Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2002

Chile: a difficult struggle ahead

· Socialist Outlook no. 11, December–January 1989 · pp 23-25 · 1,910 words

Latin America

difficult struggle ahead referendum requires the same sort of serious discussion, although the themes of the debate have shifted with the changed circumstances. The

Chilean people are confronted with the problent of how to dismantle a dictatorship that has been in control of affairs since it crushed the mass move

The question of power is not posed in the immediate way it was in 1970-

73, Pinochet's regime war shaken by its October defeat but is not on the verge of collapse. Though interal differences inside the military and bourgeoisie have got worse. we should not mistake the eventual removal of Pinochet for the ond of the

Looking at the actual figures - which are more or less free of fraud - per cent in favour of Pinochet represents a significant social hase of the traditional middle clarses, bettoroff farmers, backward rural layers, the m bourgeoisie and the military.

Economic growth

Thatcherite lines has benefitted this base

On the other side, the Convergence for a 'No' vote is made up of many parties. In the elections in 15 months time it will not be cary for them to agree on a common front or candidates. Pinochet's strength has always partly been the result of the weakness and division among his opponents.

The referendum came after the regime had - through a mixture of repression and legal concessions in the more moderate parties - ridden out the optum in the movement between 1983 and the failed July-September

1986 general strikes,

The

Convergence dominated politically by the

Christian Democrats, who sup ported the 1973 coup and the fascist 1980 constitution. All major factions of the Socialist

Party (SP) are doing their best to develop a moderate coalition with the

Christian Democrats (CD). The rising star of the SP. Ricardo Lagos is a sort of Felipe Gonzalez figure and is moderate enough to be acceptable to the CD. He says Allende was too

'extreme".

The U.S State Department is very actively involved with the CD and all moderate forces. The CD are more concerned with preventing mobilisation against the regime tuming into any sort of radical social mobilisation than in precipitating the downfall of the regime. CD president,

Gabriel Valdes, does not mince words:

The rabional way out cannot be other than an agreement with the military so that they fulfil their responsibilities and show political will In open up the transitional process." (ASPI, No. 186 Aug.1986)

The Convergence have been engaged in exploratory discussions through third parties with moderate' sectors of the army:

What about the left of the move.

ment7 Both the Communist Party

(CP) and the MIR (Interational

Revolutionary

Castroist) are outside the Corivergence. The CD have in any case rejected political agreements with

The CP, MIR and the Aimeya faction of the SP are in an altemative front, the Popular Democratic Movement (MDP). Over the past years these parties have heen niven by internal debate. The CP and MIR only decided to support the campaign for the 'No' vote in the linal run-up to the on the

What are the main political groupings and options currently on offer to Chilean workers after the recent referendum defeat for

General

Pinochet's 15 year-old dictatorship?

DAVE

KELLAWAY has been talking to a

Chilean comrade and offers a summary.

"Pinochet's regime was shaken by its October defeat, but is not on the verge of collapse...

"One of the remarkable sights... has been the way working people, after the referendum, were going up to members of the repressive forces and shaking hands.

Memories seem so short..."

P P referendum in the face of the obvious enthusiasm of the masses for striking any sort of blow against the dictatorship.

During the Allende govemment the CP was politically to the right of the SP and otber left forces. Following the trauma of the coup, the bloody repression against its militants, and then the Nicaraguan experience, it made a shift to more hand line positions, transforming its armed cadres into a sort of armed liberation front -the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front - in December 1983. The Front has been able to carry out limited armed actions against the repressive forces. Since the referendum, two of its militants have been reported killed while bombing electrical installations (Guardian 7.11.88) Its most spectacular action was the abortive assas sination of Pinochet in 1986. This action provoked further debate inside the CP and an overwhelming majority of its cadres in the Frost (particularly the youth) split from the party,

The debate was basically over how to participate in any of the limited openings for mass work, the correct policy for political alliances, and the role of armed struggle. The official Communist Party leadership around Corvalan has drawn back from its people's rebellion" line and istalking again of dialogue with the military.

Although the CP has regained a good part of its cadres in the Front, there is still a large grouping independent of it, and the Front acts autonomously from the party. A similar debate has developed inside: the MIR, which also led to a split last year. Pascal Allende's current, which favoured a line of armed struggle and working with the Front, expelled a current around Nelson Guitterez, which wanted an approach based which wanted more on using all the semi-legal openings and moderating" their political

There is anther armed struggle grouping called MAPU-LAUTARO. which is much smaller but engages in Robin Hood-type appropriation and distribution. The immediate social base of all these more radical sectors of the movement is to a great extent among the youth, unemployed and the shantytown dwellers. The traditional CP base in the trade unions has been devastated by unemployment and

One of the remarkable sights commented on by Chilean revolutionaries has been the way working people after the referendum were going up to members of the repressive forces and shaking hands. Memories seem so short. But a whole generation of militants were lost and many of the young people most involved in the

M referendum mobilisations do not remember the Allende years.

A pacifist ideology is being encouraged by the Church, the CD, the SP and the media. "Marxist" parties are still illegal, and it is difficult for new activists to find out about altemative ideas. The regime has tolerated the public activity of personalities identified with the banned CP so they are involved in discussions with Convergence parbies; but the regime invokes the CP's illegality as soon as it

Reports from Chile suggest that after all the referendum excitement there is a relatively passive atmos phere, Pinochet is firmly sticking to the schedule laid down in the consititution - under which he stays in charge until presidential and congress elections in 15 months time. Meanwhile he is reorganising the military to consolidate his power.

Pinochet will remain head of the armed forces, and the military will ap point 40 per cent of the congress. Rumours are rife that his wife might stand for president!

On the other hand the Convergence is paralyned in discussions about acceptable candidates, and for the moment is respecting the timetable. For the U.S. State Department the siluation is promising - the transition can tion is promising be calmly organised while Pinochet could be conveniently dumped if there were to be an upsurge of the

For the left in Chile it is not casy. All the practical problems of organising under continuing repression remain. The left has to relate to the masses' desire for democracy while challenging the CD's right to lead such a movement. While not clearly challenging the CD and moderate secfors, the Communist Party. in a communique since the referendum, does differentiate itself from the Conver-

*The enemy is the dictatorship and not other sectors of the opposition. We propose unity to all other sectors. Our call for a programme of meetings and marches to support the demand for Pinochet's resignation made by the United Command of Shantytown residents... such a Ipresidential candidate] would have to emerge from the popular majority and not from a group of parties."

(from New Worker Nov.RR).

Despite such criticism, eventual CP support for a moderate CD candidate cannot he ruled out. Corvalan, CP general secretary, is on record as being in lavour of dialogue and a "consensus govemment" that they would support from the outside (see International Viewpoint, 105)

Another approach is to fight for a front in the upcoming clections based on independent working class parties - which in practice would mean arguing against a CD presidential candidate in favour of an SP refonnist

Obviously within such a defensive. united front the left could raise slogans (as the MiR currently does) for revoking the 1980 Constitution. for a froely elected Constituent Assembly, for frecing all political prisoners and the return of exiles, for dismantling the secret police and of course anti-austerity demands, Strengthening and broadening the forces around the MDP and rebuilding the CUT (Chilean TUC) is also inpurTant. If at the end of the day the only opposition candidate were a Christian Democrat, then the tactical problems for the left would be more compli-

It is not clear how the revolutionary forces supporting the armed struggic fronts would intervene in such processes. An extreme position of refusing any participation in any 'icformist" alliance or 'fronts for democracy could allow the CD and SP all the space they need in the mass movement lo lead il into a dead end.

The dilemma for the Chilean lelt is: how lo maintain a clear revolutionary option (including armed capability) opposed to a smooth tratisition and yet not isolate oneself from the masses. The experiences of both Spain after Franco, and the Philippines after Marcos show it is all too easy for revolutionary currents to underestinate imperialism's room for manoeuvre (declaring the so-called impossibilily transstions") and to fail to understand the masses current conscicusness.

In the Chilean struggle today. solidarity is still important. sion has to be denounced - 3 people have already been killed in demonstrations since the referendum. Not all the political prisoners have been released. Eight thousand people have been sacked from goverment workschemes as a punishment for a

The Chile Solidarity Campaign recentiy sent an all-women delegalion composed of 1. Ruddock, M. Prosser and others to meet popular organisations in Chile. Such initiatives need our support, particularly when the mass media now tend to mention Pinochet as an avuncular type who has brought an economic boom and organises democratic votes!

We should be Irying to develop. within a general solidarity effort, what support we can for groups in Chile Who have a clear, socialist perspective against the dictatorship-

Page 22 SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 11 December 1988/January 1989

Castro speaking in Havana The evolution of the Cuban revolution cannot be properly understood unless it is seen in a world context. Whatever our verdict on the personal qualities of Fidel Castro and his team, their scope for action was defined by many factors outside their own borders and out of their direct control.

Simply to look at the policies or political origins of the Castro leadership in isolation from the specific conditions which shaped their options and their actions is as futile as trying to analyse the defeat of the British 1984 miners' strike without examinun

P

Cuban Revolution - 30 years on

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