Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2009

The fight for unity of the Arab nation

· Socialist Outlook no. 30, February 1991 · pp 19-21 · 3,007 words

Middle East Palestine Africa

GULF SPECIAL

Thirdly, the Revolt con- firmed Trotsky's observations that the peasantry is incapable of developing an independent political leadership of its own: it either follows the working class or the bourgeoisie. The peasantry played a heroic role in the struggle against British imperialism but was unable to take the leadership of the movement in its own interests. In the absence of a working class leadership the Arab peasantry was doomed to fol- low the treacherous lead of the landowners and bour- geoisie.

Fourthly the massive sup port for the Revolt throughout the Arab world, including the sending of volunteer guerril- las, demonstrated the aware- ness amongst the Arab nationalist movement that there is a single Arab nation.

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Palestinian Revolt and the success of the Mufti in taking the movement in a blatantly pro-Nazi direction there developed strong anti-Semitic currents in other Arab countries, and local Jews, fre- quently anti-Zionist, were at- tacked. However in Egypt, where the Arab nationalist movement was most ad- vanced, the nationalists inter- vened to defend the Jewish population.

After the 2nd World War the Arab national movement

again began to assert itself. In 1946 in Egypt there was a wave of strikes and demonstrations against the British presence. In Cairo and Alexandria joint committees were organised by workers and students who not only raised anti-imperialist demands but also also slogans against the local land-owners and capitalists. Throughout the Arab East left- wing parties and trades unions were formed. This movement was only halted by the out- break of war with the newly created state of Israel in 1948. But the groundswell of Arab nationalism would not go away.

Nasserism

In 1952 a group of young army officers, led by Kemal Abdul Nasser, overthrew the British-supported monarchy in Egypt. They destroyed the power of the feudalists by an agrarian reform and carried out some impor- tant nationalisations. Schools and universities were secularised, attempts were made to raise the general level of culture throughout the country whilst a programme of providing

for the setting up of a limited parliamentary regime and a restricted legalisation of political I parties Nasser was able to mobilise massive demonstrations of the workers of Cairo and Alexandria who, of course wanted no truck with the former "parliamentary" system and no concessions to the old parties. Having defeated Naguib Nasser then turned against the mass movement. This lack of democracy in Egypt was to have a major effect on the outcome of future struggles that were soon to erupt.

For however limited the reforms, and however brutal his regime, Nasser's willingness to oppose imperialism and to speak of the "Arab nation" provided a huge inspiration for the workers and peasants throughout the Arab world to renew their fight against imperialist domination. "Nasserism" led to a massive in- crease in Arab national con- sciousness, which grew after the failure of the Franco-Israeli- British invasion in 1956 follow- ing Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez canal.

1958

The most important year in the development of Arab nationalism was undoubtedly 1958. In Lebanon a mass insur- rection broke out against the

reactionary regime of Camille

Chamoun, following the assas-

sination of an opposition jour-

nalist Massil el-Matouis. This

uprising was only finally defeated after the invasion of Lebanon by United States marines, the sending of its Sixth Fleet and the threat by the US to use nuclear weapons.

Lebanon was created by French im- perialism by joining together the autonomous territory of the Maronite Christians, which had

housing for the poor was embarked on.

In reality these reforms were fairly limited in scope; for example only about 10% of the landless or poor peasants received any land through the agrarian reform. Moreover, the Nasser regime was extremely brutal in its dealings with its political opponents. Im-

mediately after the overthrow of King Farouk been conceded by the Ottoman empire under the workers of Cairo and Alexandria or-

pressure from wester imperialism, to the ganised mass strikes to fight for their own in- neighbouring territories with a Muslim terests. These were suppressed by Nasser, and majority. The Maronites had already received the leaders either executed or given long jail preferential treatment from the Turks and this sentences. The Communist Party remained il- policy was continued to an even greater extent legal and socialist and trade union activists by the French in an attempt to divide the Arab were jailed. All the old political parties were national movement. Many of the Maronite banned, a measure which didn't meet with leaders were openly pro-Zionist and, with the much opposition at first since all these parties declining importance of French imperialism were thoroughly corrupt and tied to the tumed to the US for whom thay acted as will- monarchy. Nevertheless, this meant that the ing agents against the rising tide of Arab Nasser regime was able to continue as a nationalism. military dictatorship.

What is important, therefore, about the

When Nasser's main rival Naguib argued 1958 uprising is the level of unity against the

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 30, February 1991

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GULF SPECIAL

Chamoun goverment. The in- surrection was supported by broad layers of both the Mus- lim and Maronite masses - in- cluding by the patriarch of the Maronite church, Bulus el- Maouschi, and by its con- ference of bishops who gave their support to the opposition. Moreover, the journalist whose murder sparked off the uprising was also a Maronite Christian. The government, on the other hand received support from the Muslim kings of Irag and Jor- dan.

unable to overtum all the democratic gains made by the Syrian masses.

But it was precisely this fear of uncontrolled, spon- taneous uprisings of the mas- ses that led to the refusal by Nasser to contemplate ex- tending the United Arab Republic to include Iraq. For after the overthrow of Faisal the situation in Iraq was far more developed than had ever been the case in Syria. Fusion with Iraq would have enormously strengthened the

The level of unity achieved in 1958 is truly remarkable

Kuwait, which the Iraqi masses clearly felt

opposition forces in Syria, who were difficult enough for

when compared to the present state of affairs in Lebanon and the bloody conflicts - both belonged to them. As a result Britain sent

between and within the different religious

Nasser to control on their own.

Unity with Iraq would also have greatly

*мш a sna was no | senothened the Arah national mavement

communities - which have dominated its recent history.

Iraq

Important as the events in Lebanon were they paled into insignificance compared to the massive struggles that broke out in Irag. In fact the Iraqi revolution of 1958 was far more advanced than the events in Egypt in 1952. Whilst Nasser came to power essentially through a revolt of sections of the army, the Iragi monarchy of King Faisal was over- thrown by a mass explosion of popular anger.

Whilst in Egypt political parties were banned, in Irag they were made legal, includ ing the Communist Party. This legalisation of the CP followed massive demonstrations - for example over 300,000 took to the streets to demand the inclusion of the CP in the govern- ment at a time when the party was still illegal! (In Britain it would require a demonstration of over 1 million people to compare with that level of activity). All political prisoners were immediately set free, political refugees retured to Iraq, and overtures were made to the Kurds.

Instead of waiting for govemment decrees, the peasants expropriated the land from the big landowners. Whilst the government ad- vised the peasants to wait until a law on agrarian reform was passed it did not resort to brutal suppression of the peasants, again con- trasting extremely favourably with develop- ments in Egypt under Nasser.

In fact the government - in which the army played a role but was not dominant - im- mediately introduced a law restricting the level of rents and threatened the big land- owners with heavy fines if they failed to com- ply. The Iraqi revolution destroyed the im- perialist created Iraq-Jordan Federation - which linked together the two British-imposed Hashemite monarchies. It not only removed Faisal but also threatened to spill over into Jordan to unseat King Hussein, as well as challenging British imperialist interests in

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client regimes.

The United Arab Republic

In 1958 Egypt and Syria declared their for- mal union as the United Arab Republic. The main reason for this was the need to overcome economic backwardness and develop an Arab capitalism. Despite the bourgeois nature of the governments in Syria and, especially, Egypt the creation of the UAR was a major step for- ward for the Arab masses. In fact the fusion came about as a response to the demands of the masses.

The main support for unity came from Syria, where the political situation was very different from that in Egypt. The masses were far more active in Syria, political parties and trades unions were well developed, the workers were organised independently and the Communist Party had considerable influence. The Baath Party had won considerable sup port amongst the masses on a programme of unity of all the Arab states, agrarian reform. and increased living standards - a programme that went far beyond the demands of the CP.

The main Syrian bourgeois parties - the Baath and the National Party - found themsel- ves in a similar position to Nasser, though in very different conditions. In order to combat intemal reaction and imperialism they needed to mobilise the masses. However, mass mobilisations run the risk of becoming socialist revolutions. Too weak to hold out on their own, they turned to Nasser for help.

The Syrians accepted Nasser's main condi- tion - the dissolution of all political parties - which was a serious set-back for the mass movement. However the banning of parties was more formal than real, except - impor- tantly - in the case of the Communist Party. The Baathists remained the dominant political force in Syria, and Nasser's only legal politi- cal organisation the "National Union" was never really established there. The Baathists, moreover, still had links with the Baath par- ties in Irag, Lebanon and Jordan. Nasser was

throughout the rest of the states of the Arab East - it is very questionable how long the Jordanian monarchy could have survived, even with British troops, in such a situation. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that at this time in Algeria a war of national libera- tion was being waged, and the extension of the UAR to Iraq could have had enormous benefits for the liberation movement. (There was also some popular agitation for the fusion of an independent Algeria with Tunisia and Morocco, which would have further strengthened the possibilities of reuniting the Arab nation).

For all its weaknesses the United Arab Republic did hold out great potential for the Arab revolution, but this was destroyed by a bourgeois leadership which, in the final analysis, preferred the division of the Arab na- tion to a single, socialist Arab state. Far from uniting the Arab nation the UAR itself fell apart a few years later when Nasser made a tactical move to the left at a time when the Syrian Baathists were moving right-wards. 1958 was, in many respects, the high point of Arab nationalism and of "Nasserism". Al- though "Nasserism" continued to have an im- portant influence on large sections of the Arab masses, it found itself increasingly challenged by other currents, particularly Baathism. The Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel, fol- lowed by Nasser's tum to the pro-imperialist regimes in the region effectively finished off "Nasserism" as a current capable of mobilis- ing anti-imperialist feeling throughout the Arab world.

Subsequent "Nasserite" leaders - such as Qadafi in Lybia and Numeiri in Sudan - were never more than rightist caricatures of the high-point of "Nasserism". Qadafi, for ex- ample, has proposed fusion at one time or another to all Libya's neighbouring states, without ever being able to successfully achieve it.

The events in Lebanon, Egypt, Syria and

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 30, February 1991

GULF SPECIAL

Irag demonstrate the common links between creation of the state of Israel - even more so the struggles in the various Arab states. The when they tried to justify Stalin's position by struggles in each state were enthusiastically adopting extremely sectarian theories about adopted by the masses throughout the Arab the national question. These theories were, in world, thus demonstrating the essential unity many ways, an extension of the positions of the Arab nation - which is continued today adopted during the Second World War when with the identification by the Arab people as a Stalin urged an alliance with the 'democratic whole with the strugale of the Palestinians and imnerialist nowers - which of conren meant

the support given by many Arabs to Saddam Hussein.

The heroic struggles, however, all ended in failure. The independent movements of the masses were defeated, the democratic gains were overturned and brutally repressive regimes took power. "Nasserism" still con- tinued to maintain an important influence

Arab Communist Parties

The Communist parties are amongst the oldest political parties in the Arab world - cer- tainly they pre-date both Nasserism and Baathism. However, they were also some of the first Communist Parties to become thoroughly Stalinised. Their policies have been marked by sharp zig-zags between com- plete capitulation to the national bourgeoisie and a sectarian opposition to the national struggle. Like Communist Parties throughout the world their policies were determined not by the needs of the class struggle but by the line emanating from Moscow.

For example in Palestine the CP charac- terised the anti-Jewish riots of 1929 as an anti- imperialist revolt, diverted into a pogrom by imperialist agents. But this characterisation was adopted after the event, in response to Stalin's ultra-left "Third Period' turn. At the time of the pogroms the CP had participated in the self-defence brigades to protect Jewish workers, alongside the Zionist Hagannah militia. After the abandonment of the Third Period the PCP tailended the most right-wing sections of the Arab national movement.

The influence of the CPs was considerably weakened in the post war period by the decision of the Soviet Union to support the

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 30, February 1991

abandoning any struggle for national libera- tion. Thus it was logical for the Algerian Communist Party to strongly oppose the armed independence struggle that began in 1945. They spoke of "the historical common interests of France and Algeria".

This sectarian failure to understand the na- tional question led the Syrian CP - the largest in the Arab world at the time - to oppose the union with Egypt - a mistake which isolated it from the masses (who enthusiastically en- dorsed union), and which facilitated the Party being banned. The CPs also totally opposed the Iraq-Jordan Federation, seeing it simply as a pro-imperialist creation (which it certainly was) without understanding that even this reactionary body was contradictory. It was not simply an expression of imperialist interests - it also reflected the desire of the Arab people for unity. The task was not to break up the Federation but to unite the masses to over- throw the reactionary monarchies in both Iraq and Jordan.

Having initially opposed the formation of the United Arab Republic the CPs then swung rapidly in the opposite direction and became totally uncritical supporters, even going so far as to refuse to call for their own legalisation. Yet again they were following the latest turn in Moscow which had recently developed strong, if opportunist, links with Nasser.

In Irag the CP correctly participated in the mass struggles that broke out in 1958. However, instead of encouraging the masses to seize power for themselves, the CP urged support for General Kassem. This support continued despite Kassem's repression of the

CP. This led up to the massacre of the Com munist Party by the Baathist regime that over- threw Kassem in 1963, and later spawned Saddam Hussein.

Since then the CPs have continued to tail- end bourgeois nationalist Arab leaderships. In 1964 the recently legalised Egyptian CP decided to dissolve into Nasser's Arab Social

Union (the same Nasser who for years had brutally suppressed the CP). The Sudanese CP supported the military coup of General Numeiri in 1969: two years later he massacred them. Further massacres were to follow in Iraq in the 1970s, but the CPs have continued to practice the same policies.

Moreover, the Stalinists have never tried to organise a pan-Arab party. They have always organised on the basis of the division of the Arab world imposed by imperialism, believ- ing that it is necessary to liberate each country separately, ahd only fight for unity in the dim and distant future. (In the former French colonies of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria the CPs didn't even exist as independent or- ganisations for a long time - they were sec- tions of the French Communist Party! So much for anti-imperialism).

All the events that have taken place since the decline of Nasserism show clearly that the struggles in the Arab states are indissolubly linked - the massacre of the Palestine Resis- tance in Jordan, the Syrian intervention in Lebanon for example. They also show clearly that the bourgeois (and remaining feudal) leaderships are incapable of waging a struggle anywhere near the level of that led by Nasser - and Nasser fell far short of what was neces sary. Only a struggle for socialism - a strug gle led by the working class but embracing the democratic demands of the peasantry - is capable of meeting the needs of the workers and peasants throughout the region and of uniting the Arab nation.

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