Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2009

Gorbachev retreats on '500-day' marketisation

· Socialist Outlook no. 28, November 1990 · pp 21-22 · 1,808 words

Russia and the USSR Economy

by lan McLarty

Mikhail Gorbachev's project continues to crumble. The reforms introduced to give dynamism to the economy - and protect the Kremlin elite - fail to provide the consumer goods promised; the nationalist question runs ahead of the bureaucracy's attempts to head off the move- ment; and the proposed market reforms - most notably food price in- creases - are consistent- ly delayed by those in power, who are fearful of the possible backlash as the working class try to defend their standard of living.

The work of vice-premier Abalkin's team of experts drawing up new legislation on market reform which included proposals for setting up soup kitchens was kept secret 'in order to avoid untimely confrontation in society'.

The crisis has been entirely the creation of the bureaucratic caste, constructing a plan not for the work- ing class of the USSR as a whole but to maximise consumption for them- selves. Perestroika simply represents

new bureaucratically-imposed answer to a problem that cannot be solved without the removal of the bureaucracy.

The stagnation (typified by the Brezhnev period) was largely caused by the discouragment of technologi- cal experimentation. This was not only because such advances did not materially benefit the bureaucracy, but also because - as can clearly be seen with the lack of computers in schools and industry - the advances could be used for purposes outside the control of the authorities (such as Samizdat communication).

Consigned to the dustbin of his tory are Khrushchev's claims that the 'socialist countries would overtake the West by the end of the twentieth century. However, what has not been

destroyed in the Soviet Union despite the actions of Stalin and the interven- tions of the imperialists past and present are the gains of the October Revolution embodied in nationalised property, health care, education and full employment.

The fact that the economy in the USSR is determined by the plan means that the working class can easily see who is introducing price hikes or taking away social benefits - there is none of the mystification of a 'free' market.

Gorbachev's project relies on more than voluntaristic actions from within the USSR. He has adopted a stance of 'ultra' peaceful coexistence both in terms of arms cuts and poten- tial areas of conflict.

When for example foreign mini- ster Shevardnadze after reaching agreement on all major issues con- cering land based troops in Europe quips 'and the Russians made all the concessions' he could equally be talking about any of the liberation movements his regime has recently betrayed. And as Trotsky com- mented, the international policy of the USSR is a reflection of the domestic regime.

Not only did the USSR cut oil supplies to Nicaragua at a critical stage for the Sandinistas but more recently it has made moves to set up a consulate general in Israel in spite of the Palestinian Intifada. During the Gulf crisis the USSR's senior

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 28, November 1990

military

commander,

General Mikhail Moiseyev,

speaking to the New York

Times did not in any way

rule out war; he only ar-

gued that it should not be

through the unilateral ac-

tion of the US, but con-

ducted through the UN.

At home the 28th Con-

gress of the CPSU resolved

nothing as far as the direc-

tion forward is concerned -

and with the CP in such a

state of paralysis the only

possibility for change has

to come from outside. In

spite of workers and

peasants making up 35.2%

of the CP these groups

made up only 10% of Con- gress. It is also the case that workers are the majority of those leaving the conservative Russian Communist Party at this time.

The fact that the CP is the major political force in the Soviet Union cannot be ignored, but as a political force the Stalinist bureaucracies can quickly evaporate. In Romania, a party with 20% of the country as members almost disappeared over- night. This is clearly not about to happen in this way in the USSR but the leakage of members from a monolithic party structure that cur- rently includes 10% of the Soviet population must be a thorn in the side of the Gorbachev project.

In addition for the first time since the 1920's we have seen the emer- gence of platforms. The Democratic Platform - apart from agreement on reduction of bureaucratic privileges - has no unified political line. As well as incorporating some Socialist ele- ments it includes forces such as Yeltsin (who left the CP at Congress) supporting rapid marketisation. The Democratic Platform will therefore have to split into, at least, two parts.

The Democratic Platform also has severe limitations in outlook and, whilst correctly demanding the repeal of Article 6 and campaigning against 'dogmatic' marxism, they • also see the eventual solution in the political sphere as creating what amounts to a bourgeois type par l

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SUPPLEMENT

liamentary democracy.

The Marxist Platform states it wishes to retur to the "best traditions of the 1920s", and has slightly more workers among its ranks that the Democratic Platform. It only had a handful of delegates at the 28th Con- gress but one of its members, Buzhgalin, was elected to the Central Committee.

At the Congress he stated It is necessary to give real power to every working person. How is that pos sible? There is a way... the power of the soviets.' Marxist Platform do not however have any project to leave the CP as yet - nor do they seem to ex- pect to take it over.

With the economy we have seen the emergence of two plans for marketisation; the more cautious ap proach of Prime Mini- ster Rhyzkov and the '500 days' plan of Shatalin/Petrakov, sup- ported by Yeltsin.

The latter plan rep- resents in many ways the more parasitic layer of the elite, those who are attempting to con- vert themselves into a new bourgeoisie large- ly through the privatisation of party property by transferring it into their own hands.

Shatalin's plan did hold one key advantage

Homelessne for the bureaucracy. It envisaged no rise in official prices, but a straight introduction of the market into phased sectors of the economy. This could mean it would be 'the market' that was blamed for the increases, avoiding action against the government.

Furthermore subsidies on essential goods and services were to be kept until the final part of the project when the market would be brought into these areas.

The hardest attack on the working class would therefore come at a time when marketisation had become a fait accompli throughout the rest of the economy.

The "Gorbachev - Yeltsin pact' which has now effectively been aban- doned - was a watered down version of Shatalin's blueprint. However Gor- bachev appears to have again shifted his position to that of Rhyzkov's plan running into a headlong struggle with the free-marteteers of the Russian Federation. Both schemes attempt to integrate the USSR back into the world economy.

Leading left-wing intellectual, Boris Kagarlitsky has said of the scheme that "it is absolutely clear that such a programme cannot be realised without mass repression and probably starvation". Estimates for unemploy ment if the marketisation is intro duced into the USSR run from 10 million (out of a workforce of 125 million) if it is slowly introduced rising to 40 million if it is introduced quickly.

However amongst the Soviet people supporters of rationing (as- sociated with the plan compared to those who favour price increases (more typically market) have risen by 50 million in one year. It would ap- pear there is the beginning of aware- ness amongst an increasing layer of what the market would mean.

tions over the disputed territory of Nagomo-Karabakh.

In terms of the working class the most outstanding struggle so far is clearly the miners' strike of last year. The miners went on a one day strike at the time of this year's CP Congress demanding the depoliticisation of the army, KGB and legal system, the resignation of the Rhyzkov govern- ment, the reconstruction of the trades unions and the nationalisation of CPSU property. (The nationalisation demand shows the correct class at- titude to the CPSU; some reactionary elements have tried to demand it should be made a 'criminal organisation', with the attendant problems this would have for anybody who has ever been a mem- ber of the CPs, including numbers of

the working class, who

would automatically be-

come criminalised.)

Many miners and trade

unionists from other in-

dustries and "left' intellec-

tuals (both social-

democratic and socialist)

attended the Kusbass Con-

ference this summer - in an

attempt to strengthen the

movement. One delegate

from the Urals spoke of the

historic step of the October

revolution but the need now

for a new political revolu-

tion against the

bureaucracy. ¡ation

However developments in the union federation SOTSPROF recently mean that the right wing ap- pear to have captured the leadership and may be attempting to purge the left wing - those connected with the Socialist Party - from its ranks.

At the same time, according to Kagarlitsky, other previously right wing trade unions such as SMOT (Free Inter-Professional Association of Workers) are moving left.

The situation currently in the Soviet Union calls for a new leader- ship to be built, a step which is now possible in the openings that have been wrung from the bureaucracy.

The Bonapartist super-presidency of Gorbachev shows the desperate position the Soviet elite is in, with new powers being bestowed upon Gorbachev almost daily. However, without a resolute fight by the work- ing class the same space that opened the possibility of political revolution could be utilised by those who repre- sent the counter-revolution.

In Moscow: result of the start of marketisa

In addition to the problems with the economy that the bureaucracy faces there is the continuing question of the nationalities.

Almost all of the soviet Republics have declared some form of autonomy. The nationalists often at- tract a vote far larger than the nation they represent, for example, in Latvia the popular Front obtained two thirds of the vote when only 50% of the population is Latvian.

However in areas where the Kremlin has interfered - most noticeably by sending the tanks into Azerbaijan - independent expression has been trampled. In the recent elec- tions there, official claims recorded a vote of 40% in Baku where there were observers and well over 80% in the countryside where ther were no observers.

On top of this the pernicious role of the Azerbaijani CP continues as it tries to protect its position in a rapidly moving situation. Its leader, Ayaz Mutalibov, has condemned Moscow for not cracking down sooner on what he claims were Armenian provoca-

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 28, November 1990

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