Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2009

The implosion of East European Stalinism

Socialist Outlook no. 21, February 1990 · pp 13-14 · 1,607 words

Stalinism Germany Russia and the USSR United States

EASTERN EUROPE SUPPLEMENT

NEUES FORUM

East Germany's New Forum movement on the march - heralding the demise of Stalinist rule The Implosion of

The following are extracts from a document discussed and unanimously adopted at a January 1990 conference of Socialist Outlook supporters. It was drafted before the fall of Ceausescu's Romanian regime. 1990 will be the year of elections in, at least, Hungary, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and probably Bulgaria as well. In each of these countries the elec- tions will in effect be a plebiscite on the continued rule of the Stalinist parties. In each of them, the Stalinists will certainly suffer crushing defeats. It is the end of an era.

The eruption of the East European masses in an attempt to overthrow

bureaucratic rule, together with the events in the Soviet Union, represent the most important development in world politics since the victory of the Chinese revolution in 1949. At stake is the continued existence of Stalinism as a significant force in world politics.

The whole world order which arose out of the defeat of Nazi im- perialism, finalised at Yalta and Potsdam, is now in question. The division of the European working class imposed by the 'great powers' is rapidly being swept away. The bi- polar" character of world politics, dominated by two armed camps, has been shaken to its foundations.

As we approach the 21st century a fundamental turning point has been reached: there is an historic oppor- tunity for the victory of the political revolution, but also great dangers that the working class could be robbed of

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 21, February 1990

the social gains inherent bureaucratised workers' states.

The revolution underway has shat- teringly confirmed the Trotskyist critique of "actually existing socialism'. Trotsky's watchword of defiance towards what was then an ascendent and victorious Stalinism - that 'the laws of history are stronger than the bureaucratic apparatus* - has tumed from a slogan to dramatic reality. To tum this crisis into work- ing class victories, Trotsky's abiding concem - the 'crisis of working class leadership' must be resolved.

The roots of the crisis

The mass upsurge against bureaucratic rule now affects every east European country. What has clearly sparked this crisis is the grow- ing realisation that the Gorbachevs regime lacks either the will or the capacity to intervene militarily in Baster Europe to save Stalinist rule

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Page 11

"the removal of the protective cover of the Red Army rapidly revealed the fundamental weakness and instability of bureaucratic rule. As a parasitic layer, and not a social class, the bureaucracy lacks the deep social roots and mechanisms of support enjoyed by the imperialist bourgeoisies"

*bureaucratic rule, unlike capitalism in boom periods, contains no fundamental mechanism towards innovation and the permanent revolutionising of productive technique"

Page 12

SUPPLEMENT

- as happened in Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. December's meeting of the Warsaw Pact in Moscow was sym- bolic in this respect: Gorbachev in ef- fect told the East Europeans to go their own way: the Soviet Union can no longer afford its huge subsidies to the other Comecon countries.

The removal of the protective cover of the Red Army rapidly revealed the fundamental weakness and instability of bureaucratic rule. As a parasitic layer, and not a social class, the bureaucracy lacks the deep social roots and mechanisms of sup port enjoyed by the imperialist bour- geoisies. Its rule has relied entirely on its monopoly of politics, imposed by force.

Compelled to face their own working masses alone, the party ap- paratuses and secret police forces have crumbled. While the last military action to crush a workers' revolt - the December 1981 coup by General Jaruzelski in Poland - was carried out by domestic forces, it was backed by the perceived threat of direct Russian intervention under the *Brezhnev doctrine'. Now that doctrine is at an end.

Underlying the revolt is the near- exasperation of hundreds of millions of East European citizens at the failure of the bureaucratic system to deliver either material prosperity, or political and cultural freedom. Despite repeated subventions from the Soviet Union, and vast borrowing from Western banks in the 1970s (especially by Hungary and Poland), the East European economies failed to develop beyond basic industrialisa- tion and the provision of a social wel fare system.

With the exception of East Ger- many and Czechoslovakia, even these gains have been put in question. Every East European citizen under- stands thoroughly the waste, inef- ficiency and sclerosis of the centralised bureaucratic command economy. These failings have been especially highlighted in the past 15 years, as the gap between these countries and the advanced capitalist countries has increased, both in terms of productive technique and the standard of living of the employed sections of the working class.

Bureaucratic

rule, unlike capitalism in boom periods, contains no fundamental mechanism towards innovation and the permanent revolutionising of productive techni- que: indeed structurally inbuilt in these economies are powerful tenden-

cies towards the reproduction end- lessly of the status quo. That is why the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have fallen behind in the information technology revolution.

However deep the attachment of the proletariat to the social gains of a non-capitalist system, the knowledge that workers in the West are on average more prosperous and in many respects more free, has exerted a per- manent pressure.

While the lives of the East Buropean masses are incomparably better than those of the masses in the "third world", they are still - by the yardstick of the overall development of human productive technique and culture - drab, stultefying and im- poverished. Now hundreds of mil- lions of people have decided that to gain a better life they will not go on in the old way, and that their leaders are incapable of going on in the old way: these are the classic conditions for the emergence of pre-revolution- ary situations.

The pivotal events of the crisis have occurred in Bast Germany. Until the autumn of 1989 it seemed that Eastem Europe was undergoing two separate courses of development - that of Poland and Hungary towards radical marketisation and political reform, and that of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany (and in a different way Romania) remain- ing true to the Stalinist model. But the mass movement of the East German workers smashed this dichotomy and led directly to the events in Czechos- lovakia and Bulgaria, leaving the Causescu dynasty in Romania iso- lated and under seige.

Confusion in the

imperialist camp

The response of the imperialist leaders to the events in castern Europe has been one of confusion: only the Christian Democrats in West Germany have responded with equanimity, seeing the events as strengthening their hand against their imperialist rivals. Both French and British imperialism have responded with alarm.

Overall, the existing world order depends, for imperialism, on the ex- istence of NATO and the bloc sys- tem; the division of Europe; the presence of US troops in Europe to ensure their "leadership' of the Western world; the existence of nuclear powers with special rights and a special status intemationally. While the crisis of Stalinism creates the possibility of historie defeats for the deformed workers" states, it also

creates an epoch of instability which puts in question the whole world order which has ensured the hegemony of the bourgeoisie.

For Thatcher and British capitalism the stakes are clear. Britain's international position depends fundamentally on its status as the possessor of nuclear weapons. This depends in return of the largesse of the USA: Britain's nuclear weapons are in fact provided by the United States - in tum a function of the 'special relationship" by which Britain acts as the USA's junior and faithful ally within the NATO al- liance - and in the EC. Already Thatcher has suffered a decisive defeat of the modemisation of bat- tlefield nuclear weapons. Once the bloc system and the nuclear competi- tion are in question, then Britain's usefulness as 'sidekick' to the US is removed.

Evidently for both Britain and France the idea of a united capitalist Germany is anathema. It means the domination of Europe, even more than today, by potentially the most powerful capitalist state in the world. British industry in particular would be totally marginalised. Mitterand's dream of Franco-German joint hegemony of the EC would be in tat- ters.

France's response to the crisis has been to demand the tighter integration of the European Community to act as a joint pole of attraction for capitalist restoration in the cast, as opposed to leaving this role to West Germany alone. But this is a panic strategy: at the Strasbourg summit West Ger- many was happy to go along with moves towards faster economic and political integration, because it knows that, whatever the official format, res- toration of capitalism in caster Europe, or even just a big increase in trade, will unfold to the advantage of the country with the largest economy, the best geographical conditions and the biggest established links - on all three criteria West Germany itself.

The response of the United States has been cautious. George Bush was careful to insist after the Malta sum- mit that the cold war was by no means over. Otherwise, he said, there would be no justification for US troops in Europe. A world without the bloc system and the fundamental East-West divide would create im- mense problems for the US, which relies for its leadership of the West on its military and political leadership (and the second depends on the first). Once inter-imperialist competition is

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 20, Dec-Jan 1989-90

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