Anglo-Irish accord- the Labour-Tory accord responsibility but no power. Furthermore, it tre, and Irish activists in the Labour Party Labour bipartisanship was, it seems, becom-ty of the PLP, the left of the PIP and even a was enough to bring looks of horror onto the banalities and apathy in which they swam for faces of Labour Party audiences: remember so long in the 1970s whenever Ireland was happen, woofthe Labour left, andeven cen-even at the cost of indefinitely postponing
The Hillsborough Accord has predictably roused the ire of the Unionists and Kinnock has pledged the support of the Labour Party for this Tory initiative. GEOFFREY BELL argues that this return to Labour/Tory bipartisanship on Ireland means more not less repression for the Nationalist population and requires an urgent change of tactics by activists in the Labour Party on the question on Ireland. FOR THOSE acquainted with the history of the Labour Party and matters Irish there was much that was tediously familiar with the response of the leadership of the Parliamentary Labour Party to the Anglo-Irish Accord. 'The phrase that springs to mind is one used by Labour MP Patrick Duffy in describing reactions to a different Irish event. 'Me-tooism' he complained of, nearly five years ago, when the then Labour leader Michael Foot joined with Margaret Thatcher in condemning Bobby Sands on the announcement of the death through starvation of the honourable member for Fermanagh and South Tyrone. 'Then, as now, the House of Commons spoke almost as one in defending the government's policy from attacks on it by sections of the unruly Irish. Then, as now, such unanimity will have little more than a momentary effect on the evolution of Irish realities.
Which is not to say that the Accord is without signifiance. In attempting to incorporate the government of the South of Ireland into sharing the responsibility for the North of Ireland the British government has undoubtedly adopted a new course, although it is one that the mandarins in the Foreign Office have been urging for some ycars.
But that is really the limit of the policy change, and it is not the case that this represents the first time a British government has ignored the Unionist 'veto'. Just as the Unionists are opposed to the Accord, so too were they opposed to the abolition of the Northern Ireland parliament in 1972 by the Heath government and the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 which imposed a powersharing executive and a Council of Ireland.
In many ways, both these steps were of far greater significance than the present Accord, which, for the moment at any rate, does little more than offer the Southern government a consultative role in the North: in effect,
is worth remembering the promises that were made in respect of the Accord. Various leaks suggested there was going to be the disbandment of the Ulster Defence Regiment, Southern judges presiding over the political trials in the North jointly with their Northern counterparts, a Bill of Rights and the handing over of billions of pounds by the EEC and USA to turn the North into an economic and social paradise.
None of this saw the light of day, and if it had not been for the Unionists' traditional over-reaction to change, the whole business may have gone off like a damp squib. Certainly, in the medium and long term it will have about as
Nevertheless, for socialists, and especially for British socialists, it is important to ap preciate what the support of the Parliamentary leadership of the Labour Party and indeed of the PLP in generai for the Accord represents. In doing this it is worth remembering the developments that had taken place within the Labour Party in respect to its Irish policy since the 'metovism' bipartisanship of the hunger strike days.
'An Irish political war is
necessary in the Labour Party
and this time Tory/Labour
bipartisanship needs to be
broken beyond repair.'
Since then the party had agreed to support the aim of Irish unity by consent, and to campaign for Irish unity; it had voted for the repeal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act; party conferences had vored for the ending of the use of plastic bullets in the North, for the ending of the strip-searching of women prisoners and for the abolition of juryless courts. Labour's parliamentary spokespersons such as Clive Soley and Peter Archer had shown themselves to be willing to advocate these policies in public and indeed Archer had gone further and suggested the disbandment of the sectarian UDR. Tory ing little more than a bad memory. At times the very mention of the name 'Roy Mason' him, the man who presided over the Castlereagh torture camp, the man who said the SDLP was 'extremist', the man who said 'anyone who talks about Irish unity causes me trouble' - how could we have let all that
asked ourselves. And then we would pat ourselves on our backs and reassure each other that at least there would be no return to those bad old days.
What now needs to be widely and clearly appreciated is that on 26 November, 1985, when Neil Kinnock stood up in parliament to endorse the Ango-Irish Accord and when, the following day, Labour's parliamentary opposition to the Accord was restricted to a miserly 13 votes against, then the 'bad old days' had indeed returned. Even the symanything that hints of bolism was supplied when the first Labour speaker in parliament to endorse the Accord after Neil Kinnock turned out to be none other than Roy Mason. 'I do not think there will be a united Ireland for as far as I can see' was his celebratory cry. "The special position of the Province within the United Kingdom has been strengthened,' was his triumphalist assertion.
Of course just because Roy Mason supports the Accord does not necessarily mean it should be opposed, any more than just because lan Paisley opposes it means it should be supported. And, in saying there has been a return to the bad old days, would be wrong to imply from that that the Labour leadership and vast bulk of the PLP have consciously gone back to giving the Tories a blank cheque for spending as they wish in Northern Ireland.
Nor has a definite decision been made to ditch the opposition to the repressive legislation and practices which the party is pledged 1o oppose. But in supporting the Accord the party leadership and PLP have, from that point on, given their support to a governmental, constitutional and decision-making framework which is designed to substitute for the party's own policy of 'unity by consent' and which will, at least in the short term, see an acceleration of the repressive machinery in the North of Ireland. What is perhaps most disturbing of all, is that in doing all this, the vast majority of the PLP are probably unaware of the consequences of their action or are too uninterested in the Irish situation to be bothered to find out.
This is one way in which it is possible to talk about a return to the bad old days — when only 13 Labour MPs voted against the Arcord, what this represented was a majori majority of the 'hard-left' Campaign group returning to the ocean of ignorance, mentioned
An example is the speech in parliament on the Accord made by party leader Neil Kinnock in which he praised the 'constitutional nationalists' for deciding to 'seek change
International. No. 2. January/February 1986
their own nationalist aspirations'. When the Tories' Secretary of State Tom King said much the same thing a couple of days afterwards he was roundly condemned from all sides, but there is a large element of truth in such remarks.
The important point however is that there is nothing new in this. As far as the main party to the Accord in Ireland is concerned, Fitzgerald's Fine Gael Party, it was founded on the very basis of postponing Irish unity until the indefinite future. Its origins are in those forces who, with the help of the British military, secured by force of arms the acceptance by the Irish people of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 which established limited self-government for Ireland and the partition of the country.
For Irish republicans all Fitzgerald has done is to prove that Fine Gael remains a pro-partitionist party; for what is probably the majority of working class Catholics in the North of Ireland all he has done is to suggest yet again that a 'Free State' government is prepared to sell their nationalist aspirations short in return for a pat on the back from the British establishment.
'Fitgerald's Fine Gael was
founded on the very basis of
postponing Irish unity to the
indefinite future.'
This is one, rather important, reason why the Accord will not work - the Catholic population do not, and indeed should not, trust Fitzgerald and Fine Gael to look after their interests in the consultative process which the Accord has established, and certainly a lot of changes will need to take place before the ghetto dwellers of Belfast, Derry and elsewhere give up their reliance on Provisional Republicanism in return for nods and winks from Dr Fitzgerald.
What are the changes which are in the pipeline? In parliament Neil Kinnock said 'the most critical test of the credibilty and acceptability of the agreement is its effect on security in Northern Ireland.' As far as the Unionist population is concerned this indeed may be the case, but for the leader of the Labour Party, a party pledged to abolish the PTA, important sections of the Emergency Provisions Act, strip-searching and use of plastic bullets, to seek to apply the litmus test of 'security' to the Accord is mind-boggling.
Security in the Northern Ireland context is no more than a euphemism for 'getting the Fenians'. Kinnock himself suggested as much when in condemning the use of violence in Northern Ireland he listed the John Arthur/Reflex IRA and INLA but declined to mention the UDA, the Ulster Freedom Fighters or any other of the Loyalist paramilitaries. The idea that perhaps, at one time, the dear old British might themselves have been a little heavy-handed in Ireland and might themselves have made even a minimal contribution to the spiral of violence in Ireland, was a thought that was not permitted even for a second to enter the consciousness of the RUC baton charge loyalist demonstration Labour leader. No, for him 'security' meant 7 International, No. 2, January/February 1986
support for it means. It means a return to a they have been easily trampled underfoot in The excuse offered by Labour's leader for one important consequence of the deal will supporting Irish unity while at the same time be another Roy Mason-style attempt to in-
smashing the IRA and INLA, and 'terrorism' was an Irish Catholic disease.
It now seems highly likely that the British government will take new measures in an attempt to eradicate this disease. Indeed, within a week of the deal being signed Fitzgerald was promising a new "security' drive. What this will mean in practice as far as the North of Ireland is concerned is increased use of the PTA and of the Emergency Provisions Act and greater repression generally of the Catholic working-class population.
For, while the long-term aim of the Accord was to attract support away from the Provisionals, and part of this was to be be nominal reforms in favour of the Catholics, the noisy opposition to the Accord of the Unionists has meant that in the immediate future, as Kinnock urged, it will be 'security which gets most attention from the British and Irish governments. Thus the Labour Party in supporting the Accord is, as a consequence, supporting an agreement the first effect of which will lead to an increase in repressive measures the party is pledged.to oppose.
The break with party policy goes even further, and is testified to in the assurances of both Tom King and Roy Mason that the AcMiroslav Milivojevic/Reflex cord will strengthen the Union and postpone indefinitely the re-unification of Ireland. Neil Kinnock, while reiterating that 'as a matter of policy and commitment, the Labour Party wants to see Ireland united by consent, and we are committed to working actively to secure that consent', also said in parliament 'that is not the reason for our action in approving the Hillsborough accord.'
Indeed it is not, and could not be, for support for the Accord is supporting an alternative to a policy of Irish self-determination and unity, and it is supporting the most undemocratic alternative of all: where the people of the North of Ireland have their fate
decided by two governments in which they
have no say or influence. 'within a week of the deal being
signed Fitzgerald was promising a new "security drive' ' Socialists, in supporting Irish self-
determination and Irish majority rule,
thereby challenge the 'right' of the Unionist
minority in Ireland to decide the political
fate of that country. That does not mean
they can therefore support an Accord which
completely disenfranchises both the Unionist
and the Nationalist community in the North
of Ireland. And certainly that is a very
peculiar way to be campaigning for Irish Unionist anger,
unity.
endorsing the Accord is that the latter will
advance 'the priority' of 'reconciliation in Irish Catholics.
the communities'. Even for a British politi-
cian like Kinnock who has previously shown
little interest in Northern Ireland this 8
astonishingly naive.
Thatcher and Kinnock united against the interests of the Irish people
It was almost inevitable that the Accord would attract the wrath of the Unionists while not rousing any great enthusiasm among Nationalists. The Unionists oppose the deal because it is a further challenge to their 'right' to rule their 'Ulster' as they see fit. But because it leaves the British presence in Ireland untouched, indeed in many ways it reinforces it, the Nationalist community, especially that significant working-class section which supports or has sympathy with the Provisionals, is unlikely to see the Accord as meeting its aspirations. Far from the Accord promoting 'reconciliation', it will heighten the sectarianism of the Unionists while bringing in its wake great repression of the Nationalists.
So, the Unionist opposition to the Accord should not be allowed to hide what Labour bipartisanship the basis of which is to maintain British presence in Ireland, and to to stand with develop a long-term alternative to Irish self-determination. And although the immediate consequence of the Accord has been to rouse
Sits motivation was an attempt to isolate radical republicanism; while flict a 'military solution' on the rebellious
This is where the new 'left' and 'realistic' leadership of Neil Kinnock is taking the Labour Party. It is to the credit of Ken Livingstone, a much-publicised convert to that
Philip Gordon/Reflex leadership, that he has come out in opposition to the Accord, but the question that needs to be asked of Ken and others like him is: when does his association with Kinnock cease to be an influence for progress and become a cover for reaction?
Yet perhaps the questions that need to be asked with the greatest honesty concern the tactical assumptions Irish campaigners in the Labour Party have adopted in most recent times. These were based on the view that we had 'won' the Campaign group to support for British withdrawal, that we had 'won' the party as a whole to support in principle for Irish unity, and that we had 'won ' the leadership of the party to opposi tion to repression in the North of Ireland. All this has now been shown to be one massive illusion.
Gains may indeed have been made, but the Parliamentary Labour Party's blind rush
Thatcher, Fitzgerald, and Ronald Reagan in supporting the latest imposition of a British solution to Ireland's British problem.
Which means, as far as those such as the Labour Committee on Ireland are concerned, there can be no more polite lobbying, no more pressure group politics, no more cosy chats with those in positions of influence and authority. An Irish political war is necessary in the Labour Party, and this time
Tory/Labour bipartisanship needs to be broken with such force as to make it beyond repair.
International, No. 2, January/February 1986
When politics rears its ugly head The recent split in the Workers Revolutionary Party made squalid characteristics that over the years has misled thousands of would-be 1953 along with the American Socialist seemed to many to offer a way out of the East. This time there was an added reason to political ghetto of the RCP. The practices ditch permanent revolution so they could which have bedevilled this grouping were laud Gaddafi, the regime in Iraq, and even put down therefore at its very inception. For the Ayatollah, whom the Newsline of 10 April you cannot have an organisation which is 1979, described as 'the man who symbolised made up simply of 'doers' — somebody has the revolutionary aspirations of the Iranian to provide a political line, somebody has to people'. Now money was available from the work out long-term strategy and immediate oil producing countries, money which could put aside the 'petty bourgeois indulgence' of principles for an expedient alliance it has slid discussion and debate, the more they vest all into political degeneracy. When it does that
The fall and fall of Gerry Healy fare for the media but Healyism was more than the personal turpitude of its leader. BOB PENNINGTON points to the revolutionary socialists and brought the WRP to its present ignominy and disaster.