Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2009

Who's afraid of a united Germany?

· Socialist Outlook no. 20, December–January 1990 · pp 19-22 · 2,248 words

Germany Russia and the USSR War and peace Stalinism

By John Lister The uneasy "settlement' in Europe between the Soviet Union and the Western capitalist powers was ar- rived at through a combina- tion of negotiations and the new balance of forces fol- lowing the end of World War Two. It has always seen its sharpest expression in the division of Germany.

In the initial period after the defeat of German imperialism, neither the allied powers nor Stalin could contemplate the prospect of a resurgent Ger- man nation: the country was divided by mutual consent into zones of occupation, leaving Berlin, the capital, 210 kilometres inside the Soviet zone, it- self divided between four occupying powers, and with no Germans in con- trol.

Events did not fulfil the aspirations of either side. Illusions that the Com- munists might occupy a strong posi- tion in both east and west sectors of Germany were dashed, not least by the reemergence of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which in the east was quickly forced into an unpopular merger with the Communists. On the other hand allied hopes of persuading or pressurising Stalin into an arrange-

capitalist West Germany

to be integrated into this

alliance as a counter to

Soviet influence.

The Kremlin leaders

felt threatened - the more

so because the Americans

wanted to retain their

foothold and listening post

in West Berlin, in the heart

of the Soviet post-war

"buffer zone". They hit

back by imposing a total

blockade on West Berlin,

cutting road, rail and water

routes, and stopping food,

electricity, gas and other

supplies from East Ger-

many,

The USA and Britain

responded with a huge air- lift which between June 1948 and May 1949 transported over 1.5 million tons of supplies to keep West Berlin going and symbolise wester deter- mination to stand up to communism.

After 318 days, Stalin was forced into a humiliating climbdown. A few months later the first West German government was elected, with Dr Konrad Adenauer as Chancellor, and with a new capital, Bonn. The NATO alliance - based from the beginning upon a willingness of European capitalists to allow the USA to threaten nuclear war in Europe in their "defence' - had been established in the

Striking a pose:US President Kennedy in Berlin, 1963 ment that would ensure the reconstruction of capitalism in the eastern sector and much of castern Europe also came to nothing.

In 1947 the Americans began to force the pace, announcing what amounted to a recognition that Ger- many was to be permanently divided: in June 1948 they secured the agree- ment of the British and French to the formation of a West German govern- ment. This move ran alongside the formation of a new anti-soviet military alliance, the Brussels Union. forerunner to NATO. Stalin correctly saw that the USA wanted its new

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 20, Dec-Jan 1989-90

"the Kremlin leaders hit back

by imposing a total blockade on West Berlin,

cutting road, rail and water

routes, and stopping food, electricity, gas

and other

supplies from East Germany"

Page 17

SUPPLEMENT

1955: West German Chancellor Adenauer confirms the end of occupation and the start of NATO membership summer of 1949. Though it has remained as a pretext for keeping large standing armies in Burope, there was never any notion that the NATO powers would seck to repel the hypothetical threat of a Soviet in- vasion by conventional arms: it has always been a cover for allowing US nuclear bases on European soil.

The Stalinist East German state, the German Democratic Republic, was not formed until after West Ger- many: and the Soviet response to NATO, the Warsaw Pact, imposed on sattelite regimes in Eastem Europe and based on a similar "license to kill" using nuclear weapons, was not set up until after West Germany became a formal member of NATO in 1955.

The Cold War continued to be fought out over the two Germanies, and with special vigour in Berlin, where the Americans funnelled a massive $600. billion by 1960. matched by an equal investment from the Bonn government, to turn the wester half of the city into the greatest manufacturing powerhouse of Germany, with an output of S2 bil- lion a year, more than the gross na- tional product of most member states of the United Nations. This propagan- da showcase of capitalist investment stood in stark contrast with the austere conditions in East Germany which, though more industrialised than many cast Buropean states, took years to recover from Stalin's sys- tematic post-war looting of industrial plant, and which lacked any external input of capital.

The result by the end of the 1950s was a steady stream of skilled, talented East german workers and in- tellectuals crossing over to West ger- many - some 300,000 a year, with over 3 million having deserted since 1949. Antagonised by this, and fear- ful of the growing rearmament of

"Kennedy was prepared to live with the Wall so long as the west kept its hold in Berlin.

Khruschev could think of no other way of retaining vital skilled workers in the east. As a symbol of the uneasy balance of forces in Europe and the blunt, brutal methods of the Stalinist bureaucracy, the Wall survived for 28 years"

West Ger-

many, together

with its likely

entry into the

Common

Market, Soviet

leader Nikita

Khruscher

began to raise

the stakes once

more on Ber-

lin. He

threatened to

hand control of

the Soviet

zone to East

Germany, a

government

which none of the western powers would recognise. The problem rumbled on in the back- ground to other world events, not least the Cuban revolution of 1959. followe by the arrival in the White House of the arch cold warrior John F. Kennedy, whose administration unleashed to most rapid escalation of the arms race the world had yet seen.

Khruschev pressed for negotia- tions over Berlin designed to stem the exodus of East Germans, who were already restricted from crossing the border elsewhere: Kennedy refused the slightest concession. Instead westem propaganda continued to gloat at the exodus. On August 13 1961, Khruschev ordered the Berlin Wall to be built, permanently divid- ing the city, closing the border, and dashing any dreams of a reunited Germany.

Kennedy was prepared to live with the Wall so long as the west kept its hold in Berlin. Khruschev could think of no other way of retaining vital skilled workers in the east. As a sym- bol of the uneasy balance of forces in Europe and the blunt, brutal methods of the Stalinist bureaucracy, the Wall survived for 28 years. Now as workers stream through in both direc- tions to catch up on a generation of missed visits and lost friendships, it symbolises not only the ambiguity of the Gorbachev leadership in the USSR and the new regimes in eastern Europe which he has helped create, but also a glaring contradiction in the imperialist stance.

For the USA, Britain and France, the spectre of a reunified Germany - 80 million strong, and potentially the world's third largest military power - is possibly more daunting than it is for the Soviet bureaucracy who cherish bitter memories of 20 million dead repulsing Hitler's armies. Were the new united Germany to be a

capitalist power, it would dwarf the other countries in the European Com- munity, challenge US economic and political domination in the western world, and further marginalise British capitalism.

For the Soviet bureaucracy the military alignment of a united Ger- many would give the greatest con- cem. Gorbachev might well settle for a united neutral Germany, if this of- fered the compensatory advantage of breaking up NATO and allowing the USSR to dissolve the obviously frac- tured and ineffective Warsaw Pact (in which so many signatories are clearly unreliable allies in almost any Soviet military effort).

The imperialist powers plainly regard this as a real problem, not least because even before the latest developments the West German government had for some time shown itself to be responsive to the prospect of exploiting profitable trade and technology deals with the USSR and Eastern Europe even where this runs counter to US policy. Any break from the imperialist military alliance could, they fear, see even a capitalist Ger- many drawn closer politically and economically to the cast.

Hence the note of caution among the anti-communist propaganda bal- lyhoo over the East German events. Thatcher has hurriedly written to Gorbachev to reassure him the Britain has no intention of separating East Germany from the Warsaw Pact. It would be more accurate to say that she has no desire to lose West Ger- many from the NATO alliance, and по short-term expectation that capitalism can be restored in East Germany.

All the running in the cold War has been made by the imperialists seeking to force the pace and create openings to reconquer - economical- ly or politically, if not militarily - the lost markets and labour force in Easter Europe. Now glasnost and the mass mobilisations in the cast have demolished the basis of much wester anti-communist demonology. and undermined the bedrock of the arguments for NATO's existence.

In doing so, the workers of East Germany are not only liberating themselves from Stalinist repression, but giving a lead for workers in the west, who must now follow through with an offensive against the im- perialist alliances and reactionary policies of their lown capitalist rulers.

Page 18

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 20, Dec-Jan 1989-90

SUPPLEMENT

East Berlin workers battle against Soviet tanks, June 1953

How Eastern

"the last thing

on Josef

Stalin's mind

as the Red Army fought its way westwards

towards Berlin

after routing

Hitler's armies

at Stalingrad,

and

confronting

unaided the vast bulk of the

Nazis' military strength, was a

revolutionary

extension of

socialism"

to Stalinism

Events in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Bulgaria and now, dramatically, Czechoslovakia, show that the stranglehold of Stalinism on eastem Europe is beginning to weaken in the same uneven, pragmatic way it first took its grip after World War Two.

Just as in the post-war period, the decisive factor that has triggered developments is the attitude of the Kremlin. But while Stalin's influence consisted in containing and suppress- ing every independent movement of the working class in castem Europe, Gorbachev's policies of glasnost have served to undercut the monolithic character and dictatorial powers of ruling Stalinist parties throughout the eastern bloc, opening up the pos sibility of swift and militant radicalisation by the working class.

This has been further com- pounded by Gorbachev's insistence - most dramatically in the sensitive case of East Germany - that there could be no question of Soviet troops being sent in to prop up bureaucratic leaders beseiged by their own work- ing class (and his warning against any European re-run of the bloodshed of Tienanmen Square. This about-face on intervention has most obviously

pulled the rug on East German leader

Erich Honecker, but may yet (as we go to press) serve to destabilise the regime in Czechoslovakia.

How was it, then that such a ring of Stalinist states came to be erected around the western flank of the Soviet Union after the War? The process through which the reaction ary - sometimes almost feudal - regimes were overturned, capitalist property nationalised and deformed caricatures of "workers" states" created was from the start uneven in scale and tempo.

The last thing on Josef Stalin's mind as the Red Amy fought its way westwards towards Berlin after rout- ing Hitler's armies at Stalingrad, and confronting unaided the vast bulk of the Nazis" military strength, was a revolutionary extension of socialism.

He was first and foremost con- cemed to ensure that never again would the Soviet Union be brought to the edge of defeat by another in vasion: he wanted to safeguard Soviet borders against any renewed im- perialist offensive.

He was also concerned to rebuild the devastated Soviet economy and industrial base through extracting massive reparations and where neces sary wholesale looting of plant and equipment from the conquered Axis

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 20, Dec-Jan 1989-90

powers. But Stalin also hoped to secure substantial economic assis tance in reconstruction from his im- perialist 'allies': and to this end he was quite prepared to strike deals on the division of the world into rigid'- spheres of influence' in which capitalist spheres would remain un- disturbed by Communist Parties.

Lastly, but by no means least, Stalin was concerned to stamp out any revolutionary fires that had been ignited among the working classes of eastern Europe by the military defeat of their repressive bourgeois rulers, and fanned by the arrival of the con quering Red Army with its historic Link to the October Revolution.

This is one key reason why as the Red Army moved into eastern Europe they simultaneously acted to disband and disarm the spontancous commit- tees formed by anti-fascist workers (often old CP members) which greeted their approach by raising red flags, seizing control of their fac- tories, arresting and even executing local fascists and Nazi collaborators.

Stalin's fear of such revolutionary movements on the borders of the USSR was reinforced by his interest in seeking a deal with the allied im- perialists: the result was a policy of establishing new bourgeois coalition governments throughout castern

"as the Red

Army moved

into eastern

Europe they

simultaneously

acted to

disband and

disarm the

spontaneous

committees

formed by

anti-fascist workers (often

old CP

members) which greeted their approach"

Page 19

*a new form of state apparatus had made its appearance in

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