Battle for the Sahara
IN November 1975, as the old
dictator Franco lay dying.
Spain in a tripartite secret deal
handed over the sovereignty of
its colonies of Western Sahara
to both Morocco and
Mauritania.
Days later, King Hassan ordered
his henchmen to start executing his
plans for the conquest of the Western
Sahara and the subjugation and
assimilation of the Sahraouis.
Under the cover of a "spontaneous
invasion" by tens of thousands of
Moroccan civilians — the infamous
"green march", meticulously and
lavishly masterminded from the
Palace - the Moroccan Royal Army
swiftly moved in on the steps of the
departing Spanish troops. The elite
battalions — some of the best trained
in Africa - rose to the occasion:
their shiny armour and sharp morale
were deemed enough to make the ..THAT POINTS TO A STEADILY ...AMERICAN INYOLVEMENT.. INCREASING...' ADVISERS
Socialist Viewpoint No. 12 May 1986p15
JACK GOLDBERG looks at the bitter struggle of the Saharan people for self determination. whole operation a quick pushover. King Hassan's overture was a triumph.
Not content with simply occupying strategic positions, the Moroccan army set out to crush any potential threat to its colonizing plans. Mirage and F5 fighters soon roamed the skies, systematically bombing the defenceless camps where thousands of Sahraouis took refuge from the advancing army.
King Hassan wanted a thoroughlyplanned and well executed genocide and ordered no quarter to be given: napalm and phosphorus bombs turned the camps of Tifarit, Amgala, El Guelta and Oum Dreigua into vast cemeteries.
But as the Moroccan strategists unfolded their genocidal plans, little did they know that a few miles away at Bir Lahlou, an event of momentus importance was taking place. On February 21, 1976, the President of
...IN CENTRAL AMERICA. L'ES
the Sahraouis Provisional National Council and the Secretary General of the Polisario Front declared the independence of the Democratic Republic.
This was no mere paper exercise. It was the crowning act of decades of resistance to colonialism and the most direct challenge to the newly-signed Madrid tripartite agreement primanly designed to deprive the Sahraoui people of their right to self determination.
Today the Polisario Front (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro) celebrates with pride the tenth anniversary the Republic. And looking at the impressive balance sheet achievements they have every reason to display such confidence.
The birth of the SADR was a direct reaction to the Moroccan invasion; but the fight for self-determination began a century ago in 1885 when Spain incorporated the area into its Empire.
As early as 1910, Spain appointed by royal decree a governor to the provinces, who, for the next twenty years, tried to consolidate Spanish presence on the coast and prepared plans for expansion inside the territories. This consolidation was achieved with little difficulty as the Sahraouis were busy resisting French penetration their bases in Southern Morocco.
But it was not until after the victory of Franco in Spain state in the classic sense established in the whole of the province. Franco, like his allies, dreamt of an empire.
Between 1939 and 1944, Western Sahara became the subject of attention. Plans were made for towns, airports, harbours, lines, military bases and minerals' ex-
Canary blee D. 6 U Saharan Arab %.El Ayour ATLANTIC OGEAN Dakhi of Nouadhibou of their and lucrative colony. plans were scrapped elsewhere independence from national determination. that a colonial was precolonial state, 1960s, where communication Saharan
MOROCCO pression Polisario Front. MAURITANIA enquiry ritories, categorically - International boundary **- Disputed MoroccanSaharan boundary Moroccan Wall ... stages 1-4 - I- stage 5 Mies, 300 circumvent Km favourable to ploration — a blueprint for a thriving
But the outcome of World War Il brought to an between end such ambitious schemas and the
It was not until 1957 that the colonial administration was awakened from its slumber by serious waves of other, Insurrection by the Sahraoui people. This came at a time where the whole continent was shaken by the rapid growth of a nascent nationalism and, as in in Western Sahara, the new ding political and social changes created conditions for the growth of a new political consciousness that rejected colonial domination and demanded
Tand self
Historically there were two phases: the first lasted for thirty years where a slow but progressive implantation ot a colonial state replaced a moribund
creating an embrvonic infrastructure for a modern state. This reached its peak in the
Othe second phase started with the birth of nationalism. This last stage saw the creation of the
Liberation Movement in factor" to Socialist Viewpoint No. 12 May 1986 pl6
1968 which became the conscious ex-
Cof that nationalism. The movement organised a generalised insurrection in June 1970 and later on gave way to the formation of the
In May 1975, the UN commission of
reported "Inside the terthe whole population is in favour independence and against the claims of Morocco and Mauritania (...). The Polisario Front appears to be the dominant political force.
The conspirators, in an attempt to
Tany UN declaration self determination, brought their plans forward; and the Madrid agreement was concluded
Spain, Morocco and Mauritania. For Spain it achieved two objectives: on the one hand, it ensured protection of its economic and strategic interests in the area; on the
during the delicate transition from Franco's dictatorship to the Juan Carlos monarchy, it was paramount that the Spanish armed forces were not seen to be humiliated, and han-
Sover sovereignty to Morocco was deemed more "dignified" than giving way to guerrillas they had battled with for decades.
Mauritania played a subordinate role to Morocco. Being itself under consistent claim by Morocco since the early sixties, it was too weak and too unstable to resist any initiative proposed by its powerful neighbour.
The third conspirator, King Hassan, couldn't have dreamt of a grander plan. After two attempted military coups, and facing vigorous opposition by a powerful and well organised proletariat, the King was looking desperately for a "Falkland
revive his flagging
RAZ NEST RETONEY AINDErO popularity and distract a combative proletariat from the ravages of a worsening economic crisis.
But most importantly he needed to neutralise his political opposition. A foreign adventure, a national cause proved the perfect motive around which he could unite everybody. And everyone fell for it! Every single component of the political spectrum
including the Communist Party (PPS) supported and applauded every of the King's rantings.
Having nothing to fear from inside his country, the King then proceeded with his plans for colonisation and genocide. At the same time, he masterminded a disinformation campaign, giving legitimacy to his claim. He even took his case to the International Court in the Hague hoping that UN jurists would accept the authenticity of his "proof".
The relevance of his campaigning, besides winning supporters, was to trivialise the nature of the conflict, which he purported to be a simpie conflict about borders. What he attempted to blur was the weight of imperialism behind him and the importance of the conflict in global and strategic terms.
But his efforts did not fool anybody, least of all the Sahraouis themselves. They, very soon, realised the titanic task that was needed to check a mighty army of 120,000 soldiers equipped by French and US imperialism.
For the last ten years, the young republic has set out, with the help of its Algerian protectors, to build a modern army capable of taking up the challenge and reversing the early pushover of the Moroccan troops.
The tenacity and determination of the Sahraoul fighters made up for
Sahraoul women have joined the armed struggle. their inexperience and their inferior hardware — in the early years of the war most of the equipment used was in fact captured from the invaders. Soon the young army grew in strength and confidence, and the Mauritanian army was the first to be put out of action.
This was shortly followed by the decision of President Ould Dadda to renounce his claim and pull out of the war. In fact | his regime never recovered from his short involvement in the occupation and was soon toppl ed by a military coup led by Khouna Duld Haidafla, who later recognised the Saharan Republic.
Boosted by this unexpected turn of events, the Sahraouis were in a better position to rebuff the French airforce intervention that ensued. From then on, they squared up to the Moroccan army. Their hit-and-run tactics and ambushes inflicted severe blows on demoralised troops, which hastily retreated back to the coast.
Today the ALPS (Saharan Army) controls some two Western Sahara, and the beleagured Moroccan army stretch of 1,200 miles made of 5 defence sand "walls". These "walls" - one of the latest inventions of US strategists - stuffed with listening devices and radar, means left for the stabilise the line of confrontation with the ALPS.
In this, the "walls" have more or less succeeded. The Sahraouis have proved in several instances that the walls are not invulnerable and several operations they mounted inflicted heavy casualties: but they only remain psychological victories and the war is at a standstill.
But a stalemate on the military terrain doesn't mean a breathing space for King Hassan. His elite troops took a good hiding, something he couldn't afford.
Firstly the whole adventure has become horribly expensive. One hundred and twenty thousand troops tied up for ten years at a cost of $3 million a day was a tremendous Socialist Viewpoint No, 12 May 1986p17
burden on an economy already facing collapse — if it was not for the generosity of his Saudi bankmasters.
Secondly the war has become terribly unpopular. What started as a perfect cause to unite the Moroccan people behind him, has become an embarrassment. Besides a rapid loss of credibility, King Hassan has now to face up to an angry proletariat ted up with the costs of the war. In two instances he had to order troops into the streets to quell massive insurrec-
And finally, the open lavish support by Imperialism has exposed the role played by King Hassan in the imperialist plans for the Arab world. Cing Hassan would be foolhardy if he went on pretending that this was a more local skirmish over borders. The involvement of France, and the US in propping up the tottering Hassan's regime and supporting his war, shows the extent to which they value his survival as a cast iron guarantee for the continuation their domination of the area.
Any threat throne will seriously endanger their plans, and it is in fact this least predictable outcome that is becoming a serious
This is the single most important Polisario military strategists have put
Ta strong and trusted friend of the West. His departure would not only expose NATO southern flanks but would also undermine the reactionary axis in the Arab world and shift decisively the current balance of forces.
These military successes have been complemented by equally significant
From the day it independence, the Saharan Republic used every means possible to win recognition.
From the corridors of the United Nations to the stormy meetings of the Organisation of African Unity, the Sahraoui diplomats arqued relentlessly for their right to exist as a recognised independent state.
Here again King Hassan's strategy was blown apart. After initially using the long arm of imperialism to maintain support for his claim, he soon got rattled by the swelling support for the Republic. And in losing patience, he lost many friends and made several tactical blunders, walking in and out of meetings and reneging on agreements.
Tpday, the Saharan Republic is recognised by 63 countries, and is a full member of the OAU Morocco has opted out. However, Yugoslavia is the only European country to have recognised the SADR and the Soviet Union is a notable absentee.
For ten years, the Polisario fought tenaciously to isolate King Hassan. Every recognition was seen as a nail in his coffin. But winning recognition is one thing, and putting too much faith in the UN is another. Now that the war is at a stalemate and although in a strong position, the SADR seems
be looking to mongering as a means to unlock the situation. Resolution AHG 104(XIX) passed by the OAU has now been bandied about by the Sahraouis as an acceptable basis for negotiating with King Hassan.
If negotiating recognition, it would seem a step forward for the SADR. But what terms would they deem acceptable? A shareout of the territories? A Confederation? At present this is still unclear and entering any negotiation with ill-defined objectives may lose them all the gains they have cumulated for the last decade.
Blind faith in diplomatic processes is a characteristic feature of many nationalist movements. This stems from the inadequacies of their program-
mes for power. While in most in-
stances, they reflect the anti-
imperialist consciousness
masses, they invariably avoid dealing
with the class question.
And the Polisario front is no excep-
tion. When winning recognition
generally perceived as a priority, it
Labour Movement
Campaign for Palestine
AGM Islington Town Hall Saturday May 3lst 10.00-5.00 For further details
please contact Secretary
Deadline for resolutions May 17th
while eradicated was has become free and compulsory. all its trappings drawbacks. A UN resolution- differentiate term, stratum. Islamic laws means mutual lives, still are ac- of the
makes sense to create a state - even an artificial one — in order for it to be recognised. And that is what the Polisario leadership set out to do. Out of the 165,000 Sahraouis that fled to the liberated areas a people's army was created, and this has proved crucial in the success of the guerilla war. Schools were built and illiteracy after four summer campaigns (1). Education for youth bones But the desire to create a state with the has also serious state machinery is created with a permanent bureaucracy that will, in the long ing class into a specific are encoded adopting and provide the framework for the judicial system. Women, despite the enormous impact of the war on their expected to play a Irish solidarity AVA Labour Committee on Ireland: BM Box 5355, London WC1N 3XX. Socialist Viewpoint No. 12 May 1986 p18
traditional role. The fact that they now run the rear bases makes little difference to their gender role.
The ambiguities and omissions are equally serious in the political programme, where there is little mention of socialism although egalitarianism seems a much vaunted traditional Sahraoul value.
Also while the Polisario makes no
about its hatred for King Hassan's regime and exposes at every opportunity its imperialist masters,
SADR defines itself as "non-aligned". Rather than throw its lot with the oppressed Moroccan masses, and look upon the international work-
Tas its natural ally. the Polisario leadership is increasingly
Othe inescapable gobbledegook of the "third world" fraternity devoid of class content and even devoid of anti-imperialist rhetoric.
WHY MITTERRAND STILL THINKS HE IS
Mitterrand: thumbs up for the future? Topsy-turvy world of social democracy WINNING MAY 10, 1981 went down in | in January 1982, the "cantons" elec- French labour history as a day to remember. Workers, in their thousands, filled the streets to of a celebrate the election socialist government - "their" victory and "their" government. But for the next 5 years, the French hopes working class saw their gradually dashed, and soon discovered that the government of the left was far from prepared to start shifting the balance of power away from the bosses, let alone challenge capitalism and create a new "social order". Euphoria quickly gave way to bitter disappointment. The slide towards demoralisation finally came home to roost last March 16. Then the legislative elections for the National Assembly produced a the French new rearrangement of political map. They painted a picture that had already started emerging in the course of every election since 1981: the partial legislative elections
tions in March 1982, the municipal elections in March 1983, the "senate" elections in September 1983, the European elections in June 1984 and the "cantons" elections again in March 1985.
Throughout these elections, two distinct electoral trends gradually took shape. One was very visible, even seemingly irreversible, and concerned the progress of the Comunist Party (PCF, Parti Communiste Francais) and the National Front (FN, Front National). The PCF has been on a steady downcurve since 1981 losing votes by the hundreds of thousands, while the National Front was broadly on an upward trajectory, displacing the PCF as the third main political force.
The second trend was more confused and concerned the changing balance of the Socialist Party (PSI, Parti Socialiste) and the forces of the Right. Their evolution throughout the Socialist Viewpoint No. 12 May 1986 p19
By JIM ROBERTS 5 years has been more difficult to predict. The basic characteristics that usually point towards a certain trajectory were in themselves shaky and uncertain.
For example, it became widely accepted that if the forces of the Right were united, they would have enough of a majority to form a government. But while leaders of its main components buried their differences and agreed a hastily-assembled political programme, the coalition that emerged remained fragile and sailed precariously throughout the election campaign risking disintegration even before polling day.
As for the Socialist Party, while disillusioned workers have no confidence in Mitterrand, it still remained to be seen how many of them would vote for him as an instinctual class reaction to block the Right from coming to power.
It is important to recognise and follow through these trends not as a purely academic exercise, but because Mitterrand in his endeavour to change the French political landscape has created conditions for some of these trends and, in some in-
stances, has manipulated them to suit his long-term strategic objectives.
The broad results of the elections had long been predicted, but the final precise allocation of seats was of a paramount importance to the main protagonists. How many points the socialists were able to score above 30% proved a nationwide cliffhanger throughout the evening until the last
So it is not simply a case of a pendulum motion where Right replaces left as a consequence of Mitterrand's betrayals, although there is some truth in that. The new political landscape is quite different from the last elections where two coalitions faced each other - the union of the left comprising PS and PC, and the forces of the Right which was also equally divided into RPR and UDF.
Today's fragmented picture is the result of more complex processes — some of them of a distortive nature such as proportional representation (which may eventually be scrapped by the new government).
But the results in themselves were not surprising. Mitterrand's brand of socialism has left millions of workers demoralised, and this was best illustrated in the percentage of absten-
The largest section of those voting went for the parties of the Right (UDF & RPR) which took some 42% of the vote with 275 seats between them. With the help of 14 non-aligned right wingers and 2 independents, the new majority stands at 291 seats.
The coalition of the PS and MRG (Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche) polled some 31.48% which will give them 215 seats. The PCF and the FN obtained 9.81% and 9.72% respectively, which will give them an equal number of seats - 35 each, while the defeat of the PS was plain to see, the festive scenes at the party HQ where faithfuls popped champagne corks made sense. Later, on television, Lionel Hospin, secretary of the PS, explained their exuberant mood:
Othe Socialist Party has confirmed its steady historical progression. After being an intelligent and imaginative party of opposition from 1971 to 1981, it has become after the 1981 victory a party of government. After 5 years and facing a very hard fight. it has realised the highest poll since its foundation in 1905 - with the exception of the 1981 vote which was more of a referendum to confirm Mitterrand's presidency. (...) The PS is now the first political force in this country. its parliamentary
Рожк Right wing leaders Lecannet and D'Estaing group the biggest in the National Assembly. The coalition of the Right has not achieved its objective. Its majority remains fragile and its leaders divided. The PCF is in decline. victim of its divisive policies. The FN is not doing as well as in the last European elections.
For 5 years, we have served the country well (...) The economy is in progress, social peace is back again. French people have already recognised this and we must prepare for the future..."
This speech was no meaningless demagogic swagger of a defeated politician. What Hospin emphasised constituted the main lines of the Socialists' central strategy since the abandonment of the "Union of the Left" programme in 1982 and the U. turn to austerity policies.
Othe PS-PCE government in 1981 was the culmination of a long process of radicalisation which started in May 1968. A few years later, Mitterrand undertook to build a mass Socialist Party. Central to his project was a tactical alliance with the Communist Party (PCF) Socialist Viewpoint No. 12 May 1986 p20
which until then had paraded as the mass party of the working class.
The alliance suffered ups and downs as the two partners bickered on questions of programme, and political differences, culminating in a formal break in 1977. Mitterrand cleverly used the partnership to beef up his credibility and poach members and voters from the PCF. Workers rightly saw the "Union of the Left" as the only way to break 20 years of rightwing governments, and they cautiously pressed General Secretary Georges Marchais and other leaders of the PCF to form a united front of workers' organisations against the capitalist class. Marchais was definitely became the junior partner in a nonexistent alliance dominated by Mitterrand, and they ended up supporting each other in the 1981 elections.
Soon after, Marchais was further ensnared by Mitterrand who made him a partner in government by appointing four Communist ministers. As soon as Mitterand came to power, it became clear that he had no intention of carrying out his full programme. Despite a comfortable working majority, he started to soft-pedal even before the weak and divided parties of the capitalist class began to reconstruct their forces.
The cornerstone of Mitterrand's programme was his handling of the economy. And it was here that the expectation of the working class was at its highest. His approach seemed simple and achievable even in capitalist terms. Reflate the economy and satisfy the basic economic demands of workers. For this he proposed firstly to increase consumption in order to stimulate production; once this was done it would naturally reduce unemployment. Finally as the economy reached full productive capacity, developing the nationalised sector would ensure a bigger share of state control on the economy as a whole.
While the theories looked neat, the reality was something completely different. In fact