Mitterrand stumbled at the first hurdle. Despite promises to increase the minimum legal wage (SMIC) by 30%, as part of his efforts to stimulate the economy and to make up the workers' loss of purchasing power since 1968, he could only manage a 10% increase. His plans for a strong public sector were modified. Subsidiaries of some of the giant enterprises listed for nationalisation were left in private hands. Generous over-compensation was paid to small shareholders in those state takeovers. Managing directors of the newly na-
CFDT-FO-CCC-FEN
CGT. CFDT FO-CG FRONT COMMUN SYNDICAL. USINOR BASSIN DE LONGWY French unions under the hammer from Mitterrand's austerity measures. tionalised giants (Rhone-Poulenc, PUK, CGE, St Gobain, Thomson) were picked from the ranks of the CNPF (equivalent of the CBI) and asked to draw up production plans "working towards maximum economic efficiency through the con- tinual Improvement of competitiveness". While the public sector grew in size, workers' conditions and their relationship with their management were no different from before. Rather than using the nationalised sector to the economy for the reorganise class and benefit of the working achieve full employment Mitterrand chose other means to tinker with the system. Despite hand outs of billions capitalists through of francs to direct grants and tax ex- rebates, onerations, only 17,000 jobs were created in one year. Unemployment climbed to 2 million, an increase of 350,000 in 1981. By the end of the 5-year term it topped the 3 million mark. The few measures in favour of workers, such as the 39 hour week, were not decisively imposed by the government. It was left to workers to fight it out with their bosses: more than 650 firms were affected, and several hundred thousand workers struck at one time or another. year in office, the After one
VILLERUPT R OVIMATE SLV 5 ERL F.E LONGW economic strategy was in tatters. Stuck between a combative working class demanding more concessions and a ruling class still divided but unwilling to participate in the eocnomic plans, Mitterrand and his prime minister Mauroy soon faced a huge deficit in the balance of payments and a jump in inflation.
Their response was predictable: deflation, salary freeze, contraction of the economy, and redundancies in the state sector. "Austerity" ecame a key word in every speech. For workers it meant hardship and misery. For the capitalist class, it meant bigger profits and a new confidence. In fact the bosses never needed to threaten a frontal attack to defeat Mitterrand. Не тап out of steam and reversed without being provoked.
For French workers, there was no way out. The Communist Party was too compromised to offer any alternative. By the time its ministers left the government in 1984, it was too late and besides, the largest trade union confederation, the PCF-led CGT, controlled the most militant sectors and refused to give any lead for a fightback.
Mitterrand understood, when making his U-tum, that he would ultimately lose the confidence of the working class, so he started preparSocialist Viewpoint No. 12 May 1996 p21
HOESTAME REDOA ing for the next elections.
There are some conspiracy theorists who seem fond of painting Mitterrand as a Machiavellian shadowy figure hatching complex plots from dark corners of the Elysée palace. In reality, in the absence of any vigorous opposition within his party (the one time "left" ginger group CERES having shifted to the right and the left faction PSU having lost much of its impact) Mitterrand confidently carried the majority of his party behind him.
His strategy is a well worn panacea of many a cross-class popular front government. Mitterrand realised that an electoral conjuncture similar to the 1981 period was unlikely to occur again. His only chance to keep the PS in power was to break up the bipolarisation of French politics.
His early objective of marginalising the PCF was already reaping subtantial dividends as the Communist Party faded away. His next objective was to try and influence the division of the Right. For this, he introduced proportional representation which lavoured the rise of the National Front, outflanking the traditional right. This was sufficient to weaken the comeback by the Right on March 16 — in fact their absolute majority is of 2 seats only.
As a result, Mitterrand found
himself in a more powerful position than anticiapted. He asked Jacques Chirac, Mayor of Paris and leader of the RPR, to form a government.
As President Mitterrand now feels in a much more comfortable position to use his power of veto — which is part of his presidential perogative but is still an untested grey area of the constitution of the Fifth Republic -to block any legislation that he deems unacceptable.
No wonder the socialist Party's HQ was in an ebullient mood as significant parts of these objectives were fulfilled
The PCF was the big loser, having achieved its lowest poll since 1932. Compared to the heyday of the Resistnace, when the Communist Party used to poll 5.5 million votes (28.6%) and paraded 166 deputies, the Party has slumped forty years later to become the fourth if not the fifth ranking political force in the country. This poor performance will prove another historical test for the party.
Already several prominent dissenters are calling the leadership to account. Pierre Juquin, Central Committee member, bas made a pubic call similar to Henri Fizbin in 1984. The leadership so far has refused to take up any of the criticism. L'humanité has blacked out any reference to the internal turmoil and blindly pressed on with well-worn slogans such as "the socialists have opened the door for the Right."
As the crisis deepens, the PCF leadership does not seem prepared to make the slightest concession. Instead they dismissed the call for a special congress as futile and declared that "the only correct way forward was to implement the slogan
the XXVth Congress, organise and take action'."
Just to rub salt in the wounds, the PCF ended neck and neck with the National Front, the big newcomers to the French Assembly. From one seat, the FN jumped to 35 and were able fo the first time to form a parliamentary
While some analysts tend to dismiss these fascists as an inflated phenomenon brought about by the newly-introduced proportional representation, the score they realised in the South of the country is a reminder they are here to stay - 25% in Perpignan, 22.5% in Marseilles. As long ago as the last European elections they put to the test for the first time their shiny new electoral machine covering all constituencies. They have now built a small but significant base and obvious business
Fascist leader Le Pen, winning business backing. backing that will not dissipate overnight even if proportional representation is abolished.
Unlike their British counterparts, they have projected successfully a respectable image and with judicious programme on law and order and anti-immigration have cap tured valuable terrain from the traditional Right.
It is for this reason, that Jacques
leader of the RPR, has reapeatedly denounced them as racists and ruled out any operation, refusing to include them in his coalition. This may not be a final decision. Jean-Marie le Pen, leader of the FN, has exposed instances where local RPR candidates have made pacts with the FN. In the RPR and the FN have emerged as natural allies and have put together a working majority. This is not an isolated case and it is probable that in the long run Chirac will have to reconsider co-operating with the FN if he ever needs to strengthen his
On the whole, the Right is plagued by several problems. Having come back to power with a vengeance, its room for manoeuvre is tighter than it leaders had hoped for.
• Firstly the National Front is squeezing their support on the right. Having exploited to the full the feeling of insecurity of sections of the middle and working class on the question of law and order, and played up to their jingoistic instincts on the question of immigration, the FN has colonised, at least for the time Socialist Viewpoint No. 12 May 1986 p2a
being, a good proportion of their electorate.
• Secondly, the coalition of the parties of the right is unavoidably unstable, and may not last long. This is due to the diversity of the ideological and historical traditions of its components. Chirac's RPR sees itself as a true inheriter of Gaullism. The leadership of the other big formation, the UDE, is strongly contested by its 3 biggest components, the CDS, the Republican Party and the Radical Party.
To complicate things, strong personalities have their own axes to grind, and among the ex-megastars Barre, Jean Lecanuet, etc. — it is still too early to predict who will emerge as a winner. What unites them is their hatred of the working class and their determination to reverse any of the gains, however puny, that have been achieved during the last 5 years.
While all the contenders are biding their time, Chirac will use his headstart to put himself in the best possible position to take up Mitterrand at the presidential election in 2 years' time. So, for this reason, it is still unclear how Chirac is going to square up to Mitterrand. What has been coined the "cohabitation" - a unique situation in the history of the fifth Republic — has proved so far smooth and unproblematic.
Cof "goodd housekeeping" at the expense of the working class, Mitterrand has served the bourgeoisie all too well - the economy is more stable, profits are not unhealthy and even a beginning of real growth is on the horizon.
Chirac is aware that to implement the economic programme of the platform of the Right would alter what is being achieved and might spoil unnecessarily any chance of him gradually gaining an edge over Mitterrand - his only chance of becoming President in two years' time.
This is what many analysts see as the "success" of Mitterrand. For workers it is far from a success story. It is a feeling of betrayal and demoralisation: 3 million unemployed, decimation of whole industries, reduction in the standard of living, fascists in parliament. This is the France of Mitterrand, It sums up the limitation of social democracy in crisis-ridden capitalism.
Incapable of delivering any more concessions to the working class, it will continue to prey on workers through coalitionism or electoral manoeuvres for the sole purpose of surviving to save the skin of the most wretched capitalism.
Kinnock's purge comes adrift
Fight back against the witch-hunt! By PETE FIRMIN THE intentions of Kinnock and the Labour right to expel leading Militant supporters in Liverpool and ensure a more Labour Group is compliant elected floundered on March 26. Following a court ruling the previous day that those who had conducted the inquiry into Liverpool District