Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2009

Marxist History?

· Socialist Outlook no. 12, February 1989 · pp 32-33 · 2,252 words

Marxism Labour Party The left Trade unions

Marxist history, which this purports to be, should have as its starting point the interests of the working class in its struggle against capitalism.

Unfortunately the Socialist Workers Party's (SWP) version of the Labour Party is written by Cliff and Gluckstein from the narrow viewpoint of a relatively small organisation and in support of its immediate tactical interests.

It contains a devastating critique of Labour's role in selling out the working class at every opportunity, and as such it could play a role in educating some of the Labour left who retain illusions in the party. But it does so in a very one-sided way, underplaying the contradictory nature of the Labour Party, It also ignores the role of revolutionary marxists in relation to this party, including the International Socialists.

precursor of the SWP. in the late

1960g. As a result its uscfulness as a revolutionary socialist view of the mass party is completely undermined.

Lenin's formulation of the

Labour Party as a "bourgeois

workers' party, appears at the

very beginning of the book as the theoretical framework for the argument, but although the

writers accept its contradictory

churacter in the abstract, they are

mealy-mouthed about the

historic gain for the working

class that the formation of the

Labour Party represented. It is

presented as the result of defcat:

The ILP was not the child of

new unionism, but of its defear

(Page 12, their italics). The

election of Labour MPs to

Parliament is seen as a substitute

for trade unionism: "a retreat

from trade unionism-from the

belief that collective

organisation could defend itself

(Page 29, their italics). The party

Page 30

itself was "a mixed blessing...an improvement from the openly bourgeois parties, but 'a millstone' around the necks of the minority of advanced workers (Page 37). In reality the formation of the Labour Party, as with the building of other mass parties in Europc, represented an important step in the direction of class independence by the working class, despite the betrayals of the leadership. This was always the understanding of Lenin and Trotsky-

Most of what the authors say about its class collaborationist history, its early pacts with the Liberals, its sell-outs of industrial action, in true. Its pro-imperialist chauvinism and its clevation of 'national interest' over class are proof too of its seemingly endless capitulation to the needs of the ruling class. A strong Labour Party in Parliament was seen openly by Sidney Webb and others as a safeguard against "Bolshevism'' (Page 71)

But we need only look to the United States, where no mass workers" party of any sort exists, to see the real gains in the form of class independence that the Labour Party represented and still represents. ess than 25% o the adult population voted in the last US Presidential election. They sce no alternative to the bosses. The failure of the US

working class to build an

independent party not only

represents a lower level of class consciousness, but has a

significant impact on the relation

of class forces in American

society.

But there is a lot more wrong

with this account than a bit of

one-sidedness in its emphasis.

For the one-sidedness flows

directly from the narrow interests.

of the SWP today, from its belief

that ir is already the mass

revolutionary party which will

lead the working class to its

liberation. It believes that il can

play the clasxic united front role

proposed by Lenin and Trotsky

in many of their writings in the

1920s. Posing themselves as the

alternative to the mass party

today, they deride work in the

Labour Party by revolutionary

Marxists in a footnote discussing

the tactics of the early

Communist Party as advised by

Lenin. The footnote points out

that these tactics were based on a

"party to party' united front, with

the Communists numbering

some 6000 and the Labour Party still in its infancy:

"Tactics appropriate to parties may not be suitable for miniscule groups....There have been occasions when the extreme weakness of the revolutionary left has necessitated different tactics. Thus Trotskyists in the 1930s and 1940s, as well as the Socialist Review Group (the precursor of the SWP) used

'entrism" inside the Labour Party. This did not involve a public declaration of revolutionary intent, or insistence on official rocognition of the right to free criticism and organisational autonomy. Such entrism had to be rocognised as a tactic imposed by great weakness, As soon as it had served the purpose of helping revolutionaries to stand on their own feet, entrism had to be abandoned. As a long-tem policy it could only lead to absorption by the reformist milieu or the abandonment of genuine class struggle (which

has always been outside the confines of the Labour Party organisation)" (Page 108).

Two questions (at least) arise. First, is a group like the SWP of less than 4000, in a position to impose the classic united front on today's Labour Partv7 UT course not. Only once has this been partially achieved, with the

Anti-Nazi League at the end of the 1970s. For most of its existence the SWP has been characterised by sectarian

denunciations from the sidelines.

Has the SWP s effective abstention from the struggles of the left in the Labour Party put them in a good position to propose and carry out joint work

with the Labour left, as they argue in the conclusion?

The experience of the support

groups set up during the miners

strike of 1984-5 answers that

one: no again. In many areas,

especially where they were

strong, the Labour lelt (along

with trade union lefts, women's

groups, other left groups)

initiated and led these support

groups. Constituency party

rooms were lent to miners ta

work from, rallies were

organised, money and food

collected, pickets supported. It

took the SWP months (some say

six) to realise that the strike was

going to last a long time

(contradicting their theory of the

downtum) and that the support

groups were full of militants und

Party

activists, many in the Labour

Party, who might be won to revolutionary politics. Their turn to these groups was met with

quiet derision - better Tale that

never!

The second question the hook ignores is the role played by revolutionaries in the Labour Party, not just in the last docate, but since its inception. Here their attempt to immunise their members from the questions raised by entnisen and the politics of the Labour left, leads to a distortion by omission. Apart from the footnote quoted above. a short section on the Militant (again bocause of one of their own projects), and a couple of pages on the Socialist League in the carly 1930%, there is no reference to the role (good or bad) of Trotskyists, including the Socialist Review Group in the 1960s.

More significantly the work of the Socialist Labour League (SLL) in the 1950s is also omitted. The capacity of a small. .u.. miniscule group to lead the Labour Left, in such a way that the traditional division between the political Labour Party and the "industrial' trade

unions was broken down is

ignored. A few examples will

sulfice to underline the enormity

of this omission.

In the section on Bevanism. the authors discuss the support given by Tribune In the left-wing

Blue Union' against the TGWI in 1954, and for the right of dockers to join s union of their choice. Tribune's stand was appareptly largely motivated by the hatred of the Bevanites for

Anhur Deakin, who had used the

unsave force of the IGWU IGWU1o

squash the Lahour left' (page

266).

Motivated by hatred it might have heen; but why did Bevan. who 'had no link with rank and file workers' struggles" (Page 2601 agree in support the breakaway to the Bluc Union' organised by the unofficial

committees built by the rank and file at every dock in Birkenhend. Hull, Liverpool and Manchester?

Why? Because the SI.L had greal influence in these unofficial commitices, indeed they had fused with the Birkenhead Port Workers* Committee before the move to the "Bluc Union', and were therefore able to link together the dockers and the Bevanites.

Nor was thix process simply

SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 12 February 1989

about building the Labour left, important though this was in the fight against the right. At the same time the SLL recruited both from the dockers and the Labour Party. Moreover, in the split from the Communist Party after the 1956 invasion of Hungary by the Sovict Union, of all the

groups which tried to recruit the

dissidents, the SLL were by far the most effective, They recruited intellectuais including Peter Fryer: workers' leaders like Brian Behan who sat on the building trades union's National Executive, the whole of the

Young Communist League

branch in Liverpool, and building workers and miners too. They were successful because they had a line; not only on Stalinism and the need to build a revolutionary party within the Trotskyist framework, but also a credible policy on the Labour Party and its relation to the trade

The ST.L continued to work effectively in the Labour Party and trade unions througnout tire 1950's. They mobilised and

linked activists on the Aldermaston marches under the slogan: NO WORK ON ROCKET BASES, NO WORK ON H-BOMBS, and called for industrial action against the nuclear arms race; they helped organise the left in the 1958 London busworkers stnike with their popular weekly "Newsletter'

Although their history in this period was not wholly positive (they sold Tribune but had no influence over it and some of their decisions were opportunist), they grew from 40-50 in 1953 to around 200 in 1956-58. To leave their role out of account all together is wrong, and miseducates younger and less well infonned militants. lE suggests that the leadership of the SWP does not want an educated discussion in its organisation on the history of entrism.

Such omissions make for a very partial history. This partiality is most obvious in the section on the rise of Bennism and the Labour Party in the last

decade.

In their determination to play down the role of the Labour left, to minimise the support that Benn achieved and in deciare the Labour left "in its death throes" as the SWP suggested at the Chesterfield Conference, the

NORTN-EAST PRER

WOMEN AGAINST

19

Philp Gordon/Refle

Women Against Pit Closures: SWP took months to wake up to solidarity movement around miners' strike

authors distort history, making a nonsense of the title of the hook. The extent to which the SWP's tactical decisions of the last ten years colour the books account of the period calls into question its whole validity.

Apart from some uselul statistics to counter claims about the disappearance of the working class (propagated first by the Eurn Communists and later adopted by Kinnock and the Labour right), much of the last chapter. 'Lahour Under Thatcher', is both methodologically wrong and Factually inaccurate.

Methodologically wrong because they fall to place the class struggle and the changing balance of class forces as the motor force of history at the centre of the discussion, with the miners' strike of 1984-5 as the watershed of the decade. Instead such events are interwoven as one among many - no more not less central than the Wembley Constitutional Conference of 1981 or Benn's Deputy Leadership campaign later the same year. Ax a result, Use isolation and decrease in size of the Lahour lelt is not explained by the defeat of the miners strike but as an inevitable decline in the face of disillusionment with reformism. This is pure revolutionary romanticism!

There are factual inaccuracies too. Throughout the section on Benn's deputy leadership campaign the hook argues that

his support was much smaller than Bevan's in the 1950s (the memhership of the Labour Party had 'shrunk by some three-quarters (Page 352)) and that Benn's successes in the years 1979-81 depended entirely on the goodwill of a whole layer

of union officials" (Page 352). Whether this "goodwill" was the

result of some change of heart by the union bureaucracy, or because ol pressure from the

rank and file is left unsaid The fact that wunne In... the campaign, 18% of those questioned in a MOKI PoL hought Benn would make the best leader ne stupidity of the authors claim

sintente that his por to the left of the Pauty.

Statisti

that his popularity was confined

Statistics are used again in a artial way to show how Labour Party membership declined between 1981 and 1982. Without the figures for the late 1970s and 1980 this decline can be misinterpreted. The fact is that huge numbers joined in the late 1970s and early 1980s precisely hecause the left was on the advance. The long term decline reasserts itself after Benn's deleat and even more sharply after the deteat of the miners. These set-hacks, including the defcat of the tabour left. havel had an impact on the combativity of the working class and on the relation of class forces

Militants in the Labour Party and the membership of the SWP deserve hetter than this. The Labour Party is irretrievably reformist, it remains the main political obstacle' (Page 393) to constructing a revolutionary consciousness and leadership within the working class. But other writers have charted this before, most notahly Ralph Miliband in his Paritamentar Socialism of 1961. Texpected more from these writers. This book has nothing to say about how that obstacle is to be removed — apart of course from joining the SWP:

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