lessons Tough
militarisation of After a decade of cconomic boycott, a prolonged counter- Central America, the United States has finally got what it The US pressure, combined with the recent active undemnin always wanted, a political victory over the Sandinistas. and the election defeat revolutionary intervention from
myriad of events and attempting to move forward under twin pressures: moment the clections of 1984 were greeted as but instituted a liberal democratic system of tisans, youth, indigenous people and workers, alongside the election of the aspirations of its popular base, and the blockade by US imperialism (which acted in alliance with the internal sabotage of the bourgcoisic). It was in this context that decisions about economic strategy and The democratic project outlined hy the FSLN was defined for the tion for a genuinely revolutionary government. This was a breath of fresh air which signalled a break from the tradition of the one party But what kind of democracy did the San- dinistas construct? In the enthusiasm of the the realisation of socialist democracy. Yet, on reflection, the FSLN did not take the oppor- tunity to build a genuine socialist democracy Although there was genuine consultation with mass organisations over pertinent insues, the legislative and executive functions were installed in a body which was clected once every six years. This is not Such elections may have a role in a socialist democracy, but the lengthy time span between each election, and the separation of the people from decision making power creates forms that can only be subsidiary to real political and economic control by the An alternative was available. The creation of a national assembly democratic forms were made and it was in these areas that the Sandinis- most part by its rejection of the stalinist model, insisting on the neces- sity of a multi-party democracy, and arguing that this was the only op based on the mass organisations of women, peasants, small famers, ar- Page 21 Sandinista power and socialist democracy The contre war brought conscription, economic ruin and loss of life ta leadership unwittingly contributed to its own downfall. socialist democracy. "The victory of the FLN In 1979 saw the extraordinary mobilisation of the layer outside the Somoza oligarchy" mass organisations amongst almost every conceivable social class and state. was the FLN's revolutionary project, and why has it suffered such a workers and poor peasants. The political basis of the revolution was The victory of the FSLN in 1979 saw the extraordinary mobilisation of the mass organisations amongst almost every conceivablo social class and layer outside the dominant Somoza oligarchy. The social base of the revolutionary regime was clearly much broader than simply also hmad, bringing together a series of key democratic demands, the First. opposition to the Somoza oligarchy which was bleeding the tion of a popular revolutionary government. Third, the redistribution of sence rather than anti-capitalist, and it was not clear, despite the rhetoric of some of the Frente leadership, what socialist content the revolution The FSLN seized power much more rapidly than the majority of the As a result the history of Sandinista power is one of responding to a country dry and was a vicious and brutal dictatorship. Second, the crea- deed often did. This alliance was anti-oligarchic and democratic in en Icadership expected The murder of Pedro Chamorro, Violetta's hus- hand, led to a year long explosion of popular outrage that brought down ing of the revolution by the Gorbachev leadership, are two of the three key factors which led to the defcat of the FLN at the polls in February. It is important also to analyse the strategic standing of revolution in imperialist dominated countrics. What Line followed by the Frente and its implication for our under- Somoza. In the vanguard of this process was the FSLN. rcalisation of which were central to national liberation. economic sectors - so that all could have a minimum standard of living. Finally, the right This basic democratic programme held together the broad revolutionary alliance of pined the alliance, had the advantage that it land - and the national control of fundamental to self determination, free from US interven- Terences within the FSLN. The ideological gel, the politics of Sandinismo, which under- could mean all things to all people - and in- the people, and obviated the strategic dif- SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 23, April 1990 setback?
genixic. The FSLN did not want to disrupt prodoction and had a strategy that was relled on a long team mized economy and a de facto was not completed in respect of the land - there are still tens of tives to produce lessened Still However, there sectors were in the hands of the non Somoza bour- alliance with the "patriotic bourgeoisie". This alliance was sealed at the cost of diluting the revoutionary process. The democratic revolution thousands of landless peasants in Nicaragua ten ycars after the viciory The concessions made to the bourgeoisic were themselves under- скопому deteriorated as the price of cotton plummeted, coffee production declined, and economic incen- refusing to attack the agru-export bourgcoinic, the FSLN then slashed the Living standards of its the since mince of the peuple" DEPTH local barrio commitices - all with the potential to be recalled, would have been far more democratic. It would have represented the socio- economic unities and contradictions that existed and have heen a diroct link between the mass base of the revolution and the leadership. The Council of State and the bodies represented on it were an embryonic The Sandinistas believed that the ideolngical hegemony they had achieved through leading the revolution made it inconceivable they would Ione the election. "It is not possible" was often the reply when The clection itself highlighted ganisations had become top-down organisations that were uxed to im- plement Sandinista policy. They had stapped being vehicles for the ex- pression of mass politics. Had this not been the care the Sandinistas two other facts. All the mass or- forn of such a structure. this was raised.
own supporters in an austerity programme which was IMF-like in magnitude. It was at this point absence of socialist democracy and the parliamentary nature of the National Assembly became a danger to the revolu- For many Nicaraguans outside the FSLN. the apparent attack on pains of the revolution in the coonomic field and the lack of any forms of popular control lead to a genuine frustration in a situation of economic: making tule in the economic and political programme of the FSLN, and having suffered 50,000 dead in a war which required conscription, catastrophe and continuing war, Denied any meaningful decision- whilst the rich continued unscathed, it is not surprising that given only democratic Lion. the UNO banners - subsidised by US dollars This domination of the state machinery by the FSLN rather than by the workers, peasants and the oppressed, alongside the declining role of the CDSs, the liberal democratic electoral system, and the unaccount- able nature of state bodies, allowed the leadership of the FSIN and its dinista Police and the "Sandinista Defence Committees' (CDSs). would have been aware of the threat Secondly, although Nicaragua is and was not a 'one party state" it was (and still is, for the moment) a lone position, every organiser of the police and army is a member of the FSLN. Confirmation of this was . Almost every official, every administrator in a key there for all to see from the begin- ning: the "Sandinista Amy' to their political control. party state machine*.
Thus, over and above the US blockade and the impact of the war. it was the failure of the SLN to complete the democratic revolation that opened the way to the victory of UNO last February, It is a bitter fact that only a small minority of the large farmers, those owning 200 to 500 hectares, in whom the Frente invested so much, voted for the FSLN. Yet the continued vitality of these layers was the seedbed for Had they broken up the landholdings of the bourgeoisic, the FSLN would have heen able to complete the democratic revolution in the countryside, This would have nicant a fundamental re-organisation of the economy to a degree that would have forced a transi- one opportunity to vote every six years a section of the masses, probab- ly the most unorganised sector, voted for an alliance of parties promis the reorganisation of the enemy within, and the counter-revolutionary offensive that resulted in the election victory for UNO, an alliance sup- ing peace and dollars rather than further conomic chaos and war. ported by the contras. machinery by the FSLN rather than by the workers, peasants and the "The domination of the state The cye of the storm was the conomy. The key factors in the economic situation were the cost of the contra war, which took up over half of government expenditure for eight years, the economic blockade, and the pathetic amount of aid that the USSR gave to the people of was crucial to ensure that the leadership remained in contact with the cadre to become separated from the people. The mass involvement es sential to socialist democracy did not exist. Thus when mass dissatis faction began to blow up into a political storm the PSLN neither saw However, at the same time the question of economic democracy Economic democracy tion, a necessary step towards full socialisa- Also, those who created the wealth should base. A system of workers' control of produc- tion and workers' management, was ahsent. have the final say in its distribution. In reality nor heard it coming until it was too late. Nicaragua.
lion lo a self-managed socialist economy. This would no doubt have been somewhat chaotic given the gengraphical position and the small size of the working class in Nicaragus, but it would have created a mass worker-peasant allinnce that the Prente supported at the beginning of SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 23. April 1990 peasantry totally loyal to the Frente Sandinis It would have also allowed the government to direct investment towards small commodity production for the countryside so that an or- ganic economic relationship between town and country could have been developed This would have given real content to the political Of course, such a radical programme would have heightened the leadership of the FSLN and Its cadre to become separated from the people" oppressed, alongside the declining role of the CDSs.. allowed the the revolution. mobilisations of the landless and the poor peasants increased the tempo This struggle from below was necessary because the economic strategy pursued by the Frente was based on state centred accumulation of the surpluses created by the cotton, coffee and cattle agro-export sec- tor. It was hoped that hy using these advanced centres of production the hard currency cared could be utilised by the state to develop and the workers and peasants had very little say in In the carly peniod of the revolution the outlined a mass dinistas were very reticent about carrying out a full scale land reform, but the mass strategy for social transformation. The San- how the coonomy was run. in the agrarian revolution. instinctively diversify the economy- Page 22
only 300 people appeared. On the same day the FSLN called a meeting to discuss what to do next: 50,000 participated. An irony of the clection result in that many of those who made the difference to the result were those casting a protest vote, not expecting UNO to win: many probably It is inconceiveable that the UNO alliance will hold together for a period of more than six months to a car, Chamorro's inahility to put logether a goverment that reflects all sectors of UNO - from the con- tras to the stalinist Socials Party of Nicaragua - will soon deprive her participated in the huge Sandinista rallies prior to the election. of a coherent majority within the national assembly. Sandinista support in the heyday of the revolution: the FSLN leadership became separated from the people IN DEPTH likelihood of a generalised Central American war but it is a fact that thore has never been a socialist revolution that imperialism has not tried to prevent or overthrow hy force of arms. This threat of war should not be allowed to place a strategic bruke on the transition to socialism bignity only gives imperialism the encouragement to demand more Ten years of Sandinista power indicale that far from the revolution being socialist in character, it is, as Carlor Vilas put it some time ago, "a popular, agrarian, and national Liberation revolution" in which the since, as Nicaragua in contrast to Cuba shows, equivocation or am- concessions until there are no more concessions left to make. Results
Confronted by a Sandinista Army, Sundinista Police, a bloc of 42 percent of Sandinistas in the assembly, and an inability to reform the certain that the US dollars that some Nicaraguans voted for will come under threat, it is likely that a further period of intense class struggle will occur. The masses will once again look to the FSLN to lead their constitution hecause UNO do not have enough seats, Chamoro will be revealed as the puppet of the US that she is. Moreover, il is not at all In such a situation, with the old landowners returning to reclaim their land and what remains of the democratic gains of the revolution struggle against the returing contras and the hourgenisie. Hooding in. FSLN viewed the primary contradiction" as between the Nicaraguan Within this perspective the struggle between classes is a subordinate contradiction and the reproduction of capitalist social relations was not viewed as a problem in itself by the majority of the Frente. The leader- ship constantly stressed that the "patriotic bourgcoisie" was an asset as Jung as it produced without political power. This, of course, was im- possible and the Sandinistas have paid a high price for such an illusion. Not all within the Frente shared such a position: but those who did not were rapidly marginalised in the stampede for national unity in the face nation and imperialism.
tas respond to this challenge? The FSLN is now in the midst of a mass The question which has yet to be answered is how will the Sandinis- discussion about where to go next. In this discussion three tendencies are apparent. The right argu that the result should he accepted, UNO al- lowed to gover, and that the Frente should await the next elections. The centre is arguing for an organised retreat, rehuilding the mass or- The line of the third rendency, the left wing of the FSLN, is to allow Chamorro to be president but to defend the gains of the revolution and the anny and to prepare for an armed struggle. This tendency is clonest to the most unconipromising advice of Sandine Only the Workers and ganisations and defence of the army. The experience of Sandinista rule has confirmed one basic marxist tenet: it has shown that in imperialist dominated countries it is only possible lo resolve the basic democratic questions through the growing over of the democratic revolution into a socialist one. Such a growing geoisic and the big landowners, in order to win to the side of the revolution all the middle and unorganised layers The need to break with the strategy of a mixed economy is not just an oconomic question, but primarily a political one. Only by eliminating the big landowners and capitalists can the basic aspirations of the poor peasants be met, aver demands a class war to the finish against the comprador bour- of imperialist aggression.
This gencral perspoctive should be supported by all those who wish he realised and tie democratic revolution brought to its conclusion by a to see a reversal in the balance of forces in Nicaragua. It is only through a uncompromising line of class struggle that the task of nation- al Liberation, a task the FSLN set itself a quarter of a century ago, will Will McMahon Page 23 Peasants will go all the way: transition to socialism. such a class war through the participation and power of the workers and therefore their support for the revolution comented, and only if ex- pinitatiun and profiteering has been suppressed can the sacrifices of the masses be felt as an acceptable burden It is only posable to pursue and peasurts in all areas of political and economic life. It was this that On the day ufter the election, UNO called a victory rilly at which the FSLN's political and economic strategy would not permit. Prospects SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 23. April 1990
PARTIDO DOS TRABALHADORES PT FEATURES credited. Their to the bour- tion, and their for the crisis year's clection Breakthrough absolutely dis- geois transi- for Brazil's elections in Brazil at the end of last year - the first for 29 years - 31 million votes (38%) were cast as Lula, the candidate of the PT, The result of the presidential was a spectacular