introduc- tion of market mochanisms is an in- dication of a leadership of bourgeois or petty-bourgeois intent. In the early transitional period of a socialist regime the economic question is cru- cial hut not determinate: the question of who holds political power and how
The FSLN argues that the will of the popular majority in Nicaragua is represented through the National As- sembly and that the revolution is a pluralist revolution. Some defend this analysis by claiming that Nicaragua is a pluralist socialist democracy in its carly stages. All parties have equal ac- cess to the media and have the right to arguc for their point of view. This ig- nores the fact that in Nicaragua one party has a monopoly of control of the state and the armed forces which un- derpin it. The police force is an ex- plicitly Sandinista police force and the army is explicitly a Sandinista army.
was in progress. Since the plant was
Plers Cavendish/Refes
A regime of sacrifice: young women under arms to fight the contras
In every area of the state machinery
and in every mass organisation the Frente has a monopoly of power. The National Assembly is simply a Con- stitutional Assembly which the revolutionaries created because of their expected overwhelming dominance within it, and because of the political space this would give them in national and international politics.
This situation does not indicate that the working class and its allies hold power in Nicaragua; it does indicate is that perhaps the FLN hold power on theirbehalf. The overthrow of Somoza was a rapid affair and the workers and peasants had little experience of self organisation. They were thrown into a situation where they had immense responsibilities with little practical ex- perience. This problem implied a mas- sive cultural revolution in order that the oppressed could begin to run their own lives. Part of this process was the literacy campaign. Yet just as the process was gaining hold, the revolu- tion was faced by a massive counter- revolutionary war which has lasted for the last seven years and has effective- ly drained the resources and the revolutionary elan of the people. This should not be underestimated.
Economic hardship and war have acted to demobilise the oppressed and to centralise power and resources into the machinery of the FSLN. Many of the local Sandinista Defence Commit- tees (CDSs) whilst functioning are at- tended mainly by Frente militants: many workers and peasants are oc- cupied by keeping their heads above water hecause of the price increases. The everyday struggle to survive in Nicaragua makes it difficult for the op-
pressed to take part and construct a revolutionary democracy when fac- tory-based proletarians are con spicuou by their absence and the huilding blocks of the revolution are peasants, artisans, workers in small shops, street sellers and agricultural proletarians.
The worker peasant alliance as the basis of socialist democracy does not cxist as an urban-rural axis but as a rural rural axis, outside the urban centres of power. Where there are proletarians they do not hold power: but, on occasion, they participale in it. This problem is reflected at a mass political level where there is now a Indency to distinguish belween the Frente and the revolution. An opinion poll conducted by Envio, a magazine supportive of the revolution, found that while over 80% in Managua sup- port the revolution, 67% did not sup- port any party with 30% supporting the Frente and 3% supporting all four- teen oppusition parties put together. While this is by no means a serious problem for the FSLN per se, it does pose real problems for the formation of a mass participatory socialist democracy.
Ar both economic and political levels there are significant problems for the revolution, the resolution of which will depend to a great degree on the character of the leadership and its relationship to the revolutionary bloc on which the seizure of power was hased. Either the revolution remains in a lengthy transition period or the revolutionary dynamic has been lost and a populist project is about to enter a period of severe crisis cither via a rcabsorption into the world capitalist system or a qualitative break to the
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 12 February 1989
"The
economic question is crucial but
not determinate;
the key question is who holds
political
power and
how.
"Where
there are proletarians they do not hold power;
but on
occasion,
they
participate
in it."
Page 15
"The FSLN will have to depend on the self organisation and mass mobilisation of the most oppressed and those in whose historic interests a planned and socialised economy and society will operate."
Page 16
SUPPLEM E N
len. The evidence available over the
last year suggests that either of these
scenarios are an arguahle possibility.
The Sandinista leadership is in no
sense a coherent revolutionary marx-
ist leadership (There are Marxists, Christians, radical social democrais
and radical nationalists in the FLN
and who is dominant is not at all clear).
The overthrow of the old Somoza dic-
tatorship in 1979 was not a definitive
socialist revolution, but an anti-oligar-
chic revolution led by the united front
of forces within the PSLN attached to mass organisations. The project of the Frente has been to hold that bloc together while opposing the counter- revolutionary war.
This bloc itself has contradictory tendencies within it (from landless peasant, unemployed worker, street seller and market vendor to so-called patriotic bourgeoisic" which the FSLN has insisted is a part of its project) which at the overthrow cither supported the FSLN or sccepted its leadership against Somoza. It is these
contradictions within the FSLN and
the anti-oligarchic bloc, combined
with the contradictory tendenciex in
I. aside the cice ¡ture ar opular power in
«whirh has witnessed a
sation m recent
i turther break 1x
-socialst charac
•*39
required to assure the socialist charac-
ter of the revolution.
With the defcat of the contras al-
most certain, the counter-revolution will become an internal affair backed
by the Central Intelligence Agency na ena Tinated States state depart-
ment. The FSIN will have to depend
on the self organisation and mass mobilisation of the most oppressed and those in whose historic interests a planned and socialised economy and society will operate. This will imply a transfer of power from the Frente to the workers, poor peasantry and other oppressed layers via organs of
socialist democracy of the type most
appropriate to the Nicaraguan situa- tion.
It is this next step forward which
will be the qualitative break required
and could induce a rupture in the anti- oligarchical revolutionary bloc which may be reflected inside the Frente San- dinista itself. While not recognising
the latter point, Orlando Nunez, a lead-
ing revolutionary socialist in the
FSLN, outlines such an approach in
his book Democracia y Revolucion en las americas. The strategy is to develop a Popular Assembly of Mass
Organisations alongside the National Assembly. There is no discussion of how these twn structures would operate together hut any new assemb
ly of such a kind would he a step for
Jllonar FSLN. moline-
Here Cavendish /Refie)
Piere
Sandinista soldiers: the army has been reconstructed ward to the developmen - rez. development of baste consumption socialist democracy. It nas «'en beer goods industries (and some capital
goods industries) to encourage mooled that the CDSs may become in-
proletarianisation and the production struments for discussing more than purely local problems - they may stan
of wage goods to exchange with thie to consider issues of universal inipor-
peasantry.
Twn things are clear. The revalu- tance. These two developments
tion of 1979 clearly deprived the bour- would, in time, negate the role of the
geoisie, and ils aller of poitical bourgenisie as a political and
power. Secondly while the FLN cconomic force and reduce the impor tance of the National Assembly while
claim that it is the people who hold
power in Nicaragua, it is in fact the instituting organs of class rule. This
FSL.N and its armed wing