FLEA TU RIES
1979-1989: ten years of struggle
Marking the tenth anniversary of the Nicaraguan revolution, Will Mo- Mahon looks at strengths and weak- nesses of what has been achieved.
The political landscape of the 1980s has been fashioned by US im- perialism attempting to roll back the gains made by the workers and peasants since 1945. In Asia, Africa, Latin and Central America this has often taken the form of proxy wars fought by counter-revolutionary groups financed by US imperialism. At the eye of this storm has been the Sandinista revolution.
It is ten years since the Frente Sandinista Liberacion Nacional (FSLN) destroyed the Somoza dic- tatorship. They replaced it with a popular regime that was anti-im- perialist and claimed to be intent on building a new, socialist country.
revolution must begin by recognising McMahon
Any discussion of the nature of the 5
that the achievements of the Frente have been wide ranging and sig-3 nificant.
We must also recognise that the
Nicaragua. Health, education and land fight for national self-determination is still a redistribution programmes gave the oppressed living process in Nicaragua. It is essential that a quality of life denied to the majority of internationalists defend that revolution and people in Latin and Central America. These
the interests of the workers, peasantry and op- pressed within it. This implies unconditional solidarity with the workers and peasants in all of Central America.
However, unconditional solidarity does not imply a straightjacket being placed on the critical faculties of internationalists. Neither does it imply that the leadership of the revolu- tion should be regarded as the equivalent of its mass base or that it is above criticism. One of the key lessons of the counter revolution in Grenada is that there must be open and honest discussion of the problems that a revolution faces. It is pointles whispering in comers when the labour movement needs collectively to understand what is occuring and why. Internal reforms, external war
The Sandinista government has faced problems qualitatively greater than those con- fronted by the Cuban leadership and even per- haps the Bolsheviks. Yet despite geographical vulnerability and the absence of a politically
experienced urban proletariat the revolution in its first phase managed to deliver substantial increases in living standards to the poorest in
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 17, Summer 1989
advances were a tremendous step forward for the whole of the continent and in simple humanitarian terms allowed Nicaraguans to stand up with dignity and begin to shape their own destinies.
Over the long term the aim was to enable the country to transform the slogan of national self-determination into a reality. Programmes were developed to encourage the self-or- ganisation of the workers and peasantry. This model of "participatory democracy' is at the core of the Sandinista strategy. Within this participatory democracy the forces needed for the liberation of women and progress towards autonomy for the Atlantic Coast were set in motion.
Praised and utilised by socialists world- wide as evidence of what a regime defending the interests of the majority could achieve, these reforms became the threat of a good ex- ample to the Latin American bourgeoisie and in particular the Central Americam oligarchies
and US multinationals. Faced with such a challenge to their domination, a challenge that was not based on a one-party state but offered
another version of democractic plurality,
the US and its allies moved to destabilise
the Nicaraguan regime. They launched a
counter-revolutionary war.
Cost of the contra war
The achievements of the Nicaraguan
workers and peasants can be measured
by the ferocity of the contra war
launched against them. It is important to
recount the cost of the war and the im-
plications for the developmentalist
strategy of the Sandinistas as well as the
quality of life of the average Nicaraguan.
The total cost is estimated to be over $3
billion, or over 15 years' export earn-
ings. As in all revolutions, the best
cadres headed for the front, directly to
confront the counter-revolution. This
denied the political and state structures
many of the most able organisers.
Moreover, the costs of the war led to a
dramatic scaling down of the education,
health and other welfare programmes,
formerly the centrepiece of the popular
revolution.
The more recent costs for the poor
have included massive price rises, deregulation of the grain markets and the sacking of over half of the state employees. Widespread and generalised poverty has reap- peared on the streets of Managua, Leon and other major cities.
Whither Nicaragua?
So after a decade of war and revolution how can we characterise the Nicaraguan revolution and what are its prospects? These two questions are, of course, intertwined.
Some argue that in 1979 the FSLN used armed power to overthrow the Somozista regime, definitively smashed the old state machine, and in its place constructed one that was serving the interests of the workers and peasantry. Concessions to the bourgeoisie, it is argued, were merely a long term tactical maneouver that would lead to the eventual elimination of the capitalist class. In addition, the petit bourgeois economy would be sur- rounded by the structures and controls of the popular planned socialist economy.
This whole argument was constructed on the basis of an acceptance of the Sandinista ideology as, in some form, proletarian, and the belief that the FSLN was a revolutionary socialist party with a clear strategy for the transition to socialism. Whether this is in fact the case is debatable. This can be discussed at
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two crucial levels; the economy and socialist democracy • The mixed economy and national development
The economic strategy of the FSLN has been one of pluralism based on a mixed economy: this is underlined by the protection of the rights of private producers, which are enshrined in section six of the constitution. The long-term nature of the mixed economy project has been commented on by President Ortega. In a recent interview with Time magazine he said, 'We are convinced our model should not be the countries of Eastern Europe or Cuba ... the proper example for Nicaragua would be the Scandinavian countries.
Yet, despite the economic concessions made to the large and medium-size bour- geoisie, the economy is still facing economic disaster. Enormous spending cuts have been carried out by the FSLN against its own social base and it is making more concessions to the capitalist ranchers. In the first six months of this year ranchers have been allowed to open up direct export lines for cattle, given preferential interest rates on loans and reas- sured that there will be no more confiscations of large scale landholdings. The aim, accord- ing to the Sandinista government, is to make cattle ranching the axis of the country's economic recovery.
This is essentially the same scheme that has already been attempted and failed with the cotton bourgeoisie. The whole project is designed to finance development through the expansion of the export sector. If it was clear that the economy was a socialist economy, then there could be a certain merit to this scheme, although it would be vulnerable to fluctuations in the world market. However, within the Frente's strategic mixed economy perspective, the big bourgeoisie in key export sectors have become untouchable economical- ly, since it is imperative that the export sector is allowed to accumulate undisturbed.
Preferential economic measures for the bourgeoisie move any surplus that might exist from the poor to the rich. The 'logic of the majority' is not served by reinforcing the con- fidence of the bourgeoisie in their economic power while introducing austerity measures which have the effect of demobilising the workers and poor peasantry. The evidence seems to clearly indicate that the mixed economy does not work. Rather, it is the source of of crisis after crisis for the economy. Its dynamic is a drift to the right in economic policy. The only way to prevent this is to break the economic and political power of the landholders and large bourgeoisie - once and for all.
Elections, socialist democracy
and workers' power
The spending cuts against the workers and peasantry and the economic reactivation
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FEATURES
programme do not in themselves give a defini- tive characterisation of the Sandinista regime. Any socialist state under attack from im- perialism would have to cut social expendi- ture. Merely the mobilisation of productive labour into defence activities takes resources away from the social sector. Encouraging the bourgeoisie to produce can be the best way to create the rope with which to hang them. However, the key question is in what struc- tural political context is this taking place?
Early on in the revolution many analysts became convinced that the role of the mass or- ganisations and local Sandinista Defence Committees (CDSs) was to lay the basis for the foundation of a genuine mass based socialist democracy. The mass organisations played a key role in the Council of State which provided a direct link between the mas- ses and the decision making process. It seemed to be the embryo of a new socialist democracy. The elections of 1984 changed this situation qualitatively.
Role of the mass organisations
These elections had a two-fold political purpose. First, they were used to strengthen the legitimacy of the leadership role of the FSLN. Second, they were a political manoeuvre to outflank US imperialism in the region and to assert the national sovereignty of the revolution. Many commentators on the left saw it as a living example of revolutionary democracy. A more sober analysis of what oc- curred indicates that in place of the legitimacy of the mass organisations there is now a five- yearly electoral system. This is closer to a liberal democratic model than a socialist democracy.
This problem is added to when the role of the mass organisations is considered, As Luis Serra, a well known sociologist resident in Managua argues (2) "There are many state authorities in which these organisations par- ticipate in working out policy and projects concerning the sectors they represent. None- theless, such participation is generally only of a consultative nature, and they are in a minority with respect to the government's delegates'. The danger of the subordination of the mass organisations to the FSLN is clear.
The CDSs, as James Dunkerley points out (3), are bodies that do not have powers beyond being the eyes and ears of the revolution. It is true that they operate as a barometer of mass feeling for the Frente but this again is repre- sentation on the basis of consultation rather the power to determine and define policy.
The decision-making and legislative
legislative processes are carried out in the national as- sembly which is a parliamentary body. As Mandel argues (5), such a parliamentary body is not in itself a problem if this organ does not supercede the power of soviet-type bodies and the economic decision-making process is tied to workplaces. But in Nicaragua there are no soviet-type bodies and there is very little
workers' control. Such a model of democracy is a large obstacle to the socialist transition. Second assembly?
Given the enormous problems that the Frente are having with the economy the lack of direct organs of workers' and peasants" democracy is a threat to the revolution and its democratic gains. If those who made the revolution have to suffer because of the contra war then it is crucial that the democracy on offer allows them to take that decision. Other- wise, the party simply takes the decision for them. To avoid a generalisation of this prob- lem a regeneration of the CDSs is required. Investing more power in them and creating a second parallel assembly based on council type elections from workplace, co-operative and CDS would balance the purely repre- sentational nature of the National Assembly. It would place the economic decision making process in the hands of those who produce the surplus value and allow them to distribute it throughout the economy in their interests. Is the FSLN marxist?
If the dynamic of the economy is ques- tionable, and the nature of the democracy quite clearly not socialist but 'participatory' then the last defence of the transition lies in its leadership and the state formation that it has created. If it can be shown that the Frente leadership has a coherent marxist majority that is merely being pragmatic in the face of a difficult situation and that the state machine it rests on is a workers' state, then it could be ar- gued that the revolution is secured but that the strategy being followed endangers it.
What kind of ideology does the Frente have? The answer is not as simple as the ques- tion. The Frente is a complex combination of marxist, nationalist, social democratic, revolu- tionary and reformist christian thought encap- sulated in the term Sandinistaism. The number of traditions within the FSLN are of crucial importance in the decision making process at a leadership level. We are not witnessing, as Henri Weber originally suggested (5), a mar- xist vanguard-within-a vanguard leading less coherent layers to a socialist transformation under the cover of the term Sandinistaism. To believe otherwise would be to ignore the economic, democratic and state / constitution- al developments discussed above.
So which project has the majority support within the leadership of the FSLN and what are the consequences for the revolution? Evidence for an assessment is very difficult to come by. But given the dynamic of the past period it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the difficulties of war and the emphasis on the export-led growth strategy have led to stressof the question of national unity and an attempt to place national development above any particular class logic. This assessment is reinforced by the new international climate in which the FSLN is operating. Gorbachev's project of a peaceful co-existence for the
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 17, Summer 1989
FEATURES
1990s is a clear indication that the CPSU is not prepared to underwrite the Nicaraguan revolution.
Thus the contra war, the decline in mass mobilisations, the mixed economy strategy, the international climate and the notion of national development have all been key fac- tors in pushing the balance of forces in the FSLN's leadership away from a radical tran- sition. This is, in effect, a long term strategic retreat from the transition to socialism. is Nicaragua a workers' state?
To sustain itself a workers' state needs a socialist economy and democracy to ensure its own reproduction. Although the Sandinis- tas can be said to have definitively smashed Somoza's bourgeois state machine in 1979, it is clear that its replacement is not of a socialist character. Rather, it is of a con- tradictory type that has reflected the different ideological sources within Sandinista thought and practice.
For a decade a spectrum from the patriotic bourgeoisie via street trader to poor peasant and proletarian has been held in balance by the nationalist core of the anti- imperialist revolution through a state machine that it is the structural embodiment of a workers' and farmers' government. The real problem with this outcome from a mar- xist perspective is that there are neither the structures of socialist democracy to chal- lenge the course of the Frente leadership not the political space to do so in civil society, given the dominant role of the FSLN in the revolutionary war. This indicates that the
workers' and farmers' government and the
state created by the massive socio-economic crisis in Nicaragua in the 1970s are more likely to lead to the final creation of a Mexican or Algerian (ie non-socialist) our- come than a socialist transition, given the present dynamic of the Frente leadership. This does not indicate that such an outcome is inevitable - just the most likely scenario.
Now that the war is over, and the focus appears to be shifting to the rising revolu- tionary struggle in El Salvador, it is possible that the marxist wing within the FSLN could begin again to win the arguments over strategy. A shift to the left could result, and a positive resolution of the transition period might occur. However, this option will need a dynamic intervention from the marxist wing to pull the situation around through the mobilisation of the most advanced layers on the basis of a programme for a transition to socialism.
References
1. Agencia Nueva Nicaragua, April 1988. 2. International Viewpoint, April 17th 1989 3. James Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus, Verso 1988. Chapter 7. 4. Socialist Register, 1989. Chapter 8 5. Henri Weber, The Sandinista Revolusion, Verso 1980.
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 17, Summer 1989
Workers hold key to
the question of Hong
and Macao
Kong
Extract from text adopted by the 5th National Congress of the Revolutionary Communist Party of China.
Chinese Trotskyists have since 1948 advocated that the sovereignty of both Hong Kong and Macao be recovered from imperialism. However, the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) still has the same conciliationist policy now as it did when the New China was created, and continues to submit to
treaties signed be- tween the Qing government, Britain and Portugal.
The Deng faction continues this policy, and only after the lease treaty expires on June 30th 1997 will it "recover' Hong Kong. Nevertheless, the act of taking back the sovereignty of Hong Kong should still be supported.
Having failed to retain control of Hong Kong, British im- nerialism hac
clearly that the people of Hong Kong will enjoy a high degree of the right to self rule, ad- ministrative control and legislation after 1997. But it also states that the Hong Kong Basic Law must be defined by Beijing in accordance with the contents of the Joint Agreement. The Basic Law Drafting Committee that the CCP appointed and the Consultative Committee that it indirectly appointed enable it totally to con- trol the drawing up of the Basic Law.
The sovereinty of Hong Kong belongs to China, meaning that it belongs to all the people of China. The people of Hong Kong are a part of China. However, Hong Kong, for historical
and economic reasons, has been separated from the rest of China. As the people of these two places have not had the opportunity to democratically merge their different systers, Hong Kong should be ruled democratically by the people of Hong Kong. It should be stressed that this demand is raised in . specific historical cir- cumstances and does not imply that Hong Kong will permanent- ly hold this special
hypocritically posed as the defender of the
position.
rights of those living in the colony and con- tinues to exploit the fear and discontent of the Hong Kong people towards the CCP in order to defend the interests of British, foreign and local capitalists.
During negotiations between the British and Chinese governments on the future of Hong Kong, absolute secrecy has been maintained over the contents of the deals being struck. This has deprived Chinese people and in particular, of course, those
Fighting for the return of the sovereignty of Hong Kong to China and demanding that Hong Kong itself is democratically self managed, means to resist the bureaucratic rule of the CCP. The people of Hong Kong must decide for themselves which social and economic sys- ter they want in Hong Kong.
The CCP's policy of one country, two systems' means that after recovering Hong Kong, the capitialist system there will remain in place for 50 years. This policy not only deprives the people of Hong Kong of their
living in Hong Kong, of their right to know, speak out, intervene and decide. This in it- right to decide what system thay want but also self gives a good impression of the way in denies the working class any possibility of
struggling to overthrow capitalism. This is a which the CCP is likely to continue to ex- tend its influence over the people of Hong fundamental betrayal of the basics of marxism.
In addition, if Hong Kong continues with a Kong.
capitalist system, its higher productivity and
At the moment, the Chinese and British links to international capitalism will act as a governments are investigating models of
beach-head for world capitalist expansion into joint rule for Hong Kong - joint rule by the Beijing bureaucrats and Hong Kong rich. China. The contradictions between the
capitalist economy in Hong Kong and main- The Chinese-British Joint Declaration states land China will sharpen day by day. Thus, the
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