What's new
since
Lebanese
invasion?
MORE than two years after Israel's inof the Lebanon, newsmongers are unanimous in pronouncing the monumental failure of
"Operation Peace for Galilee", prime objective to liquidate the PLO once and for all did not come up to expectations; nor did its plans to ensure permanent supremacy of the
Phalangists in Lebanon and secure a peace treaty. The May 17th Agree.
ment, tentatively negotiated with the foundered under the blows of the lef nationalists. So the sequels of the invasion seem nothing but a disastrous entrenched occupation with its heavy toll of casualties, now topping 600
Israeli soldiers dead, coupled with a ruinous financial burden.
La closer look at the developments in the area shows an alltogether different picture. It sug gests that the invasion, while not fulfilling what it set out to do, has ruptured the status quo and created ripe conditions for drawing the reactionary Arab regimes into the Camp
David process and for the imposition of an imperialist-dictated settlement in the area. The mood "new realism" in the Arab ranks became evident at a time when Israel itself is under increasing pressure to settle.
First, the catastrophic state of the economy can no longer allow the base. They had cut through all that wire, been caught, subjected to a strip search and four hours questioning - and then released.
No arrests — no adverse publicity for Heseltine. The women were very calm, they had been in the base many times before and will certainly be in again. Women are getting in every week, they're just not getting
We were lucky. There were no evictions on the three days we were there but at some gates the bailiffs are coming daily or even several In the wake of Thatcher's Falklands war Israeli military chiefs unleashed their brutal litzkrieg and invasio:
outhern Lebanon. Lucy Ma thews and Jack Goldberg explain how things have changed since then. same level of military expenditure, and plans to trim down the defence budget are currently under discus-
US intervention to refloat an economy hovering on the brink of disaster, would inevitably carry strings to bring Israel to heel, or at least to curtail its freedom of
It also suggests that the unity of the PLO has suffered a severe, perhaps irreparable, dent. While Israel failed to wipe out the PLO as a military force, it nevertheless won an imporforces and their Lebanese allies, by forcing the PLO out of its stronghold throughout the breadth of the Arab world, where most of them remain
- the only exception being in Syria, which, under threat of attack from Israel, left PLO fighters fully operational.
The consequences for the PLO Socialist Viewpoint, No. 2, November 1984. Page 14 times a day. Anything the women can't carry away quickly as personal property is seized.
But the harassment is not weakening the women's resolve. There are more camps than ever now, and more women at each camp. And the women are stronger, more determined than ever not only to get Cruise missiles out but to work for a society based on quite different values. were serious and far-reaching. The favoured the rise of the right wing of the PLO who felt confident to junk democratically-agreed ind in flagrant breach of the PNC re-opened relations with Egypt — the only Arab state to have openly co-operated with the implementation of the imperialist plan for the region, in signing the Camp David Agreement.
Arafat's visit to Cairo last January signified on his part, and on the part of the right wing in the PLO he represented, nothing less than the first step towards a process of surrender to Israel and a betrayal of
*The Palestinian National Council
(PNC) is the supreme policy-making body of the Palestinian people. Its first meeting took place in Jerusalem in May held in Aste brey (16th PNC) was held in Algiers in 1983, attended by 357 delegates out of the total of 417.
the Palestinian struggle. The full implications of the visit, stretch far beyond the arena Palestinian politics: the rapprochement between Arafat and Mubarak has opened the way tor the Western Arab states to renew their relations with Egypt they have long been hoping for. And this developemnt is leading evitably to a reversal of the previous line-up of the Arab states; whereas previously it was Egypt that isolated in the Arab world, it is now Syria that seems to be becoming increasingly isolated as the other Arab regimes move towards the Camp David arena.
It cannot be said at the present time that this major turn in favour of the implementation of an dictated settlement in the region has been decisively settled. However, we look at the position of the forces traditionally opposed to perialist settlement, it becomes clear that "the Palestinian revolution" presently lacing its oppositionists" most threat ever. The within the PLO, sheltering under the dubious hospitality of Syria, remain deeply divided, and therefore unable to exert significant political fluence in the area; while Syria itself is becoming increasingly isolated for three reasons. The first is the shift to the right of the Arab regimes; the second is the demise of the imperialist forces in the PLO - a demise which Syria has actively helped to bring about, and is still playing a decisive part in. The third reason is the lack of Syria has received from the Union in its anti-Arafat stance, and the subsequent shift of Soviet policy away from its exclusive reliance on Syria, and towards building relationships not only with those which seem set for a reunion with Egypt, but also with Egypt itself.
The present fragmentation of the forces in the PLO began as a split inside Fatah*, the largest and most influential organisation in the headed by Yasser Arafat, also the most heterogeneous of the organisations inside the PLO where Marxists and the traditional bourgeoisie coexist side by side. It was inside Fatah that those seeking a compromise solution with imperialism have always been contained. Friction these elements, and those opposed to such an accommodation has been a source of conflict throughout Fatah's history. In the aftermath of Israel's invasion of Lebanon, the sharpened and a dispute over the appointment of two military
*The ight resistance organisation grouped in the PIO are:
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Saiqua, the Arab Liberation Front, the Popular Front for the Liberation Palestine General Command (not to be confused with PFLP). the Struggle Front and the Palestine Liberation Front.
however of prosomething inwas imperialistif iman is serious
1nantisupport that
Soviet regimes
PLO between conflict manders, whose conduct during comwar left their struggle seriously in doubt, brought matters to a head.
Fatah, the leader of the camp, Abu Musa, presented a list of demands to try to bring to heel the decision-makers democratic control of the rank and file. This was met with a rebutt, and
Palestine fighting between erupted.
the commitment to the by no
Subsequently the
"military solution"
under as an the two sides
Socialist Viewpoint, No. 2, November 1984. Page 15
The fighting itself was, however, means the decisive factor behind the present fragmented state of the PLO, although it has suited Arafat to present it as such. Responsibility for the fragmentation lies entirely with Arafat himself. His decision to visit Cairo can only be seen as a calculated move to finish the PLO independent democratic organisation in which all Palestinian groups have a voice. And it was ab-
From left to right: George Habash, General Secretary of the PFLP, Ali Nasser Mohamed, General Secretary of the Yemini
Socialist Party, Nayef Hawatmeh, General Secretary of the DFLP. solutely necessary for him to achieve this before he could start making fresh moves towards negotiating an imperialist-dictated settlement.
After the outbreak of fighting it became apparent that Arafat had no interest in taking steps to heal the rift and reunite the PLO. On the contrary, he devoted all his efforts to ensure that no PNC takes place in which all the political components of the PLO are represented, and is preparing instead for a conference of his supporters that would have sufficient credibility to "represent" the Palestinians in future planned negotiations.
While Arafat has been solidating his position, gathering support and building himself in Jordan, the led by Abu Musa have joined forces with the PFLP-General Command, Saiqua (the Syrian backed Palestinian group), and two smaller Palestinan groups, the Popular Struggle Front and the Arab Liberation Front to form the "National Alliance". This grouping, backed by Syria, is only united in their demand resignation of Arafat as Chair of the PLO as a precondition for attending a PNC meeting. Otherwise there is little political homogeneity between them. In fact, it is only Saiqua which can really be said to be a political organisation.
The peculiarity of the Palestinian liberation struggle in never having had any "home soil" on which to base itself, has always lett organisations open to domination and control by their host countries. It was the strength of the PLO a united, organisation that has prevented the reactionary Arab regimes from forcing a compromise through Arafat, long before now. Equally, it was the unity of the PLO which has frustrated Syria's attempts to subordinate those forces inside the PLO opposed to such a settlement, to its own power. The present fragmenof tation threatening to wipe out the only gain ever made by the Palestinians - an influential and independent voice in the area.
Palestine tion of .
Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine proclaimed
Marxist which have always played a promiemerged, these have been confor base
"dissidents"
against them.
for bloc has, since document IoI within the PLO in continuing
Palestinian political to trying
Alliance to drop its demand democratic unacceptable ing
Committee settlement, of the PLO).
seriously the PLO is
The Popular Front for the Libera-
(PFLP)
and the
(DFLP), both selforganisations nent role in the politics of the PLO,
Syria, are fully aware of the serious implications of the split. Ever since the split boycott organisations two absolutely central in negotiations with both sides, to try to bring the PLO back together again.
But however correct their efforts to representation pick up the pieces and retrieve the situation, the balance of power in the region seems to be heavily loaded
The PFLP and the DFLP have joined together with the Palestinian Communist Party and the Palestinian
Liberation Front, to form a bloc called the "Democratic Alliance". This been last spring, negotiating on the one hand with the persuade the
Central Committee of Fatah, a basic reuniting all groups a democratic organisation committed to an anti- imperialist struggle (the agreement with the Central Committee being the key to outflanking Aratat by depriving him of the support he needs for his present course while, on the other hand, it has been persuade the National
IoI
Arafat's resignation (this demand be-
Central to the of Fatah, and strongly
Democratic supported by Syria precisely because
Syria wants to prevent the reuniting
So far the Democratic Alliance has achieved one notable success in its
Syria first task in procuring the ratification
Socialist Viewpoint, No. 2, November 1984. Page 16 by the Fatah Central Committee of the "Aden-Algiers Agreement". This document recognises that Arafat's visit to Cairo was a purely personal event, that it contravened PNC decisions and that the PLO is in no way bound by the results of the visit nor any commitment that may have been made. Further, the agreement reaffirms the anti-imperialist line of the PLO stressing the importance of good relations with the Soviet Union and and decisions taken at the Baghdad Summit in 1978 for a total of in the Camp David and non-cooperation with plans. In addition, major organisational measures are contained in the document designed to ensure full of all groups at the leadership level and to prevent "per sonal acts" such as the Cairo visit from occuring in the future.
The Aden Algiers Agreement may be deemed a success in that it contains everything required by the Democratic Alliance as the minimum basis for reconvening all constituent groups to a PNC. However, it is only if the Democratic Alliance is able to
National Alliance to agree to attend a PNC on the basis of this document, that Fatah will be forced to abide by the agreed terms. Without this, there is no doubt that Arafat will continue going his own way regardless.
Persuading the National Alliance to soften its intransigeant stand has proved a harder task. There have been several problems lacing the Democratic Alliance in this task, and it is not entirely clear which ones have been the most important. First of all there is the problem that the
Alliance is based on Syrian soil, which inevitably makes negotiations aimed at breaking the National Alliance from the Syrian position rather tricky - the PFLP have only been allowed to organise ir since 1978, and are no
strangers to Syrian prisons. Secondly contained within the Alliance is Saiqua, whose politics are dictated by the Syrian Ba'athist Party, and which is accordingly opposed to the reunification of the PLO is the slightly different problem of the relation between Syria and the "dissident' group led by Abu Musa: Abu Musa's history as the military hero of the bitter fighting against the Syrian in Tel-al-Za'atar in 1978 leaves no doubt as to his scepticism regarding the Syrian commitment to the Palestianian struggle; however, in chosing to take arms against Arafat and his followers, the "dissidents" were forc: ed into a dangerous dependency on Syria — something that Syria has not been slow to exploit. Finally, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion part of the problem faced by the Democratic Alliance is that it is trying to negotiate with a group which is not only politically heterogeneous — united only in their one demand, but not necessarily in their reasons for demanding it - but also politically immature. exception of Saiqua, groups of the National Alliance are basically military, not groups, and it is possible that it is simply a lack of political experience and understanding that makes them believe that the removal of Arafat will automatically deteat the trend he represents in the PLO
The Democratic Alliance can still reach an agreement with the National Alliance but time is running out. The negotiations were able to take place only because the Alliance has been able to forestall on the one hand Arafat from convening a PNC until an agreement with the National Alliance has been reached and on the other hand the National Alliance from holding its own Conference as an alternative to the PNC. The dire consequences of this balancing act have been the paralysis of the PLO for the last two years.
But the situation cannot be frozen for ever, and there are already indications that the voices of an independent PLO may be loosing the battle. Arafat has recently announc: :
Arafat with Mubarak
National
Thirdly that ed that he has now gathered enough very him to hold a quorate PNC which, if
With the place in Jordan. Algeria, host coun the member the National Alliance. Certain political they entered Jordan, fect, posing the possibility of a PNC which would only political opinions
Democratic
South Yemen in all future negotiations.
the PLO was quences for the
Arab country by measured
Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
betrayal"
which mercial world, struggles
Against it, however
Hafez Al-Assad
"independents" willing to support he "had no alternative" would take try of the previous PNC, has refused to host a PNC which does not include that many leading members of the PFLP any prered Jord h, raptis, in of.
gather political his own.
sympathetic to
There is little doubt that, were he to achieve this, the Conference would the receive the backing of the majority of
Palestinians
Lebanon, i the Arab states - with the exception of Syria and perhaps Algeria and the new body as representing the Palestinian people
The convulsion within the ranks of not without conseof the
Arab rest world. It triggered off major shifts in the pattern of balance of forces. Until which then, the political complexion of any could roughly be its attitude to the
Yemen
After signing the Camp David
Agreement with Israel - perceived by the Arab masses as the "ultimate
Socialist Viewpoint, No. 2, November 1984. Page 17
- Egypt stood alone, outlawed by the Baghdad Summit imposed on it, at least on paper, a severe economic and comboycott. Branded as "stooge of Imperialism and Zionism"
Sadat administration Ian the gauntlet for many years and — for the first time in nearly two decades -lost irremediably its role of incontestable pace-maker of the Arab leading the anti-imperialist oI Arab nationalism. stood a heterogeneous coalition of radical regimes - among them Syria, Libya, Algeria and South Yemen — ready to abuse any government that dared signal an approval, "historic l compromiso" discrete, Egypt's
. Even the powerful Saudis were incapable of nudging a move towards a pro-imperialist settlement and remained cautiously aloof awaiting better days.
It is undeniable that the intransigeant stand by the "radicals" was partly a reflection of the strength of the Palestinian movement. Then the Palestinians represented a powerful force in their Lebanese stronghold which certain regimes like Syria feared and were eager to coax into submission or even neutralise by force if necessary. Others like Libya wanted to play first-fiddle hoping to emerge as the "new leader" of the Arab world, a seat becoming vacant after the demise of Egypt.
The coalition was short-lived. With defeat and scattering of the from their bases in it suffered a death blow. Soon it became incapable of acting as a cohesive bloc able to play an eifective role in coercing the Arab regimes and each of its components pursued unilaterally a specific orientation to suit its interests. The situation was further complicated by the schism inside the ranks of the PLO ensued. Libya, beyond rhetorical calls to Palestinian leaders for martyrdom, lost what limited initiative it ever had. Algeria and South buried themselves in the listless meander of shuttle diplomacy in an attempt to paper the cracks in the PLO ranks.
THE PALE MIND-NE ON
SELF-DETERMINAT ON
Only Syria, by virtue of being physically embroiled in the Lebanese arena, emerged as a strong, powerful voice capable of confronting Israel and was generally reecognised as the masterful leader of the Arab world.
securing a twenty-year "coAtter operation" treaty with the Soviet Union, it threw itself confidently in the Lebanese imbroglio, chalking up resounding successes. During the skirmishes between warring factions and political currents in Lebanon some of them fully-fledged mini-wars — Syria played a skilful role in balancing the political patterns to its ad vantage. At times, it was the "hard cop" throwing its military might behind a favoured side only to crackdown and bludgeon it to the negotiating table if it ran out of control (as in the case of battles between the fundamentalist TAWHID and the Democratic Arab party in Tripoli). At others, it was the "soft cop" ', dishing out advice and supervising truces.
At the Geneva Conference called to settle old scores between Lebanon's warlords and map out a new political order, Syria, despite the presence of the US as observers, bluntly dictated the terms of the agreement. Most importantly, its military strength was decisive in helping prevent the Lebanese left from rescuing their country from the clutches of Zionism and defeat imperialist plans to stablize Lebanon under the aegis of US and European "peace keeping" troops thus tipping it in the camp of Israel. It came out, in the eyes of the Arab masses, with enormous presuge as the true defender of Arab interests. Even the US were quick to recognise the strength of Syria's position and regard it as a serious and valid interlocutor. All top US visitors to the Middle East — from Schultz to Murphy — have included Damascus in their tour of the capitals.
However, last January, the visit to Cairo by Yasser Arafat was a major setback for this ascendency. Beside the turmoil it created in the Palesti-
U.S.-ISRAEL OUT
OF LEBANON
nian camp, it reawakened most of the right wing regimes who may soon stampede to embrace Egypt back into the Ärab fold, indicating their own readiness to surrender to a prosettlement. Cairo Amman re-established diplomatic Mubarak paid a visit to Hussain a week later. After breaking from its
Egypt is now confident that other Arab countries will soon grasp the advantages of the "new realism and show their readiness to go along
Iraq is the next country tipped to re-establish links with Egypt. It has already broken the Baghdad Summit boycott by acquiring vast quantities
Egypt and a healthy commercial flow between the two countries is steadily increasing. Saudi Arabia's criticism was so mute that it was taken as a covert approval.
hysterical threats fooled anybody. Gaddafi's rhetorical hustrated by his support or te "dissidents in the SUO, was heavily tarnished by his union with the King
St Med theo. Teaty of Arab-Arican
"Treaty of Arab-African with his old enemy King Hassan thus cementing the unity of
For the Arab masses, the embrace of Gaddafi the intractable anti-imperialist - and the despotic monarch — the architect of Camp David - was mystifying hocus-pocus. There are already signs that his capitulation to King Hassan deeper than predicted Polisario Liberation Struggle in the Sahara as a gesture of good faith to his newly-found ally, Gaddafi is now busy extricating himself from Chad negotiated by King Hassan preserving the interests o French imperialism in that country. There is little doubt that when the new diplomatic offensive by the right wing Arab regimes starts shaping up, Libya will be skilfully neutralised by King Hassan. Socialist Viewpoint, No. 2, November 1984. Page 18
The American administration was pleasantly suprised by the new turn of events and would certainly like to intervene to shape it into some form of cohesive force with an adequate strategy. It is no coincidence that President Reagan relaunched his old plan for peace which many had considered dead and buried on the same day that Mubarak visited Amman.
But most worrying for the Syrians is the shift in the attitude of the Soviet Union. The visit by an alarmed President Assad to Moscow on October 17 only confirmed his worst fears. In the last few months, the Soviet Union has started a process of building bridges with even the most reactionary Arab regimes. On October 9, a treaty of "co-operation and friendship" (similar to those signed with Syria and South Yemen) was signed between Chernenko and North Yemen President Ali Abdullah Salah. Relations with Egypt are suddenly back to normal. Further, arms deals were negotiated with Kuwait and Iraq, and important openings made to Jordan and Saudi Arabia. It is evident that the Soviet Union were quick to react to the impending right wing alignment and by launching a diplomatic offensive hope to have a say in any settlement that may take place. They have already started canvassing opiinternational conference on the Middle East that would include the US, the Soviet Union, Israel and the Arab parties involved For this to happen, they would need alliances beyond Syria. Exploratory talks with the principal contenders in the conflict a meeting between Gromyko and Shamir at the UN, followed by a meeting with Arafat in East Berlin — are a further indication that the Soviet Union is bracing itself to play a leading role in any carve up that may result from a peace formula.
Israel, however, as the US is well aware, is no US puppet. While the American administration will be well satisfied if it can bring the Arab regimes - in line with Egypt - onto their knees, there is no guarantee that Israel will be satisfied till they are prostrate. Past Israeli governments have repeatedly snubbed Americar response to the Reagan plan — launched in the Autumn of 1982 which hinged on some sort of a confederation between Jordan and the Bank and included a call for a freeze on new settlements — was actually to rate of settlementPalestinian territory. Even the Israeli Labour Party, which has successfully managed to retain a less militant image regarding settlements, has so far refused to commit itself to a settlement freeze, despite constant US pressure.
It is quite clear, to the US at least, that for a settlement to be reached in the Middle East, the Arab states will require sufficient face-savinc cessions from Israel tor them to be able to present their surrender as a successful bargain, to their own
Reagan with Peres masses and to the rest of the world. But although the US has, had no indication that such concessions would be forthcoming Israel, there are good reasons believe that this situation been changing over the last two years
Israel's long history as economic extravagance seems finally to be catching up with it.
Israel is currently facing economic crisis more any it has encountered in its history. Its long tradition of financing massive military expenditure, an increasing standard through substantial loans, from the US, has brought Israel to its disastrous current situation, with an inflation rate topping 1,000% and a level of debt repayment billion out of the country's budget oi $22.5 billion. Senior treasury officials are now claiming that a further $2 billion will have to be chopped from the budget for the government to stand any chance of making headway in improving Israel's economic state of affairs. This would bring Israels expendable budget to a mere $7 billion (this would not only cover all Israel's military expenditure but also health, education, for basic food products and fuel, and the police ) — a total according to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, which is just over halt of what was spent on the conflict" in 1983 alone. It is clear that the economic pressures on Israel to reach a settlement with the forces in the region what is less clear is whether the present political instability evidenced by the results of last June's elections will enable such a settlement reached.
At last June's election, nearly 70% of the electorate gave their voices in equal proportion to Likud Labour, a continued mandate policies started four decades ago until now,
During a dull campaign touching upon trom issue, to quivocally the harmony in their views too has on most issues at many open public debates. So it is hardly suprising that rash they till one ban in seen as a pale imitation of Likud and could not have presented any alterall extreme than native.
As a gaining marginally more seats than
Likud, it actually won fewer seats coupled with than in the 1981 elections — the only of living, electoral gains going to the far-left and far-right parties.
mainly
Israel's first genuine fascist party,
Kach, gained a Knesset member for the first time and, on of $15.5 newly-emerged list, the "soft Zionist" Progressive list for Peace, gained 2 seats.
precipitated recent subsidies
"Palestinian main are immense;
be to and
Fatah fighters to which government
Knesset, doubled reserves dangerously disadvantage
IOW
MAPAM).
scarcely can fundamental presence any both parties expressed une-
"unity
Industry.
Labour was merely
The while consequence,
On the right, the left, the
Palestinian-Jewish
Following the elections, Israel was than a thrashed by into a political crisis
Socialist Viewpoint, No. 2, November 1984. Page 19 left the country without for 52 days, during which time Labour leader Peres was desperately trying to cobble up a majority together out of the hotch-potch of political parties represented in the while Israel's inflation and foreign currency continued to dwindle close to bankruptcy. The Labour Alignment is always at a when it comes to coalition-building, because the nardemands put forward by the myriad of small religious parties as a condig te poems to the Lud, while posing little problems to are deemed unacceptable to certain elements in the Labour Alignment to the left of the Labour Party (notably
With this fact weighted against the Labour Party, and a fourseat lead over Likud in its favour, the possibilities of either side getting together a working coalition seemed remote, and with the pressure of the economic crisis daily increasing, agreement was finally reached on both sides for forming a government of national unity. The breadth of pressures forcing them to join hands best be illustrated by the of butcher Sharon, previously dismissed from the Begin government for his involvement in the Sabra Chatila seas an the peres secured seat in Peres government as Minister for Trade and present Israeli government, not only the main two parties but also their respective coalition partners, leaves a total of 23 out of 120 Knesset members in opposition. An amazing total of one in four Knesset members actually sits in the Cabinet, which has been expanded from 16 to 31 posts (including 6 deputies) in order to permit each major party control of sufficient posts to secure the support of their coalition partners. Under these conditions, the Knesset itself has been reduced to nothing more rubber stamp for decisions the government in
endless inter- and bargaining. So while it is perfectly clear.to all the parties concerned that a settlement is going to reached between Israel neighbouring states in order to prevent the impending slide economic disaster, it remains to be seen whether the present government is capable of taking the necessary teps in this direction he behaviou of Likud joined the government would tend to imply that it has opted for solidating its own rather shaky basis rather than going for government unity. Likud is feeling threatened by the growing Party, Kach, which, like Likud, has its base among the poorer sections of Jewish (Oriental Tearly Sephardi Kahane, the leader of Kach, has been very active during the last year givstreet meetings unemployment (still at very low level compared to Europe and the US) and high deprivation. The rabbi, a classic fascist, blames the Palestinians fo all society's ills, economic ills, and advocates the expulsion of all Palestinians from the country. With Israel experiencing for the first time a prospect of across-theboard job losses, cuts in living staneconomic inscurity and taking into account Israel's long history of inrise of a fascist movement seem ideal. Some opinion polls estimate that durthree months Kahane's election to the Knesset, his popularity trebled.
It is obviously with all this in mind that the Likud has decided to champion the cause of the poorer Israelis, agreements Peres has been trying to moment, by supHistradrut and Government, porting the fistradrut in its opposition to dropping full indexation of wages to inflation and any other form of wages cuts. David Levy, the deputy leader of Likud, whose Moroccan origin makes him a natural choice for PR man, has been outspoken in his aton many of the proposed nounced his Party s intention to gain control of the Histradrut (currently dominated by Labour, which was responsible for the initial creation of the Histradrut). With Kach's exclusion from government putting it in an excellent position against Likud whenever a government policy is seen to result in adverse effects on their joint base, Likud is clearly anxious to publicly disassociate itself, or at least express reservations on beforehand.
The pressures on Likud to move towards Kach on economic issues, are likely to act in the same way over Middle-East, with Likud's unwillingness to be intracoalition an obstacle to proving those minimum even concessions demanded by the prohave to be
West Arab regimes in order to settle.
and her
However, it is exactly here that the economic power of the US could prointo
The ve decisive.
both differ from the extreme racialpurist nationalists who the bases among middle-class settler population of the since it
West Bank (some satisfied with conthe occupied territories, are claiming dollars will soften increasingly
Fascist motivated by motives, the tionalist
Rabbi economic aid.
payment mut 90m more advantageous time.
off, judging from withdrawal of the
Lebanon, gested vaded the
West Bank to be was firmly
Israel, which retuse permission tor anyone to tative of the Palestinians.
these policies tions with King Hussein, who, time, invited
Mubarak for an seen to compromise achieving face-saving Likud and Kach have their mainly white, of whom, not no-compromise over all of Jordan as well). No amount of such a settler; however the working class supporters of Likud and Kach are primarily economic, not naand neither Party will probably be willing to risk being seen to be the block to American
America has given the Peres government substantial concessions with no apparent strings attached. These include: the payment of the entire $2.6 billin grant to Israe for 1985 by the end of October 1984 debts are to US banks); a deal to buy a certain value of military equipment from Israel; the establishment of an free-trade zone; and the future fighter plane, the Levi, to be built in the country. However, all these concessions amount merely to staving-off measures, in particular the decision to bring forward the timing of the 1985 grant rather than to offer more money, and the 6-month rather than annulment. It is likely that the US, possibly in conjunction with Peres, is holding back certain concessions, to be put on the table at a
Such a time might not be too far the speed manoeuverings in the area, especially Jordan. Immediately following the
PLO from the Hussein of Jordan sugreconvening the Jordanian Parliament West Bank in 1967, and frozen since Israel incalled for the one-third of the seats reserved for representatives from the
Preoccupied. This opposed at the time by announed it would may be the tend from the West Bank, and by the (then united) PLO, which rightly interpreted the move as an attempt to bypass the PLO as the sole represennas visited Mubarak, thereby open• ng the way for the Arab regimes to breeak their boycott of Camp David. Arafat has conducted lengthy negoawas hailed by Shamir, the leader of Likud, as "a victory for the peace Socialist Viewpoint, No. 2, November 1984. Page 20
Shamir process within the framework of the Camp David agreements".
Jordan has also been building ties with the USSR, and seems set to come to an agreement which would replace of Jordan's puchases of arms by Soviet weaponry. Finally, Arafat has recently shown shown signs of being about to call a "PNC" supporters in Jordan.
of support for the host
When the Peres government was desire to start negotiations with Jordan. King Hussein rejected the offer immediately, but that is unlikely to be the end of the story. However inflexible Likud might want to appear, the fact is that Shamir, too, has been involved in lengthy discus-
USSR. It looks very much as if, while all sides are doing their best to appear absolutely opposed to coming to a deal with the other side, all sides are also up to their behind-the-scenes manoeuvering in a subtle diplomacy that involves both of the powers, as well as the major states in
While it is difficult to predict the final shaping of these different ingredients and the pace of their dynamic, it is certain that US imperialism, once the elections are over, will mount a major offensive to speed up its trajectory towards a settlement that will suit its interest. The fly in the ointment masses, who in many instances during the past year — in Tunisia, last January in Morrocco and last September in Egypt -have vented their anger and frustration in desperate uprisings repressed in blood. It remains to be seen how they will react and whether the scope of that reaction would upset the current balance of forces and political
Labour Movement Campaign for Palestine.
28 Carlton Mansions,
Holmleigh Road, London N16.