Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2009

NICARAGUA: Tough lessons from election defeat

· Socialist Outlook no. 23, April 1990 · pp 23-25 · 3,106 words

Latin America

Sandinistas prepare for new round of struggle Tough lessor from election defeat

After a decade of economic boycott, a prolonged counter- revolutionary intervention and the militarisation of Central America, the United States has finally got what it always wanted, a political victory over the Sandinistas.

The US pressure, combined with the recent active undemnin- ing of the revolution by the Gorbachev leadership, are two of the three key factore which Ind to the defcat of the FSLN at the polls in February. It is important also to analyse the strategic Line followed by the Frente and its implication for our under- standing of revolution in imperialist dominated countries. What was the FSLN's revolutionary project, and why has it suffered such a setback?

The victory of the FSLN in 1970 saw the extraordinary mobilisation of the mass organisations amongst almost every conceivable social class and layer outside the dominant Somoza oligarchy. The social base of the revolutionary regime was clearly much broader than simply workers and poor peasants. The political basis of the revolution was also bmad, bringing together a series of key democratic demands, the realisation of which were central to national liberation.

First, opposition to the Somoza oligarchy which was bleeding the country dry and was a vicious and brutal dictatorship. Second, the crea- tion of a popular revolutionary government. Third, the redistribution of Land - and the national control of fundamental economic sectors - so that all could have a minimum standard of living. Finally, the right to self determination, free from US interven- tion.

ontra war brought co

c ruln and loss of life

myriad of events and attempting to move forward under twin pressures: the aspirations of its popular base, and the blockade by US imperialism (which acted in alliance with the internal sabotage of the bourgeoisic). It was in this context that decisions about economic strategy and democratic forms were made and it was in these areas that the Sandinis. ta leadership unwittingly contributed to its own downfall.

Sandinista power and socialist democracy

The democratic project outlined hy the FSLN was defined for the most part by its rejection of the stalinist model, insisting on the neces- sity of a multi-party democracy, and arguing that this was the only op tion for a genuinely revolutionary government. This was a breath of fresh air which signalled a break from the tradition of the one party state.

"The victory of the FLN in 1979 saw the extraordinary mobilisation of the mass organisations amongst almost

every conceivable social class and layer outside the Somoza oligarchy"

This basic democratic programme held together the broad revolutionary alliance of the people. and ahviated thie strategie dir. ferences within the FSL.N. The ideological gel, the politics of Sandinismo, which under-

which under- pinned the alliance, had the advantage that it could mean all things to all people - and in- deed often did. The atmance wo sence rather inan anti-capuans.. of some of the Frente reader. would have,

The FSLN-....

and democratic in e

mad it was not clear, despite the rhetoric ID. What socianst content the revolution

The SLN seized power much more rapidly than the majority of the Icadership expected. The murder of Pedro Chamorro, Violetta's hus- hand, led to a year long explosion of popular outrage that brought down Somoza. In the vanguard of this process was the FSLN.

As a result the history of Sandinista power is one of responding in a

But what kind of democracy did the San- dinistas construct? In the enthusiasm of the moment the elections of 1984 were greeted as the realisation of socialist democracy. Yet, on reflection, the FSLN did not take the oppor- tunity to build a genuine socialist democracy but instituted a liberal democratic system of rule.

Although there was gennine consultation

with mass organisations over pertinent issues.

the legislative and executive functions were installed in a body which was clected once every six years. Thin is not socialist democracy. Such elections may have a role in a socialist democracy, but the lengthy time span between each election, and the separation of the people from decision making power creates forms that can only be subsidiary to real political and economic control by the marses.

An alternative was available. The creation of a national assembly based on the mass organisations of women, peasants, small farmerx, ar- tisants, youth, indigenous people and workers, alongside the election of

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 23, April 1990

Page 21

local barrio committees - all with the potential to be recalled, would

have been far more democratic. It would have represented the socio- have been far more de... economic unities and contradictions that existed and have heen a direct link berween the mass base of the revolation and the leadership. The Council of State and the bodies represented on it were an embryonic form of such a structure.

The Sandinistas believed that the ideological hegemony they liad achieved through leading the revolution made it inconceivable they would lone the election. "It is not possible' was often the reply when this was raised.

clection itself highlighted two other facts. All the mass or- ganisations had become top-down organisations that were used to im plement Sandinista policy. They had stapped being vehicles for the ex- pression of mass politics. Had this not been the case the Sandiniste would have been aware of the threat to their political control.

Secondly, although Nicaragua is and was not a 'one party state" it was (and still is. for the moment) a lone party slate machine". Almost every official, every administrator in a key position, every aganiser of the police and army is a member of the FSLN. Confirmation of this was there for all to see from the begin- ning: the "Sandinista Amy "San- dinista Police and the "Sandinista Defence Committees' (CDSs).

This domination of the state machinery by the FLN rather than by the workers, peasants and the oppressed, alongside the declining role of the CDSs, the liberal democratic electoral system, and the unaccount-

electoras system, and the unaccount-

able nature of state bodies, allowed the leadership of the FSLN and its

cadre to become separated from the people. The mass involvement es-

sential to socialist democracy did not exist. Thus when mass dissatis-

faction began to blow up into a political storm the FLN neither saw

nor heard it coming until it was too late.

Economic democracy

The eye of the storm was the economy. The key factors in the economic situation were the cost of the contra war, which took up over half of government expenditure for eight years, the economic blockade,

expendit or cight years the economic blockade, and the pathetic amount of aid that the USSR gave to the people of Nicaragua.

However, at the same time the question of economic democracy was crucial to ensure that the leadership remained in contact with the base. A system of workers' control of produc- tion, a necessary step towards full socialisa- tion and workers management, was ahsent Also, those who created the wealth should have the final say in its distribution. In reality

.. distributi-- in reality

the workers and peasants had very little say in

littls sar in how the economy was run.

In the early period of the revolution the

•deologica hegemony they lind

on made it inconceivable they exible was often the reply when

However, these sectors warn Renisi.. The FSLN did not w. strategy that warn 4 allinice with the patrote bourger™ cost of dilutin. the revoutiona.- was not complete thousanas of tandle». of the peuple.

The concessions made

110:

ic Ia dat

Itsell gog

All th-mas- ganisations had become top-down

mined plummeted,

economy

incen-

tives to produce lessened Still

refusing to attack the agru-export

FSLN then slashed the living standards of its

since the

as the pr

coffee production

declined, and economic

bourycoikie,

own supporters in an austerity programme which was IMF-like in magnitude. It was at this point b* the ebsence of sociamsE

democracy and the parliamentary nature of the National Assembly became a danger to the revolu- tion.

UNO banners - subsidised by US dollars

follars

For many Nicaraguans outside ESLN the appacit afface on

democrati. paine of the revolution in the coonomic field and the lack of any forms of

the

cadre to he

popular control lead to a genuine frustration in a situation of economic catastrophe and continuing war. Denied any meaningful decision- making tole in the economic and political programme of the FLN, and having suffered 50,000 dead in a war which required conscription. whilst the rich continued unscathed, it is not surprising that given only one opportunity to vote every six years a section of the masses, probab. ly the most unorganised sector, voted for an alliance of parties promis ing peace and dollars rather than further conomic chaos and war.

Thus, over and above the US blockade and the impact of the war, it was the failure of the FLN to complete the democratic revolution that opened the way to the victory of UNO last February, it is a bitter fact that only a small minority of the large farmers, those owning 200 tu 500 hectares, in whom the Frente invested so much, voted. for the FSLN. Yet the continued vitality of these layers was the seedbed for the reorganisation of the enemy within, and the counter-revolutionary offensive that resulted un the election victory for IJNO, an alliance sup- ported by the contras.

W7° E

on in = situation of connue

tV meaningful decision

angeramme of the FSLN and

conscripuon.

wonsing that.esven.onlv

on of the masens, probab

sance on parnes pronus

r which required

"The domination of the state machinery by the FSLN rather than by

the workers, peasants and the

oppressed, alongside the declining

role of the CDSs.. allowed the leadership of the FLN and Its cadre to

become separated from the people"

peasanty instinctively outlined a mass strategy for social transformation. The San-

dinislas Weic sed sre a full mar mobilisation in the agrarian revolution.

Th itriter

dinistas were very reticent about carrying out

but the mass

mobilisations of the landless and the poor peasants increased the tempo

This struggle from below was necessary because the economic strategy pursued by the Frente was based on state centred accumulation of the surpluses created by the cotton, coffee and cattle agro-export see- tor. It was hoped that hy uxing these advanced centres of production the hard currency cared could be utilised by the state to develop and

hard diva-

ononc red accumulation of production the

Had they hroken up the landholdings of the bourgeoisic, the FLN would have heen able to complete the democratic revolution in the countryside, This would have nicant a fundamental re-organisation of the economy to a degree thar would have forced a transi- Lion lo a self-managed socialist economy.

This would no doubt have been somewhat

chaotic given the gengraphical position and the small size of the working class in Nicaragus, but it would have created a mass peasantry totally loyal to the Frente Sandinis-

Al mesation and king case in

Nicaragus, but it would have created a mass

It would have also allowed the government to direct investment towards small commodity production for the countryside so that an or-

stitt e nat

ndinis

ta.

It would have towards small.

been develone worker-pearan the revolution.

Of coue:

ganic economic relationship between town and country could have been developed. This woald have given real content to the political worker-peakant alliance that the Prente supported at the beginning of

Of course, such a radical programme would have heightened the

Page 22

IST OL /LOOK nn 23. AD: 1990

IN DEPTH

Sandinista support in the heyday of the revolution: the FSLN leadership became separated from the people likelihood of a generalised Central American war: but it is a fact that there has never been a socialist revolution that imperialism has not tried to prevent or overthrow hy force of arms. This threat of war should not

1h....

- put it is a lact that 1 penals has not tried

* of mar should not

ition to socialism

-yllvocation or am

as in demand more won su make.

since, as Nicaragua in contrast to Cuba shows, equivocation or am- concessions until there are no more concessions left to make.

Results

being xocialist in character, it is, as Carlos Vilas put it some time ago, "a popular, agrarian, and national liberation revolution" in which the

he allowed to place a strategic brake on the transition to socialism bignity only gives imperialism the encouragement to demand more

all

Ten years of Sandinista power indicate that far from the revolution

it tar imm the revolution

sut It some time ago, mvaution in which the tetween the Nicarazuan

FSLN viewed the "primary contradiction" as between the Nicaraguan

Within this perspective the struggle between classes is a subordinate

contradiction and the reproduction of capitalist social relations was not

viewed as a problem in itself by the majority of the Frente. The leader-

ship constantly stressed that the 'patriotic bourgcoisie was an asset as

lung as it produced without political power. This, of course, was im-

possible and the Sandinistas have paid a high price for such an illusion.

Nut all within the Frente shared such a position: but those who did not

were rapidly margnalised in the stampede for national unity in the face

The experience of Sandinista rule has confirmed one basic marxist tenet: it has shown that in imperialist dominated countries it is only possible to resnive the basic democratic questions through the growing

viewed as

long = .. posuble and the Sanem. Nut an with - the Fren* were rapidly marginalinu of insperialist aggression.

The -=nerience

instant.. stressed sh

The experience of Sandinista rule has confirmed one basic marxist tenet: it has shown that in imperialist dominated countries it is only

possible to resnive the basic democratic questions through the growing

over of the democratic revolution into a socialist one. Such a growing

over demands a class war to the finish against the comprador bour-

genisie and the big landowners, in order to win to the side of the

revolurion all the middle and unorganised layerx. The need to break

with the strategy of a mixed economy is not just an oconomic question,

but primarily a political one. Only by climinating the big landowners

and capitalists can the basic aspirations of the poor peasants be met. and therefore their support for the revolution cemented, and only if ex-

pinitation and profiteering has been suppressed can the sacrifices of the masses be fell as an acceptable burden. It is only possible to pursue such a class war through the participation and power of the workers and peasents in all arcas of political and economic We. It was this that the FSLN's political and oconomic strategy would not permit.

Prospects

On the day after the election, UNO called a victory rally at which

Life. d not p

achar of the sible in pursue

ine workers. It was this that

only 300 pcople appeared. On the same day the FSLN called a meeting to discuss what to do next: 50,000 participated. An irony of the election result is that many of those who made the difference to the result were those casting a protest vote, not expecting UNO to win: many probably participated in the huge Sandinista rallies prior to the election.

It is inconceiveable that the UNO alliance will hold together for a period of more than six months to a year. Chamorro's inahility to put together a goverment that reflects all sectors of UNO - from the con- tras to the stalinist Socialist Party of Nicaragua - will soon deprive her of a coherent majority within the national assembly.

Confronted by a Sandinista Army, Sandinista Police, a bloc of 42 percent of Sandinistas in the assembly, and an inability to reform the constitution because UNO do not have enough seats, Chamorro will be revealed as the puppet of the US that shie is. Moreover, it is not at all certain that the US dollars that some Nicaraguans voted for will come Hooding in.

In such a situation, with the old landowners returning to reclaim their land and what remains of the democratic gains of the revolution under threat, it is likely that a further period of intense class struggle will occur. The masses will once again look to the FSLN to lead their struggle against the returning contras and the hourgenisie.

The question which has yet to be answered is how will the Sandinis- tas respond to this challenge? The PSLN is now in the midst of a mass discussion aboer where to go next. In this discussion three tendencies are apparent. The right argu that the result should he accepted, UNO al- lowed to govem, and that the Frente should await the next elections. The centre is arguing for an organised retreat, rebuilding the mass or-

-id retreat. rehuilding the mass or- ganisations and defence of the army.

The line of the third tendency, the left wing of the RSLN. is to allow

result is that many of those who made the difference to the result were those casting a protest vote, not expecting UNO to win: many probably

the m

ax the FSLN called a meeting water An uvar of the clection

*Iterence to the result were

• Win. many probably

weathe election

01... ..

Pare.

man hold together for a

moro * nahility to put Mors o1 UNO - from the con-

will soon deprive her

tras to the stalinist Socialist Party of Nicaragua - will soon deprive her

Sundinista Ponce, a bloc of 42

- an inability in reform the

- annugh seats, Chamoro will be

Moreover. » re not at all i same incaraguans voted for will come

Chamorro to be president but to defend the gains of the revolution and the anny and to prepare for an armed struggle. This tendency is clonest to the most uncompromising advice of Sandino 'Only the Workers and

Chamar to no the anny and to prepar to the most uncompr Peasants will eo all

This seneral per

revprial

al liberaon. a rask be realis transitio

"d and the d i to encialie

1 Rum

it wing of the FLN, Is to alow

aine of the revolution and

Than tendency is clonest

Onsv the Workers and

upoord by all those who wish ine in Nicaragua. It is only

• gene that the task of nation-

quarter of a centurv ago, will

hrught to its concluson by a

Will McMahon

SOCIALIST OUTLOCH no 23

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