the right wing is going its own way? Do you see a breaking point somewhere, and will there he a time when this unity is threatened by the way the leadership is going politically?

We do not understand unity an a means for of people's power. keeping us silent. What we sce is a dialectic of unity and struggle. There is no struggle withou. is anotber striking example. As soon as a leader

is jailed or deported, a dozen others spring up unity and we struggle through unity.

to replace him or her. A new morality of the

The strength of the intifadah is its unity - a

uprising has also developed. Wedding unity that goes beyond mere coordination of the different political organisations in the struggle ceremonies and funerals become national oc- It is important now not to shake this siterna casions; there is conscious solidarity, a con- "nity, and we think any cleavage in the exte- scious commitment to being a Palestinian, 1o nal unity will be reflected in the struggle inside. the love of the land, and a readiness to sacnifice.

Each and every citizen has a role to play in thie The course of the intifadah is towards con- tinuity and escalation, and its development " intifadah.

What is the role of the Soviet Union and other partial and then general insurrection.

In the same context we look towards increan- international parties in solving the regional ing the involvement of the 850,000 Palestinian- problems? What about the stand of Syria und subjected in 1948, including those living under Libya, which despite expectations played no occupation for 20 or 40 years, those under the repression of the Arab regimes, or in the diaspora. We must think not only of short term the superpowers (for us the IS is the head of objectives but of longer-term strategic ones, in which the main framework of our struggle is the institutions of the PLO.

Can vou tell us something abour the leaderchen means that our choice of a solution is not a of the uprising and the character of the cany. Saviet choice, nor American indeed, but our

at ronsciousness that has taken place. anil thr choice. No solution could be imposed on us.

while we still retain our leadership and inde- role of the working class?

The Israeli authorities have worked essen- pendence.

Ax for the Arab regimes, they either con- tially to annex the Palestinian economy to the

zonist one. The Palestinian workforc-

or were silent or gave inadequate support that

zionist factories, fars and settlements in

cludes around 120,000 workers from the West

Bank and Gaza Strip. In addition there are 40- racrifices of our people. Libya gives some

60,000) workers without permits. It was clear tr material support, and Irag adopted families of

martyrs nd wounded, hut this is not enough. the leadership of the intifadah that to stop this

The Arab Gulf stales paid billions of dollars large workforce from working an alternative

shoud be created but this was yet to be to support Irag's war, while they pay only

prepared.

However there were other ways of crippling

the Israeli coonomy, including the organisation the right for oil money to he directed towards

of the labour force and several days of general

The strength of the

intifadah is

BESHIR KHAIRI spoke to Socialist Outlook What do you think the last Palestine National Council (PNC) achieved, and what are its implications for the uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip?

The last PNC was the council of the in- tifadah, and its preparation centred on how to support it. Two main issues were raised. First, the resolutions concerning the upnising, which were adopted unanimously, emphasised the im- portance of unity, the continuity and escalation of the intifadah, and the armed struggle. The second point on the agenda dealt with three is sue: the declaration of independence and the declaration of a male noth unanimously passed - while the third point, the political com- munique, and particularly its reference to UN

*erence • IN resolutions 242 and 338, was the subject of

he subject of major disagreement.

The opposition achieved 46 votes against and ten abstentions. The Popular Frost for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was the main core of the upposition. However, while oppos ing, it also raised the slogan of national unity.

The PFLP has always helieved that if there were important disagreements it should withdraw from the PLO Executive Committee, while remaining in all other PLO institutions.

By staying inside the Executive we are sup porting national unity, but this in no way means that we are ready to cover up our differences On the contrary, we see that in this very impor- tant period of our people's struggle it is more necessary to uphold our convictions. How do you analyse what happened at the PNC

meeting with regard to the policy of Arafat and meeting with regard in ther the right wing?

Arafat's speech in front of the UN con- fcrence in Geneva was coherent with the PNC meeting. Later at the press conference he intro- duced some points which I consider to be con- tradictory. First, regarding the right of the Is raeli sture tr appet there

referred to it as such in the PNC resolutions. referred in " as sun ...

Second, the question of terrorism as explained

KHAIRE

spoke to Socialist

as Palestne wattonal ... and what are its ising in the West Bank

was nothing that PN: reelution

by Arafat at the PNC meeting was correct and very different from what he staled at the press conference.

We as a liberation movement do not practice terrorism, and as a poople we have been and still are victims of terrorism. On the other hand the USA has carried out terrorist acts against world- wide liberation movements, and the im- perialist stooge in the region, the zionist state: commits daily terrorist acts against our people

12 Was calfrec

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A new consu

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raeli farms and factories, and helps with the

boycolt of Israeli produce. A new conscious-

inlad Nati

mal Leaderstup

ron as a leader sherk pring «p.

ally of the

ondarity, - con- • a Palestinian to

a mole ~ play ur

role during or after the PNC?.

H. Ter

d'egari •na imperar

sitical altitude towards

the IS re the head of

de the USSR isafriend

national question 1x a

mians to solve Ther

the imperialist camp. while the USSR is a friend and ally) the P'alestinian national question in a problem for the Palestinians to solve. This

in indeed. but our

imposed on

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a ng.•. the uprisine.

towards

Page 12

.00k no

CENTRALAMERICA

Piem Cavendish/Reßex

Revolution and

Counter-revolution

in Central America

In mid-Januart, President Bush reiterated his support to the right-wing guerrilla movement of Angola at a time when the Cuban troops are withdrawing. Bush was also involved in the Irangate scandal, and has al- ways been a hawk on the ques- tion of Central America.

Should we expect any change in American policy on Central Aunerica afler Reagan, or any evolution in a region that for long has looked to be on the hrink of heing submerged cither by revalutionary tides or by floods of

For the millions of poor people living in the isthmus, life remains very hard and the future very grim. Most

aller repression?

peaceful end to mass ve injustices and

inequalities. Those in power would destroy everything before they give it up, as Somoza did in Nicaragua in

1979.

In Nicaragua, the revolubicmary arocess born on the 19th July 1979 has been crippled by natural disasters (the

most recent being the dramatic hur-

ricane of October 1988) and hmught to 1E5 knees by the US

"destabilisation'. This has failed

militarily to overthrow the Sandinista

govemment but has had some success

in destroying the fragile and depend-

ent economy, now in absolute chans

The economic pmblems of the

other countries, kept afloat only by

millions of US dollars, are reflected in

increasing political polarisation. In El

countries face repression, torture or murder in varying degreex, from ler- rilying death squads. To struggle in those circumstances represents a

Salvador, the "acceptable" face of

Christian Democracy has crumbled,

and has opened space for the only al

temative: the fascist ARENA paty.

likely to win the next elections, and

posing a dilemma for George Bush. countries However the Salvadoran revolution ary forces of the FMLN are quite op

timistic that victory is possible. as is

Salvador, the "acceptable" face of

much greater act of courage and fauth Hunger and poverty do their deadly work, even more slowly and mor painfully; there is no hope of any

SENALIST C...

than in nur "democratic Hines

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 12 February 1989

detailed in the article:

The army is also in power in

president; howeverhe cannor disguise the huge problems of a terribly im poverished population and the strength of the evolutionary move ment.

Central America raises many is-

Guatemala, though not so openly.

president; howeverhe cannor disguise

- The

sues about revolution, revolutionary

Сreth...

leaderships, their problems and ability to win in the face of a massive military and repressive machinery set against them. It raises fundamental but often

maderst:

sanD

liheration or the struggles and par ticipation of indigenous peoples.

It offers living examples to apply and understand revolutionary theory. showing the complexity of real life, in which political weaknesses can cost

•beration

thousands of lives. Above all, it demonstrates the value of Marxist faith in the oppressed to take control of their destiny and move towards socialism rather than barbarity.

Maria Astorga

A.cI

"Central

America raises many

issues

about

revolution

and revol-

utionary

leaderships"

Page 13

el Foot. N. es el Partido

•de los Trabajadores

FSLN banner: is it really the 'party of the workers?

Nicaragua

Which way for the

revolution?

10 years on

"The average Nicaraguan, by the end of July, could barely afford to eat, and while

queues had

all but disappeared, begging began to reappear on the streets"

Page 14

As the Nicaraguan Revolution reaches the end of its first decade a series of questions about its nature still remain in the balance. The revolution remains a profoundly con- tradictory phenomenon which by its bare facts is able to supp- ly evidence for both those who see it as a socialist revolution and those who doubt the inten- tions of the ruling Frente San- dinista Liberacion Nacional (FSLN).

This can be shown at an economic level by two examples where the direction of Sandinista policies has al-

lowed the development of two con-

tradictory class tendencies.

In the first case, in February 1988

the SIN implemented a series of

economic reforms which have led to a

decline in the living standards of most

workers and peasants. Food guaran-

Ices that had previously been univer- sal were withdrawn for all but govem- ment workers, whils the prices of basic grains were no longer controlled and left to the so called laws of supp ly and demand. The past few years had scen a disappearance of the popular stores" which had guaranteed a decent supply of all basic goods to everyone

- especially in the poor neighhour- hoods (barrios). The long term closure of the stores, in addition to the more recent economic changes, have had the effect of encouraging and strengthening the petty-bourgeoisie, the bourgcoisic and the capitalist market place.

The motive for this policy was to end the shortages that were develop- ing in the supplies of basic grains, and to legalise what was an enormous black market. Included in this move was a more populist change in the cur- rency rate which, by being introduced overnight, ambushed thousands of speculators and, because there was a limit set on the amount to be ex- changed, denied the internal sup porters of the US-hacked anti-govem- ment 'contra" forces all the funds they had built up in old currency.

Initially, these reforms were very popular because of the short tem ef fect on the speculators, but this tumed out to be a side issue compared to what followed. The freeing up of prices did encourage the peasants to grow more. the shortages in supply were over- come; but only at the price of a col- lapse in the incomes of urban workers and many of the poorer peasantry, who have no surplus to sell, and lost ground to the general inflationary effects which the reform halted only tem-

porarily. The average Nicaraguan, by the end of July, could barely afford to cat, and while qucues had all but dis appeared, hegging hegan to reappear on the streets as a result. At the sane time, during the ninth anniversary celebrations, Daniel Ostega an- nounced that the revolution was now socialist in character.

The second example occurred at the beginning of July 1988. The FLN decided to nationalise the San An- tonio Sugar Processing Complex; not only the plant itself but a railway line and thousands of hectares of land. in- cluding virtually the whole town of San Antonio which was the property of the family that owned the plant. This was the largest private enterprise in the whole country, and its land was part owned by the technicians who ran

the plant.

The company was known for its liheral patron-client relationships with its workers in terms of work con- ditions, food guarantees, wages and

housing. There was fierce debate amongst the workers at the plant about whether or not the nationalisation was a good idca. The Frente explained that despite help from MIDINKA (the department responsible for ngricul- ture) the complex had failed to come up to expected production levels and that it felt a creeping decapitalisation

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 12 February 1989

SUPPLE M

was in progress. Since the plant was the largest private company in Nicaragua its nationalisation was a real waming to the bourgooisie, but one that was not based on the social struggles of the oppressed.

How we read these apparently con- tradictory events depends on our over- all analysis of the regime. One might suggest that the Frente's long tem commitment to the mixed economy produced both the price reform and the nationalisation. The price reform be- cause the dominant bloc in the Frente was not prepared to see the elimination of the mixed economy and wanted to support market conditions in the agricultural sector; the nationalisation because it is not unusual for anti-im- peralist petty-bourgeois regimes to carry out wholesale nationali sations in various sectors to guarantee the over- all reproduction of the mixed economy. This analysis would put the Frente clearly in the historical tradi- tion of the 'third way", the revolution in the lineage of Mexico rather than Cuba.

Another view « that the nationalisation is another calculated step in the expropriation of the bour- geoisie and the socialisation of the economy. Price reforms in themselves do not indicate the anti-working class nature of the regime itself given the economic difficulties that it is facing. The Frente have decided to ex- propriate the part of the economy they feel able to run in a period of war, leav- ing the pelly-hourgeois sector to ac- cumulate and stimulale the economy in the style of the Bolshevik New Economic Policy after the Russian Revolution.

It is not possible to reduce the ques. tion to one of economics. Nationalisa- Lion is no more indicative of a socialist state or government than the

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