uture of the Left in Europe With the advent of the 1992 'Single Europe' Act in a situation of growing capitalist crisis and the turmoll in eastern Europe, the Left faces complex issues of analysis and strategy. Phil Hearse talked about these questions to PATRICK CAMILLER, an editor of New Left Review, who is compiling a collection of writings about the European Left soon to be published by Verso.
• What is the motivation behind the proposal for a "single Europe' in 19927 • There are two interconnected motivations. The first is an attempt by the Social Democrat and Christian Democrat political leaderships to adapt to a new form of capital accumulation and social regulation.
Since the late 1970s, probably starting in California, there has been a search for a new mode of regulation to replace the old "Fordist" model of labour relations and capital accumulation. This has involved the neo-liberal view of the economy with attempts at deregulation of the operations of capital and de-unionisation. 1 don't think that a new model has been found - so called PostFordism* - we are very much in a SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 20, Dec-Jan 1989-90
EUROPE SUPPLEMENT transitional stage. But clearly the crucial aspect of '1992 is the attempt by capital to facilitate the movement and concentration of capital, and to circumvent traditional centres of labour movement resistance.
The second connected aspect, although how this will work out is not clear yet, is the preparation by European capital to face the possibility of a triangular trade war with the USA and Japan. In particular, the US is trying aggressively to reconquer lost economic ground, and this could set off a fierce competitive struggle. But it is complicated by the presence of the US and increasingly Japanese multinationals inside Europe; there are obvious differences of approach to the 1992 idea among different factions of US capital, for example. Nonetheless, 1992 can also be seen as a rather belated attempt to
John Harris (IFL) build a relatively compact and integrated trading bloc is preparation for every eventuality. • How do you explain the proposal for a "Social Europe'? What should be the attitude of socialists towards it? • Well the idea of a 'Social Europe really stems from the need to sell '1992' to the peoples of Europe; after all the prospect of the reorganisation and strengthening of capital is not a very attractive idea in itself -another dimension was needed to try to capture people's imagination.
But perhaps it also represents a slight change in the attitude of sections of capital - spurred on by the defeat of the Chirac government in France in 1988. This major turning
"the US is trying aggressively to
reconquer lost
economic ground, and this
could set off a
fierce
competitive struggle. But it is complicated by the presence
of the US and
increasingly
Japanese
multinationals inside Europe"
Page 13
West Germany: East Germans queue for consumer goods: West Germans queue for housing
...in Spain, half the membership of the trade union movement was lost - a process which accelerated after Gonzalez's Socialist Party came to power" *the combined electoral strength of the social democratic and communist parties is probably as strong as ever ... but the militant participation and activism in these parties has undoubtedly declined" Page 14
point put an end to the reactionary dreams of the "Thatcherisation' or "Reaganisation" of Europe.
It is important to remember that the Social Europe proposals, such as worker participation, do not have any statutory force in the respective individual countries of the EC. Therefore its impact will probably be limited.
As far as the attitude of socialists is concemed, while keeping in mind the limitations of the Social Europe proposals, I think our attitude should be roughly the same as towards the 19th century factory legislation - to support any moves towards equalisation of labour conditions on the basis of "levelling up'. But the key thing will continue to be struggle, especially as the Social Europe proposals in part are contrary to the whole deregulation thrust which is the core of 1992'. • Since the capitalist crisis of 19745 the workers' movement has been fighting mainly defensive struggles. Has the labour movement maintained its basic strength, or has it been seriously eroded? • I think its basic strength is still intact, although this varies considerably from country to country. The inability of the labour movement to respond immediately to the onset of the crisis in 1974-5 allowed austerity to be imposed and unemployment to grow.
It is always necessary to respond immediately to capitalist austerity attacks if their effects are to be combated; but the labour leaders, including the Social Democratic and Communist party leaders, were in the main complicit in the austerity attack. There can be no question that this meant an erosion of labour movement strength, especially as a result of growing unemployment.
effects were felt in Spain, where half the membership of the trade union movement was lost -a process which accelerated after Gonzalez's Socialist Party came to power. But it's also in Spain that the biggest fightback has begun, with the December 1988 general strike, and the heartening moves towards a
SUPPLEMENT plus plus unification in action of the trade union movement (1).
However if we look at the heartlands of social democratic trade unionism in West Germany and Sweden, although some sections of West German industry have been devastated by capitalist restructuring. the self-confidence and membership of the union movement has largely held up. In my view there are signs of the possibility of resurgence of trade union struggle in many parts of Europe.
As far as the social democratic and Communist parties are concemed, their combined electoral strength is probably as strong as ever
although there has been a redistribution of strength between them. in favour of the social democrats. But the militant participation and activism in these parties has undoubtedly declined.
I would say the most acute political crisis in Europe today is affecting the parties of the capitalist right -most evident in Spain, but now ap parent even in Britain. But clearly the decline in the active participation of the masses in the working class parties does reflect a certain kind of crisis which these organisations face - a crisis of their overall project, of a lack of a 'civilisational vision", of a clear model of an overall alternative future capable of capturing the imagination of the working masses. Without such a vision it is impossible to involve larger sections of the mas ses in activism in these parties.
This is the real crisis of the Left -a crisis of perspectives, an ideological crisis. But maybe the developments in Spain are the harbinger of a new mass
Marked Diskente re-politicisation. • Is the decline of the Communist parties a defeat for the socialist left? For example, is the decline of the French CP a defeat for the most militant workers? • Yes, I do think it can be seen as a kind of defeat, because it's part of the withdrawal of sections of the working class from active politics - a function of the lack of a convincing anti-capitalist project.
In France, the CP in the post-war years attracted tens of thousands of the most militant and class conscious workers who thought this party could be a vehicle of self-defence and, perhaps, of an altemative future. But much of the responsibility for this defeat must be placed at the door of the leaderships of the CPs themsel ves.
For example, in Spain in the late seventies the support given by the CP leadership to the Moncloa austerity pact led to the withdrawal of tens of thousands of its militants from active support, and even active politics. The retreat of the French CP into the sectarian ghetto after the break-up of the Union of the Left - reflecting its ideological sectarianism and undemocratic intemal regime - ensured that party's decline. The same story is repeated elsewhere: it has resulted in the loss of hundreds of thousands of young people from left wing politics. • How do you explain, apart from Britain, the relative lack of leftwing opposition in the social democratic parties to their almost universal move to the right? • The fundamental element in SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 20, Dec-Jan 1989-90
these parties has been the decline in membership, and for example in France, the consequent decline of local and regional internal politi- cal life. In Spain of course there has left opposition been to Gonzalez's austerity measures, but this has usually ended in widespread resignations and expulsions - for example the resignation of 100 members in Barcelona(2) on the eve of the recent elections, but also many expulsions in the south of the country - and sharp conflict with the trade unions. In West Germany, the leadership of the SPD, despite its lack of an overall altema- tive vision, has been much more successful in negotiating the 'rapids" of the crisis of the 1980s - partly because it hasn't been in power, and has thus tended to avoid the blame measures. Neither should we forget the radicalisation inside the SPD at the time of the crisis over Cruise and Pershing missiles, and the growth of currents which were opposed to NATO and the new militarism. The SPD leadership has been flexible enough to make an opening towards sections of the Green Party leadership on the basis of ecological policies; it has also floated its own scheme for the reduction of the working week on the basis of a con- sequent reduction in pay - a proposal started by Lafontaine(3). This has caused conflict with the leadership of the engineering union IG-Metal(4), and these tensions show the con- tinued existence of a current in the West German trade union movement and the SPD which in new cir- cumstances could be the core of a radical left wing. • What about the Italian CP? Are its structures open enough to allow the formation of a left op- position? • In terms of structures, I don't see a basic obstacle to the growth of a class struggle current - but then I don't see any signs of it either! The last Congress of the PCI, which renounced the Russian Oc- tober Revolution and the Communist tradition - and instead tumed towards an ideological rapproche- ment with the West German SPD - SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 20, Dec-Jan 1989-90
SUPPLEMENT Striking Belglen beer workers support calls for an EC Social Charter marks a major turning point.
The traditionalists around Cosutta have shown no signs of being able to develop a coherent alternative. In fact the radical trends at the base have been more structured by the current around Ingrao, which looks to a synthesis of the 'new social movements as a way of renewing the Communist tradition. This of course reflects the weight of the ecological, feminist and other social movements in Italian radical politics. • Do you think that the 'new social movements* - especially those based on womens liberation and ecology - can provide a realistic alternative route for those opposing capitalist restructuring? • I don't think so, no. It's difficult to overestimate the importance of the emergence of the ecological movement, and especially the Greens in Germany at the time of the rise of the peace movement. But the internal fissures in the Greens since then show the limitations of these movements.
However important these movements are in raising vital issues for a socialist altemative at a national and interational level, they cannot -either separately or together - on their own provide a social agency capable of forging and implementing
JUPILER MABIERE BRASSICO MON BOULO an alternative social project.
The Greens in Germany have always faced the choice between ghettoisation in some sort of fundamentalist ecological stance, thus setting themselves in opposition to the concrete struggles and aspirations of the working class, and on the other hand forging an alliance with the workers' movement - and even integration into it. • How do you assess the European revolutionary left? Since the 1970s most of the biggest organisations have just disappeared - with perhaps the exception of the Communist Movement (MC) in Spain and Democrazia Proletaria (DP) in Italy. The largest organisations remaining, like the L.CR in France and the Militant in Britain tend to be from the Trotskyist tradition. • Most of the revolutionary left was hard-hit by the decline in spontaneous struggles after the 1974-5 capitalist crisis.
In general it was not able to find a common language with, or a secure route towards, sections of the working class movement. The "post-'68" revolutionary left, often almost engulfing older and more stable traditions, was driven by a subjectivist radicalism which didn't really engage with the life and struggles of
"the last Congress of the
Italian Communist Party
renounced the Russian October Revolution and the Communist
tradition - and instead turned
towards an ideological rapprochement
with the West
German SPD" "it's difficult to overestimate the
importance of the emergence of
the ecological movement, and
especially the
Greens in Germany at the time of the rise
of the peace movement. But
the internal
fissures in the
Greens since
then show the
limitations of
these
movements"
Page 15
"none of the central problems facing the peoples of Europe - economic security, environmental protection, freedom from war, to name but three - can be solved except at a continental, and indeed wider, level" "in the coming days and weeks we shall see just how successful Honecker and the Stalinist old guard were in destroying the socialist tradition in that country" Page 16
the mass labour movement.
This radicalism took varied political forms ranging from anarcho-spontancism to council communism -ideological and strategic forms which had been thrown up at various stages in the 150-year history of the socialist movement. Almost without exception these movements counterposed themselves to the existing labour movement and looked towards political and workplace structures which would simply bypass the structures of the labour movement to which the working class, including its socialist core, remained attached. Almost without exception this kind of thing eventually leads to widespread demoralisation and withdrawal from politics. perienced in Spain and Italy - in Spain the collapse of organisations up to 30,000 strong, and much the same thing in Italy. This first crystallised around the Portuguese revolution in 1974-5, where most sections of the far left either looked towards the emergence of soviets, when this was not an objective possiblity, or started playing around with putschism. sented a real impatience, in seeking to foist schemas on history before the left had established the necessary strength and legitimacy.
These failings revealed themselves precisely at the time when the labour movement was facing its sternest test in the mid-1970s austerity offensive, and when in general the leaders of the mass labour movement were capitulating before it. This of course sharpened a process of disappointment and disillusionment, which the subjective radicalism of the far left was unable to combat. • With the crisis in the Eastern bloc, is it useful to raise the demand for a united Socialist Europe? Or is it unrealistic to expect the overcoming of the bloc system? Should socialists support a united Germany? • There can be no question that the goal of socialists should be a socialist reunification of the continent - a United Socialist States of Europe.
It's possible to make the economic, political and cultural case for this in theoretical argument, but I'm sceptical whether it can be put forward today as a political slogan. The most obvious reason is that capitalist Europe is still the bastion of economic strength in the continent, and that a great deal needs to be done before the population of capitalist
SUPPLEMENT Europe consciously embraces socialism as a meaningful and realis tic altemative.
However this is a rather different question from the overcoming of the existing antagonistic blocs. None of the central problems facing the peoples of security, environmental protection, freedom from war, to name but three - can be solved except at a continental, and indeed wider, level. In the coming decade, socialists will need to go beyond text-books and find ways of acting in the pan-European terrain which is developing around us. Obviously, the framework of national states will continue to be important for a long time to come but the strug gle for a socialist Europe should in creasingly take the form of struggles and demands at a directly allEuropean level.
Much the same could be said about Germany itself, which in one sense is a kind of concentration of these questions. It seems clear, for example, that strong economic and other links between the GDR and the Federal Republic are necessary and desirable today, and that the continental struggle between capitalism and socialism will also be posed at the level of relations - contradictory, but relations nevertheless - between actually existing capitalist and postcapitalist countries.
The gigantic events which have occurred in East Germany place an enormous responsibility on reform communists and other socialists in the GDR. In the coming days and weeks we shall see just how successful Honecker and the Stalinist old guard were in destroying the socialist tradition in that country. Despite the repressive and undemocratic record, I believe there are social gains and collectivist values which could provide the basis for a renewed democratic and socialist GDR. This would be a tremendously positive factor in European politics. Socialism with democracy - that is the line many of the opposition leaders in the GDR are taking, and its a long time since we heard that from oppositionists in the Eastem bloc. • What should be the basis of our proposals on this; what should be our alternative 'civilisational" project? •Obviously a great deal of collective though has to be given to this, but 1 think the following things are key.
First, the proposal that we want public control and planning of
economic activity, just as we want public health, social services etc. A socialist altemative has to be aimed at destroying the neo-liberal two-thirds society", and enshrining the right to work as a fundamental social right, as well as establishing basic economic welfare and security.
But socialist alternative "civilisational" project has to go way beyond that. In capitalist society, new technology continually threatens to devalue human lives through deskilling and mass unemployment. But this should not blind us to the enormous potential of the electronic revolution to shrink what Marx once called the "realm of necessity" and to expand the realm of culture and freedom beyond the workplace.
At the heart of a socialist programme today should be the ob jective of a steady and planned reduction in the working week for all participants in the labour force, and a corresponding enrichment of all other dimensions of individual and collective life. I need hardly add that such a process of social and cultural change, stretching across and between continents, would create the conditions for a much higher development of progressive feminism and other movements that look toward a reconstruction of personal relations.
question of ecologically sound economic growth must be built in as an absolutely central part of our alternative. Indeed it's hard to believe that so many people today, both in the West and the East, seem prepared to write off social planning and espouse the virtues of a free market. For after Chemobyl, it is surely obvious that democratic public control of productive activity has never been more crucial to the present and future wellbeing of the human race. Ecological protection is also the area in which the most immediate steps could be taken at an intemational level for the coordination of research, the sharing of new technological forms and the introduction of statutory nors.
Finally I'd like to stress that a pan-European programme for social advance, from the Atlantic to the Urals, cannot be aimed at other parts of the world, particularly the third world. A European super-state, with its own
Cof nationalism and ethnocentrism, has nothing to do with the sort of project we are discussing.
New relations between Burope and the rest of the world must also be part of the project as must the right of real social and political equality for all who live in Europe, including the milSOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 20, Dec-Jan 1989-90
Who's a