IRELAND DOUBLE FEATURE
"of the 2.5 million jobs created in the
UK since 1983 only a paltry
18,000 had been in the
North of
Ireland. In short, the employment situation is bad and will get worse"
"The British strategy - the political defeat of Sinn
Fein, the building of a new moderate consensus throughout
Ireland and the establishment of a devolved power-sharing administration in the Six
Counties - remains in place"
understanding of Irish history', and he invited Brooke elaborate his remarks. Since then Brooke has declined 1o do so, but has repcaled his willingness to talk with Sinn Fein in the event of a ceasefire. The IRA has said no ceasefire without a dramatic shift in government McGuiness, in April edition of the Fortnight had again had Friendly words for Brooke, saying he *does appear to suffer less from the intran sagent gung-ho style secrclaries of state". added, "if that really is the case, and Mr Brooke is genuinely struggling with the intricate realities of Irish politick, then republicans - who want peace and justice as much as anyone - have a responsibility to examine carefully any signals that may hold out even the tiniest opportunity for
The difficulty in figuring out if the British are really up to anything new is that the signals have been confusing. At the start of March the Daily Telegraph revealed that Brooke s Junior minister. Richard Necdham. had suggested in a speech the previous month to business poopic in the North of Ireland that the revamped Helsinki Convention in 1992 should guarantee the perminent partition of Ireland. In relum. providing they openly accepted partition, Catholics would be allowed some participation in power-sharing in the North and the Helsinki Convention would supposedly guarantee their civil liberties.
But perhaps most telling of all was a report issued at the end of March by the Northern Ireland Economic Re scarch Centre on thic economy and job prospects for the six courties. Un omployment there is currently at 14 per cent, and the prediction is that it will, at the best, remain there until 1995. To stop the jobless figures getting higher would need government wages subsidies, a massive growth in internal investment and the promotion of migration of up to 10,000 a усаг. I was reported that of the 2.5 million jobs created in the UK since 19X3
RON LAD
KE VARNED You les WILL MELT FEON THE HEAT OF ULSTER Loyalist noses were put out of joint by the Angio-Irish accord only a paltry 18.000 had been in the of Ireland. In short employment situation is bad and will
There is no indication that the government ameliorate this connomic situation by inlerventionist policies. Other dreams of money from America, and elsewhere, which followed the signing of
Anglo-Irist Agreement tanled to muterialise. Accordingly, the oconomic and social conditions which helped to create mass support for Irish republicanism in Catholic working class districts will remain. The British government does not scem 100 worried about this: neither is there any indication and it is battling for Catholic hearts and minds by lowerrepression levels. ample, the alterations in the operaof the Vister Defence Regiment which were also promised it the Anglo-Irish Agreement remain
Despite its unfulfilled promises, the Anglo-Irish Agreement remains relevant. The Britch stralegy indicated by that agreement - the political defeat of Sinn Fein, the building of a new moderate consensus throughout Ireland and the establishment of a devolved power-sharing administraton in the Six Counles - remains in place. What has changed since the Agreement was signed are British Lactics within thal strategy
The first problem the Hritish faced, as soon as the ink was dry on the Agreement, was the degree of loyalist opposition to it. This in tumm meant that some of the reforms offered to the respectable Catholics in the S.D.LP, the Irish government and the Church delivered for fear of further annoying the Unionists. The oc casional outbursts of pique shown by the Irish government -such as playing fast and loose with the British over extradition - have been one consequence, have further dented the whole strategy: So has the continued support for Sinn Fein, (even though that has ebbed slightly), and the military prowess while if 15 true that there is not the militancy in the opposition to the Anglo-Irish agreement within the loyalist camp that there once was, attempts 1o involve the Joyalist leaders in serious talks with the British goverment still fall an the
Those within loyalism who lavour a more conciliatory response to the British are now saying there will he no movement from their side until after the general election.
If that is the case it is not surprising that Peter Brooke has decided to concentrate his attention on tha nationalist/republican His promise of talks with republicans if they became constitutionalists, and even more dramatically his likening of the North of Ireland situation lo other colonial ones, were, it is true no more than public expressions of what some sections of British ruling circles have been saying for yoars, mevertheless it was the timing of the pronouncement that was important One factor which informed this was a very public and honest self-examination by republicanism as to where it was going, and a recognition of the failure in establish a significant base of support in the South of Ireland.
This self-examination was nothing approaching the rumours of splits that appeared in the British media, and were probably exaggerated in perception by Brooke and his advisors. But they did provide a useful opening through which Brooke could poke his head, utter a few sentences and leave some puzzled faces behind. Scen in this way the remarks, rather Lhan rep-
IRELAND DOUBLE FEATURE resenting some great sea change in British
Just strategy.
WCEC one of those rare x-
British amples of politicians being a little clever in their dealings with the
Irish:
Brooke was in a no-lose situation: if did his words strengthen a ceasefire wing within republicanism, all to the good, if they did not at least they would cause a hitic disorientation.
The degree of seriousness with which Sinn Fein appears to have taken
Brooke's words da indeed suggest they have over-responded to what could very well be seen as fitle more than a bit of mischiefmaking. On the other hand, the
British political system is always keen to offer prestige, recognition and
• scat a negotiating table to its most intransigent opponents. providing they accept the ground rules of that political system.
Either way. there is no great directional change in British policy taking place.
Richard Needham's search for permanent guarantees for partition indicate that
Britam's bottom line of support for the existing constitutional boundaries does not change. The slum conditions of the North of
Ireland economy testify to:
the familiar British indirference and political lazi ness in respect of Ireland.
which have done so much lo sustain Ireland's British problem over the cen turies. Peter Brooke may indeed be an exception to he such characteristics.
may wish to prove himself not ihc political has-been everyone assumed he was when he was exiled by
Thatcher, or he may be trying to display his independence
From her ulwa Unionism, bur with the
Tories in crisis and the general elcetion hot so far away, the idea that deep-seated political initiative is un derway does not stand up to examina tion. The reality is the growing economic depression in the North of
More flexible on colonial policy than Lahour: Is Thatcher heading a rethink on Ireland?
Ircland, the unwillingness of Brilain to do anything about it, and the very peripheral place occupied by the
North of Ireland in British politics.
Not only may the readership of this, magazine not know who the Northern
Ireland, Socretary of State is, notonly docs the British general public cerinly not know, it can even be wondered if, at times, THEN
NºS 1.NO PRISON UNIFORM FIVE
2 NO PRISON WORK
3FREE ASSOCIATION.
4 VISITS LETTERS
PARCELS, AND RECWFACILTIES
5. FULL REMISSION.
BOBBY SANDS
RAY
MECREESH
Thatcher remembers.
And yet the world is changing If
Thatcher really is on the way out, then so, too, is her own very personal commitment lo Unionism. A modern European, Tike Michaci Hesclune, would he unlikely to have any such Unionist hang ups. It could even be that the tractional strategic importance of Ireland to Britain may have diminished when new Europe cierges from the current convulsions. In such circumstances the age-old Irish republican helief that sooner or later, if the pressure is applied, Britain will want to cut ils losses and get out may indeed come into its own.
The depressing thought 1s that the опе circumstance where this seems unlikely to occur is the event of a Labour victory at the next election.
As Labour's attacks on
Brooke's: willingness to
DEMANDS consider a chalogue with
Sinn Fein indicate, the truth.
Labour is more conser vative than sections of the Tories on the Irish national qüestion. British
Tory government's have always been willing to dump their chauvinistic haggage and colonial
FRANCIS mentality when it suits
WHICHES wider interests.
PATSY
Labour,
Labour, cortinly someone like Neil Kin
CHARA nock, such baggage and such a mentality are almost first principles.
Heseltine gets his act together preity soon, or there is some spectacular development in the war front the politics of the stand-off in the North of Ireland scem unlikely to change for a few years yet. So, sorry folks, but there is no end in sight.
"the slum conditions of the North of
Ireland that today economy testify to the familiar
British
Indifference and political laziness in respect of
For
Ireland, which have done so much to sustain
Ireland's British problem over the centuries"
Page 17 SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 24, May 1990
IRELAND DOUBLEFEATURE
*In the South, nelther the
Labour Party nor the
Workers'
Party differentiate themselves from the union bureaucrats
.... But Sinn
Fein instead of counterposing
Itself to its political enemles and the bureaucrats, tries to play the political game on their terms"
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK nD 24, May 1990
Is the IRA going to declare a ceasefire in the near future in exchange for some concessions granted by the present administration in Belfast headed by Peter Brooke? LIAM MAC UAID argues that the answer is "no'. Last year's elections in the 26 counties saw Sinn Fein thoroughly marginalised as a political force. IL won 1.2 percent of the vote as compared to 1.99 percent in the 1987 election. By any standards il was a terrible result for an organisation claiming to represent the demand of the Irish pople for freedom.
In the circumstances it was not far short of a catastrophe. The Progressive Democrats who split from Fianna: Fail hecausc it wasn't sufficiently Thatcherite in its economics and pro British in its politics saw their share of the vote Tall from 11.8 percent to 5.5 percent Fianna Fail retained its percentage of thie vote but lost four seats, one to an independent on the single issuc of the closure of a local hospital. Most significantly it lost large numbers of working class votes and only saved several seats beacausc of transfers from Fine Gae! and the Progressive Democrats.
In fact the election marked a radicalisation in Trish politics. The stalinist Workers" Party and the class collaborationist Labour Party each made a net gain of three seats and even the Greens had two TDs elected. Sinn Fein didn't win a single seat. The Irish working class, reacting against an economic crisis and years of usterity offensives, abandoning Fianna Fail, turned not to Sinn Fein but to Iwo parties whose economic perspoctives are really no different From the bourgeois parties.
Gerry Adams: wants new approach to protestant workørs
Sinn Fein, in the cycs of radicalising irish working class volers, was not seen as a political alterative to the crisis of capitalist rule.
In the North the situation is not quite so dire. In last year's council elections Sinn Fein won 69,000 votes, 11 percent of the total votes cast. The party considers this to be the solid Republican bedrock. Another more accurate way of describing the same phenomenon is that the political radicalisation that followed the H-Block struggle and was expressed by the electoral rise of Sinn Fein has been halted.
has created iwo political poles in the Republican movement. At one extreme, activists talk of the need to dig in for a long war'. In practice, because the lack of mass struggles allows the repressive forces to concentrate almost entirely on the Republican movement the armed struggle has become mOre adventurist, and civilian deaths now comprise a grater proportion of those killed by the IRA (39 percent).
To compound this, Shorts aircraft factory, a major industrial employer of protestants in Belfast has heen atlacked wice in recent monts, once in the same week that Gerry Adams spoke af the Ard Fheis on the nood to address the needs protestant workers.
At the other pole, and these are people who arc being squeezed at the mothose ment,
Republicans who want to turn to the Southern working class and make Sinn
Fein a working class party in its politics as well as its
5 social composition.
both the North and the
South there is a large political space which could be filled by a class struggle party with an understanding of the national question which reflects the view of most of the
Insh working class-
Im the North there Is simply no apposition to the collaboration of the union burcaucracy in dis-
Conscquently:
nationalist workers have only a dim understanding of the connection between trade union struggles and the national question. The SDLP, a member of the Socialist International and party of the Catholic bourgeoisie has an attitude lo class struggie that makes Kinnock look like a Trotskyist.
In the South, neither the Labour
Party nor the Workers' Party differenhemselves from the union burcaucrais who participate in what is called "The Programme of National
Recovery", and do not challenge the need for cuts. But Sinn Fein is conscious of its isolation, and instead of counterposing itself to ils political enemies and the bureaucrats, it tries lo play the political game on their
Beroen the two poles, there is a gradation of views. The Republican leadership is pragmatic and occupies the centre ground because its poncipal concem is to hold the movement together. In this it has-been remarkably successful, thus far only losing some of the more politically primitive
But sometimes there is a political
Page 18
IRELAND DOUBLE FEATURE price in be paid for orBanisational unity, The mechanism through which the leadership preserves the unity of the Republican movement is to integrate those ideas which it cither Finds attractive or can't mswer, even when these result in an uncomfortable combination. So, for example, virtually every election in the North sees some sort of appeal from Sinn Fein for a pact or alliance with the SDLP.
During the Hunger Strike in 1981, the SDLP didn't didn't dare stand against Bobby Sands when he sought election to. Westminster. But the Republicans don't properly grasp that this was because of the SDLP's terror being crushed, The SDLP is the most enthusiastic supporter of the Anglo Irish Agreement, an agreement whose Republicanism as a force in Irish politics. What earthly reason is there for the SDLP to form an electoral pact with the Sinn Fein?
Similarly in the South, Sinn Frin makes constant appeals to Fianna Fail. In a press conference given just alic a Dublin court decided notto extradite him, Owen Carron implored Fianna Fail to put an end to all extradition. They are no more likely to repeal the Section 31 restrictions on broadcasting statements by Sinn Fein members; indeed such appeals to them on this basis only reinforce the view that they are the parliamentary defenders of Irish nationalism.
Appealing to the bourgeois parties as representatives of nationalist voters is not the same thing as trying te break the large numbers of working class voters from these parties by putting demands on them. To do so demands a clear understanding of the class nature of the SDLP and Fianna Fail. This is lacking.
Yet at the same time statements by Adams and the pages of Republican News are filled with references to the working class. Holding the movement together demands that the adoption of programmatic advances is done at the speed at which it is felt the average cumann (branch) can handle ihe
Meanwhile the working class, the Brits and the bourgeoisie
Without their common acceptance of the necessity for armed struggle
-QR IRISH UNIT I
The 100,000 at Bobby Sands' funeral was the equivalent of 1.1 million in Britain
British imperialism, strands of opinion in the Republican movement do not have a ercal deal in common ideologically: They include rampant marxists who Republicans, Republicans who are becoming marxists, people who in Britain or Europe would be quite happy as social democrats and large numbers of people who just hate the British army in their sircels.
Accommodating all these is something of a triumph of pragmatism hut it produces such equivocation as Sinn Fein's position on abortion and its reluctance to campaign openly for divorce. It also means that a lot of what happens in the world is simply ignored because it cannot be fitted within the movement's ideological
This has very dirost political consequences. While the Republicans happily identify themselves with the Palestinian intifada and quote Nelson Mandela's comments on armed struggle approvingly, they just do nor know how to respond 1o the collapse
This is partly because they do not understand it. and partly there is some stalinist influence in their ranks. However the Workers' Party has recently expelled a leading idcologue, Eoghan Harris, who argued that socialism is now nothing Meanwhile Workers' Party Pronsias de Rossa propounds murket solutions to the crisis of the Irish есолоту. YeL al a time when a political enemy with a large working turmoil, the
DUN'T LET
THE IRISH
PRISONERS
Republican movement is not able to produce a crilique or attempt to win
Of nocessity this survey of the prescat situation of the Republican Movement has been gloomy. But remember that 100,000 people altended Bobby Sands' funeral in 1981; this is the equivalent of a crowd of almost 1,125,000 in Britain. Remember also the awe inspiring heroism of in numerahle Republican militants who every day face sudden death at the hands of the UDA. UDR, RUC and
Most important of all remember the resilience of the nationalist working class. There have been worse roughs in the present struggle. Between 1974 and 1979 the Republican movement was lillle more than a military machine and it was the mass movement created by the campaigns in delence of the prisoners which stimulated its political development.
There is: no mass movement dominated by the Republicans at the moment and even the rocent extradition victories have been the product of conflicts inside the Irish ruling class rather than the fruits of mass
It is the political heterogeneity of the Republicans which allows us to predict that they will not lay down their arms in the foreseeable future. There is a layer of active and passive support which they know they can rely on. The challenge facing them is to lead the Irish working class in the battle against British imperialism and Irish capitalism - and that is the chalJenge they have still to meet.
*while the
Republicans happily Identify themselves with the Palestinian
Intifada and quote Nelson
Mandela's comments on armed struggle approvingly, they just do not know how to respond to the collapse of stalinism"
Page 19 SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 24, May 1990