defeat in Liverpool Carlos Augusto Guarita/Reflex Derek Hatton - a lot on his mind full gear, and there is no doubt that the Tories feared a head-on collision with any of the defiant councils; a collision could have resulted in sending in commissioners, and an all-out strike by council workers, widely supported around the country. The Tories preferred to bide their time
Nonetheless, because Liverpool's budget was a deficit budget, the financial crisis soon
Lor CNCILLURS thon to be began to make itself felt. By the summer oi 1984 the council was faced with a choice cither to make a deal with the government involving concessions on both sides, in a situation in which the Tories were under pressure to compromise, or to go for a full scale confrontation, an all-or-nothing battle In the end, in July 1984 the council decided a deal involving a large package of govern ment aid in return for a 17 per cent rate increase.
Given that 60 per cent of houscholds in Liverpool do not pay rates, probably Including something like 80 per cent of the working class, this deal could not be called a savage attack on working class living stan dards. But its tactical wisdom must be open to question. The reason is simple: if there was a time to go into confrontation with the Tories it was surely during the miners strike, at a time when mass enthusiasm in Liverpool for the defiance strategy was at its height.
As against that, the readiness of the other rate-capped and heavily penalised councils to support Liverpool in such a move It have been in doubt, for the simple reason that they had by no means themselves reach ed the financial crunch. The 'live to fight another day' approach of the July 1984 deal was based heavily on the assumption that in spring 1985, when all the rate-capped coun cils simultancously adopted a "no rate' op tion, Liverpool would be in a much better situation to light. As we shall see this
been defeated and a Tory rate set. But this was a hopeless relinquishing of political responsibility If there was no majority for the defiance strategy, then Livingstone should have voted for it anyway and precipitated a crisis in the GH.C: Labour group. This would have pur the responsibility for the defeat on the right wing of the Labour group. Me should then have resigned as GLO: leader and refused to take responsibilty for the debacle, as did Hilda Kcan in Hackney. By capitulating, he sent out the worst possible message at a - that realism (read: sur- crucial time render) would prevail in the face of the sabotage by the right-wing minorities in the Labour groups. As the other rate-capped and heavily penalised councils began to go down one by one, Liverpool became increasingly isolated. But the Militand leadership in the council were running into problens of their own Philip Gordon Reflex making wheh alienated sections of the workforce. There was the dispute with the city NALGO branch about a group of workers taken on under the job creation scheme and then downgraded, with a loss of around 910 per work in wages. Derek Hat- ton's comment that 'there are thousands of assumption was ill founded. With the workers in this city who would give their honourable exception of Lambeth, there was right arm for a job of any kind' — with the no real will for a showdown with the Tories. strong implication that the downgraded peo- ple should be satisfied with their lot — was 1985 — increasing isolation not exactly conducive to good relations with Liverpool city council again decided upon a the unions. deficit budget strategy for 1985. Technically, But much more important was the disastrous Sam Bond affair. The appoint- this was again illegal, or subjert to being declared illegal, but the government decided ment of Militant supporter Sam Bond as to bide its time and face down the rate- race relations advisor was a slap in the face to the black community in the city, and drove a capped councils which had declared for the 'no rate? strategy. If carried out, the 'no wedge between Militant and many Labour rate' strategy would have had the effect of left supporters who had backed the council without supporting Militant. Hatton's ob- confronting the government with around a duracy in the face of the outery in the city dozen councils going into illegality, and eventually with no option but to send in only worsened this mistake. commissioners and face the inevitable strug gle and storm. But it seems likely that among "There could be no doubting those leaders who declared for this strategy the enormous popularity of the of illegality there was at least an element of Council's stand..." bad faith. They doubtless hoped that the very threat of mass defiance would force the government to back down and make a deal. The Sam Bond affair highlighted But Thatcher and Jenkin were not so casi- something right at the heart of Militant's ap- en ly bluffed. They counted on two things: first, proach - a manipulative attitude to the that if they refused to budge, a series of mass support for the council. They were re be council leaders like Livingstone, Hodge and beginning to take this support for granted, rs Blunkett would eventually cave in, and se- and set their face against any open, jin cond that where there were leaders deter- democratic structures to the campaign. Real its mined to fight like Hilda Kean in Hackney, decisions were taken in the Militant caucus. they would have difficulty keeping their ma- Their manipulative, undemocratic and ser- jer jority for defiance in their own Labour tarian approach culminated in the ludicrous ils groups. This assessment proved a sound decision in September 1985 to declare the one. workforce redundant. This was a decision on The ignominious capitulation at the GLO not subject to any discussion or scrutiny by h- was pivotal in determining the course of the workforer themselves. By taking it, Hat- tht events. Livingstone, in proposing the setting tom and Mulhearn loaded a gun and handed tal of a maximum rate instead of urging con- it to Baker and Kinnock — and Kinnock lin tinued defiance as did Jobn MeDonel, was promptly fired it at the Labour Party in- able to present himselt as the 'realist'. Alter conference. all, he could argue, there was no real majori- The redundancy decision completely ly in the GiL.Ci, given the split in the Labour alienated the workforce. I drove them back group, for the no rate option: it would have into the arms of their own union leaders and
the Labour leadership, cager to produce a «imb-down compromise.
The union leaders and the Association of Metropolitan Authorities sponsored the production of the Stonefrost report which came up with a package of measures for 'saving the city. 'This involved making the city financially viable again through a limited rate rise, borrowing, and a partial capitalisation' of its spending funds — which would have had the effect of limiting the house building programme. The only alternative to this Stoncfrost approach would have been to let the city run out of money, organise a general strike in the city and prepare to defy the commissioners
There is no guarantee that the council workforce, in the circumstances of autumn 1985, would have agreed to this strategy
•The Sam Bond affair was
disastrous... But it should have bern put to them, for then democratic decision. The factors workine against it were of course that the council was now nearly isolated in its defiance of the government. If the council workforce had voted against this kind of mass action to defeat the government's spending limits. then the council should have accepted some variation of the Stonefrost report as the best compromise which could be achieved. What happened in fact was that the council presented the workforce with the ultimatum of accepting the redundancy notices. When this ploy failed, it then reverted to its deal with the Swiss banks which it had been negotiating for months
It has to be said that in the medium and long term the Swiss banks deal is infinitely worse than any vanant of the Sconctrost irport. As the debts and interest charges mount up, it will have a devastating effect on the capital spending programme. have been forced back into waiting for a Labour government to bail them out — the precise opposite they sought to achieve, and indeed what all the other coun cil leaders are now relying on. It is a sorry end to a campaign that won such support among the people of Liverpool Vultures move in By alienating their own workforce the council leadership have now opened themselves up to attack from all sides. Kinnock and the Labour NEC are determined to exact maximum revenge. Reactionary forces in the ciry, supported covertly by the Tories and Liberals, have organised Liverpool Against Militant, which has organised big rallies. The stage must now be set for an eventual defeat of Labour at the polls, and the regaining of the council by the Liberals or a Liberal-Tory coalition. This would be a disaster for the people of Liverpool. But if it happens, despite Militant's sectarianism, those responsible will be all those who obstructed a serious fight over ratecapping, first and
19 foremost the Kinnock leadership
impressions. From the point of view of the United States, Star Wars has a rational and deadly political logic — the re-establishment and maintenance of US hegemony in Western Europe. MacDonald here charts the course of Star Wars, the outcome of the summit, and the crucial role of NATO Star Wars and the summit The struggle for western Europe
as a conduit of American power and influence in Europe. WITH THE EXCEPTION of a single article (by the former director of Chatham House in The Times), the vast press outpouring on the Geneva