The 'M' factor:
South Africa
with Mandela
Nelson Mandela's release has injected the "M" factor into South African politics - a crisis of authority for the white govemment, where the vast majority of blacks regard Mandela, not de Klerk as the legitimate head of state. Are we seeing the beginning of the end of apartheid? What sort of society do Mandela and his allies see replacing racial capitalism?
The events of the last month have been uplifting and inspiring for all those committed to the struggle against apartheid. Mandela's presence and actions since his release have been a tremendous vindication of principled politics in the struggle against the racist regime.
Politically, Mandela's voice has been one of an intransigent reformist leader speaking for the whole nation. In his Soweto speech he held forth the prospect of jobs and homes. He has insisted on his disciplined membership of the ANC, reliance on mass action, and refusal to drop the armed struggle. He has also invoked the spectre of nationalisation of the monopolies envisaged in the Freedom Charter.
The continued commitment to the armed struggle is emblematic but vital. Even at its height Umkhonto we Sizwe's campaign was one of "propaganda actions". In 1987 there were 230 actions of this type, mainly aimed at members of the security forces and col laborators. By 1988 this had declined by 30% and in 1989, a Soviet spokesperson was able to cynically remark, in reply to accusations that the USSR was abandoning the armed struggle, "What armed struggle?".
However, the armed struggle has been a vital part of the organisation's ability to win the youth of the black townships to its banner. Its reaffirmation is both a reflection of that pressure and a commitment to that mass base.
Likewise was Mandela's insistence in his Capetown speech that apartheid will be ended by decisive mass action. These were not the words of an organisation or a leader which places primary reliance on a negotiated settlement.
FEATURES
By Gerry Nicholls
Mandela's continuous stress on his membership of the
ANC and his adherence to its discipline is also a pledge that he had not and would not act on a separate agenda to that of his organisation.
However this is a double edged sword.
On the one hand, the
ANC clearly wishes to benefit from the prestige associated their base.
stead share prices tumbled by 7.5 per cent.
pooh-poohing fears of widespread nationalisation. International reaction to Mandela's release, too, has been confused and contradictory.
press office withdrew a prepared statement, and her speechwriters worked overtime to try and square the circle of her condemnation of with his name. On the other, the organisation may be faced with making political concessions which may be very difficult to justify to
It is perhaps for this reason that Mandela has continued to stress that clause of the Freedom Charter which commits the ANC to the expropriation of big capital. Partly for this A pall bearer gasps through tear gas during a funeral in Crossroeds, Cape Town, 1986 reason the predicted boom in the South African stock exchange did not take place. Indespite leading industrialists like Zac de Beer the mark.
After his Capetown speech, Thatcher's able.
the ANC as a "typical terrorist organisation",
Mandela's reaffirmation of the armed struggle, and her invitation for him to visit Downing
Street on his release.
Thatcher is determined to use Mandela's release as a pretext to relax sanctions (which she never supported). But she also wishes to continue her govemment's role as go-between for de Klerk, Buthelezei and
Mandela.
George Bush too has his problems. The President is at odds with legislation of his
Congress. He remains com mitted to sanctions much more wide-ranging than Britain's.
Legally, however, he cannot relax those sanctions unless de
Klerk repeals the state of emergency, the Group Area Act and the Population Registration Act, and allows people of all races to participate in the political process.
It is fear that de Klerk will do just that which is fuelling the mass mobilisation of the far right. They have considerable parliamentary support, and their contention that they would win an election of the white electorate today may not be wide of
More sinister, particularly in the long term, is their base of support within the police and the army. De Klerk's strategy is supposed to command the support of the army leadership.
but how far that has filtered down is debate-
It has been estimated that at least 70 per
Paqe 7
cent of the police belong to the Conservative Party or the neo-Nazis. However the
Conservatives* problem remains lack of the credibility of their political programme of separation of the races, in particular white where the
"homeland' should be.
such
Without a
"solution" in practice, their amounts to mainpolicy of aparthied tenance through repression. Their means for achieving power is 'extra-parliamentary" action from their supporters inside and out of the state
However de apparatus.
Klerk is confident that he speaks for big capital in
South Africa, and that, changing the given economic structure of the be this will country, decisive in the long run.
It is this change in the social base of the
National Party which accounts for its
"liberalisation". The change from the party representing primarily Afrikaner capital has not been an overnight phenomenon, of course.
It is merely that in de Klerk they have found a spokesperson capable of articulating those interests. P.W. Botha, his predecessor, was too closely linked with the Party's past.
This is why de Klerk's reforms reflect a real change in the South African political situation and not a mere cosmetic ploy to lift sanctions. This is not to say that the reforms themselves are radical. As Jesse Jackson pointed out, Mandela is free, but he still does his have the cannot sec not vole, grandchildren go to the school of their choice, and is not free to reside where he wishes. As such the reforms fall far short even of the
FEATURES The extreme right wing feels threatened by De Klerk's limited steps modest requirements of the international diplomatic community, let alone the aspirations of the black masses.
It is evidently the unleashing of these aspirations which has all along been the fear holding back Mandela's release. It is not merely the goverment that has been fearful. Mandela and the ANC leadership have consistently stressed that the political process that will now ensue would be a protracted one. This is in part due to the remaining divisions with the black camp, demonstrated by the camage in Natal where over 2000 people have died as a result of clashes between supporters of the ANC and local warlords who claim affiliation to Buthelezi.
Mandela's tremendous moral authority may permit a temporary resolution to the crisis, but the root of the problem lies in the mass base which Buthelezi commands, parCrossroeds, linoleum rellef print, Sydney Holo, 1986 ticularly among uprooted Zulu rural workers.
Buthelezi has long been regarded by Thatcher as a trump card to play in the unfolding political process. Representatives from the St John's Wood offices of his Inkatha movement have always been in close contact with Conservative Central Office, and Buthelezi has been a frequent and welcome visitor to Downing Street.
Divisions exist too within the ANC, There is a world of differenc between the multi-millionaire Richard Maponya in whose BMW Mandela was escorted to his homecoming rally, and the youths who waited to greet the released leader. Maponya is one of the five richest men in South Africa, white or black.
These social divisions are reflected in the interplay between factions and tendencies within the ANC, divisions that will become more pronounced as the political process deepens. Mandela's role in holding together this coalition will be crucial. Probably his greatest allies in this will be the South African Communist Party.
Its vision of a future South Africa corresponds to the schema of the national democratic stage, followed by socialist transformation. The ANC both organisationally and politically represents the vehicle for the introduction of the national democratic stage. Ironically while Mandela has been stressing the question of nationalisation, SACP leader Joe Slovo has been playing the reassuring theme of a "mixed economy" in which national capital would be respected and foreign investment welcomed.
This poses no problem for the SACP. which is able to emphasise the maximum or minimum parts of its programme to suit the occasion and the audience. What is more intractable however has been the party's attempts to come to grips with perestroika and
Page 8 SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 22, March 1990