SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 29. December/January 1990/91
siser than
sven
ry. op-
SUPPLEMENT "And when they got there, the sheives were all bare"; the Soviet crisis is one of under-production
THE AGREEMENT reached during the summer between Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Russian federation President Boris Yeltsin on the transition to a market economy is of historic significance. The ground appears to have shifted decisively away from the perestroika - or restructuring - of the economy to a dismantling of the nationalised property relations and their increasing replacement by capitalist ownership.
Perestroika, brought in to resolve an
ever-deepening crisis, has been strong on rhetoric but weak on results, and half-measures have simply exacerbated the situation. Now Gorbachev has announced his intention to push through the formation of a normal full-blooded market" and a "controlled transition to market relations", will the USSR follow the more advanced examples of Poland and Hungary, or are the processes at work rather more complex and unpredictable?
RICK SIMON reports.
The problems of
bureaucratic planning
EVOLUT INARY Marv. have traditionally emphasised certain features of Soviet society.
• First. the capitalists were eliminated as a class through the process begun by the October 1917
w. the small
(tuzuigly pust the new workers" state.
working viase we- ned out of power ratum around Stann
the loundation
ied ine polental -* nroperty relations in
revolution
• Second. the nationalisation of the means of production created the potential, but only the potential, for
the transformation of the
Sovict economy in the 1930s, but did
so in a very contradictory and self-
destructive way. Forced collectivisa-
tion of agricultur did not provide
the means for industrialication: on
the coutrary, it drastically damaged
the Soviet Union's agricultural base
and demanded var resources, which could otherwise have been tilised
for industrial development. The plan-
ning mechanism created hy Stalin
tion of agricultur did not provide
ans for
the
development of a planned
• Third, because of the devasta- tion caused by the Civil War and the isolation suffered by the revolution
a comparatively backward
WITLOOk n0 29. December/Januar
in SOCIALIST
mm deveupmen* ning mechanism created hy Stalin
was, moreover, highly centralised
and bureaucratic. Plan targets had the
force of law and the continual exhor-
ration to overfulfill the plan created
shortages and bottlenecks.
Nevertheless, in overall terms the
economy grew
at an
so in the period of reconstruction after the Second World War. But this war extensive growth based on the
Bee ore
more factories, more workers. Once
the potential for extensive growth
или "nce ave grow!"
rushe thr
began to diminish in the 1950s, the more far-sighted Sovict cconomists realised that future economic growth would only he socured on the basis
of increasing the prodoctivity of
04.
mic growth on the hasts
"Forced collectivisation of
agriculture
drastically
damaged the Soviet Union's agricultural base and demanded vast resources,
which could otherwise have been utilised for
industrial development"
Page 13
SUPPLEMENT
A reform was introduced in 1965 which sought to give enterprises more autonomy and introduce market elements into the economy. but bureaucratic opposition reduced the reform to nought. Tinkering with the economy became such a constant feature of Brezhnev's regime that the process was described by one American Sovictologist, as a 'tread- mill of reforms'. Debates over how best to change the Soviet planning mechanism have therefor been going on for the past thirty years and more.
The major shortcomings 0f bureaucratic planning can be sum- marised as follows:
• First, the quality of goods suf fers as the prime target is the quan- tity of output;
• Second, there is no incentive on the part of enterprises to provide accurate unformation about their productive capacity, because gaining the lowest possible plan target is the main prionty.
• Third, all inputs and outputs are bureaucratically allocated, which leads to poor supply, inefficiency as enterprises have to develop their own "in-house" production for vital com- ponents and corruption. as enterprise managers do virtually any- thing to obtain vitally-needed inputs.
Of prime importance, however. is the bureaucracy"- position in the production process. The bureaucracy is not a class, but a social stratum held together by its monopoly of political power. It derives its privileges, which amount to pilfering on a grand scale, from its control of the nationalised means of produc tion. It does not occupy a common position in the production process or an organic interest in its continual rationalisation.
The Soviet economic
crisis
Nor has the bureaucracy ever been simply a defender, albeit tyran- nical, of the nationalised property relations. It arose on the hasis of both the burgeoning Party/state ap paratus and on the entrepreneurial elements and wealthy peasantry created hr the New Economic Policy, and is therefore tom between a desire to maintain the source of its
the nationalised pavileges economy - and to systernatise those privileges through ownership of the means of production, ie, by retum- ing to capitalism.
Page 14
"It has been a crisis characterised by chronic underproduction, particularly of basic consumer goods, rather than the overproduction typical of capitalist economic crises"
The Soviel economic crisis has assumed a completely different chamcter from that of capitalist economic criscs. It has, firstly, been a cumulative ens» resulting 1e steadily declining productivity - the result of the inability of the bureaucracy to accomplish the tran- sition from extensive to intensive economic growth and, in the 1970s, the enormous volume of resources poured into building up the Soviet military capability.
Sccondly, it has been a crisis characterised by chronic under- production, particularly of basic con- sumer gonds, rather than the over- production typical of capitalist economic crises. According to CIA estimates, only 50 out of 1200 hasic consumer goods are readily available in the shops and this despite an in- crease of 6.4% in consumer goods production in the first quarter of 1990. Overall production in the same period registered a fall of 1.2% Soviet indebtedness is aiso on the in- crease - up by 10 billion roubles in 1989 to 51 billion - and the budget deficit has increased from 18 billion roubles in 1986 to 92 billion in 1989. There has also been some defaulting on debt repayments for the first time
The crisis has now been exacer- bated by the collapse of the Council for Mutual Economic Awareness (CMEA) or Comecon. Although this may be of long-tem economic benefit to the Soviet Union - Easteru Europe absorbed more Soviet resour- ces than it provided - it mobs the Soviet leadership of a variety of ex- periments in Inosening centralised control of the economy from which it had gathered useful information and, more crucially, threatens to force the Soviet economy more abruptly onto the world market as it is deprived of the buffer of relations. with Comecon countries.
While that is not going to happen ovemight - because 50% of Soviet trade is still with CMEA countries, and there are many problems as- sociated with the transition fom a nationalised economy tr nue dominated by private capital in Eastern Europe - the key problems of pricing, convertibility of the rouble and genuine enterprise autonomy are brought to the fore.
Gorbachev's reforms
The fundamental aim perestroika has been to reverse long- term Soviet economic decline bv a
transition from extensive to intensive growth the bureaucracy's privileges and power intact. However, instead of drastic surgery there have been only half- measures. All of the major economic reforn measures enacted in the past
tive y' •hair
Al of the major econonuc
measures enacted in the past
five years have been characterised by
their interal contradictions, which
are the result of compromises c- tween different sections of the ruling bureaucracy pursuing radically dif- ferent interests
Gorbachev's initial reforms in the shape of traditional centralised cam- paigns for greater discipline and against corruption and the abuse of alcohol did little to relieve the economic situation.
The extent of corruption and the depth of the economic malaise necessitated the introduction of glas- nost as a means of building a coali- tion in favour of reform against the more entrenched elements of the hureaucracy. This has red to a deepening of the crisis. Major con- cessions have been made on the fun- damental questions of who holds political power, and the crimex, and hy extension the methods, of former Party leaderships have been sub- jected to ruthless examination.
During 1987.88 Soviet leadership introduced three major cconomic reforms. The most impor- tant of these, the Law on the State Enterprises. strove to increase enterprise autonomy, introduce a profit motive and create an interest among the workforce in enterprise efficiency by extending their rights to elect management at all levels and participate in workplace decision- making. These measures were, however, immediately nullified by other provisions of the Law which reinforced centralised planning and the power of the ministries.
Other measures, the Law on In- dividual Economic Activity and the Law on Co-operatives, helped to *galise already existing black market relations in the service sector
of the economy. In 1989, the number
-n-operatives expanded from
78,000 to 133,000) with a tumover of 30 billion roubles but with only "St of industral output. Their operations have also been affected by lack of supplies and the conse.
quent need to resort to illegal means, the costs of which have been passed on in the consumer, resulting in prices much higher than in the stale
sector. Thus has made them un-
of
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 29, December/January 1990/91
SUPPLEMENT
popular. Ir. some republica operatives run by non-undigenur natinnalities have often become the target of inflamed nationalist foel- ings.
reform by more radical economists. •oncretely. this means denationalisation of state enterprises. Price reform is only a comliary of this process.
The turn towards
Leonid Abalkin, deputy Prime Minister for cconomic reform, ac- knowledged that perestroika had not made any tangible improvements in the Soviet cconomy and, in Novem- her 1984, advanced madical economic programme in an attempt to break from the compromises of the past. He declared that "there is no worthy alterative to the market as the method of coordinating the ac tivities and interests of economic agents"
However, this programme's ap
proach was too much for proach was majority of the Supreme Sovier. composed predominantly of Party and state apparatchiks, who adopted instead a plan put forward by Soviet Prime Minister, Nikolai Ryzhkov. which put the emphasis on a switch from heavy industry to production of consumer goods and backed away from the introduction of market ele- ments into the economy.
beneve-
•naL
247888 political democratisation are interlinked. But other keen supporters of the market clearly sense that glasnost and politi- cal democratisation have outpaced economic reform and have led only to chaos. They argue that marketisa- ton can only be implemented through the iron hand, an approach dubbed 'market Stalinism" by lead- ing Soviet socialist Boris Kagar- litsky.
The failure of Ryzhkov'* programme has led to a palpable shifi in the terms of the debate over economic reform. The days of perestroika are numbered.
Even just a year ago the key to cconomic reform was seen to be the pricing system. Once prices were freed from the shackles of central control, a market could be estab- lished in means of production and enterprises would be free to enter into contractual relations with each other, with Western firms and with the state to produce goods on a supp- ly-and-demand hasis.
It is no longer price reform but the development of competition in the Soviet economy and the transfor- mation of property rights which are seen to he the key to economic
The star of formerly prominent reform cconomists, such as Abel Aganbegyan, the architeet of the finst phase of perestroika, is on the wane. Much mate forthright Liberal economistA such as Nikolai Petrakov, now have the car of Presi dent Gorbachev.
Interviewed in Moscow News. Petrakov argued that "without open- ing out the cconomy, no effective reform can he carried out. When people can buy shares, the endless problems which plague joint ven fures will be solved instantly. We have to overcome our dogmas: why can't there be enterprises which are wholly owned by foreign com- Panies?"
The appearance of McDonalds in Red Square is just a sideshow com- pared to the prospect of wholesale privatisation. But, as the Polish ex perience has demonstrated, it is one thing to proclaim a market reform. and quite another to carry it out. Nevertheless, the terms of the debate now centre on how such a reform
can be implemented rather than over the principle of introducing it.
Plans are now being drawn up to tum selected state enterprises into joint-stock companies and to create a stock market. According to Petrakov,
"by the end of 1990, it will be pos cible to transfer 2,200 large enterprises - 70% of the fixed assets in industry - to a joint stock basis". There will also be a pressing ahead with co-operatives and small busi- nesses.
Such ambitious plans for a market economy assume both the support of the people of the Soviet Union and aid from the West. There is Little to suggest that either will be forthcoming. There was a marked Liberalisation of Soviet foreign trade in 1989. but this has only led to a hard currency squeeze and widespread defaulting on debt repay-
ments.
Western goverments and firms want evidence of the real operation of a market cconomy. In a hard. nosed cditorial, the Economist ar-
gued:
"The fastest way to tutor East Europeans in the ways of the free market is to make them compete against Mexicans and Malaysians for
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 29, December/January 1990/91
Gorby: make workers pay for the crisis
the hard-cared dollars, yen, and D Marks of western savers (June 10;
The Gorbachev-Yeltsin
agreement
This agreement is designed to cany out just such a radical shift in the operation of the Soviet conomy- Based on Yeltsin's 500-day plan for the Russian Federation, this agree- ment seeks also to regulate conomic relations between the USSR's 15 republics through the market.
The firs half of the plan en-
visages the creation of a legislative
framework and the privatisation and
visages me framework an sale of housing au This process .. des much at the enormous
much of the enormous savings ac-
cumulated in the past fiften years ax a result of having little to spend one's money on. Once 200 billion roubles of state assets have been sold, the net stage of full scale marketisation will be implemented.
As yet the details have not heen released, but the ability to reach even stage one must be doubted unless foreign capital is allowed some ac- cess to Soviet indudry. The aholition of central ministries is also en- visaged, which will bring Yeltsin and Gorbachev into direct conflict with a major part of the state bureaucracy.
It's a case of desperate measures for desperate times, but made pos- sible though Yeltsin's popularity and his attainment of the Russian Presidency and Gorbachev's un- creased room for manocuvre through lus increasing autonomy from the Party apparatus and the success he achieved at the Party Congress.
Yeltsin's popularity derives from his consistent opposition to the ap- paratus, culminating in his resigna-
"Keen supporters
of the market
argue that marketisation can
only be
implemented
through the iron
hand - an approach dubbed 'market Stalinism' by leading Soviet
socialist Boris
Kagarlitsky™
Page 15
SUPPLEMENT
achieving this of
But, so far, the response of the official unions to workers" action has heen largely negative or even irrelevant.
clearly
as to the realities of the market. Not
good and steady supply of basic
surprisingly, most people want a
commodities and services, and the market is seen as the best method for
after years bureaucratic inefficiency and corrup-
The question of privatisation is
matter, however. workers also want a say in what is produced and how. But where will
file was demonstruted at the ro ference of the miner where full-time union
anade lane
activities
tion. another
and pit managers (who are also
members of the union) outnum-
bered working miners and suc-
cessfully stifled their demands upshot has been moves
fowards an independent miner's
union in three of the most impor-
tant Soviet coalfields.
The formation of the Confedera- tion of Lahour in Novokuznetsk on May 1 represents a major advance for the Soviet workers" movement. The Confederation is an umbrella for Jabour organisations for the defence of workers' interests and for the pur- suit of a 'truly democratic snciety". Small though the Confederation is at the moment, its hackhone undoub- tedly consists of industrial workers
Most
the resources for privatisation come from? From foreign capital, and
the workers are fighting at the moment.
Even the limited steps towards
associnted
Soviet workers struggle with aged equipment
tion from the Party, and his delence
of workers social guarantees. Now
he is trying to look two ways at the
same time - forging ahead to a
while verbally
defending working class interests.
"The most
drastic proposals emanate from liberal intellectual circles and involve an assault on
Te is tong .. same "m
market conomy while verbally defer.g"
The working class and
the crisis
Accompanying plans for a market economy have been calls to "reject: our previous interpretation of the guarantee of the right to work in the
constitution" (Article 40) and for the
institution of a labour market with no certainty of employment. Certainly the socond phase of the Yeltsin/Gor-
or the
bachev plan
Such hardships have forced the
would entail
splo talk among
/Gos
social
liberal
reformers and ever greater econonuc
Soviet
working class into increasing action.
In 1989, 7 million days were Inst as
the result of industrial action and
Soviet official trade unions have always been bypassed by
inter-ethnic conflict.
DOCT
These
word now exter
wnrenise
ICT-e
tinons navn such
word but extensions of the state into
the workplace, Their function has been to assist management in the ful-
bodics Western
•re not trade sense of the -re state into unction has
we lul-
working class living standards through privatisation, savage price rises, and the threat of unemployment to whip the
working class into line"
filment of the plan and to provide
welfare henefits, such as
holidays, for their members.
Nevertheless, the pace of events is having an impact on the Soviet
certain wellan
urs. for the
provede
unions. In response to the threat of unemployment.
the leadership has declared that "we can- not allow the greatest and most im-
trade union
portant social achievement of the
Socialist state "the right to work" to
disappear ... any haste to implement
without
01 molement
a market Page 16
mechanism of social protection of
the workers ... wnuld lead nur un-
a teliable nrutection el
prepared country into the ahyss of social disintegration" (quoted in the Financial Times 25/4/90).
from the very bureaucracy.
with the first phase of Perestroika - labour enllective councils and elec- tion of managers are under threat
It would be a misconception In helieve that Trotskyists have never been in favour of a markel in the Soviet Union. During the period of the first Five-Year Plan, Trotsky ar-
workplace democracy
tedly consists of industrial workers
gued that bureaucratic centralisation
would lead to the ruin of the planned economy. In its stead he proposed a combination of plan, market and soviet democracy. The revitalisation of organs of grass-roote democmcy in the enterprises and the Incalitics is still a vital necessity. It is only
anu. in paracula, Ie mu Confederation uzues for the n lion of the present 2° demand echoca by Ye"sa coyotmeat chiovine inc of the workera. his programme. 2- tradictory.
thmugh such genuinely democratic
bodies that the relationship between
The emergence of the market and plan can be woked out.
Gorbachev has SOTSPROF Insependen socialist trade union association is also an in- dication of the growing conscious- ness of the Soviet working class hut, as yet, independent workers" or- ganisations are in their infancy with
mcasures. the mass of the 140 million Soviet workers remaining members of the fictions Any independe unions must, therefore, ensure that they do not become isolated tron. nationalised
workers' response to it. other workers and thus open to provocation and repression or adven- turist actions.
Conclusion
The pressure is growing for dras-
tie measures to extricate the Soviet economy from the hole it is now in.
er adv.
argued that économic refor will only work "if
it's supported by millions of Soviet
people and meets their mierests".
But the more that more half
are implemeated.
worse the crisis bocomes. The key question now is that of ownership, which places a question mark against
the
the continuing existence of the
cconomy, aid be
The outcome is not a foregone conclusion, but is directly related to events both in and beyond the Soviet Union. The extent of working class resistance to privatisation in Easter Europe, of working class rexistance
The most drastic proposals emanate from libera intellectual eu involve an assault on working class livine standards throuen priv tion. civage price rises the men of all subsidies on n goods, and the threat ment to whip the working line.
in Wester Europe to the rationalisa- tion of 1992, and the extent to which a new socialist leadership is forged within the Soviet working claks itself are of crucial importance lo the out- come of perestroika and to the
movement for
renewal empr
However, mi inside the Soviet
IXD Islina B3 workers' mninms
of the socialism thronghout the world. Focus on Eastern Europe
Dens
• Rick Simon writes for Labota
29.
SUPPLEMENT
The East Germen bureaucrats, like Humpty Dumply, sat on the Wall: but wi