Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2009

Why Republicans can't say yes to talks

· Socialist Outlook no. 24, May 1990 · pp 18-21 · 3,255 words

Ireland Britain Palestine

IRELAND DOUBLE FEATURE

fered to the respect- "of the 2.5

able Catholics in the

S.D.L.P., the Irish million jobs

government and the created in the remarks. Since then Catholic Church UK since 1983 Brooke has declined could not be

delivered for fear of only a paltry

IKON LAD

further annoying the 18,000 had

EE VARNED

Unionists.

Ten law WILL MEL T been in the

FRIN THE HEA

North of ceasefire. IRA ULSTER pique shown by the

Ireland. In

employment

but Mar!n situation is

in the

Than 1

get worse" Irish magazine WHELAR

Fortnight had again

182. Friendly words

"does appear lo suffer

Loyalist noses were put out of joint by the Anglo-Irish accord

"The British strategy - the political defeat of Sinn Fein, the building of a new moderate consensus throughout Ireland and the establishment of a devolved power-sharing administration in the Six Counties - remains in

place"

previous of state".

Iealer..

I5 Echuck tricate rean

McGuiness the case, and tv struggling

- Irish

«TeDUDICan:

peace and justice as much as anyone

- have a responsibility to examine carefully any signals that may hold out even the tiniest opportunity for

i as arvone

examine

hAla

The difficulty in figuring out if the British are really up to anything new

is that the signais have been confus-

ing. At the start of March the Daily Telegraph revealed that Brooke's

junior minister, Richard Neodham.

had suggested in a speech the pre- vious month to business poopic in the North of Ireland that the revamped Helsinki Convention in 1992 should guarantee the permanent partition of Ireland. In relum. providing thcy openly accepted partition, Catholics

would be allowed some participation

in power-sharing in the North and the Helsinki Convention would sup-

posedly guarantee their civil liberties.

But perhaps most telling of all was

the Northern Ireland Economic Re search Centre on the cconomy and job prospects for the six counties. Un

But perhaps most telling of all was

nd ol March.n.

1 Economic R-

employment there is currently at 14 per cent, and the prediction is that it will, at the best, remain there until 1995. To stop the johless figures get- ting higher would need government wages subsidies, a massive growth in

of migration of up to 10,000 a ycar. le was reported that of the 25 million

jobs created in the UK since 19X3

- growIn I DEOmUN MI a VRaT

only a paltry 18,000 had been in the North of Ireland. In short employment situation is bad and will get worse.

There is no indication that the Tory government will ameliorate this ceonomic situation by interventionist policies. Other dreams of money from America, and else- where, which followed the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement have failed to materialise. Accordingly, the

North of Ireland. In short

Went

seck

the

helped to create mass support for Irish republicanism in Catholic work- ing class districts will remain. The British government does not scem too worried abour this: neither is there any indication and it is battling for Catholic hearts and minds by lower- ing the repression levels. For ex- ample, the alterations in the opcra- tional role of the Uister Defence Regiment which were also promised at the Anglo-Irish Agreement remain undeliverd

Despite its unfulfilled promises, the Anglo-Irish Agreement remains relevant. The British strategy indi- cated by that agreement - the political

athr

RF

Agreement was signed are British tac-

The first problem the British

faced, as soon as the ink was dry on the Agreement. was the degree of

The casional outbursts of

Irish government

such as playing fast

and loose with the

British over extradi-

tion - have been one

consequence,

- turther dented

the whole strategy

So has the continued

support for Sinn Fein.

(even though that has

ehhed slightly), and

the military prowess

si the IRA. And

while it is true that

there is not the militancy in the op- position to the Anglo-Irish agreement

within the loyalist camp that there with::: the suvarist

once was, attempts to involve the nice was loyalist leaders in serious talks with the British govemment still fall at the Aaraor fence. loyalism who favour a more con- ciliatory response to the British are

Brt: tinn

talks with i fall at the

Within

TOTe Coll Britis. ar

now saying there will he no move- ment from their side until after the

a move nit shier the

general election.

If that is the caxe it is not surpris ing that Peter Brooke has decided to

ing that Peter Brooke has decided to

concentrate his attention on the nationalist/tepublican

community.

His promise of talks with republicans

if they became constitutionalists, and even more dramatically his likening of the North of Ireland situation lo other colonial ones, were, it is true no more than public expressions of what some sections of British ruling circles have been saying for years; neverthe- less it was the timing of the pronoun- cement that was important. One fac

tor which informed this was a very

public and honest self-examination by

republicanism as to where it was

going, and a recognition of the failure

te establish a significant basc of sup:

port in the South of Ireland.

This self-examination was nothing

approaching the rumours of splits that

appeared in the British media, and

were probably exaggerated in percep-

tion by Brooke and his advisors. But

they did provide a useful opening

through which Brooke could poke his

head, utter a few sentences and leave

some puzzled faces behind. Scen in

this way the remarks, rather than rep

na His orem

the

172100120

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 24, May 1990

Page 16

IRELAND DOUBLE FEATURE

strategy. Just one of those rare ex-

British politicians being a lit- tle clever in their dealings with the

Brooke was in a no-lose situation: if his words did strengthen a ceasefire

More flexible on colonial policy than Labour: Is Thatcher heading a rethink on Ireland?

sea change in British

wetC

wung within republicanism, all to the good, if they did not. at leas they would cause a litie disorientation. The degree of seriousness with which Sinn Fein appears to have taken Brooke's words dc. indeed suggest they have over-responded in what could very wo.. tle more thar. a hi naking. On the othe British political aySter keen to offer prestige. re = scat a negotiating tar intransigent opponents. they accepl... political system.

Either wav. the tional change in British policy taking place. Richard Needham's search for permanent guarantees for partition indicate that Britain's bollom line of support for the existing constitutional boundaries does not change. The slum conditions of the North of Ireland economy testify to the familiar British indir- ference and political lazi- ness in respect of Ireland. which have done so much to sustain Ireland's British problem over the ~ turies. Peter Brooke may indeed be an exception to characteristics, he may wish to prove himself not the political has-been

be

Ireland, the unwillingness of Britain

so do anything about it, and the very

- place cupied by une

North of Ireland in British politics.

Not only may the readership of this,

magazine not know who the Northern providing

Ireland, Socretary of State is, not only

does the British general public cer-

winly not know, it can even be

wondered if, at times,

THE FIVE

Nº$1 NO PRISON UNIFORM

4VISITS LETTERS

PARCELS,AND RECNFACIUTIES

5. FULL REMISSION

BOBBY

-FRANCI

SANDS

* HUGHE:

PATSY

RAY CHAR

M'CREESH

Thatcher remembers.

And yet the world is changing. If

Thatcher really is on the way out,

then so, too, is her own very personal

commitment to Unionism. A modern

European, like Michaci Hesclune,

would he unlikely to have any such

Unionist hang-ups. It could even be growing

that the tractional strategic impor-

Br:

when he was exiled by Thatcher, or he may

trying to display his independence from her ultra Unionism, bur with the

Tories in crisis and the general elec-

so lar awav. deep-seated mouticas um derway doc, me stand bon The reality 1s economic depressin-

diminis...

tance of Ireland to Britain may have

diminished when new Europe emer ges from the current convulsions. In

such circumstances the age-old Irish

republican helief that sooner or later,

if the pressure is applied, Britain will

indeed come into its own.

The depressing thought is that the

one circumstance where this seems

tory at the next election

As Labour's attacks on

Brooke's: willingness: 10

consider a dialogue with

unlikely to occur is the

event of a Labour vic

As L

front the ne Nortr

nance ti

Ikr. but

Sinn Fein indicate, the

truth is that today

Lalour is more conser-

vative than sections of

the Tories on the Irish

national question. British Tury government's have always been willing to dume their chauvinistici naggage and colonial

mentality when it suits willer interest.

Labour, certainly for

For

someone like Neil Kin

nock, such baggage and

such a mentality are al-

most first principles.

So unless Michael

Heseltine gets his act

• or there is some: r deveroomen in the warl put of the stand-off in

Ireland seem unukery sof

tew ycars ver. So, som

sigh

"the sium

conditions of

the North of

Ireland

economy testify

to the familiar

British

indifference

and political

laziness in

respect of

Ireland, which

have done so much to sustain Ireland's British

problem over the centuries"

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 24, May 1990

IRELAND DOUBLE FEATURE

"in the South, neither the Labour Party nor the Workers'

Party differentiate themselves from the union bureaucrats .... But Sinn Fein instead of counterposing Itself to its political enemies and the bureaucrats, tries to play the political game on their terms"

Is the IRA going to declare a ceasefire in the near future in exchange for some concessions granted by the present administration in Belfast headed by Peter Brooke? LIAM

MAC UAID argues

that the answer is 'no'.

Last year's elections in the 26 counties saw Sinn Fein thoroughly marginalised as a political force. It won 1.2 percent of the vote as com- pared to 1.99 percent in the 1987 election. By any

By any standards il was a terrible result for an organisation claiming to represent the demand of the Irish people for freedom.

In the circumstances it was not far short of a catastrophe. The Progres- sive Democrats who split from Fianna Fail hecause it wasn't sufficiently Thatcherite in its economics and pro- British in its politics saw their share of the vote fall from 11.8 percent to 5.5 percent Fianna Fail retained its percentage at tric vote but lost four seats, one lo an independent on the single issue of the closure of a local hospital. Most significantly it lost large numbers of working class votes and only saved several seats beacause of transfers from Fine Gael and the Progressive Democrats.

In fact the election marked a radicalisation in Irish politics. The stalinist Workers: Party and the class collaborationist Labour Party each made a net gain of three seats and even the Greens had two TDs elected. Sinn Fein didn't win a single seat. The Irish working class, reacting

against an economic crisis and years oF austerity offensives, abandoning

rea abandoning Fianna Fail, turned not to Sinn Fein

but to two parties whose economic perspoctives are really no different From the bourgeois parties,

Gerry Adams: wants

proach to protesta

Sinn Fein, in the eyes of radicalis- ing Irish working class voters, was not seen as a political altemative to the crisis of capitalist rule

In the North the situation is not quite so dire. In last year's council elections Sinn Fein won 69,00nl votes. 11 percent of the total votes cast. The party considers this to be the solid Republican bedrock. Another more accurate way of describing the same phenomenon is that the wave of political radicalisation that followed the H-Block struggle and was ex- pressed by the electoral rise of Sinn Fein has been halted.

This has created two political poles in the Republican movement. At one extreme, activists talk of the need to dig in for a "long war'. In practice, because the lack of mass struggles allows the repressive forces to concentrate almost entirely on the Republican movement, the armed struggle has become more adven- turist, and civilian deaths now com- prise a greater proportion of those killed by the IRA (39 percent).

To compound this, Shorts aircraft factory, a major industrial employer of protestants in Belfast has heen at- tacked iwice in recent months, once in the same week that Gerry Adams

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 24, May 1990

spoke at the Ard Fheis on ha rood to address the

of protestant

needs

workers.

At the other pole, and

these are people who are

being squeezed at the mo-

ment. those

Republicans who want to

turn to the Southern work-

ing class and make Sinn

Fein a working class party

in its politics as well as its

social composition In

both the North and the

South there is a large

political space which

could be filled by a class

struggle party with an un-

derstanding of the nation-

al question which reflects

the view of most of the

Insh working class.

In the North there Is

simply no opposition to

the collaboration of the trade aton hureaucracy in dis- crimination. Conscauently most nationalist workers have only a dim understanding of the connection be- tween trade union struggles and the national question. The SDLP, a mem- ber of the Socialist International and party of the Catholic bourgcoisie has an attitude to class struggie that makes Kinnock look like a Trotskyist.

In the South, neither the Labour Party nor the Workers' Party differen- tiate themserves from the union bureaucrats who participate in what is called The Programme of National Recovery, and do not challenge the need for cuts. But Sinn Fein is con- scious of its isolation, and instead of counterposing itself to ils political enemies and the burcaucrats, it tries. to play the political game on their terms.

Betwoen the two poles, there is a gradation of views. The Republican leadership is pragmatic and occupies the centre ground because its prin- cipal concern is to hold the movement together. In this it has been remarkab. ly successful, thus far only losing some of the more politically primitive traditionalists.

But sometimes there is a political

Page 18

IRELAND DOUBLE FEATURE unity, DUN'T LET

THE IRISH

PRISONERS•

when these

for ex-

FOR IRISH UNITI

The 100,000 at Bobby Sands' funeral was the equivalent of 1.1 million in Britain

The

of the Republican

sort of appeal from Sinn Fein for a pact or alliance with the SDLP.

During the Hunger Strike in 1981, the SDLP chan't dare stand against Bobby Sands whier he sought electior to Westminster. But the Republicans don't properly grasp that this was because of the SDLP's terror being crushed. The SDLP is the most enthusiastic supporter of the Anglo Irish Agreement, an agreement whose principal aut: is to destroy Republicanism as a force in Irish politics. What carthly reason is there

for the SDLP to form an electoral

PR

The 100,L

makes constant appeals to Fianna Fail. In a press conference given just aller a Dublin court decided not to ex- tradite him, Owen Carron implored Fianna Fail to put an end to all ex- tradition. They are no more likely to repeal the Section 31 restrictions on broadcasting statements by Sinn Fein members: muced ouch appeals them on this basis only reinforce the view that they are the parliamentary defenders of Irish nationalism.

Appealing to the bourgeois parties as representatives of nationalist voters is not the same thing as trying to break the large numbers of working class voters from these parties by put- ung demands on ther Te un so demands a clear understanding of the class narure of the SDLP and Fianna Fail. This is lacking.

Yet at the same time statements by Adams and the pages of Repuhlican News are filled with references to the working class. Holding the movement together demands that the adoption of programmatic advances is done at the speed at which it is felt the average -umann tranc." the change Meanw:

the working class. the Brits and the bourgeoisie

Without their common acceptance

againsr British imperialism. the various strands of opinion in the Republican movement do not have =

greal deal in common idcologically.

include rampan: catholi... Icminists, marxists who becams

Republicans. Republicans who are

becoming marxists, people who in

Britain or Europe would be quite

happy as social democrats and large

numbers of people who just hate the

British army in their sircets.

Accommodating all these is same-

thing of a triumph of pragmatism hut

it produces such equivocation as Sinn Fein's position on abortion and its reluctance to campaign openly for divorce. It also means that a lot of what happens in the world is simply ignored because it cannot be fitted within the movement's ideological framework.

This has very dirost political con- -yuences. While the Republicans happily identify themselves with the Palestinian intifada and quote Nelson Mandela's comments on armed strug- gie approvingly, they just do not know how to respond to the collapse of stalinism.

They

I.... partl erstand it.

This is partly because they do not

and partly Because

some waust influence their ranks. However the Workers' Party has recently expelled a leading que. Eoshan Haris. wno ar

now notin

dream.

leade

gued that socialism is now nothing but ole peoples

Meanwhile Workers' Party Icader

Pronsias de Rossa propounds market

solutions to the crisis of the Irish

nomy. Yet at a time when a

political enemy with a large working

class base is in turmoil, the

Republican movement is not able 10 produce a crilique or attempt to win its supporters.

Of necessity this survey of the present situation of the Republican Movement has been gloomy. But remember that 100,000 poople al- tended Bobby Sands" funeral in 1981; this is the equivalent of a crowd of al- most 1,125,000 in Britain. Remember

ment 01.

or attempt to win.

this surcy ii the of w.. Kepubncan

. -oomv. Bin.

198:. Remember

also the awe inspiring heroism of in-

numerahle Republican militants who

every day face sudden death at the

hands of the UDA. UDR, RUC and

don death at the UDR. RUC and.

Most important of all remember

the resilienice of the nationalist work- ing class. There have been worse troughs in the present struggle. Bc- tween 1974 and 1979 the Republican movement was little more than a military machine and it was the mass movement created by the campaigns in defence of the prisoners which stimulated its political development

There ... mass movement dominated by the Republicans at the moment and even the recent extradi- tion victories have been the product of conflicts inside the Irish ruling

class rather than the fruits of mass

It is the political heterogeneity of

the Republicans which allows us to

predict that they will not lay down

their arms in the foreseeable future.

There is a layer of active and passive

support which they know they can

rely on. The challenge facing them is

to lead the Irish working class in the

battle against British imperialism and

Irish capitalism - and that is the chal-

lenge they have still to meet.

There is a layer of active and passive

"while the

Republicans happily identify themselves with the Palestinian

intifada and

quote Nelson

Mandela's

comments on armed struggle

approvingly, they just do not

know how to respond to the

collapse of

stalinism"

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 24, May 1990

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