Guatemalan
coup
Piers Cavendish/Reflex
The capitalist world only talks about events that suit its ideological purposes or make money. The ongoing massacres of poor peasants or military coups that matter in the political destiny of the oppressed are not worth reporting.
Despite its failure, the attempted coup of the 1Ith May in Guatemala was significant as it marked a tuming point in the policy of the Christian Democratic government of President Cerezo, the failure of its counter-in- surgency project and the culmination of deep divisions inside the ruling class and the army. Since then. mobilisations of the popular move ment and repression have been on the increase Last to eat, first to die
Guatemals, the country of beautiful Maya ruins and colourful Indian dres ses, is one of the worst to live in. it ranks only third in Latin America for the quality of life, Between 40 and 55% (depending on the estimates) of its population are 'extremely poor and up to 86% live below the poverty line. It has the worst infant morality rate and the worst literacy rate of Central America, one of the poorest health records and the most unequal land distribution of Latin America.
Life expectancy is very low, in par- ticular among the Indians who repre- sent Rome 50 to 70% of the population. Over 60% of the 2 million adults avail- able for work are completely un- employed. In this intensely racist society, pure-blood Indians are com- pared to plants and animals whilst the ladinos, the mixed-blood people. dominate socicty. There are 22 Indian communities all over the country, and all speak a different idiom. This can make communication difficult, as Rigoberta Menchú reported in her per-
- unequa.
sonal testimony, 'I Rigoberta Menchü". She explained that hunger and poverty are another for of kili- ing in parallel to direct repression.
Guatemala has a strong agro-export sector (based on coffee, cotton and sugar) to the detriment of production for local consumption and in which wages are extremely low, a fairly strong industry - both controlled by a limited number of families.
8% of Guatemalans control 9096 of the land. Cotton production, the most labour intensive, crashed recently due to falling world prices. The private sector did not invest much in the last few years with the rocession in the in- dustrial countries and the fear of politi- cal instability in the region. Instead, the profits made have been sent abroad or lavishly spent by the tiny ruling class. Prices of staple food, however, keep on increasing: maize and beans trebled in 1985 alone.
Guatemala Ltd
Three intertwined gmups control the country and make huge profits. The oligarchy, the Guatemalan ladinos clite which started in the last century when coffee became a major produce, has since moved onto in- dustry and other agro-exports. They generate three-quarters of the country's foreign exchange.
The armed forces have always played a much more important role in
Guatemala than clsewhere in Central America, because they did not keep to the subordinate role of defending the interests of the ruling class but have developed their cconomic base, with some generals becoming millionaires. The Bank of the Army is the 7th largest in the country. The specific na- ture of the military in the country has prompted some authors to name it "Garrison State' or "Garrison Guatemala.
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 12 February 1989
Decisive elements in the 'garrison state'
The US multinationals and banks
vener mel veulE>
arc often linked to the traditional
transnationals including 90 of the top
500 US companiex. They far outweigh the national industrial capital.
Insurgency and
counter-insurgency
Discontent and rcvolts are natural
given the gross inequalities of the situation. Repression has reached un- believable heights in Guatemala, until the carly 80's when major blows were inflicted to the guerrilla organisations.
believable heights in Guatemala, until
anen mart mine
guilla orgari..
The Guatemalan guerrillas are, with their 20-year history, the oldest insur- gent movement on the continent. The various organisations (ERP. ORPA, FAR and PGT) regrouped in the Guatemalan National Revnlutionary Unity (URNG) in Fehruary 1982 and, despite their defcal in the massive anny counter-offensive of 1981-82, have reemerged as a vigorous politi cal and military force to be included
The counter insurgency project was designed in 1982 to strategicaly" the URNG by military means, by international isolation and by social measures to lessen the exist
•defeat
Part of the
www.waut
•. sense of
"the worst
infant mortality
rate, the
worst
literacy
rate, one of
the poorest
health
records
and the
most
unequal
land distribution
of Latin
America...
Page 17
"In September 1988 a new organisation of women was formed: the Coordinating Committee of Guatemalan Widows.
Known as CONAVIGUA, it adopted the following slogan for the dignity and unity of women, we are present in the struggle of
the people'."
Page 18
UPPLE "M E N
Never a threat to the
system
In January 1986, for the first time after 32 years of unbroken military rule, the civilian president, Vinicio Cerezo, took office. The result was praised by the US Administration as the "final step in the reestablishment of democracy. It was of course part of their strategy in isolate the "totalitarian' Nicaragua. Rigoberta Menchu said: "Vinicio Cerezo bas kept a space for himself with the military because he has never been, and never will be, a threat to the sys- tem. That is why he is the President." Cerezo came to power with a very watered down programme that still in- cluded a policy of 'active neutrality in the regional conflict and a stance against the military overthrow of the Sandinista govemment as advocated by Waxhington. His efforts won him support from the international com- munity after years of isolation because of the appalling human rights record of Guatemala. Cerezo had dropped all idea of agrarian reform and wanted to restructure the economy using Inter- national Monetary Fund schemes.
These measures required some political opening and led to confronta- tion between different groups of the oligarchy and the military at the time of the 1987 Peace Plan initiated by President Arias of Costa Rica in an at- tempt to bring peace to the whole region.
Peace and power
The Esquipulas agreements forced the Guatemalan president to open space for a dialogue with its opposi tion, as was requested by Nicaragua to the delight of the US strategists. This was totally rejected by the oligarchy which wanted to eradicate the revolu tionary movement The group of the "Officers of the Mountain appeared as a major pressure group within the army which forced a unilateral break of the talks. Then came a number of defeats in Cerezo's attempts to win in- terational recognition. As aresult, the US aid approved for Guatemala was reduced and the 'neutrality" ended.
The bad and the ugly
In 1976 when the US govemment cut military aid to the country, some officers were trained in Taiwan army political centre and others in American centres. Israel became the major sup pliers of military arms and equipment. This resulted in 2 very different con- ceptions in counter-insurgency
One sector of the army is led by the Defence Minister Gramajo who calls for respoct of the institutional proces ser. It is supported by the members of the oligarchy involved in exportation,
commercialisation industry and financing
The other faction led by the 'Of ficers of the Mountain" is opposed to dialogue with the URNG, to the agrarian refom, to the return of the In- temational Red Cross, to the presence of the Soviet and Cuban press cor respondents (who have had to leave since), and wants the dismissal of Gramajo and the maintaining of the civil self-defence patrol. They are sup- ported by the agro-exporters involved in coffee and cattle production. For them, the govemment should be total- ly subordinated to the military and they show little concern for the poten- tial loss of international aid and
Labour and Papular Action - formed
at the end of 1987 as a response to the
govemment's policies on electricity,
salariex, prices, human rights viola-
tions, the right to organise and the
tions, the right to organise and the retum of the land to the peasants) be-
cause of the threat of general strike.
He signed the union's demands, hence
acknowledging their legitimacy and
opening political space for their par-
The oligarchy reacted ticipation.
strongly against it, in particular given
the political nature of the agreement which included the Icgalisation of the CUC (Committee for Peasant Unity) considered a violent faction on the fringes of the law'. The government was also obliged to create conditions
Doming prati
The s
The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) was
formied on Febuary 8 1982 by the Guerilla Army of the Poor
(EGP), the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), the Organisation of the People in Arms (ORPA), and the directorate of the
Guatemalan Workers Party (PGT). The unity process was con-
solidated in May 1985 with the formation of the general command
of the URNG. In the last six years the URNG has extended its in-
surgent activities to eight of the twenty-two departments in
Guatemala in a territory of three million inhabitants, equal to al-
most half the entire population. The unity process has allowed the development of a sole guerilla front operating in the central plains.
(From Barricada International, 8.9.88)
legitimacy that this could entail. They believe that "war is war' and are gain- ing ground. They are behind the 1Ith May attempted coup
At the end of 1987 the army launched a campaign which was to be 'the final battle against the insurgency. 6,000 troops were sent into the Quiché department. The cx- pedition ended without even an offi cial report. According to the URNG, the army suffered some 500 caxualties in 60 days of confrontation. At the same time, various plots or rumours of coups in the capital prompted several moves of troops around the country and large military operations had to be suspended because of fears of uprising against the government. The guerrillas were able to strike at the army and ex- tend its operation to nearly half the country. The intensification of the armed conflict failed to meet the army's objective. With its demand for a political dialogue, the URNG took the initiative. Defence Minister Gramajo tried to justify this by stating: "The radicals within the army say that dialogue constitutes a political defeat. To my mind, rather, the dialogue is a ratification of the military victory over the URNG. Dialogue is a euphemism we use to speak of surrender.
Agreements and
disagreements
There was no surrender however. In April, President Cerezo signed an agreement with the UASP (Unity of
ver. In ed an utv of
for the repatriation of refugees living in Mexico and to support the demand of the GAM (Mutual Support Group) to form a commission about the disap
peared.
Then came the visit of the RUOG (United Representation of the Guatemalan Opposition). Originally the government wantedto use the visi! for its own aims and publicise it wide- When it was accepted by the RUDG members, it then tried 1o prevent it. 2 of the 4 delegates were ar- rested and released the day of their ar- rival. The visit backfired on Cerezo. li was one of the main reasons for the coup:
The coup failed. Cerezo and Gramajo are still in control. For the moment. Since the coup, the death
squads have grown. At the end of August, more than half a million Guatemalans went on strike as the government has not honoured its
promises, The aims of the Cerero
goverment have all failed and Cerezo
is losing more and more credibility. The URNG is getting stronger, The main problem remains the army. as it has been formany year in what some
have called Garrison Guatemala. The Guatemalans still talk about the
coup bocause it signalled the end of
the Christian Democrat adventure and
a new stage for the revolutionary movement.
DICT..
Maria Astorga
SOCIALIST OUTLOOK no 12 February 1989
E M EN
El Salvador
The end
is in sight
In 1989 eyes should be turned te El