Sandinistas prepare for new round of struggle Tough lessor from election defeat
After a decade of economic boycott, a prolonged counter- revolutionary intervention and the militarisation of Central America, the United States has finally got what it always wanted, a political victory over the Sandinistas.
The US pressure, combined with the recent active undemnin- ing of the revolution by the Gorbachev leadership, are two of the three key factore which Ind to the defcat of the FSLN at the polls in February. It is important also to analyse the strategic Line followed by the Frente and its implication for our under- standing of revolution in imperialist dominated countries. What was the FSLN's revolutionary project, and why has it suffered such a setback?
The victory of the FSLN in 1970 saw the extraordinary mobilisation of the mass organisations amongst almost every conceivable social class and layer outside the dominant Somoza oligarchy. The social base of the revolutionary regime was clearly much broader than simply workers and poor peasants. The political basis of the revolution was also bmad, bringing together a series of key democratic demands, the realisation of which were central to national liberation.
First, opposition to the Somoza oligarchy which was bleeding the country dry and was a vicious and brutal dictatorship. Second, the crea- tion of a popular revolutionary government. Third, the redistribution of Land - and the national control of fundamental economic sectors - so that all could have a minimum standard of living. Finally, the right to self determination, free from US interven- tion.
ontra war brought co
c ruln and loss of life
myriad of events and attempting to move forward under twin pressures: the aspirations of its popular base, and the blockade by US imperialism (which acted in alliance with the internal sabotage of the bourgeoisic). It was in this context that decisions about economic strategy and democratic forms were made and it was in these areas that the Sandinis. ta leadership unwittingly contributed to its own downfall.
Sandinista power and socialist democracy
The democratic project outlined hy the FSLN was defined for the most part by its rejection of the stalinist model, insisting on the neces- sity of a multi-party democracy, and arguing that this was the only op tion for a genuinely revolutionary government. This was a breath of fresh air which signalled a break from the tradition of the one party state.
"The victory of the FLN in 1979 saw the extraordinary mobilisation of the mass organisations amongst almost
every conceivable social class and layer outside the Somoza oligarchy"
This basic democratic programme held together the broad revolutionary alliance of the people. and ahviated thie strategie dir. ferences within the FSL.N. The ideological gel, the politics of Sandinismo, which under-
which under- pinned the alliance, had the advantage that it could mean all things to all people - and in- deed often did. The atmance wo sence rather inan anti-capuans.. of some of the Frente reader. would have,
The FSLN-....
and democratic in e
mad it was not clear, despite the rhetoric ID. What socianst content the revolution
The SLN seized power much more rapidly than the majority of the Icadership expected. The murder of Pedro Chamorro, Violetta's hus- hand, led to a year long explosion of popular outrage that brought down Somoza. In the vanguard of this process was the FSLN.
As a result the history of Sandinista power is one of responding in a
But what kind of democracy did the San- dinistas construct? In the enthusiasm of the moment the elections of 1984 were greeted as the realisation of socialist democracy. Yet, on reflection, the FSLN did not take the oppor- tunity to build a genuine socialist democracy but instituted a liberal democratic system of rule.
Although there was gennine consultation
with mass organisations over pertinent issues.
the legislative and executive functions were installed in a body which was clected once every six years. Thin is not socialist democracy. Such elections may have a role in a socialist democracy, but the lengthy time span between each election, and the separation of the people from decision making power creates forms that can only be subsidiary to real political and economic control by the marses.
An alternative was available. The creation of a national assembly based on the mass organisations of women, peasants, small farmerx, ar- tisants, youth, indigenous people and workers, alongside the election of
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 23, April 1990
Page 21
local barrio committees - all with the potential to be recalled, would
have been far more democratic. It would have represented the socio- have been far more de... economic unities and contradictions that existed and have heen a direct link berween the mass base of the revolation and the leadership. The Council of State and the bodies represented on it were an embryonic form of such a structure.
The Sandinistas believed that the ideological hegemony they liad achieved through leading the revolution made it inconceivable they would lone the election. "It is not possible' was often the reply when this was raised.
clection itself highlighted two other facts. All the mass or- ganisations had become top-down organisations that were used to im plement Sandinista policy. They had stapped being vehicles for the ex- pression of mass politics. Had this not been the case the Sandiniste would have been aware of the threat to their political control.
Secondly, although Nicaragua is and was not a 'one party state" it was (and still is. for the moment) a lone party slate machine". Almost every official, every administrator in a key position, every aganiser of the police and army is a member of the FSLN. Confirmation of this was there for all to see from the begin- ning: the "Sandinista Amy "San- dinista Police and the "Sandinista Defence Committees' (CDSs).
This domination of the state machinery by the FLN rather than by the workers, peasants and the oppressed, alongside the declining role of the CDSs, the liberal democratic electoral system, and the unaccount-
electoras system, and the unaccount-
able nature of state bodies, allowed the leadership of the FSLN and its
cadre to become separated from the people. The mass involvement es-
sential to socialist democracy did not exist. Thus when mass dissatis-
faction began to blow up into a political storm the FLN neither saw
nor heard it coming until it was too late.
Economic democracy
The eye of the storm was the economy. The key factors in the economic situation were the cost of the contra war, which took up over half of government expenditure for eight years, the economic blockade,
expendit or cight years the economic blockade, and the pathetic amount of aid that the USSR gave to the people of Nicaragua.
However, at the same time the question of economic democracy was crucial to ensure that the leadership remained in contact with the base. A system of workers' control of produc- tion, a necessary step towards full socialisa- tion and workers management, was ahsent Also, those who created the wealth should have the final say in its distribution. In reality
.. distributi-- in reality
the workers and peasants had very little say in
littls sar in how the economy was run.
In the early period of the revolution the
•deologica hegemony they lind
on made it inconceivable they exible was often the reply when
However, these sectors warn Renisi.. The FSLN did not w. strategy that warn 4 allinice with the patrote bourger™ cost of dilutin. the revoutiona.- was not complete thousanas of tandle». of the peuple.
The concessions made
110:
ic Ia dat
Itsell gog
All th-mas- ganisations had become top-down
mined plummeted,
economy
incen-
tives to produce lessened Still
refusing to attack the agru-export
FSLN then slashed the living standards of its
since the
as the pr
coffee production
declined, and economic
bourycoikie,
own supporters in an austerity programme which was IMF-like in magnitude. It was at this point b* the ebsence of sociamsE
democracy and the parliamentary nature of the National Assembly became a danger to the revolu- tion.
UNO banners - subsidised by US dollars
follars
For many Nicaraguans outside ESLN the appacit afface on
democrati. paine of the revolution in the coonomic field and the lack of any forms of
the
cadre to he
popular control lead to a genuine frustration in a situation of economic catastrophe and continuing war. Denied any meaningful decision- making tole in the economic and political programme of the FLN, and having suffered 50,000 dead in a war which required conscription. whilst the rich continued unscathed, it is not surprising that given only one opportunity to vote every six years a section of the masses, probab. ly the most unorganised sector, voted for an alliance of parties promis ing peace and dollars rather than further conomic chaos and war.
Thus, over and above the US blockade and the impact of the war, it was the failure of the FLN to complete the democratic revolution that opened the way to the victory of UNO last February, it is a bitter fact that only a small minority of the large farmers, those owning 200 tu 500 hectares, in whom the Frente invested so much, voted. for the FSLN. Yet the continued vitality of these layers was the seedbed for the reorganisation of the enemy within, and the counter-revolutionary offensive that resulted un the election victory for IJNO, an alliance sup- ported by the contras.
W7° E
on in = situation of connue
tV meaningful decision
angeramme of the FSLN and
conscripuon.
wonsing that.esven.onlv
on of the masens, probab
sance on parnes pronus
r which required
"The domination of the state machinery by the FSLN rather than by
the workers, peasants and the
oppressed, alongside the declining
role of the CDSs.. allowed the leadership of the FLN and Its cadre to
become separated from the people"
peasanty instinctively outlined a mass strategy for social transformation. The San-
dinislas Weic sed sre a full mar mobilisation in the agrarian revolution.
Th itriter
dinistas were very reticent about carrying out
but the mass
mobilisations of the landless and the poor peasants increased the tempo
This struggle from below was necessary because the economic strategy pursued by the Frente was based on state centred accumulation of the surpluses created by the cotton, coffee and cattle agro-export see- tor. It was hoped that hy uxing these advanced centres of production the hard currency cared could be utilised by the state to develop and
hard diva-
ononc red accumulation of production the
Had they hroken up the landholdings of the bourgeoisic, the FLN would have heen able to complete the democratic revolution in the countryside, This would have nicant a fundamental re-organisation of the economy to a degree thar would have forced a transi- Lion lo a self-managed socialist economy.
This would no doubt have been somewhat
chaotic given the gengraphical position and the small size of the working class in Nicaragus, but it would have created a mass peasantry totally loyal to the Frente Sandinis-
Al mesation and king case in
Nicaragus, but it would have created a mass
It would have also allowed the government to direct investment towards small commodity production for the countryside so that an or-
stitt e nat
ndinis
ta.
It would have towards small.
been develone worker-pearan the revolution.
Of coue:
ganic economic relationship between town and country could have been developed. This woald have given real content to the political worker-peakant alliance that the Prente supported at the beginning of
Of course, such a radical programme would have heightened the
Page 22
IST OL /LOOK nn 23. AD: 1990
IN DEPTH
Sandinista support in the heyday of the revolution: the FSLN leadership became separated from the people likelihood of a generalised Central American war: but it is a fact that there has never been a socialist revolution that imperialism has not tried to prevent or overthrow hy force of arms. This threat of war should not
1h....
- put it is a lact that 1 penals has not tried
* of mar should not
ition to socialism
-yllvocation or am
as in demand more won su make.
since, as Nicaragua in contrast to Cuba shows, equivocation or am- concessions until there are no more concessions left to make.
Results
being xocialist in character, it is, as Carlos Vilas put it some time ago, "a popular, agrarian, and national liberation revolution" in which the
he allowed to place a strategic brake on the transition to socialism bignity only gives imperialism the encouragement to demand more
all
Ten years of Sandinista power indicate that far from the revolution
it tar imm the revolution
sut It some time ago, mvaution in which the tetween the Nicarazuan
FSLN viewed the "primary contradiction" as between the Nicaraguan
Within this perspective the struggle between classes is a subordinate
contradiction and the reproduction of capitalist social relations was not
viewed as a problem in itself by the majority of the Frente. The leader-
ship constantly stressed that the 'patriotic bourgcoisie was an asset as
lung as it produced without political power. This, of course, was im-
possible and the Sandinistas have paid a high price for such an illusion.
Nut all within the Frente shared such a position: but those who did not
were rapidly margnalised in the stampede for national unity in the face
The experience of Sandinista rule has confirmed one basic marxist tenet: it has shown that in imperialist dominated countries it is only possible to resnive the basic democratic questions through the growing
viewed as
long = .. posuble and the Sanem. Nut an with - the Fren* were rapidly marginalinu of insperialist aggression.
The -=nerience
instant.. stressed sh
The experience of Sandinista rule has confirmed one basic marxist tenet: it has shown that in imperialist dominated countries it is only
possible to resnive the basic democratic questions through the growing
over of the democratic revolution into a socialist one. Such a growing
over demands a class war to the finish against the comprador bour-
genisie and the big landowners, in order to win to the side of the
revolurion all the middle and unorganised layerx. The need to break
with the strategy of a mixed economy is not just an oconomic question,
but primarily a political one. Only by climinating the big landowners
and capitalists can the basic aspirations of the poor peasants be met. and therefore their support for the revolution cemented, and only if ex-
pinitation and profiteering has been suppressed can the sacrifices of the masses be fell as an acceptable burden. It is only possible to pursue such a class war through the participation and power of the workers and peasents in all arcas of political and economic We. It was this that the FSLN's political and oconomic strategy would not permit.
Prospects
On the day after the election, UNO called a victory rally at which
Life. d not p
achar of the sible in pursue
ine workers. It was this that
only 300 pcople appeared. On the same day the FSLN called a meeting to discuss what to do next: 50,000 participated. An irony of the election result is that many of those who made the difference to the result were those casting a protest vote, not expecting UNO to win: many probably participated in the huge Sandinista rallies prior to the election.
It is inconceiveable that the UNO alliance will hold together for a period of more than six months to a year. Chamorro's inahility to put together a goverment that reflects all sectors of UNO - from the con- tras to the stalinist Socialist Party of Nicaragua - will soon deprive her of a coherent majority within the national assembly.
Confronted by a Sandinista Army, Sandinista Police, a bloc of 42 percent of Sandinistas in the assembly, and an inability to reform the constitution because UNO do not have enough seats, Chamorro will be revealed as the puppet of the US that shie is. Moreover, it is not at all certain that the US dollars that some Nicaraguans voted for will come Hooding in.
In such a situation, with the old landowners returning to reclaim their land and what remains of the democratic gains of the revolution under threat, it is likely that a further period of intense class struggle will occur. The masses will once again look to the FSLN to lead their struggle against the returning contras and the hourgenisie.
The question which has yet to be answered is how will the Sandinis- tas respond to this challenge? The PSLN is now in the midst of a mass discussion aboer where to go next. In this discussion three tendencies are apparent. The right argu that the result should he accepted, UNO al- lowed to govem, and that the Frente should await the next elections. The centre is arguing for an organised retreat, rebuilding the mass or-
-id retreat. rehuilding the mass or- ganisations and defence of the army.
The line of the third tendency, the left wing of the RSLN. is to allow
result is that many of those who made the difference to the result were those casting a protest vote, not expecting UNO to win: many probably
the m
ax the FSLN called a meeting water An uvar of the clection
*Iterence to the result were
• Win. many probably
weathe election
01... ..
Pare.
man hold together for a
moro * nahility to put Mors o1 UNO - from the con-
will soon deprive her
tras to the stalinist Socialist Party of Nicaragua - will soon deprive her
Sundinista Ponce, a bloc of 42
- an inability in reform the
- annugh seats, Chamoro will be
Moreover. » re not at all i same incaraguans voted for will come
Chamorro to be president but to defend the gains of the revolution and the anny and to prepare for an armed struggle. This tendency is clonest to the most uncompromising advice of Sandino 'Only the Workers and
Chamar to no the anny and to prepar to the most uncompr Peasants will eo all
This seneral per
revprial
al liberaon. a rask be realis transitio
"d and the d i to encialie
1 Rum
it wing of the FLN, Is to alow
aine of the revolution and
Than tendency is clonest
Onsv the Workers and
upoord by all those who wish ine in Nicaragua. It is only
• gene that the task of nation-
quarter of a centurv ago, will
hrught to its concluson by a
Will McMahon
SOCIALIST OUTLOCH no 23
Page 23