Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2009

The challenge of nationalism in the USSR

· Socialist Outlook no. 28, November 1990 · pp 15-21 · 5,230 words

Russia and the USSR Stalinism Trotsky

SUPPLEMENT 70 years of Stalinist rule did not solve the Natlonal Question but exacerbated it

USSR

The rise of mass nationalist movements in the USSR has surprised most socialists and dismayed many others. In this article DAFYDD RHYS examines the period of the Russian revolution and early Soviet power and finds it rich in debates and experiences on the National Question. He argues that Marxists must reclaim this heritage and learn from it If we are not to be totally disorientated by recent events.

The pre 1917 Bolshevik position on the question, developed large- ly by Lenin, consisted of two key elements. Firstly, recognition of the right of oppressed nations to

self-determination up to and in- cluding complete independence; secondly, a struggle against all forms of nationalism - and above all Great Russian nationalism. These were advanced with the aim of establishing the complete equality of all nations within the Tsarist empire, thus facilitating a free and voluntary union between them. This Holy Russian empire, declared, "one and indivisible" by the Tsars, was to Lenin a "prisonhouse of nations' and its revolutionary overthrow could not but have a national as well as a social content.

The February 1917 revolution aroused great expectations amongst the imprisoned nations, awakening many to conscious national life for the very first time. Yet in the national

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 28, November 1990

sphere the Provisional government did little more than annul some of the more archaic Tsarist laws. The voices of the oppressed nationalities grew louder as the months passed and these national movements con- tributed to the increasing instability of the regime. In this context the Bolsheviks' defence of the right of nations to self-determination con- tributed in no small degree to their victory in October.

Yet the national question presented a number of problems to the new government. The national movements might have hastened the downfall of the February regime, and in many cases actively opposed it; but this did not inevitably mean that they all supported the government of October. Social contradictions within the oppressed nationalities were generally less developed than in the centre. In addition the 'national

"The February

1917 revolu-

tion aroused great expecta- tions amongst the imprisoned

nations,

awakening

many to con- scious nation-

al life for the

very first

time."

Page 13

"Great Russian tendencies were further exacerbated by the national divide between town and country in the oppressed nations. The towns, including the working class, were largely Russified and nationalist consciousness was generally low. Thus the national question was easily downgraded or ignored due to chauvinism or impatience"

Page 14

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bond' between the bourgeoise and peasantry also tended to blur these so- cial contradictions.

The class differentiation of the na- tional movements in Latvia, Estonia, Belorussia and to a lesser extent the Ukraine was well developed by Oc- tober. In other areas this was far from the case. Thus in many areas the Bol- sheviks found themselves very weak outside the urban centres. The bour- geois nationalist Dashnaks were strong in Armenia, the Mussavat Party in Azerbaijan. After October the Georgian Mensheviks, staunch defenders of unity under Kerensky, declared themselves for inde- pendence.

Such nationalist developments were hardly surprising. The masses of the oppressed nationalities, awaken- ing for the first time to political life, were doing so in their own languages. Predominantly peasant, they were overwhelmingly concerned with solu- tions to their national and agrarian plight. In such circumstances the new government had to show that not only 'formal' but also practical, material equality with the former ruling nationality was possible under the Soviet system. An attentive and serious attitude to their national demands was necessary to overcome suspicions and resentments arising from long years of oppression.

Another problem presented itself almost immediately - the civil war. A war launched by the counter-revolu- tion aided by interational im- perialism with scant regard for any principles of self-determination. Waging such a war demanded the most ruthless methods for the new state to survive. These were not without their consequences in the na- tional sphere. As Trotsky pointed out in a 1923 article for Pravda:

"A harsh military regime cannot but bear heavily on cultural life in general and national culture in par- ticular. Contributing to this was the fact that in particular cases the back- wardness of a Red Army unit, the ill will of certain elements in the Com- munist organisation in such a unit, and the inadequate efforts of the political commissars concerned gave rise to ignoring and even rough tram- pling upon national feelings and moods."(1)

He describes these problems as "isolated and passing" but the pas- sage also illustrates a deeper problem within the Bolshevik ranks which ex- isted before the rise of Stalinism. It can best be illustrated by the follow-

ing examples:

"Russian

Communist Party members on Ukranian territory must put into prac- tice the right of the working

people to study in the Ukranian language and to speak their na- tive language in all Soviet in stitutions; they must in every way counteract attempts at Russification that push the Ukranian lan- guage into the background, and must con- vert the lan- guage into an Ukranlan peasants: I instrument for the Communist education of the working people"(2)

"In Ukraine urban culture is Rus- sian; Ukranian culture is rural. The proletariat has an urban, Russian cul- ture. The future belongs to the proletarian culture, ie. to the urban culture, ie. to Russian culture. Life it- self will effect an assimilation of the Ukranian language to Rus- sian...though at present the Com- munist Party helps the peasant to develop his rural Ukranian culture, it...must...work towards the in- evitable victory of Russian cul- ture..."(3)

Both statements are by Bol- sheviks; both were written in 1919; the first is by Lenin, the second by Dmitrii Lebed, secretary of the Uk- ranian Communist Party.

Such a "struggle of two cultures" had been the unofficial policy of the Bolshevik administration in the Uk- raine before 1919. It found an active expression in sometimes the most ex- treme forms. The communist Zatonsky recounted how red guards had at times shot people for speaking Ukranian, or professing Ukranian nationality, considering this to be counter-revolutionary!

How could such positions arise? They clearly echo Plekhanov, the founder of Russian marxism and a formative influence on many of the Bolsheviks:

"The abolition of serfdom, univer- sal conscription, the development of

David King

their demands were often ignored commerce and industry, the steady growth of the homeless agrarian proletariat, the influence of the ad- ministration, railroads and schools...have definitively merged the rural population of the Ukraine, even linguistically....into a sphere of influences shared with Russia."(4)

Looking deeper they reflect the influence of Great Russian nationalism even within the revolu- tionary movement. Such positions were far less prevalent amongst the Bolsheviks then the Mensheviks, So- cial Revolutionaries or Bourgeois Cadets, whose chauvinism was multi- plied a thousandfold; but they never- theless existed. Great Russian tenden- cies were further exacerbated by the national divide between town and country in the oppressed nations. The towns, including the working class, were largely Russified and nationalist consciousness was generally low. Thus the national question was easily downgraded or ignored due to chauvinism or impatience. Such na- tional nihilism often cloaked its chauvinism in fine, fake-inter- nationalist phrases.

Mistakes on the national question raised the possibility of losing the civil war in the Ukraine and a wrenching re-assessment had to be made. Trotsky's statement to the Red Army on the eve of their Ukranian offensive against Denikin is resound- ingly and genuinely internationalist:

"The Ukraine is the land of the Ukranian workers and working

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 28, November 1990

SUPPLEMENT

peasants. They alone have the right to rule in the Ukraine, to govern it and to build a new life in it... Keep this firmly in mind: your task is not to conquer the Ukraine but to liberate it. When Denikin's bands have finally been smashed, the working people of the liberated Ukraine will themselves decide on what

terms they are to live with Soviet Russia... Long live the free and independent Soviet Ukraine!"(5)

This position contributed not only to the victory against Denikin but also facilitated the fusion of the Ukranian Bol- sheviks with the Borotbist or- ganisation. The Borotbists were the extreme left wing of the Uk- ranian Social Revolutionaries who had moved towards com- munism but favoured a complete- ly independent Ukraine.

The nationalities problem' took a more sinister tum in the Caucusus where the growing in- Ordzho

fluence of the central bureaucracy became evident. Georgia was formal- ly independent from 1918 to 1921 and served as a base for both the Ger- mans and the British. It was invaded by the Red Army in 1921, a move authorised by the Politburo based on information from Stalin, Commissar of Nationalities, and Ordzhonikidze, military commander on the Caucasian front.

The Red Army was meant to as- sist a Bolshevik uprising, which ac- cording to Stalin and Ordzhonikidze would receive widespread support. The reality was very different and was seen as an act of aggression by much of the peasantry and even sec- tions of the working class. Both Lenin and the Georgian Communists were very concerned about the status of the new republic and anxious to respect the rights of the Georgians as a formerly oppressed nationality. Lenin proposed a block with Jor- dania, whose Menshevik government had been overthrown, and cautioned the Georgian Communists:

"I really want you to keep in mind that both the internal and internation- al conditions in Georgia require that Georgian communists do not imple- ment Russian formulas but develop skilfully and flexibly an original tac- tie based on a more conciliatory at- titude towards petty-bourgeois ele- ments of all sorts"(6)

Ordzhonikidze, Stalin's man in the area, paid little attention to these words or the pleas of the Georgian Communists, and continued to act in

onikidze (ng) and Dzerzhinsky

David King onikidze (right) and Dzerzhinsky: Stalin's men in Georala

a heavy handed manner.

When in 1922 Stalin put forward his "autonomisation" plan proposing "entry" of the non-Russian republics into the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), opposi- tion was centred in Georgia. At first Lenin sided with Stalin and Ordzhonikidze in the face of the Georgians' complaints, proposing at the same time that "entry" should be amended to "Formal union with the RSFSR in the Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia". He explained that:

"The spirit of this concession is, I nope, clear: we see ourselves as equals in law with the Ukranian SSR and the others and enter with them into a new union, a new federa- tion..."(7)

Lenin was obviously worried and soon afterwards he sent a note to Kamenev declaring, "war to the death on Great Russian Chauvinism". His final article on the question, and the last of his life, was suppressed until 1956 by the Stalinist bureaucracy. It is a textbook of revolutionary method on the national question. It shows how Lenin's posi- tion developed and changed through the experience of the Russian revolu- tion.

He clearly sets the Great Russian chauvinist campaign of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky (who investigated the matter) in the context of the rising Soviet bureaucracy:

"It is said that a united apparatus was needed. Where did that as-

surance come from? Did it not come from that same Russian apparatus which... we took over from Tsarism and slightly anointed with Soviet oil?"(8)

International isolation, civil war and famine had prevented the young Soviet state from developing an ap- paratus that was anything more than a bourgeois and Tsarist hotch-potch" and in such a situation:

"...the 'freedom to secede from the union' by which we justify our- selves will be a mere scrap of paper, unable to defend the non-Russians from the onslaught of that really Rus- sian man, the Great Russian chauvinist, in substance a rascal and tyrant, such as the typical Russian bureaucract is."(9)

How the non-Russian nationalities were to suffer in later years at the hands of such rascals and tyrants, Lenin could never have im- agined.

Lenin also addressed the question of how revolutionaries should ap proach nationalism:

"....an abstract presentation of the question of nationalism in general is of no use at all. A distinction must necessarily be made between the nationalism of an oppressor nation and that of an oppressed nation, the nationalism of a big nation and that of a small nation."(10)

He also modified his previous position which favoured a formal equality between nations in the union:

...internationalism on the part of

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 28, November 1990

"Lenin's posi-

tion

developed and changed

through the experience of

the Russian

revolution."

"A distinction

must neces-

sarily be

made be-

tween the

nationalism of an oppres-

sor nation and that of an oppressed na-

tion"

990%

15

"A feeling of national resentment has been accumulated in the formerly oppressed nations over decades and centuries... It is necessary that a small nation should feel that a radical and irreversable Change has taken place in the consciousness I of the former 'ruling' nation."

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ENT

the oppressors or "great" nations, as they are called (though they are great only in their violence, only great as bullies), must consist not only in the observance of the formal equality of nations but even an inequality of the oppressor nation, the great nation, that must make up for the inequality which obtains in actual practice."(11)

Trotsky expanded on this theme in his Pravda article, by drawing a powerful parallel with women's op pression:

"A feeling of national resentment has been accumulated in the formerly oppressed nations over decades and centuries. And this heritage, as with the oppressed position of women it should be said, cannot be disposed of

merely be declarations, however sin- cere they may be and even if they are given legislative character. It is neces- sary that a woman should feel, in or- dinary life, in everyday experience, that there are no exteral restrictions upon her and no contemptuous or condescending attitude is being taken towards her... It is necessary that a small nation should feel that a radical and irreversable change has taken place in the consciousness of the former ruling' nation."(12)

This is much more than an accom- modation or appeasment to nationalism: it goes to the root of what is really meant by international working class solidarity. Lenin and Trotsky did not propose separatism, they remained in favour of strengthening the union: but only through winning the voluntary agree- ment of the other republics. The ques- tion also had an intemational, strategic importance, given the Bolsheviks' perspective of develop- ing national, anti-colonial revolutions in the East. As Lenin explained:

"It would be unpardonable oppor- tunism if, on the eve of the debut of the East, just as it is awakening, we undermine our prestige with its peoples, even if only by the slightest crudity or injustice towards our own non-Russian nationalities."(13)

These positions won the day at the 12th Congress of the Communist Party, but the ascendent bureaucracy had little intention of carrying them out. The petty bourgeois outlook of this social stratum naturally drew it to the culture of the old bourgeoisie and Tsarist Bureaucracy. Great Russian Chauvinism rose like a scum on the tide of the Stalinist counter-revolution and came naturally to the bureaucracy's social base of ex-

Tsarist bureaucrats and professional functionaries in the non-Russian

republics.

It fell to the Left Opposition to continue the struggle for a revolution- ary policy on the national question. The Platform of the Left Opposition argued that the key task was not to suppress national awakening, but to direct it along socialist channels. This meant promoting the development of local languages and schools and 'nationalising' the state machinery ('Nationalising' was an official policy of transforming the local party, state, trade union and co-operative struc- tures to use the local language and staff). This Ukranianisation, Tur- cification, etc, could not succeed by bureaucratically relying on experts, but by relying on the working class

and the lower stratum in the countryside, in a struggle against Kulak and chauvinist elements. The Left Opposition also proposed a spe- cial 15 year plan to address the economic needs of the non-Russian republics. (14)

The consolidation of the bureaucracy bought dire consequen- ces for the national minorities. Whilst it is true that the "regime of the guardhouse" weighed heavily on the whole of the USSR, it weighed dis proportionately on the non-Russian nationalities, just as it did on Soviet women. Imposition of Russian methods, particularly forced collec tivisation, caused massive devastation and widespread famine, with millions dying in the Ukraine alone.

Resistance was met with mass deportations and the elimination of virtually all the local communist leaderships. In the Ukraine for ex- ample, ex-Borotbists won the leader- ship of the party and carried out Uk- ranianisation policies until the late 1920s. They were driven from the party and most were killed in the pur- ges. The scale of repression in the Ukraine reflected the scale of opposi- tion to it; leading Trotsky to call for an independent Soviet Ukraine in a series of articles in the late 1930s. Anti-religious persecution was also particularly brutal amongst non-Rus- sian nationalities, in an effort to prevent the Churches or Mosques from acting as national unifiers. The USSR extended its borders in 1939 by occupying Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Finland and parts of Poland.

The Great Russian chauvinism of the Soviet bureaucracy reached new heights during the Second World War. This war portrayed as a "Great

who were condemned as a people, as reactionary and fascist. This chauvinism was no mere rhetoric, however, and during and after the war the bureaucracy punished those peoples whom it considered had betrayed the USSR with mass execu- tions and deportations. The Crimean Tartars are still campaigning to this day for the right to retur to their homeland in the Ukraine - a demand supported, to its credit, by the Uk- rainian Popular Front, since its im- plementation would mean at least a partial evacuation of the present population.

Since the war the non-Russian nationalities have to varying degrees faced a policy of cultural and linguis-

mr ranger tic assimilation, along with dis- crimination in the allocation of jobs, housing and land. Assimilation was openly advocated by Khrushchev and adopted as a goal by the 22nd Party Congress in 1961. The consequences of this policy for the Ukraine were well documented by the communist dissident Ivan Dzuba in his book In- ternationalism or Russification?, for which he was jailed and later forced to recant. A similar fate faced others who raised their voices against the cult of the "Soviet nation", a term adopted by the 24th Party Congress. It is significant that the largest single group of political prisoners in the pre- Gorbachev USSR were Ukranians jailed for the 'crime' of nationalism.

The present situation in the USSR must be analysed in the light of this long and sorry history of national op pression under Stalinism. It is little wonder that mass nationalist move- ments have emerged in the space provided by Glasnost, expressing ex- treme dissatisfaction on the part of these oppressed nations with their na- tional fate.

How then should revolutionary socialists respond? The first thing to appreciate is that in the oppressed na- tions all questions, those of democracy, the environment, anti- militarism and the economy, have a national colouring. In Moscow the demands are for greater democratic rights, in Vilnius they are for greater national democracy - the right to decide their own national future. Thus the struggle of the oppressed nations must be seen as an important, and ad- vanced, component of the inevitable struggles around democratic demands that can pave the way for political revolution. We must be careful to avoid the idea that the nolitical

Patriotic War" to defend the "socialist motherland" against the Germans,

revolution is something that will be centred in Moscow or Leningrad and

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 28, November 1990

SUPPLEMENT

be fought around purely "class" demands. The revolutionary struggle of the oppressed nationalities against their oppression will be a key com- ponent of any political revolution in the USSR.

The declaration of independence by Lithuania, followed by Latvia and Estonia, has placed their national struggle firmly at the centre of the world stage and demands a response. The key question for socialists must be: have the Stalinist bureaucracy and the present Gorbachev leadership convinced the Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian massed of the supe riority of Stalinist centralism over Baltic independence? The answer is clearly no.

This must be our point of depar- ture, and socialists have to not only support but advocate independence for these countries. Any other posi- o tion will leave us by-passed bya events and completely isolated from z a dialogue with the masses. We musta avoid any worthless, abstract schemas of defending self-determina- tion whilst arguing for the Baltic states to remain within the USSR on the basis of some common anti- bureaucratic fight. The Baltic peoples do not want an improved form of union - they want independence! To offer them self-determination on paper whilst arguing that they should not secede is to do nothing more than parrot the positions of the bureaucracy for the last 60 years. As Trotsky pointed out when dealing with the Ukraine in the 1930s:

"We must proceed from facts and not ideal norms. The Thermidorean reaction in the USSR...must be paid for in genuine currency in all spheres, including that of the Ukranian ques tion."(15)

We must admit to the fact that the national dignity of the oppressed peoples has been fundamentally and systematically trampled upon by the bureaucracy, and develop our posi- tions accordingly. Of course our task as socialists is not merely to com- ment on or analyse a situation but to develop a strategy to take it forward. To move from the power of the bureaucracy to the power of the elected Soviet - that is our goal. The key to such developments in the op pressed nations will be the struggle around national rights and self-deter- mination. The revolutionary left, both internationally and within the USSR, should actively advocate an inde- pendent soviet Latvia, Lithuania, Es tonia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine. It is only through an un-

Trotsky struggled for a revolutionary position on the national question ambiguous commitment to such posi for independence has even greater tions that socialists can hope to gain a potency since it points the finger at hearing within the national move- the real enemy; the Moscow ments. bureaucracy and its local allies, not

Such a position is not a sop to the Armenian people. nationalists, or a 'trick' to get them to

Many socialists, including an support socialism, but an honest editorial in Socialist Outlook, have recognition of their national rights. pointed to the illusions of the Baltic We have to show by our actions that fronts that Wester imperialists will the aim of our socialism is not to defend them. The last months have abolish' the oppressed nations but to shown the imperialists themselves give them the fullest space for their going out of their way to destroy any national development. Our failure to such illusions. It should be increas champion these demands leaves the ingly clear to the Baltic peoples that field open to fundamentalist, clerical the USA is no more concerned with and pro-bourgeois forces whose self-determination in the USSR than voices are growing louder by the day. it is in its Central American "back

Some will argue that to advocate yard' . the capitalist press has been independence is in effect to advocate full of warnings to the hasty Balts independent capitalist states, given that they are endangering the nature of the Popular Fronts. Gorbacnev's rule. Such an unholy al- Such positions reveal both a liance gives revolutionary socialists a profound pessimism and a lack of clear space to advance a different clarity on how socialists should sup- position - that of a common struggle

port national movements. Of course we have something to say on the na- ture of post-independence states; we are for nationalised property relations and the rule of democratic workers' councils (not least because genuine independence under capitalism is a fiction). But we can only win the masses to such a position if we adopt a correct attitude to the question that justifiably preoccupies them - the na- tional question. It should also be em-

phasised that none of the Popular Fronts that exist have a finished, finalised pro-capitalist programme. Only the Azeri front has succumbed to chauvinism, and there the demand

against the Stalinist bureaucracy and imperialism - through building active solidarity with the struggle for inde- pendence. It is only in this way that we can show in practice who the best allies of the Baltic republic are.

Events are also clarifying the positions of the Soviet Left, many of whom were initially extremely sec- tarian and antagonistic to the national movements. The Lithuanian declara- tion of independence has forced them

to take a clear stand; either for Gior- bachev and blockade, or for inde pendence. At the 1990 May Day demonstration they overwhelmingly chose the correct position. This

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 28, November 1990

"We must

avoid any

worthless,

abstract

schemas of defending self- determination whilst arguing for the Baltic

states to remain within

Page 17

"The attitude of revolutionary socialists, both internationally and within the USSR, will be decisive in deciding whether the national current flows towards reaction or revolution."

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internationalist rhetoric. Our at- shows most clearly how the different struggles within the

titude to the national move- USSR run parallel to each

ments in the USSR and the les- other and exert influence upon

sons we learn from them can each other, in this case in a

help to show that nothing could positive direction. Important

be further from genuine revolu- links have been established tionary internationalism. between radical deputies in

Trotsky summarised this inter-

nationalism with the following Moscow and Leningrad and the Front leaderships. A recent

analogy when advocating an in- conference of independent

dependent Soviet Ukraine in the workers' movements and or- 1930s: ganisations held in Novkuz-

"The Kremlin bureaucracy netsk adopted a resolution of

tells the Soviet woman: Inas- support for independent

much as there is socialism in Lithuania and called on

our country, you must be happy workers' collectives to break

and give up abortions (or suffer the blockade. The Supreme

the penalty). To the Ukranian Soviets of Moldavia, Georgia

they say: Inasmuch as the and the Russian republic have

socialist revolution has solved also begun to make encourag

the national question, it is your ing overtures to the Baltic

duty to be happy in the USSR republics.

and to renounce all thoughts of

In this context it is not Socialists must win nationalists to side of revolution separation (or face the firing

helpful to suggest that the Fronts should tactically curb or moderate their demands. Such a move would be disastrous, giving breathing space and new confidence to Stalinist organisations in the Baltic and demoralising those who look to the Baltic for a lead. Revolutionary socialists would never give such "moderating' advice to oppressed nationalities in difficult or minority positions under imperialism, such as the Palestinians within the Israeli state, the six county Irish republicans or the Kanaks of New Caledonia. Rather we would advocate a strategy to build solidarity and spread and

deepen the struggle. The same should be true of the national question in the USSR and we should be careful not to apply a double standard.

A defeat for Baltic independence would be a defeat for the whole multi-form, multi-national process of radicalisation and struggle within the USSR. The Baltic peoples may be numerically small but they have an important influence. This is par-

ticularly true of the developing na- tional movement in the Ukraine, a na- tional question with decisive significance for the whole USSR. It is inconceivable that a mass national movement will not develop here given the history of repression and the high level of resistance to it, right through to the dissidents of the 1960s and 1970s.

The national question is of strategic importance within the USSR. Seventy years of Stalinist rule have not solved the national question but exacerbated it. In addition the remnants of the early Leninist policy

and subsequent industrialisation have created significant, nationally con- scious, working classes in most op pressed nations. This reality has to be addressed by any international revolutionary left which seriously wishes to see an anti-bureaucratic political revolution in the USSR. Our starting point in this must be to learn from and popularise the revolutionary heritage of the Bolsheviks and the Left Opposition on the question. It is a heritage of which we can be proud.

We must guard against ignoring these movements for the bright lights of the simpler more obviously

"socialist' anti-bureaucratic fight in Moscow and Leningrad. The struggle of the oppressed nationalities for self- determination will be a key element of the unfolding political revolution. The attitude of revolutionary socialists, both internationally and within the USSR, will be decisive in deciding whether the national current flows towards reaction or revolution. An immediate international campaign of solidarity with the Baltic states is

of solidarity with the Baltic states is needed, through existing solidarity structures or by creating new ones, around the demands of: 'Self- deterination for the Baltic states!', 'All Union troops out' and 'Workers" organisations - break the blockade!'

The question also has domestic relevance. The British labour move ment is heavily influenced by Stalinist and Great British chauvinist ideas. The Mid Glamorgan Labour councillor who recently declared the Welsh language; "a nauseating ir- relevance to an international socialist like me" : stands in a long line of "socialists' who cloak chauvinism in

squad).

What does the revolutionary say to the woman? 'You will decide your- self whether you want a child; I will defend your right to abortion against the Kremlin police'. To the Ukranian people he (sic) says: 'Of importance to me is your attitude toward your na- tional destiny and not the "socialist" sophistries of the Kremlin police; I will support your struggle for inde- pendence with all my might!"(16)

References

1. Trotsky, L., "The National Question and the Education of the Party Youth.' in Lenin's Fight Against Stalinism. Path finder Press

2. Lenin, V.I., cited by Antonio Mos- coto in International Marxist Review, Vol 4 No 2, Autumn 1989

3. Lebed, Dmitrii, cited by Roman Rosdolsky in Engels and the Nonhistoric, Critique Books, 1987

4. Plekhanov, as (3)

5. cited as (2)

6. cited as (2)

7. Lenin, V.I., letter to L.B. Kamenev for Members of the Political Bureau, in Lenin's Fight Against Stalinism, Path- finder

8. Lenin, V.I., The question of Nationalities or "Autonomisation', as (7) or in pamphlet form in Last Letters and Articles, Novostii Press.

9. as (8)

10. as (8)

11. as (8)

12. as (1)

13. as (8)

14. Trotsky, L., Platform of the Left Opposition', in Challenge of the Left Op position (1926-27), Pathfinder Press

15. Trotsky, L., 'Independence of the Ukraine and Sectarian Muddleheads, in Writings of Leon Trotsky (1939-40), Path- finder Press

16. as (15)

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