The following analysis of the policies of the Deng faction of the Chinese Communist Party is abridged from an extensive document on the situation in China and the
perspectives for revolutionaries, published in English in the Trotskyist magazine
October Review, journal of the Hong Kong section of the Fourth International.
The economic policy of the Chinese Communist Party fac- tion around Deng Xiaoping has aimed from the beginning to preserve and strengthen bureaucratic rule. Its basic ap- proach has been to deprive the labouring masses of their democratic power over produc- tion, while conducting an open- door policy, hoping that with the help of technology and capital from other countries China could make economic progress.
At the same time the Deng faction has relaxed the administrative stranglchold on the economy of the Mao Zedong era, and decentralised power to local bureaucrats, secking to
cultivate a lechnocracy and encourage the development of commodity production and an invigorated, market cconomy.
This line, hased on the technocrats and the competent in the countryside, has fostered the develop- ment of capitalist elements in China, enkling the system of state ownership. the planned economy and the monopoly of foreign trade. The ernsion has not yet brought about a qualitative change, hut is quantitative ly increasine. The premne the bureaucracy cannot effectively defend the socialist elements of the economy from further erosion. Part of the state ownership system is begin ning to disintegrate, the mle of state planning and distribution is lessening. the rule of market mechanisms is in
ersn d th
Tha
creasing, and the clements of the
private capitalist economy are grow ing in opposition to and in contention
with the state-owned sector of the
economy, causing the latter's weight
in the national economy to diminish. The danger of capitalist restoration
in did not relax the
spor on political wages avainet
ad corruntion and ite
sar were can
•y a very small • partv wantes oflenne an «r .. purge alien elements
the ruline faction.
ne ande- neckur froni
• Arminer. especially
-working -ass secured
Jendstimulated the
Page 16
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 16, June 1989
Deng's line has remained a Stai delegation to Moscow includin
Chinese masses, the Deng faction quickly discarded its liberal" posture and resorted to bureaucratic repres sion of democratic demands.
Ir banned the night to strike and the Four Freedoms' (to air views, to con- tend ideas, to write wall posters amd to debate), and deleted these from China's constitution. It banned unoff- cial organisations and publications. and wrested fighters for democracy. It repressed critical works by writers,
carried out a campaign against
"spiritual pollution', and even ex
pelled some members of the Com-
cated more daring reforms. The
reaction of the ruling faction to the stu-
dent movements in 1986 and 1987
onE a car spirituas pollution pelled some membe munist Party (CCT) who had advo-
ated more daring reaction of the ruling facti dent movement-- fully exposed its determination to repress and crush any accumulation of strength by the people.
Idcolegically, the bureaucracy at- tempted to shirk all blame for the ad- verse deeds of the final period of Man Zedong's rule. Though the Deng fac- tion was compelled to admit some of the crrors and ahuses committed by Man and the ceutral leadership of the CCP, they did their best to prevent the people from making a radical reassess- ment of Mao Zedong or the Cultural revolution
The nise of the Deng faction to power has not altered the line of huild- ing 'socialism in one country" as ad- vocated hy Stalin. On the contrary, its open-door policy and its general domestic and foreign policy are a con- tination of this line. The bureaucracy
The nee TeNa
tinuan
still refuxes to extend the socialist
revolution to other countrics, and sceksto repress the people's mobilisa- tion within the country it controls.
Thus the CCP leadership headed by Deng ishy nature Stalinist, and against
it Trotskyists struggle for two basic
SUP P L E M E N
intellectuals who were
branded "rightists" in
1957) further en-
couraged the mood and
struggle of the masses,
and this gave an im-
petus to the "Beijing
Spring' democracy
ist line throughout: here in 1963/ President Liu Shaoqi and Premie.
propositions - socialist democracy in China itself and world revolution out- side its borders.
The development of
mass struggle
The CCP has always consciously repressed the independent class mobilisation of the workers and peasints, strictly controlling mass or- ganisations such as trade unions and even persecuting or exterminating workers who indulge in independent. critical thinking. This has been one of the key means by which the bureaucracy safeguards its rule.
The 1976 Tienanmen riot showed that the maxses had developed heyond their previous long periods of passive resistance, go slows and boycott, to express their discontent with the ruling faction though massive spon- taneous actions. it was a preview of the anti-bure ancratic political revolution, and was only suppressed hy the CCP thmugh hrute force.
The death of Man Zedong deprived the CCP of a central leader and opened up a historical opportunity for the people gradually to break away from the chains of autocracy.
The masses began to exen pressure. raising various demands including an end in the political repression of the Mao Zedong era, improvements in the people's material and cultural life.
socialist democracy and a system of
legality, and the rehabilitation of people victimised by wrong verdicts.
The pressure of the masses and the
factional struggle inside the CCPcom pelled the ruling faction to rehabilitate the Tienanmen incident, recognising it
as a spontancous revolutionary mass action. The partial rehabilitation of this incident and other wrong verdicts
(including several hundred thousand
Malls
ad Sure
movement, with its wave of wall posters. demonstrations for
democracy, protests
against hunger and per
secution, and the mush-
rooming unofficial or
ganixations and
publications.
The policy of the
Deng faction did nuth-
ing to alter the super-
structure or the relation-
ship between the ruling
caste and the ruled
people: so political
democratisation be- came the central demand of the popular movement.
The Beijing Spring constituted a milestone in the democracy move- ment in China. Before its suppression in the spring of 1981, vanguard forces among the masses had linked up ex- tensively with each other. Young people, mainly workers and some former "red guards" who had ex- perienced and reassessed the Cultural Revolution, gathered around unoffi- cial publications, diagnosed social contradictions and probed altematives for development. Its mainstream af- firmed socialism aand demanded the realisation of socialist democracy. In September 1980 the National As- sociation of Unofficial Publications in China was founded, signifying a con- scious joining of forces in the democracy movement to fom the embryo of a revolutionary leadership. It oriented towards links with the working class, rooting itself among workers and communicating in solidarity with the international work- ing class movement.
The bureaucratic repression in 1981 compelled the democracy move. ment to tum underground. Continual repression further exposed the reac tionary position of the Deng faction and helped vanguard elements discard their illusions in it.
As the ruling faction's urban economic reforns began to unfold, the working class suffered new at- tacks. Soaring price rises attacked their living standards; the contract system and the widening of wage dif- ferentials directly attacked the right to work and welfare benefits. With real living standards under fire, defensive struggles such as strikes and go-slows have increased.
For the peasants. Deng's reforms
leads a Thou Enlal
For the peasants. Deng's reforms
Deng
1989
"The CCP leadership headed by Deng is by
nature
Stalinist, and against
it Trotskyists struggle for
two basic
proposi-
tions -
socialist
democracy
in China it-
self and
world revolution outside its
borders"
le in
"The bureaucratic
repression in 1981 com-
pelled the
democracy
movement
to turn un-
derground"
Pace 17
"The rural question is again be- coming grave, and by mid 1987 peasant riots against bureaucratism took place in Shan- dong and Hunan provinces"
"Under the rule of Mao Zedong, consumer goods were scarce and low in quality, and the bureaucracy tried to ban the market by ad- ministrative means, resulting in a series of economic and social contradic- tions"
Page 18
S PP LE E N
offered relief from the nondage the 'People's Communes'. However the policy of encouraging the com-
petent elements to en-
geared towards satis- fying those who can af- ford to pay, not the
general masses and their most basic needs. What decides invest- ment is not considera-
rich themselves accen- "uated i rural differentiation, ag- gravating the gap be- tween rich and poor. The rural question is
again becoming grave.
and by mid 1987 peasant riots against hureaucratism took place in Shandong and Hunan provinces.
The new social con- tradictions and mass discontent aroused by the Deng faction's rightist policies in the alien and ine
«gaun ber
tion for society as a whole, but considera- tion of dispersed, in- dividual economic sectors or enterprises: hanne producion tends towards anarchy. This anarchie state of production is hasically similar to the features of the market cconomy
in capitalist society.
In a society in the transition fron: capitalism to
socialism, especiaily
in cconomically back-
ward countries, the un
even development of
productivity and insuf-
licient supply of goods
cause consumption
goods to retain their
characteristics as com
nouttiex and the
market and small scale
commodity production
inevitably still prevail.
Administrative
methods to repress or
climinate them are not
effective. Only through the gradual
raising of productivity and establish- ing the abundance of products can their mole diminish and vanish.
The CCP practised cconomic plan- ning soon after it gained power. However the plan was drawn up en- tirely by party cadres and was decided by those above; those below were compelled to execule the plan. The
"planned cconomy became an economy planned by bureaucratic command. Under the rule of Mao Zedong, consumer goods were scarce and low in yuality, and the hureaucracy tried to ban the market by
administrative means, resulting in a series of economic and social con- tradictions and a serious sethack to the enthusiasm of the producer.
The Deng faction relaxed the
bureaucratic administrative control,
and at the same time swung to the
right, permitting the market law of
value to operate freely in the
countryside and then in the urban
economic centres. To permit market
functions to operate fully" meant
more and more a restoration of the
countryside began 10 surface in 1985. Stu- dent demonstrations
and struggles were g reflections of social a discontent. Following g
demonstration of
Septemher 18 1985.g
the students took again 9
to the itreets in massive &
numbers in December
Shanghal: workers join with students in revolt at Com- "axo. Their unequivo- munist Party corruption and repression of democracy
cal demand for politi-
cal democratisation and their exposure of the social con- tradictions have drawn extensive sym- palley med support. and the state of in- difference and lack of confidence or perspective among the masses is beginning to change.
The Deng faction will not be lenient in its suppression of the mass upsurge. Repression will continue, yet it will also lead to the masses discarding their must-s and turning to their own strength in order to change the present conditions.
The planned economy
and the market
economy
the Septeniner
The economic policy of the Deng faction is to make use of material in- centives and market mechanisms to activate an economy which had heen strangled by the bureaucracy. On the one hand, the regime has not up to now annnunced any change in its formula
or moraining the plannco economy as predominant, with market adjustment as a supplement. On the
other hand, it has set out to 'fully develop the commodity economy. develop the market in commodities, gradually 'perfect the market system. and reduce the scope of planning car-
ried out by command.
Until the end of 1986, the result of the initial reform on the planning sys- tem was that the categories of proucts produced by command under the State Planning Commission had fallen from around 120 in 1984 lo about her Production of grain and other major agicultural products had changed from previous production by command to the present production by non-binding guidance. There had been a reduction in resources centrally distributed by the state from 256 kinds in 1984 to just 20. There had also been the emergeuce of a labour market, a market in means of production, and a capital market. The gradual reduction of the scope of planning signified a continuing decrease in the weight of the planned cconomy and its replacement with market mechanisms. Further develop ment along these lines might lead to a predominance of the market connomy. which the CCP camouflages with the tem "socialist commodity cconomy"
The market economy and the planned cconomy are in opposition and contradiction. The planned cconomy calls for conscious analysis of society's overall demand, and al- location of social resources and products according to pre-established priorities. But under the domination of the market conomy, production is
Th
inder-prosuc. we large arr
apians economy.
-existence of m us some sectors and ..u others. At the same unts ot social surplus
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 16, June 1989
Increased supplies of consumer goods have become available: but at a price, as inflation soars
products were not converted into so- cial accumulation but into the ac- cumulation of private capital. Since both investment and production are now directed by profits, the planned economy will gradually disintegrate.
Accumulation and
consumption
After the Deng faction came to power. there was a slight rise in the rate of consumption in the national ibr come. There was more development of light industry and increased produc- tion of day-to-day consumer goods. There was also an increase in funds to facilitate a rise in state purchasing prices for some agricultural products.
These moves were intended to stimulate the people's incentives to produce. However from 1983 on- wards this policy was thrown into reverse: the rate of accumulation rose, along with the pmportion of heavy in- dustry in the value of industnal output. The scale of investment in fixed assets at central level, local level and in non- planned sectors could not be reduced and went out of control. The policy of giving priority to heavy industry remained predominant, and the development of light industry slowed down. Investment in agriculture fell every vear tits share of totis capitas in. vestment fell from I1.1 percent in
1979 to 3.4 percent in 1985). Thux the proportion of consumption shrank while that of accumulation hax risen.
.aumTIp
mimuration hax riser
Although heavy industry is the most important sector in developing
the economy and raising productivity. the planned economy should not pur-
wia per sue the most rapid development of a single sector but seek the optimal ef ficiency of the economy as a whole. In particular its focus should be on the
SOCHLIST OUTLOOK no 16.
improvement of the people's standard of living. In fact the long periods of neglect of the development of agricul- ture and fight industry have created serious imbalances which have in turn impeded the development of heavy in- dustry. Hence a reduced rate of con- sumption did not bring gains from an increased rate of accumulation.
When they decide the ratio between accumulation and consumption, the bureaucrats pose the question in the simplified formula that 'an increase in consumption means a decrease in investment". This is not actually so. The productivity of labouris an impor- tant factor. Under bureaucratic rule, berides the portion devoted to produc- tive investments and consumption by producers, a considerable portion of the social product is consumed in a non-productive way, in particular in the consumption by the privileged bureaucracy and the expenses of a redundant administrative apparatus. Byabolishing the economic privileges of the bureaucracy, productive invest-
ments and consumption hy producers
can both be increased In addition, the
major detrimental factor in the en- thusiasm of producers can be removed. Under democratic manage ment, today's massive squandering of resources in production and circula tion could also he drastically reduced.
The rural economic
reform
The rural policy of the Deng faction was to encourage pearanix to enrich themselves. The official formula proposed that a portion of people (the competent) getting rich first would lead to common wealth heing enjoyed by the entire population.
The practice of the contract respon
sibility system was to establish the family as the unit of independent production. This means the restora- tion of small-scale individual peasant production, and the abolition of the mode of collective farming of the Mao Zedong era, when the basic unit of ac- counting was the production brigade Such a change means concessions to the peasant tendency for small production, and also signifies official recognition by the CCP that the line of the People's Commune was bankrupt.
The Deng faction was forced to lift the bandage of the Poople's Com- mune, and its slight increase in the purchasing price of agricultural sub- sidiary foods (which had long been maintained at a very low level) resulted in some improvement in the impoverished living standard of the peasants, and increased their initia- tive. As a result, the first few years of the production responsibility system showed a rather quick increase in agricultural and subsidiary produc- tion.
Nevertheless when the CCP
changed its previous ultra-left" policy it swung to the other extreme. encouraging individual peasants to enrich themselves without restraint, and giving them assistance. This caused a concentration of farm land in the hands of the "competent growers". A powerful stratum has emerged in the countryside as specialised households engaged in indostry, com- merce, communications, construction and services, their capital accumula- tion is growing. Rich peasants, private industrial and •ammereal
entrepreneurs and even loan sharks have appeared, and "millionaires" eulogised by the regime obtained publicity. By 1986, the fixed assets of
"When the
CCP changed its
previous
'ultra-left"
policy it
swung to
the other extreme, en-
couraging
individual peasants to
enrich themselves
without
restraint,
and giving them assis-
tance"
Page 19
"The
People's Commune policy of the Mao Zedong era and the Dengist policy of as- sisting the competent to enrich themselves ... appear to go to two ex- tremes, and yet in es- sence they are the two alternatives of Stalinist bureaucratic rule"
IL E S UP
conncils. certain
private
In the absence of
enterprises reached
democratic
decision-making
Economic consortia
and supervision by were also developing
the workers, the rapidly. The CCP
operation of in- cadres in the
dustries and
countryside make up
enterprises is more
quite a significant por-
and more subject to tion of the rich, using
the law of the the power in their
market, and they hands to obtain the
compete for resour most favourable condi-
cer and for the tions. Bureaucrat capi-
market under the tal is gradually form-
domination of the ing law of value. Under
Alongside social
such competition. differentiation in the
the pursuit of profits countryside, the gap
as becomes the aim of between the backward t Earmor alse now in deadlontest: Zhao Zivand with Li Pend
enterprises reached several million yuan.
vita-
and developed regions (in particular between the inland mountainoas regions and the coastal provinces) is widening, and class con- tradictions are breeding.
In some state-run farms, the family responsibility system was also prac- tised. The state farm was divided into small farms, and the state permitted the sale of farming animals, small and medium farm tools, trucks and staff quarters to the staff members. This means part of the state property of the farms is disintegrating and reverting to private ownership.
In sum, the Deng faction's rural policy has struck a way out of the stalemate created by the People's Commune policy, yet it breeds new
contradictions. The burcaucracy's
laissez faire type of market refor which violates socialist principles: the cadres' corruption: the privatisation and concentration of wealth, means of production and some land; the ap- pearance of large numbers of hired Jabourers: the accumulation of private capital; the expansion of capitalist production on the basis of exploitation
of hired lahourers, and unevenness of the market economy ... all these cause further class differentiation and con-
stitute the motive force for capitalist restoration in China.
In the past we opposed the People's
Commune policy of the Man Zedong
era. Now we also oppose the Dengist
policy of assisting the competent to
enrich themselves. These two policies
appear to go to two extremes, and yet
in essence they are the two alternatives
of Stalinist hureaucratic rule. The
same vacillations have appeared in the
countries.
.... Now we ar
on the East European
Weoppose the regression of collec-
production
le propose
control by the CCP
and extortion of
ne abolished: all
and enov the righte
se fami
and benefits of the democratic and col lective management of the farm. Agriculture should go on the road of collectivisation and mechanisation. Towards this end, the state must assist the peasants with material resources. coupled with demneratic manage- ment. Examples must be set for the peasants, and idcological education must be conducted. After long periods of effort, the superiority of collec tivisation and mechanixation will show itself and attract peasants to go voluntarily onto the road of collec- tivisation, since they will see from ex- perience that it brings then. mal benefits.
The urban economic
reform
The Deng faction decentralised power to bureaucrats in local enterprises, and separated the ad- ministration from the enterprises which now enjoy greater autonomy. bearing responsibility for their own profits and losses, submitting profits in lieu of taxes. In some enterprises, a shareholding system is heing at- tempted. Some state-run and collec tive enterprises are contracted to in- dividuals. Workers wage
differentials are widening The con- tract system of employment is being promoted.
What the CCP tried to promote in the enterprises is not the autonomy of
the workers or the expansion and
functioning of the power of workers
councils, but the concentration of
power in the hands of the factory
directors to breed a layer of tech
nocrats who will act ax supporters of
the ruling caste. Some of the decision
making powers enjoyed hy the
workers' councils, as stipulated in
state ordinances, are no longer men-
tioned. The party leadership no longer
exercises restraint over the factory
directors, but neither is there the prac
tise of "leadership by workers'
economic opera-
tion, and making enterpnises respon- sible for their own profits and losses leads inevitably to price nisex, elimina- tion of the weak by the strong. spoculation and profiteering-
The contract system means the hiring for private operation of means of production and facilities which are state owned or collectively owned The operators employ large numbers of workers, run the enterprises on capitalist methods, incréase the inten- sity of labour, and squeeze the maxi- mum surplus value out of the workforce. The relations between the contractors and the workers they employ is in reality one of employer and employee, not qualitatively dif ferent from the exploitative relations in capitalism.
Today the right of ownership of some brigade-run enterprises in -hanging, Peasants can invest and hold shares in the collective enterprises. This is basically similarto the bourgeoisie holding shares in capitalist society, gaining surplus value without working.
Price reform
A major part of the Deng faction's cconomic programme was price refonu: gradual abolition of the state's uniform setting of prices, which were in he changed to free floating prices. The result was that the prices of the great majority of products and com
modibes soared, with commodities in
short supply soaring the most, and
serious consequences for people's
living standards.
A complaint prevalent among the
masses is 'Nine years of reform; nine
among the
sform; nine
years of price inflation". In May 1988
the CCP stated that the difficult har-
rier of price reform must be crossed' and must not be 'circumscribed". Thus
control over prices was further relaxed, people's conditions of living
tured more tough, there were mas sive withdrawals from the banks, and
- JUTLOOK no 1h June 1989
A complaint prevalent among the masses is 'Nine years of reform; nine years of price inflation'
Page 20
UP P L E M E N T
a rush for commodities. With this ag gravation of the crisis of hureaucratic rule, price reform was slowed down in September. In a difficult situation, the CCP's policy on prices vacillated.
The problem of prices is essential-
these measures are detrimental to the interests of workers and should be rejected.
Although the CCP has. always proclaimed that the proletariat was master of the country, it has always deprived it of its power to be the master. Since 1980, due to the impact of the workers' movement in Eastern Burope, and especially Poland, the
the trade unions. However in China as in other bureaucratised workers states, the trade unions do not take up thistask, and are instead the tool of the party's bureaucratic rule, assisting the ruling caste to implement its policies. In China the working class and its van- guard should draw from the ex- perience of the Polish trade union, and fight to organise a union independent
of the govemment.
In the past two years
ly a question of insufficient products to meet national needs. If the problem
is not tackled at the roots, and produc- tion is not increased to meet the needs of the people, and instead state price setting is abolished, the con sequence can only he runaway prices, greater disequilibrium in production and even more dif- ficulty in meeting people surgent needs.
While there is no significant general rise in the actual income of the people, and expecially while there are no concrete state measures to protect against price rises, the state has an obligation to maintain a subsidy on the basic
cost of living"
Axfor the peasants, the general rise on the prices of industrial goods causes a substantial in- crease in the production costs of agricultural and subsidiary products, thus reducing peasant incomes. This will reduce peasant incentives to grow grain and lead to decreased grain production.
Safeguarding workers'
rights
By the end of 1987, the number of workers in China reached 130 million, with over half of them being industrial workers. This figure is over ten times the number of workers in 1949: moreover they are concentrated in big industrial regions, and their weight is significant.
The CCP has set a quota for every state-owned enterprise fixing its total wage bill, which can only vary accord- ing to the success of the enterprise in accomplishing the state plan and its ef ficiency. The CCP has also set out to widen wage differentials within each enterprise in order to introduce com- petition. The redistribution of wages within a set total amount was designed to increase the intensity of labour, making workers work harder to gain more wages at the expense of other workers. Workers with weaker labour poweror those engaged in unskilled or simple labour faced a reduction in wages.
" products no. If the roblem
the workers have ig-
nored the cancellation
of the right to strike:
with increased discon-
tent over price reform.
the frequency of strikes
and the numbers of
workers participating in
them have increased.
Go-slows are also more
generalised and acute.
This shows that the
working class has in-
creasingly risen to op
pose the policies of the
bureaucracy that are detrimental to their interests.
Under pressure from strikes and go-slows, the existing trade union leadership was compelled to change its tone or some of its methods of work. For example, if proposed that the govemment-run nature of the trade union should be reformed in order to realise the 'mass nature of the of the trade union". It also proposed the es tablishment of a minimum wage and a sliding scale of wages correspond- ing with prices.
We propose that the working class should start its struggle with the fight Lo organise a democratic trade union. building a structure to fight for workers" rights, -onsoudating ils strength and combativity, from which it can proceed to the fight to establish democratic relations of production and the control of political power.
The individual
economy and the
private economy
In the past the CCP used ad- ministrative measures forcibly to eliminate the private economy, while the state cconomy and the collective economy, under bureaucratic oppres- sion and with workers deprived of any right to decide, became bogged down in stagnation, resulting in further shortages of goods. It was this objec- tive situation which forced the Deng faction to change its policy.
However the Dengist policy is to stimulate the commodity economy and allow private enterprises to develop in a spontaneous and unor- ganised way under the domination of the law of value. The commodity
Tangshan miners: workers' rights eroded struggle of the Chinese workers for their rights has also developed. In order to prevent the eruption of a Polish-type labour movement in China, and in order to stimulate workers to help raise production, the CCP promulgated the Temporary or- dinance on workers" councils in state owned industrial enterprises in July 1981. This gave workers some powers: yet the promises were very limited, existing more in formality than in reality, and the workers' coun cils that were set up were in general devoid of power and were baxically used by the authorities to implement their policies and to raise production.
Despite this, the promulgation of the ordinance reflected the fact that workers' discontent had pressurised the CCP into making some conces- sions; the workers could make use of this opportunity to fight for their own rights. Workers in many enterprises not only pressed the authorities to im- plement the ordinance, hut alsn at- tempted to go heyond it. For example. it was officially provided that workers could elect their rank and file leaders in the enterprise: however workers more and more demanded the election
of all leaders, including the factory director. The authoritics in fact prac- tised a system where the factory direc- tor was the one responsible for the fac tory under the direction of the party
committee: in a numher of enterprises workers pressed instead for a system in which the factory director would be responsible for the factory committee
- under the guidance of the workers
This was a conscious effort to intro duce differentials. competition and in- equalities within the working class. In addition, employment on contract terms was introduced for newly recruited workers in state owned enterprises in the winter of 1986. These workers now resemble casual workers, with no safeguards on their right to work or social security. All
council!
The defence of workers' interests
should have been the central task of
SONIAL IST OUTLOOK nn 16.
"While there is no
significant general rise
in the ac- tual income
of the people, and
especially while there are no con-
crete state
measures
to protect
against price rises,
the state
has an
obligation to maintain
a subsidy
on the
basic cost
of living"
"With in-
creased discontent
over price reform, the
frequency
of strikes
and the numbers of
workers
participat- ing in them
have in-
creased.
Go-slows
are also
more generalised and acute"
Page 21
"by the end of 1987, 30 million workers were hired by private enterprises in China"
October Review, which publishes in Chinese, with key articles translated into English, can bet contacted c/o GPO Box 10144, Hong Kong
Page 22
U P ш l MUE T
Li Peng: conservative on prices
economy inevitably leads to the emergence of exploiters and so-
cial polarisation. A small
proportion becomes small
capitalists, while the majority of people are reduced to hired
labourers (according to the es- timates of Ge Lin, Professor at Nanjing University, by the end of 1987 30 million workers were hired by private enterprises in China).
"ader this policy the devrlapment of private enterprises is very rapid. In some towns their output value com- prises a big proportion of the total in- dustrial output. In the national economy, the weight of state in- dustries has fallen from 83 percent in 1978 to 67 percent in 1987, and fur- ther to 64 percent a few months later. indicating the tendency of private and other non-state enterprises to gain strength. This implies that the ad- vantageous position of state enterprises will gradually he replaced, and that the gains of the 1949 revolu- Lion are continuously being eroded, Halting this tendency requires the or- ganixation and mobilisation of the proletariat to take control of the run- ning of the state economy.
Open door policy and
the special economic
zones.
The setting up of four special economic zones, the opening of Hainan Island and 14 coastal cities to the external world, and varying degrees of opening of many other places, all show the exiensive opening
of China to international capitalism.
No country can develop its cconomy with its doors closed. However, because the Labour produc tivity of China is relatively low, the monopoly of trade becomes a neces- sary means to protect national industry from competition from capitalist cconomies with a higher labour productivity. Under the protection of
a monopoly of trade, the state can
selectively trade with imperialist
countries to utilise foreign technology
and resources much needed for nation-
al economic construction, as well as
leaming management methods.
Production items that are in
demand but for which there are no
state funds for development, can be
produced jointly with foreign capital.
but under certain principles. The over
all guiding principle should be that a
THIS THIN
neticam to the overall
my not hantul to the nroperty orthe planned
economy, making no harmful conces
sions to foreign capital, and carrying no heavy political or economic price.
SunAuo pmne sicriue once
The activities of foreign capital
in China and the interests of the
economic system it represents are
in acute conflict with China's state
cconomy. The more foreign capi-
tal invests in China and coor
dinates in activities with the grow-
ing individual economy and
private industries and commerce,
the greater their strength and the
more threatening the erosion of
the state cconomy will become.
Since the productivity of labour
of foreign capitalism is mach
higher than that of China, when
China spontancously adapts to and integrates itself with the world capitalist market, surplus value will flow out nf China in massive volame and China's national economy will find it difficult to develop inde- pendently as well as becoming af- fected by the periodic crises of world capitalism. The experiences of some Bastern European countries have shown this.
When the CCP arguex for unprin- cipled opening up to foreign capital, it misleads the people into believing that capitalism is superior to state owner- ship and the planned economy, and Fosters illusions in capitalism along with loss of faith in true socialism. meanwhile, under the coordination of foreign capital, the system of exploita-
tion is reviving in different areas of China. More labouring people are ex- ploited: social differentiations in- crease, incqualitics expand, the men- tality of privatisation is strengthened,
the concept that money is the top priority becomes more widespread. and the social mood worsens.
Some bureaucrats are lonking to convert their parasitic basis from the state mownership system to the market economy: instead of pursuing their private interests with power in their hands, they turn to becoming property owners making capitalist private investments. When large
amounts of foreign capital enter
China, comprador capital may form.
If capitalist forces develop in China more rapidly and extensively, and there is no powerful intervention from
the people, then at a certain moment
of crisis, the CCP will have to choose
between two altematives: cither it
The people must fully grasp the relevant information, know how much is being paid and why during economic transactions with advanced capitalist economies, and be able lo make timely revisions under their own supervision and discussion.
Severe damage was done when China developed its cconomy in autar- chic fashion under the imperialist cconomic blockade. However the need to maintain economic relations with capitalist countries does not mean that China should fully open it- self up to the extemal world. Unprin- cipled openings to foreign capital by the ruling faction aiso cause unneces- sary damage.
Under increasing pressure from foreign businesses, concessions made by China are increasingly significant Initial pruposals for joint capital ven- tures or joint operations are becoming sole operalions by foreign capital: joint operation periods of several years (with the enterprise retumed to China at the end) are being extended to several decades: plans only to ex- port goods produced by foreien capi. tal are giving way to production part- ly or even entirely for domestic consumption. The state monopoly of foreign trade is also under altack. This not only provides a very favourable in- vestment ground for foreign capitalists, bul also concedes part of the domestic market, hence dealing a severe blow to national industry.
The profits whien foreig" capitalists make in China can be con- verted to foreign currency and freely remitted out of the country: this means that the wealth produced by Chinese workers, and national resources can be appropriated legally and without restraint.
The CCP has made big conces- sions, bur the actual gains are small.
The balance is unfavourable: the in- vestment of forcign capital is small and mostly concentrated in the noo- productive sectors such as tourism and rcal estate. China even has to provide loans, or invest jointly. The import of industrial technology and equipment falls far short of the level expected.
changes its present rightist policien
and restrains the activities of foreign
and Chinese capitalist forces, or it
continues to be swept away by
capitalist forces and undergoes trans
system assumes predominance and capitalism is reinstated.
the Does.
The final showdown will be in-
evitable. This is the inescapable trend of development of the Chinese
economy SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 16, June 1989