Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2009

Castro's unique opportunity

· Socialist Outlook no. 11, December–January 1989 · pp 25-26 · 1,421 words

Latin America Russia and the USSR

The evolution of the Cuban revolution cannot be properly understood unless it is seen in a world context. Whatever our verdict on the personal qualities of Fidel Castro and his team, their scope for action was defined by many factors outside their own borders and out of their direct control.

Simply to look at the policies or political origins of the Castro leader- ship in isolation from the specific con- ditions which shaped their options and their actions is as futile as trying to analyse the defeat of the British 1984 miners" strike without examin-

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 11 Decen

ing the role of the Tory and TUC leaders, or discussing the problems of the Nicaraguan revolution withnut ex- amining the role of US imperialism and the Kremlin leaders.

Nobody would dispute that in com- parison with equivalent leaderships of post war revolutionary struggles, the Castro team was quite extraordinary in its tenacity and its attempts to assert its independence not only from the USA, hut also (in the carly days) from Moscow. Where other leaders buckled under and abandoned revolu- tionary or even radical policies rather than break their alliances with sec- tions of the capitalist class, Castro was from the start prepared to split from

"Gorbachev

is if

anything, less likely than Brezhnev to risk promoting conflict in Washington's 'backyard."

...the Cuban revolution stands as an inspiration to many millions of workers and peasants around the world, but not as a finished 'model for today's revolutionary

struggles.

S U P PL M E N

tion of the major capitalists.

By 196l the abject failure of Kennedy's Bay of Pigs invasion at- tempt showed the extent to which the

old reactionaries had simply upped and left Cuba to carry on their nefarious activities in Miami or clsc- where

The second, quite decisive, factor was the changes taking place in Krem- lin policy from 1960 onwards. The Kruscher leadership. beset by an economic crisis at home, was also wrestling with the probiem of how to counter a new US military build-up aggressively promoted by new sabre- rattling president Kennedy, and in- cluding new Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) capable of hitting Soviet targets from US soil.

Khruschev was also facing a new political competitor to Moscow's in- fluence within the once monolithic stalinist movement; Mao Zedong's Chinese bureaucracy had emerged in open opposition, splitting vanous na- tional communist parties and secking a new periphery of contacts for Beij- ing as levers of diplomatic pressure against imperialism.

For years, the Moscow line for communist parties in the 'third world" (and especially Latin America) had heen to respect the speheres of influence agreed with imperialism in the post-war settlement, and seek al- «ances with "progressive "anti- imperialist sections of capitalists. This line in Cuba had led the CP into a long-term accomodation with Batis- ta. and vigorous opposition to Castro's guerrilla movement until the writing was clearly on the wall in the final months of the dictatorship. The maoists, on the other hand, while still embracing popular frontist politics, leaned much more towards the lype of guerrilla tactics favoured by Castro.

The Kremlin leaders therefore had to jockey between their instincts - of suspicion towards revolutionary movements not under their control - and their need to swing back their glohal relationship of forces with US imperialism: they wanted to head off the Chinese challenge to their authority in the emerging movement of Liberation struggles - but without triggering a new surge of potentially embarrassing revolutionary action.

Castro and Guevara were able to take advantage of this unique opening

- responding to the escalating US boycott of Cuban sugar and cconomic blockade by turning to Moscow and Beijing for support. When Moscow was slow to respond. Guevara would persuade Beijing lo show support and then retum to negotiate more from Moscow.

Soviet economic aid was followed by what has ever since remained a free

supply of armaments to Cuba: and this in turn was followed by the most remarkable promise of all - Khruschev's pledge to use Soviet armed force, even missiles, to guan- tee the defence of the infant revolu- tionary regime 90 miles from Florida. This stands in sharp contrast to sub- sequent Soviet policy on the much more distant Nicaragua.

Khruschev plainly hoped that a spin-off from this would be to site Soviet intermediate range missiles in Cuba - a low budget response to Kennedy's ICBM threat Though in the 1962 'Cuban missiles crisis' this option was abandoned, the commit- ment to Cuba has remained a major (and expensive) aspect of Kremlin strategy and foreign policy.

No similar situation has opened up since 1959. The closest comparison would be with the huge military sup- port given by the Soviet bureaucracy (and Cuba) to the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia since 1977. However this support ran no risk of direct US retalialion, and simply served to protect Mengistu's reactionary regime against US-backed des- rabilisation and legitimate national liberation struggles of the Eritrean and other oppressed peoples.

In fact it has been not Cuba - with its break from both imperialist and na- tional capital, its military and economic reliance upon Soviet sup port and its subsequent political as similation into the Kremlin orbit -that has heen the model for subsequent liberation movements, so much as Al- geria.

The Ben Bella leadership of the Al- gerian anti-imperialist National Liberation Front (FLN) was of a dif- ferent calibre from Cuba's Fidelistas: but different, too, was the attitude of the LISSR, which was not seriously in- terested in Algeria or repared to offer substantial support. Though the FLN as a mass movement was many times stronger than Castro's ramshackle July 26 Movement, the defeat of French imperialism was followed not by a break from imperialism but a renegotiation of terms and the reconstriction of the bourgeois state machinery, which we have just recently seen in action against militant workers and youth.

Very different, too, was the situa tion after the 1979 Sandinista victory over dictator Somoza in Nicaragua. •Unlike Cuba. which had been a major base of US investment, the Nicaraguan economy was weak, and dominated by national capitalists, substantial sections of which had thrown in their lot with the anti- Somoza struggle - but then stayed on as a vocal and stubbom obstacle to progreRs

•Cuba is an island: but Nicuragua's extensive borders with Honduras and Costa Rica have given Somoza's old National Guard and other CIA back- ed mercenaries the chance to regroup and mount continual cross border

sabotage and terrorism; •Soviet leaderships since 1979 have shown little or no economic or military commitment to defend Nicaragua, and uscd their leverage on Havana to limit Cuba's involvenient. Gorbachev is if anything less likely than Brezhne to risk promoting a conflict in Washington's "backyard'. • The Sandinista leaders themselves, for all their courageous defiance of US pressure, have always insisted that their goal is not a workers" state or socialism, but a mixed economy. Itis by no means certain that even if total external support were forthcoming the Sandinistas wonld opt for the "Cuban Road'. Significantly Fidel Castro himself has been among those advising them not to.

Thirty years on, therefore, the Cuhan Revolution stands as an in- spiration to many millions of workers and peasants around the world, but not a finished "model" for today's revolu- tionary struggles. With the partial ex-

ception of Nicaragua, every attempt to export the "lessons" of the Cuban ruggle have proved a total disaster. costing the lives of thousands of gai- Lant guerrilla fighters.

In stressing the material gains for Cuban workers and the superiority of the Cuban system to the viciously ex- ploitative capitalist regimes of Latin America and elsewhere, we must not forget the extent in which this is un- derwritten by multi-billion dollar sub- sidies from the USSR.

While welcoming the inter- nationalism of the Cuhan military of- toit that is heiping to defend Angola from South African and rcactionary terrorist attacks, we should remember that Soviet endorsement of this ix also linked to Cuban military involvement in repressing the Entrean struggle for self-determination.

Fidel Castro may provide a pleasant contrast to General Jaruzelski and his ilk, the grey-faced bureaucrats who have led only police- state regimes in caster Europe. But for all his achievements and popularity. Castro's survival is partly because he now represents the lac- ceptable, radical face of Stalinism.

The book Cuba; Radical Face of Stalinism by John Lister is still available at t4.50 including postage, from Socialist Outlook.

11 December 1988/January 1989

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