Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2009

The 'M' factor

· Socialist Outlook no. 22, March 1990 · pp 9-10 · 1,911 words

South Africa Britain

FEATURES

South Africa

with Mandela

By Gerry Nicholls Nelson Mandela's release has injected the

"M" factor into South African politics - a

crisis of authority for the white govem-

ment, where the vast majority of blacks

regard Mandela, not de Klerk as the

legitimate head of state. Are we seeing

the beginning of the end of apartheid?

What sort of society do Mandela and his

allies see replacing racial capitalism?

The events of the last month have been

uplifting and inspiring for all those committed

to the struggle against apartheid. Mandela's

presence and actions since his release have

been a tremendous vindication of principled

politics in the struggle against the racist regime.

Politically, Mandela's voice has been one

of an intransigent reformist leader speaking for the whole nation. In his Soweto speech he held forth the prospect of jobs and homes. He has insisted on his disciplined membership of the ANC, reliance on mass action, and refusal to drop the armed struggle. He has also in- voked the spectre of nationalisation of the mo- nopolies envisaged in the Freedom Charter.

The continued commitment to the armed struggle is emblematic but vital. Even at its height Umkhonto we Sizwe's campaign was one of "propaganda actions". In 1987 there were 230 actions of this type, mainly aimed at mem- bers of the security forces and col laborators. By 1988 this had declined by 30% and in 1989, a Soviet spokesperson was able to cynically remark, in reply to ac- cusations that the USSR was aban- doning the armed struggle, "What armed struggle?".

However, the armed struggle has been a vital part of the organisation's ability to win the youth of the black townships to its banner. Its reaffirmation is both a reflec- tion of that pressure and a commitment to that mass base.

Likewise was Mandela's insistence in his Capetown speech that apartheid will be ended by decisive mass action. These were not the words of an organisation or a leader which places primary reliance on a negotiated settle- ment.

Mandela's con- tinuous stress on his membership of the ANC and his ad- herence to its dis cipline is also a pledge that he had not and would not act on a separate agenda to that of his organisa- tion.

However this is a double edged sword.

On the one hand, the ANC clearly wishes to benefit from the prestige associated with his name. On the other, the organisation the ANC as a typical terrorist organisation", may be faced with making political conces- Mandela's reaffirmation of the armed struggle, sions which may be very difficult to justify to and her invitation for him to visit Downing

Street on his release. their base.

It is perhaps for this reason that Mandela

Thatcher is determined to use Mandela's has continued to stress that clause of the release as a pretext to relax sanctions (which Freedom Charter which commits the ANC to she never supported). But she also wishes to the expropriation of big capital. Partly for this continue her goverment's role as go-between

for de Klerk, Buthelezei and Mandela.

George Bush too has his problems. The President is at odds with legislation of his Congress. He remains com mitted to sanctions much more wide-ranging than Britain's. Legally, however, he cannot relax those sanctions unless de Klerk repeals the state of emer- gency, the Group Area Act and the Population Registration Act, and allows people of all races to participate in the political process.

It is fear that de Klerk will

A pall bearer gasps through tear gas during a funeral in Crossroeds, Cape Town, 1986

reason the predicted boom in the South African stock exchange did not take place. In- stead share prices tumbled by 7.5 per cent. despite leading industrialists like Zac de Beer pooh-poohing fears of widespread nationalisa-

tion. International reaction to Mandela's tion. International reaction release, too, has been confused and contradic- tory.

After his Capetown speech, Thatcher's press office withdrew a prepared statement, and her speechwriters worked overtime to try and square the circle of her condemnation of

do just that which is fuelling the mass mobilisation of the far right. They have considerable parliamentary support, and their contention that they would win an election of the white electorate today may not be wide of the mark.

More sinister, particularly in the long term, is their base of support within the police and the army. De Klerk's strategy is supposed to command the support of the army leadership. but how far that has filtered down is debate- able.

It has been estimated that at least 70 per

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 22, March 1990

Paqe 7

FEATURES

cent of the police belong to the Conservative Party or the neo-Nazis. However the Conservatives problem remains the lack of credibility of their political programme of separation of the races, in particular where the white "homeland' should be.

Without such a "solution" in practice, their policy amounts to main- tenance of aparthied through repression. Their means for achieving power is 'extra-parliamentary" ac- tion from their supporters inside and out of the state apparatus. However de Klerk is confident that he speaks for big capital in South Africa, and that, given the changing economic structure of the

The extreme right wing feels threatened by De Klerk's limited steps

country. this will be decisive in the long run.

It is this change in the social base of the National Party which accounts for its "liberalisation". The change from the party representing primarily Afrikaner capital has not been an overnight phenomenon, of course. It is merely that in de Klerk they have found a spokesperson capable of articulating those in- terests. P.W. Botha, his predecessor, was too closely linked with the Party's past.

This is why de Klerk's reforms reflect a real change in the South African political situation and not a mere cosmetic ploy to lift sanctions. This is not to say that the reforms themselves are radical. As Jesse Jackson pointed out, Mandela is free, but he still does not have the vote, cannot see his

modest requirements of the international diplomatic community, let alone the aspira- tions of the black masses.

It is evidently the unleashing of these aspirations which has all along been the fear holding back Mandela's release. It is not merely the government that has been fearful. Mandela and the ANC leadership have consis- tently stressed that the political process that will now ensue would be a protracted one.

This is in part due to the remaining divisions

camage in Natal where over 2000 people have died as a result of clashes between supporters of the ANC and local warlords who claim af- filiation to Buthelezi.

Mandela's tremendous moral authority

grandchildren go to the school of their choice, may permit a temporary resoluton to une

crisis, but the root of the problem lies in the and is not free to reside where he wishes. As

such the reforms fall far short even of the mass base which Buthelezi commands, par-

Page 8

Crossroeds, linoleum rellef print, Sydney Holo, 1986 Crossroe

ticularly among uprooted Zulu rural workers.

Buthelezi has long been regarded by Thatcher as a trump card to play in the un- folding political process. Representatives from the St John's Wood offices of his In- katha movement have always been in close contact with Conservative Central Office, and Buthelezi has been a frequent and welcome visitor to Downing Street.

Divisions exist too within the ANC, There is a world of differenc between the multi-mil- lionaire Richard Maponya in whose BMW Mandela was escorted to his homecoming rally, and the youths who waited to greet the released leader. Maponya is one of the five richest men in South Africa, white or black.

These social divisions are reflected in the interplay between factions and tendencies within the ANC, divisions that will become more pronounced as the political process deepens. Mandela's role in holding together this coalition will be crucial. Probably his greatest allies in this will be the South African Communist Party.

Its vision of a future South Africa cor- responds to the schema of the national democratic stage, followed by socialist trans- formation. The ANC both organisationally and politically represents the vehicle for the introduction of the national democratic stage. Ironically while Mandela has been stressing the question of nationalisation, SACP leader Joe Slovo has been playing the reassuring theme of a "mixed economy" in which nation- al capital would be respected and foreign in- vestment welcomed.

This poses no problem for the SACP. which is able to emphasise the maximum or minimum parts of its programme to suit the occasion and the audience. What is more in- tractable however has been the party's at- tempts to come to grips with perestroika and

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 22, March 1990

apply it to South African realities.

Implicit in the recent agenda of the ANC has been the idea that it would represent the

whole nation, overcoming tribal and ethnic divisions within its ranks. It also has had the strong implication that the new political sys tem would evolve towards a one-party state, Zimbabwe-style.

This undercurrent has been clear, not only in the ANC's rough treatment of other trends within the liberation movement, but also in its attempts to annex the trade union movement to its own programme.

In a recent SACP pamphlet, Has Socialism Failed?, Joe Slovo strongly endorses Gor- bachev and perestroika. He addresses the question of democratic socialism, concluding that in both national democratic and socialist phases a multi-party democracy is essential. For what this would look like in a post apart- heid-South Africa one need only look at the constitution adopted by post-independence Namibia.

But the more immediate implications are for the political map of the liberation move- ment in the next period. Mandela's presence on the political stage enhances the already overwhelming preponderance of the ANC.

Other organisations within the liberation movement like the Pan-African Congress, Azanian Peoples* Organisation and the Cape Action League face the problem of mar- ginalisation both through the ANC and goverment excluding them form the political process.

However the question of pluralism arises both from the ANC's necessity to unite with currents to their right, the necessity of a con- tinued alliance with the unions and their own internal divisions.

Under these conditions Slovo's musings have more than a theoretical significance. Campaigns for united action with ANC and Mass Democratic Movement forces (MDM), particularly around continuing government repression, are finding an echo with forces at the base.

The basis for participation in the various manifestations of the MDM, and debate with currents within it has never been greater. Neither is it "too late' for a fighting unity to be established. While Mandela has predicted the end of apartheid within his lifetime, we are not witnessing the sudden collapse of a regime.

This applies to the solidarity movement in- terationally. The road to the smashing of the apartheid state is not a short one. Maintenance of international sanctions remains an essential part of the armoury of the liberation move- ment and maintenance of pressure on our government, a vital component of the fight for sanctions.

The positive turn towards pluralistic debate now argued by Joe Slovo should also be the approach of the solidarity movement. drawing in all the political elements who have been stirred and motivated into taking action by the momentous events of February. SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 22, March 1990

ABGRTI

LELAL

AND

SAFE

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