Socialist Outlook

Socialist Viewpoint, International, Socialist Outlook and their supplements, 1984–2009

The Anglo-Irish accord — the Labour-Tory accord

· International no. 2, January–February 1986 · pp 8-10 · 2,784 words

Ireland Labour Party Britain

Anglo-Irish accord

the Labour-Tory accord

Hillsbo predictably Unionists a pledged the support Party for this Tory i GEOFFREY BELL argues this return to Labour/Tory bipartisanship on Ireland mean more not less repression for the Nationalist population and requires an urgent change of tactics by activists in the Labo Party on the question on Ireland

The Hillsborough Accord has predictably roused the ire of the

rough Accord roused the ire nd Kinn

ock has of the Labor nitiative

that

FOR THOSE acquainted with the history of the Labour Party and matters Irish there was much that was tediously familiar with the response of the leadership of the Parliamen- tary Labour Party to the Anglo-Trish Ac- cord. The phrase that springs to mind is one used by Labour MP Patrick Duffy in describing reactions to a different Irish event. "Me-tooism' he complained of, nearly five years ago, when the then Labour leader Michael foot joined with Margaret That- cher in condemning Bobby Sands on the an- nouncement of the death through starvation of the honourable member for Fermanagh and South Tyrone. 'Then, as now, the House of Commons spoke almost as one in defen- ding the government's policy from attacks on it by sections of the unruly Irish. Then, as now, such unanimity will have little more than a momentary effect on the evolution of Irish realities.

Which is not to say that the Accord is without signifiance. In attempting to incor- porate the government of the South of Ireland into sharing the responsibility for the North of Ireland the British government has undoubtedly adopted a new course, although it is one that the mandarins in the Foreign Office have been urging for some years.

But that is really the limit of the policy change, and it is not the case that this represents the first time a British govern- ment has ignored the Unionist 'veto'. • Just as the Unionists are opposed to the Accord, so too were they opposed to the abolition of the Vorthern Ireland parliament in 1972 by the Heath government and the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 which imposed a power sharing executive and a Council of Ireland.

In many ways, both these steps were of far greater significance than the present Accord, which, for the moment at any rate, does little more than offer the Southern government a consultative role in the North: in effec

responsibility but no power. Furthermore, it is worth remembering the promises that were made in respect of the Accord. Various leaks suggested there was going to be the disbandment of the Ulster Defence Regi- ment, Southern judges presiding over the political trials in the North jointly with their Northern counterparts, a Bill of Rights and the handing over of billions of pounds by the EEC and USA to turn the North into an economic and social paradise.

None of this saw the light of day, and if it had not been for the Unionists' traditional over-reaction to anything that hints of change, the whole business may have gone off like a damp squib. Certainly, in the medium and long term it will have about as much effect.

Nevertheless, for socialists, and especially for British socialists, it is important to ap- preciate what the support of the Parliamen- tary leadership of the Labour Party and in- deed of the PLP in generai for the Accord represents. In doing this it is worth remembering the developments that had taken place within the Labour Party in respect to its Irish policy since the 'me- tovism' bipartisansh p of the hunger strike days.

rish political war

ecessary in the Labour Par and this time Tory/Labour bipartisanship needs to be

broken beyond repair.'

An Irish political war is

nee then the party had agreed to support the aim of trish unity by consent, and to campaign for Irish unity; it had voted for the repeal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act; party conferences had voted for the ending of the use of plastic bullets in the North, for the ending of the strip-searching of women prisoners and for the abolition of juryless courts. Labour's parliamentary spokesper- sons such as Clive Soley and Peter Archer had shown themselves to be willing to ad- vocate these policies in public and indeed Ar- cher had gone further and suggested the disbandment of the sectarian UDR. Tory- Labour bipartisanship was, it seems, becom- ing little more than a bad memory. At times the very mention of the name 'Roy Mason' was enough to bring looks of horror onto the faces of Labour Party audiences: remember him, the man who presided over the Castlereagh torture camp, the man who said the SDLP was 'extremist' , the man who said "anyone who talks about Irish unity causes me trouble' -- how could we have let all that happen, we of the Labour left, and even cen-

tre, and Irish activists in the Labour Party asked ourselves. And then we would pat ourselves on our backs and reassure each other that at least there would be no return to those bad old days.

What now needs to be widely and clearly appreciated is that on 26 November, 1985, when Neil Kinnock stood up in parliament to endorse the Ango-Irish Accord and when, the following day, Labour's parliamentary opposition to the Accord was restricted to a miserly 13 votes against, then the 'bad old days' had indeed returned. Even the sym- bolism was supplied when the first Labour speaker in parliament to endorse the Accord after Neil Kinnock turned out to be none other than Roy Mason. 'I do not think there will be a united Ireland for as far as I can see' was his celebratory cry. "The special position of the Province within the United Kingdom has been strengthened,' was his triumphalist assertion.

Of course just because Roy Mason sup- ports the Accord does not necessarily mean it should be opposed, any more than just because lan Paisley opposes it means it should be supported. And, in saying there has been a return to the bad old days, it would be wrong to imply from that that the Labour leadership and vast bulk of the PLP have consciously gone back to giving the Tories a blank cheque for spending as they wish in Northern Ireland

Nor has a definite decision been made to ditch the opposition to the repressive legisla- tion and practices which the party is pledged to oppose. But in supporting the Accord the party leadership and PLP have, from that point on, given their support to a govern- mental, constitutional and decision-making framework which is designed to substitute for the party's own policy of 'unity by con- sent' and which will, at least in the short term, see an acceleration of the repressive machinery in the North of Ireland. What is perhaps most disturbing of all, is that in do- ing all this, the vast majority of the PLP are probably unaware of the consequences of their action or are too uninterested in the Irish situation to be bothered to find out.

This is one way in which it is possible to (alk about a return to the bad old days — when only 13 Labour MP's voted against the Arcord, what this represented was a majori- ty of the PIP, the left of the PL.P' and even a majority of the 'hard-left' Campaign group returning to the ocean of ignorance, banalities and apathy in which they swam for so long in the 1970s whenever Ireland was mentioned

An example is the speech in parliament on the Accord made by party leader Neil Kin- nock in which he praised the 'constitutional nationalists' for deciding to 'seek change even at the cost of indefinitely postponing

No. 2. January/February 1986

charge loyalist demonstration No. 2, January/February 1986

their own nationalist aspirations'. . When the Tories' Secretary of State Tom King said much the same thing a couple of days after- wards he was roundly condemned from all sides, but there is a large element of truth in such remarks.

The important point however is that there is nothing new in this. As far as the main party to the Accord in Ireland is concerned, Fitzgerald's Fine Gael Party, it was founded on the very basis of postponing Irish unity until the indefinite future. Its origins are in those forces who, with the help of the British military, secured by force of arms the accep- tance by the Irish people of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 which established limited self-government for Ireland and the partition of the country.

For Irish republicans all Fitzgerald has done is to prove that Fine Gael remains a pro-partitionist party; for what is probably the majority of working class Catholics in the North of Ireland all he has done is to suggest yet again that a 'Free State' government is prepared to sell their nationalist aspirations short in return for a pat on the back from the British establishment.

'Fitgerald'

Gael was founded on the very basis of postponing Irish unity the

indefinite future.

s Fine

This is one, rather important, reason why the Accord will not work - the Catholic population do not, and indeed should not, trust Fitzgerald and Fine Gael to look after their interests in the consultative process which the Accord has established, and cer- tainly a lot of changes will need to take place before the ghetto dwellers of Belfast, Derry and elsewhere give up their reliance on Pro- visional Republicanism in return for nods and winks from Dr Fitzgerald.

What are the changes which are in the pipeline? In parliament Neil Kinnock said 'the most critical test of the credibilty and ac- ceptability of the agreement is its effect on security in Northern Ireland.' As far as the Unionist population is concerned this indeed may be the case, but for the leader of the Labour Party, a party pledged to abolish the PTA, important sections of the Emergency Provisions Act, strip-searching and use of plastic bullets, to seek to apply the litmus test of 'security' to the Accord is mind-boggling.

Security in the Northern Ireland context is no more than a euphemism for 'getting the Fenians'. Kinnock himself suggested as much when in condemning the use of violence in Northern Ireland he listed the IRA and INLA but declined to mention the UDA, the Ulster Freedom Fighters or any other of the Loyalist paramilitaries. The idea that perhaps, at one time, the dear old British might themselves have been a little heavy-handed in Ireland and might themselves have made even a minimal con- tribution to the spiral of violence in Ireland, was a thought that was not permitted even for a second to enter the consciousness of the Labour leader. No, for him 'security' meant

John Arthur/Reflex

7

Miroslav Milivojevic/Ketlex

smashing the IRA and INLA, and rorism' was an Irish Catholic disease.

It now seems highly likely that the British government will take new measures in an attempt to eradicate this disease. Indeed, within a week of the deal being signed Fit- zgerald was promising a new 'security' drive. What this will mean in practice as far as the North of Ireland is concerned is in- creased use of the PTA and of the Emergen- cy Provisions Act and greater repression generally of the Catholic working-class population.

For, while the long-term aim of the Ac- cord was to attract support away from the Provisionals, and part of this wes to be be nominal reforms in favour of the Catholics, the noisy opposition to the Accord of the Unionists has meant that in the immediate future, as Kinnock urged, it will be 'securi- ty' which gets most attention from the British and Irish governments. Thus the Labour Party in supporting the Accord is, as a consequence, supporting an agreement the first effect of which will lead to an increase in repressive measures the party is pledged to oppose.

The break with party policy goes even fur- ther, and is testified to in the assurances of both Tom King and Roy Mason that the Ac- cord will strengthen the Union and postpone indefinitely the re-unification of Ireland. Neil Kinnock, while reiterating that 'as a matter of policy and commitment, the Labour Party wants to see Ireland united by consent, and we are committed to working actively to secure that consent' , also said in parliament 'that is not the reason for our ac- tion in approving the Hillsborough accord.'

Indeed it is not, and could not be, for sup-

port for the Accord is supporting an alter-

native to a policy of Irish self-determination

and unity, and it is supporting the most

undemocratic alternative of all: where the

people of the North of Ireland have their fate

decided by two governments in which they

have no say or influence.

8

'within a week of the

signed Fitzgeral

promising a new "

drive"

deal being d was

Socialists, n supporting Irish self- determination and Irish majority rule, thereby challenge the 'right' of the Unionist minority in Ireland to decide the political fate of that country. That does not mean they can therefore support an Accord which completely disenfranchises both the Unionist and the Nationalist community in the North of Ireland. And certainly that is a very peculiar way to be campaigning for Irish unity.

The excuse offered by Labour s leader tor

supporting Irish unity while at the same time

endorsing the Accord is that the latter will advance 'the priority' of 'reconciliation in the communities' . Even for a British politi- cian like Kinnock who has previously shown little interest in Northern Ireland this is astonishingly naïve

Thatcher and Kinnock united against the interests

It was almost inevitable that the Accord would attract the wrath of the Unionists while not rousing any great enthusiasm among Nationalists. The Unionists oppose the deal because it is a further challenge to their 'right' to rule their 'Ulster' as they see fit. But because it leaves the British presence in Ireland untouched, indeed in many ways it reinforces it, the Nationalist community, especially that significant working-class sec- tion which supports or has sympathy with the Provisionals, is unlikely to see the Accord as meeting its aspirations. Far from the Ac- cord promoting 'reconciliation', it will heighten the sectarianism of the Unionists while bringing in its wake great repression of the Nationalists.

So, the Unionist opposition to the Accord should not be allowed to hide what Labour support for it means. It means a return to a bipartisanship the basis of which is to main- tain British presence in Ireland, and to develop a long-term alternative to Irish self- determination. And although the immediate consequence of the Accord has been to rouse Unionist anger, its motivation was an at- tempt to isolate radical republicanism; while one important consequence of the deal will be another Roy Mason-style attempt to in-

flict a 'military solution' on the rebellious

Irish Catholics.

This is where the new 'left' and 'realistic' leadership of Neil Kinnock is taking the Labour Party. It is to the credit of Ken Liv- ingstone, a much-publicised convert to that

leadership, that he has come out in opposi- tion to the Accord, but the question that needs to be asked of Ken and others like him is: when does his association with Kinnock cease to be an influence for progress and become a cover for reaction?

Yet perhaps the questions that need to be asked with the greatest honesty concern the tactical assumptions Irish campaigners in the Labour Party have adopted in most re- cent times. These were based on the view that we had 'won' the Campaign group to support for British withdrawal, that we had 'won' the party as a whole to support in principle for Irish unity, and that we had 'won' the leadership of the party to oppost- tion to repression in the North of Ireland. All this has now been shown to be one massive illusion.

Gains may indeed have been made, but they have been easily trampled underfoot in the Parliamentary Labour Party's blind rush to stand with Thatcher, Fitzgerald, and Ronald Reagan in supporting the latest im- position of a British solution to Ireland's British problem.

Which means, as far as those such as the Labour Committee on Ireland are concern- ed, there can be no more polite lobbying, no more pressure group politics, no more cosy chats with those in positions of influence and authority. An Irish political war is necessary in the Labour Party, and this time Tory/Labour bipartisanship needs to be broken with such force as to make it beyond repair.

Januar

Philis Gordon/Reflex

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