Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2009

Federal tanks crush the old Yugoslavia

· Socialist Outlook no. 6, July 20 1991 · 2,262 words

Balkans

YUGOSLAVIA is heading inexorably to war. Probably sooner than later, the drive by Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic for a 'Greater Serbia' will lead to a renewed attack on Slovenia and, especially, Croatia. What are the historical roots of this crisis? Socialist Outlook talked to MICHELE LEE about what lies behind the Serbian drive for domination.

SO: When Tito's Communists came to power in 1945, how was the national question dealt with?

ML: The Communist approach to the national question was determined before and during the war – already by 1943 it was clear that the new Yugoslavia would by a federation based on national equality. In other words, on this issue the Communists followed Lenin. The old Yugoslavia had come into existence in 1918 through the joint efforts of political representatives of three Yugoslav nation only – Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. The idea was that Yugoslavia would ensure their common freedom from foreign domination, while allowing their individual national unification. The Communists went further and talked of national self-determination as a universal right, which should thus be granted also to the Macedonian, Moslem and Montenegrin populations.

Hence the partisan war was a triple war – for liberation from foreign invasion and fascism; for the overthrow of capitalism; and for the establishment of national states of the six South Slav nations, within the framework of the Yugoslav federation.

This in practice meant limiting the power of Serbia, which had dominated pre-war Yugoslavia. In the war, the Communists appealed directly to the Serb population, arguing that they had everything to gain by Yugoslavia becoming a state of equal nationalities. This policy was translated into the federal system. The borders of the partisan command-areas followed the borders of present-day republics and provinces. It should by said that the Albanian population wished from the start to be joined with Albania. After war there were plans to create a broader Balkan federation, within which there would be an Albanian federal unit. Once this plan had fallen through, the Yugoslav government had to solve the Albanian national question within Yugoslavia.

Despite this federal structure, for the first fifteen years or so political power remained centralised. However, during the 1960s and 1970s, there was a shift of power to the republics and provinces, resulting in the adoption of a new constitution in 1974. This constitution was revolutionary in the sense that it elevated the two provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina to the status of full federal members. It is this arrangement of 1974 that Milosevic and co. destroyed, starting with its forced incorporation of Kosovo and Vojvodina into Serbia.

SO: What is your assessment of Yugoslavia under Tito – was it Stalinist?

ML: Yes and no. The revolution which brought the Communists to power was a genuine, popular revolution – communist rule in Yugoslavia (or Albania) was not imposed from outside, as in other countries of eastern Europe. But at the time of the revolution the working class was weak, amounting to less than ten per cent of the total population. This meant that, in a sense, the Communist Party made the revolution on its behalf. Moreover, the party's need to build a base among the peasantry influence also its political and cultural outlook.

On the other hand, Tito himself was a product of the Stalinised Comintern. He remained convinced that the revolutionary gains of 1941-5 could be preserved only by the party controlling all political and economic life. More generally, the authoritarian features of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (later League of Communists) were enhanced by the fact that the revolution took place in war-time conditions.

SO: What lay behind the split between Moscow and Belgrade during the late 1940s?

ML: Simply that Stalin wanted to control the Yugoslav party. He wanted the same relationship with Yugoslavia, one of total subordination, which existed with other East European countries. This was a matter of life and death for the Yugoslav party, and also for Yugoslavia. Domination by Moscow would have meant not only direct placement of Stalin's chosen people in power, but also an end to national equality within Yugoslavia, i.e. the return of Serbia to its pre-war dominant position.

It is worth mentioning in this context Tito's special relationship with the army. The army always had a strong party organisation: over 95 per cent of the officers were party members. The army came to political prominence in the early 1970s, when it backed Tito's decision to institute a mass purge of party leaders in Croatia and Serbia, and to a lesser extent in Slovenia and Macedonia. In the re-organisation of the party structure that followed, the army gained a place on the party presidency. After Tito's death, no Yugoslav politician had quite the same influence.

SO: How do you assess the Yugoslav experience with self-management?

ML: Yugoslavia's attempt to escape the problems of excessive economic centralisation through the introduction of self-management was also a very important social experiment in that it involved tens of thousands of blue and white-collar workers in the running of their enterprises. The experiment failed for essentially two reasons. The first reason is that one cannot have socialism, even self-managing socialism, in one country. In the 1960s, it became clear that Yugoslavia had to integrate itself more into the world economy, and this meant also accepting many of its rules. This strengthened the hand of management at the expense of the workers' councils. The second reason is that the introduction of self-management did not run in parallel with the extension of democracy: the party continued to take all the important economic decisions.

SO: If the form of the current crisis is the drive by the Milosevic leadership for domination, and the building of a 'Greater Serbia', what really lies behind it all? Why did Yugoslavia go into crisis?

ML: There are several reasons for this, of which perhaps the most important was the growing economic crisis. Once the first phase of industrialisation had been completed (by the late 1950s), the next stage involved modernising the economy and creating new industrial branches. In the 1970s, much of the necessary investment came from heavy borrowing from abroad, which led to a huge national debt by the early 1980s. As the economy worsened, there was growing unemployment and general lowering of living standards. Also, the gap between the more and less developed parts of the country grew, intensifying the struggle over distribution of resources.

The economic problems were joined to political ones. When Tito died, in 1980, there was a political vacuum, leading to a power struggle among the federal units. As a part of this struggle, a coup took place within the Serbian Communist Party, organised by a group of generals and party state functionaries, bringing Milosevic to power.

The Yugoslav army (i.e. its high command) decided to back Milosevic, without surrendering any of its independence. The army did not like the introduction of the multi-party system, so was hostile both to the reformer in the Slovene and Croatian Communist Parties and to the governments that emerged out of the multi-party elections of April 1990. In these and subsequent elections, the Communists' loss of power everywhere except Serbia and Montenegro led to a political pact between Milosevic and the army. The generals were ready to back Milosevic partly because they favoured a recentralised Yugoslavia, partly because he was/is a Communist conservative, partly because they wanted to safeguard their material and political privileges and partly because most of them were Serb. We thus witnessed a complete turn around. The original Communist project was to safeguard the unity of Yugoslavia by limiting the power of Serbia; now, as far as the generals and Milosevic were concerned, the unity of Yugoslavia could be guaranteed only by Serbia's dominance.

Today, the process of 'Serbianisation' of the army is proceeding apace. Non-Serb officers are being replaced; any non-Serb is regarded with suspicion.

SO: What is Milosevic's programme for a Greater Serbia? Is he prepared to drive Slovenia out of the federation? Surely this would be irrational, given the concentration of wealth in the western part of the federation?

ML: There is an impression that Serbia wants to drive Slovenia out in order to be better able to impose its domination on the others – particulary Croatia. You have to remember that in the original Yugoslav state after 1918 Slovenia was only added at the insistence of the Croats and the Slovenes; for the Serbs, Slovenia was an optional extra.

My guess is that the recent army attack on Slovenia was not motivated mainly by a drive to keep them in the federation, but to secure the borders temporarily in order that Croatia could not be supplied from the West. The key aim is to deal with and subordinate Croatia and with it the rest of Yugoslavia. When the war comes, as seems absolutely inevitable, it will take the form of an all-out attack on Croatia.

As far as the economic rationality of driving out Slovenia is concerned, well it is not economically rational – but then the Serbian leadership is not thinking in economically rational, but politically-rational terms.

SO: How have politics developed in the past period in Croatia and Slovenia?

ML: Slovenia and Croatia differ greatly. Unlike Croatia, Slovenia is ethnically homogeneous. Moreover, the 1972 party purge did not affect Slovenia as much as it did Croatia. Finally, Slovenia started to liberalise much earlier, in the mid-1980s, when the reforming wing of the local Communist party gained the upper hand over the conservatives. This led to the establishment of liberal regime, with the de facto freedom of expression and assembly.

In 1988 the army tried to put a stop to this process of political democratisation in Slovenia, contemplating at one point even outright intervention. They arrested three Mladina journalists (one of whom was Janez Jansa, Slovenia's current Minister of Defence) and an army sergeant, on the grounds that they had stolen a secret military document. the trial of the four led to a mass mobilisation of the Slovene population in defence of national and democratic rights.

Though in the elections of April 1990 the Communists were defeated, by a right-of-centre nationalist coalition DEMOS, they remained the largest party. Indeed Milan Kucan, their leader, was elected president of the republic. Despite the frequent complaints that the DEMOS government is authoritarian, Slovene political life is more open and democratic that Croatian. This is due, among other things, also to the fact that Slovenia adopted a proportional electoral system, giving a wide span of political groups and parties presence in the republican parliament.

Things happened differently in Croatia. There, the decision top go for multi-party elections came at the last minute – barely four months before they actually took place. It involved an effective coup within the party, executed by reformed Communists. The electoral system which they adopted, however, was the British variety, i.e. first past the post. Finally, the elections were held against the background of an already massive campaign against Croatia by Serbia, part of which consisted in whipping up the Serb minority against the Croatian state. All these factors contributed to the electoral victory not of a coalition, as in Slovenia, but of a single nationalist party – the Croatian Democratic Union (CDU). The CDU won some 42 per cent of the vote, but gained nearly two-thirds of parliamentary seats.

In these elections, Croatia's Serb minority mostly voted for the Communists rather than for the nationalist Serb Democratic party. After the CDU victory, however, the majority of Serb voters became politically passive while a minority turned to the Serb nationalists.

The CDU is not so much a party as a disparate coalition. To overcome internal conflicts and contradictions, the party is organised on a highly centralised basis, and run in an autocratic manner. Tudjman and his immediate advisers belong to the party's centre. The right wing are nationalist hawks and/or clericals, while the left shades into Social Democracy. Despite the efforts the CDU has made to win the confidence of Croatia's Serbs, the Serb minority remains fearful. It is being squeezed on both sides, by Croat and Serb extremists alike.

SO: Does Yugoslavia have a future? Could a restored federation exist after a stage of independence of the republics?

ML: We should be clear about what the position of Croatia and Slovenia actually is. Their official position until now has been that they want to be sovereign states – not secede. This means that federal laws should not apply unless they are accepted by the republics. This is really a programme for confederation. They that want to be completely independent, but do not reject the possibility of some form of economic co-operation in that framework. Croatia and Slovenia have proposed two possible forms of confederation – with either a joint parliament with limited powers or a council made up of equal numbers of delegates from each of the federal units. things in its competence, or joint meetings of delegations from the different republics to do the same. Serbia rejected every proposal.

I think that Yugoslavia was a tremendously useful framework for developing the region economically, socially and politically. It could take resources from the richer areas to ensure a more even economic development of the poorer parts. But since the development of the economic crisis this material basis for the federation could not be sustained. On the other hand I think some form of confederation would be a rational option – a confederation of sovereign states. Yugoslavia, the old Yugoslavia, is dead.

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