economic policy basically about the virtues of the marker? And is not his foreign policy about more compromises with the imperialists? But then again, aren't his democratic reforms essentially progressive? How does all this fit together?
Before answering these questions, we should ponder exactly why Gorbachev and the team around him have introduced this particular combination of policies in the way they have. In our view the explanation is essentially the following.
First, Gorbachev's international policy, aimed at creating a new regime of international peaceful co-existence is premised on the idea that the only way to reverse the relationship of forces with imperialism on the political, military and economic fronts, is world-wide compromise - a new modus vivendi with imperialism. From the viewpoint of the bureaucracy this is quite logical: the only alternative would he to link themselves to broad currents in the international working class on the basis of anti-capitalist struggle. But after decades of stalinism there is not the basis of support and enthusiasm for the Soviet Union in the western working class: neither is the Soviet bureaucracy - which itself rests on containing the power of the Soviet working class - prepared to tie its fate to that of class struggle internationally. for obvious reasons.
Second, the introduction of perestroika and glasnost in one move, linking one to the other. 15 very significant, In other East European countries economic reforms have been tried without simultaneously making concessions to the working class, the intelligentsia and the technocrats on the front of democratic reforms. Gorbachev hopes to consolidate a social bloc which identifies his whole project with democratisation and supports it for that reason - despite the economic sacrifices which the working class is called upon to make. In addition, Gorbachev's advisors have correctly identified the crucial linkage between economic efficiency, technological dynamism and the free flow of information. It is impossible to have much scientific and technical dynamism in a country where most scientists are prohibited access to photocopiers for security reasons.
What, then should be the attitude of revolutionary socialists to the Gorbachev reforms, to perestroika and glasnost?
First, we should not go along with the basic thrust of Soviet foreign policy, even if it does put the cold war factions of the US government on the defensive, and show them much more obviously as the aggressors. It may be that there are aspects of the new Soviet foreign policy which lead to outcomes we can support - the INF deal for example, and perhaps other arms roduc-
Yet world-wide peaceful co-existence is certainly not socialist interationalism, championing of the oppressed or the international working class. In some ways it is the direct opposite - an even more narrow following of the state interests of the Soviet bureaucacy:
However, precisely hecause the new policy is hased on a rigorous definition of Soviet bureaucratic interests, as opposed to those of the international working class, it may in some instan cos collide with those of imperialism. For example, it is tar from certain that the Soviet Union is prepared to give up all its military outposts and interests worldwide without very considerable concessions. Whereas they are quite capable of selling out the strug gle in Angola or Nicaragua, there is no guarantee that they will As far as the cconomic reform is concorned, revolutionary socialists should note two things, First, of course Gorbachevis advisors do identify real and urgent problems - the crisis of bureaucratically centralised planning. But their solutions are not pro-working class, socialist solutions. The socialist answer is the democratisation of the planning process. the unleashing of the creative power of the masses, popular sovereignty over basic ceonomic decisions - if you like, a national regime of workers Gorbachev's proposals are far from that. They are a reform of bureaucratic planning. which introduces some measures to end its over-centralisation, but above all introduces short and medium-term austerity for the working class. The implicit deal is that then economic rationalisation will create better cconomic conditions for the workers at some point in the future. Right now workers have to accept austerity. There is a good deal of conhypocrisy in the Gorbachevites crusade against the "bureaucrats'. Lower rank administrators may have to change jobs and he downgraded: but the bureaucratic political elite will be untouched. The people who "World-wide suffer the real sacrifices will be the working peaceful co-existence is However much wereject perestroika as a real solution to the problems of bureaucratic plancertainly not ning, we should also note however it is not in any socialist way whatsoever a restoration of capitalism, or going in the direction of restoring capitalism. internationalism... Even the most extreme Gorbachevite economc in some ways it is thorists are talking about a marketisation of economic relations within the framework of the the direct opposite plan: that is to say, within the framework of a state-owned, planned. economy even if it has a smallish and subordinate private sector within it. It is ludicrous to suggest, as do some extreme stalinists, that Gorbachev is taking the "capitalist road'. It is true, however, that perestroika will deepen existing inequalities between workers and bureaucrats and among workers themselves. - political liberalisation - should not simply be rejected by socialists as a 'fraud". It is true that a real democratisation, which gives sovereign power to the popular masses, is not what Gorbachev has in mind. Nonetheless political liberalisation and more official tolerance. however circumscribed, will give the masses the opportunity to overcome the long-lerm de-politicisation created by long decades of Socialists always give critical support to democratic reforms which allow the working class, the popular masses and the political left more space to formulate and articulate their demands. The obvious parallel is political liberalisation underauthoritarian capitalist regimes, which is never simply rejected by socialists. We support more democratic rights - but with one proviso: we think the democratisation process should go all the way. Gorbachev's proposals for perestroika and glasnost have opened up the most important political ferment in the Soviet Union since 1956. This has taken several forms: • The reawakening of the struggle of oppressed nationalities. especially that of the Armenian minority in Azerbaijan and in the
• The beginning of a political polarisation inside the working class over the question of the conomic reforms.
• A struggle inside the party and the hureaucracy over the tempo and extent of the reforms - including the Politburo and the
Secretariat.
• The emergence of independent political clubs, including a federation of socialist clubs which held it first conference last
November with 600 poople attending.
class sees the perestroika reforms as a threat to their interests, and they are right about thar. On the other hand, it scems that there are sections of industrial workers who are enthused by the
Gorbachev project. For example, many workers, including party members, supported Boris Yeltsin when he was sacked as Moscow party chief for attacking bureaucratic privileges.
100,000 people was held in
Kaliningrad to support glasnost and perestroika. This was not simply an official demonstration, although party members participated. So did supporters of the socialist clubs and thousands of ordinary workers,
It would perhaps be correct to say that there is a battle going on for the hearts and minds of the working class, with the Gorbachvites appealing to the possibility of longterm democratisation and y better life', while conservative opponents appeal to the workers justified sense of their real, short term, matcrial interests.
The national question 1s an explosive issue in the Soviet
Union hecause stalinism trod under foot i many
50 nationalities and national right. Any political libcralisation is almost certain to throw up new national demands and movements: in certain instances - for cxample the Ukraine — national demands could he an important axis of political revolution.
socialists to national demands should be support for the right of national self-determination.
sparation. Separation should be a right if the majority want it, hut is not necessarily a policy which socialists advocate. In general our position should be for national rights within a socialist federation - a real union of Soviet republics!
precisely because we have so little to go on in terms of hard facts.
The statements of the protagnonists are often coded and ambiguous. Nontheless, it is clear that a hig majority of the burcaucratic political elite staunchly supports refonn - although many burcaucrats at lower level, who risk losing their jobs and privileges, probably do not. But Gorbuchev's number two,
Ligachev, who chairs the meetings of the Politburo, is clearly unhappy about too much democracy and too much economic reform. While not exactly Brezhnevite", Ligachev cerlainly represents a faction which could challenge Gorbachev if he was seen to be failing.
Pm There is no douht that a substantial section of the working Alter the 19th conterence, a demonstration of more than
GLASNOST
However the basic programmatic position of revolutionary but not necessarily for national The disputes inside the burcaucratic clite are difficult to read
P T H some in the socialist clubs.
demanded "All power to the Soviets"
large economic growth, and it is doubtful if he will get both.
burcaucrats who want to disrupt reform, and there are
To call on the workers to impose perestroika against conservative bureaucrats could lead to a of working class ferment which would outflank ing a tightrope between the conservative se.
fall off.
On the other hand. Boris Yeltsin, who advocated an attack on bureaucratic privilege as such - for which he was sacked - represents a retorm current within the he bureaucracy which seems radical compared with Gorbachev - and certainly compared with Ligachev. The Yeltsin people seem to have links with
The socialist clubs themselves are a quite remarkable political development The political orientation of key figures like
Boris Kagarlitsky can be seen from the demonstration they held in Pushkin Square on the eve of the 19th Congress. Called by the
Organising Committee for a Popular Front' (!) the rally was held under red flags - and portraits of Mikhail Gorbachev! It
- but democratically clected, real Soviets. And it demanded that perestroika be
These contradictory positions reveal much about the present viewpoint of the clubs. They are for socialist democracy and renewal, and are utilising the opportunitics provided by glasnost to advance their demands.
They see the Ligacher people as their biggest enemies in the short-term, and they are probably righr about that. It is among people like those in the socialist clubs that the nucleus of a real democratic socialist apposition can be built.
Will the Gorbachev project succeed? Partly this depends on what happens internationally
Gorbachev has placed a lot on the imperialists doing a good"
deal and heing prepared to come up with the technology.
trade and bank loans. If they don't he will be in some trouble. Bur in any case, Gorbachev has placed an awlul lot on his own rhetoric being true - and it almost certainly isn't
Fconomic reforms, involving limited marketisation, have been tried in other Eastern European countries. without notable success. Gorbachey is going for simultaneous restructuring and.
Those workers who support Gorbachev will be very disappointed if they make conomic sacrifices and relatively linle comes their way in terms of democracy and higher living stand ards. But Gorbachev has a more immediate problem with that working class. He won a cheap victory at the 19th confe assasbecause the Ligachey people rolled with the punches - will be
( this lan-
But lower down the apparatus, there are thousands whole left of party members who want to do the same. Gorbacolidarity are really to mobilise the workers in an active fight to defill sce Peru in servalives if he is to push his reforms through. Thered into another s' struggles conching on Lima
* and an end to develop into a struggle for real democracy. Gomers have been on bureaucracy and the working class. It won Ttake a August 1988,
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 9 October 1988 Page 25