Interview with a representative of the Palestine National Salvation Front Battle of the Camps
On May 19, the Amal militia, with the backing of the Syrians, launched a vicious attack on the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra, Chatila and Brouj al Brajneh. killing hundreds of alestinians and leavin any hundred wounded to die by blockading the camps and preventing the Red Cross from evacuating them.
The Amal's objective to take control of the camps and disarm the Palestinians within 48 hours was thwarted by the bravery and determination of the Palestinian fighters who are defending every inch of their camps. As we go to press. the battles in and around the camps are still raging. although with less intensity.
Unlike the massacres of Palestinians by the Phalangists in Sabra and Chatila in 1982, the latest events made little headline and found little resonance in the labour movement. One reason may be the decision of Walid Jumblatt.
the broadcasting networks to pull out their reporters trom the area after receiving threats from the Amal militias. But more important has been the
ifticulties in grasping th omplexity of the shiftin alliances and of the issues at stake.
Socialist Viewpoint asked Abu Sami, representative oi the National Salvation Front, to give us his analysis of these latest developments. What has been happening in the Camps around Beirut in the last two weeks?
Militias of Amal, with a green light from the Syrians, have been encircling the refugee camps around Beirut, in an attempt to disarm the Palestinians by force. The Palestinians are not getting any help from the outside. Our guns in the mountain areas are not allowed to be used: they are used only from time to time when Walid Jumblatt is daring enough to resist the Syrian pressure on him. Sometimes he asks us to stop, sometimes he turns a blind eye to some bombardment from our guns. What is the balance of forces involved?
In military terms the people who are encircling the camps are much stronger than those who are defending them. It was thought that it would take six to twenty-four hours to end the whole thing, and this was the assurance of Nabih Berri to the Syrians. Even we thought that the maximum we could stand is for six days, but now it is more than two weeks, and people are still ready to resist.
The Palestinians are feeling that if we lost this battle, if we surrender, if we give up our arms, we have no future at all, and this explains why all the people are taking part in the fighting; women, very young men and women, everybody is fighting for their lives, for their future, for their own safety because they have experienced what it would mean to be disarmed when so many adversaries are trying to harm the Palestinians. What lies behind Amal's attacks on the Palestinians? The leadership of Amal thinks like this: we have suffered a lot because of Israeli reaction against the Palestinians trying to fight the Israelis from South Lebanon. The Israelis are withdrawing now and have warned that any single bullet will be strongly answered with guns. We have paid a lot; it's time for us to have a rest, we should not be the only people to give sacrifices for the Palestinians' cause.
Secondly, some people who colSocialist Viewpoint, No. 6, June 1985. Page 18
laborated with the Israeli occupation forces during the last three years have come back to Amal after the withdrawal of the Israelis, speaking of themselves as coming back to the fold again and trying to be good, and so on. We have fought a good battle against the occupation with Amal, and it is a pity that the people whom we were fighting with are fighting against us now. What do you foresee as the consequences of these recent developments for Syria and for the PLO?
These developments will make Syria lose its Palestinian allies; they will make it difficult for Syria to maintain alliances with the Arab nationalist states fighting against imperialism and its projects in the area, and this would weaken Syria in the end. It would be some kind of free service, giving something to the Americans just like that. Further to that, the Syrians are now helping Yasser Arafat who they speak of as being against us, but doing what they
are doing in the camps they are making it easier for Arafat to say "We've already told you of the Syrian intentions and ambitions to contain the PLO, we don't have another alternative than to go with King Hussein.
As a result the Syrians are pushing some elements within the leadership of Fatah who internally criticise Arafat to rally after him rather than to escalate their criticism. This makes us feel as if the Syrians, without intention, are serving him. We don't think that there is some kind of plot between Syria, Israel and the Americans as Arafat always charges. No, on the contrary, it's some kind of miscalculation on the part of the Syrians and it has to do with the class perspectives of the regime itself, how it thinks, how it looks to the PLO in general, how it looks to the Palestinian resistance movement. But it's not some kind of agreement, or a new "Camp Murphy" as Arafat has said. It is true that the Syrians try to contain the PLO, but not in the same way Arafat is saying, and not necessarily with some kind of agreement with the Israelis. You claim that the Syrians gave the green light. Why would they do this if they claim they are the allies of the Palestinian Left?
The Syrians think this way. Israel is withdrawing, the leadership of the Falange Party is speaking of accepting the Syrian option, so it is time to rearrange the Lebanon according to our own way, some kind of regime based on a balance between the different religious sects and factions in Lebanon, and we have to eliminate
Today's slaughter recalls the bloodshed of Beirut nearly 10 years ago.
Arafat at the 1983 PNC meeting. the Palestinian factor as much as possible. And it will not be easy for us to deal with them, so they have to be disarmed.
They claim it is only Arafat they are fighting. They say "We are not against the Palestinians in general, we are not against the Salvation Front, we are just trying to forbid Arafat and his followers to make trouble in the Lebanon. As long as they have arms they can make trouble, we are trying to disarm them."
This curtain of Arafat being the target of this attack is a very thin curtain which does not cover anything. Following the fighting between the two factions in Fatah in September 1983, the PLO split into three factions: the proArafat within Fatah, the National Alliance and the Democratic Alliance. Socialist Viewpoint, No. 6, June 1985. Page 19
Recently that has developed in the formation of the National Salvation Front. • Could you say something about the reasons for forming the National Salvation Front, and what forces are involved in it? The National Salvation Front consists of 6 organisations: the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), Al Fatah (anti-Arafat) — the group which the western press refers to as "the dissidents" - the PFLP General Command, Al Saiqua, and the Palestine Struggle Front (PSF).
The Democratic Alliance has played a very central role and a very positive role in trying to solve the internal conflict within the PLO in the interests of the nationalist line — the anti-imperialist line of the PLO - and in the interest of preserving the political programme of the PLO which was drawn up at the 16th PNC held in Algiers in 1983. After many months of discussions and negotiations between the Democratic Alliance and the Central Committee of Fatah, the Aden-Algiers agreement ws signed. But the leadership of Fatah has breached this agreement again and again. The Democratic Allinace has written numerous memoranda asking the leadership of Fatah to respect their signature and to honour their obligation, but the leadership of Fatah saw only one thing in the Aden-Algiers agreement - that of the 15th of September was the only and most important article in the Aden-Algiers agreement. During the talks between the Democratic Alliance and the central committee of Fatah trying to find a way out of this conflict, the central committee of Fatah unilaterally decided to hold a PNC in Amman.
However, despite the fact that the holding of the "so-called PNC" in Amman was a political choice in itself, not a geographical choice; despite the fact that this PNC has pardoned Arafat of so many dangerous mistakes that were done; despite the fact that the central committee of Fatah and Arafat himself made every effort to sabotage every chance of repairing the relations between Syria and the PLO, between the PLO and the National Lebanese movement; despite all this we still said that it's not the end of the world, and we still might find a way to reconcile our differences.
But after the signing of the agreement of February 11, the Amman agreement — between Arafat and King Hussein — we thought of this step as being a really qualitative step in the direction of being involved with the American strategies and
plans for the area. I'll not go into details of the February 11 agreement, but the least that can be said is that it's based essentially on the UN resolution 242 which deals with the Palestinian question as a question of borders between the Arabs and Israel, which never speaks of the Palestinians even as refugees: it speaks of retugees only, and it's within the context of the Jordanian-American-Egyptian idea of finding a solution not giving the Palestinians an independent state, not giving the Palestinians the right of self-determination. So after the February 1l agreement, two organisations of the Democratic Alliance explained this as a qualitative step from the line which tries to be in harmony with the American plans for the area to the line of being really involved with it. So, after this qualitative step of the Amman agreement, half of the Democratic Alliance felt that the situation needed to be dealt with in a different way than before.
It's not any more a matter of tendencies of deviation by the right leadership of the PLO. Steps are taking place, facts are being made on the ground. So, according to the Aden document which is the political basis for forming the Democratic Alliance, it is frankly stated that there should be a broad national Palestinian front of all the groups trying to keep the character of the PLO as an anti-imperialist, as a nationalist movement, holding to the Palestinians rights at this stage: rights of self-determination, establishing an independent Palestinian state under the leadership of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Now, if this strong national front was needed in a time when things were not as bad as they are now, it's much more urgent now, alter the Amman agreement. The comrades in the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and the Palestine Communist Party (PCP) thought that there is no need for such a thing... "We can go on as the Democratic Alliance trying to find a way out of this dilemma, how to solve the conflict without creating something that might devolve to a parallel PLO." We are Reagan with Saudi ruler King Fahd: Arab reactionary regimes are pressuring Arafat.
aware of the dangers involved in having a parallel PLO because we know that to have two PLOs means the loss of the PLO in general, and there is no need to go into details of the dangers in having two PLOs or even three PLOs.
Unfortunately comrades in the DFLP and the Palestine Communist Party did not accept this project. They said we can cooperate with eveybody against the Amman agreement without having any organisational formation to co-ordinate the efforts of the groups that are trying to keep the real character of the PLO, so there was no other choice than to try to make a bloc of the forces ready to fight against the Amman agreement and against the line which led to the Amman agreement. Do you think the National Salvation Front will succeed in getting Arafat to change course?
We don't have illusions that Arafat will rethink his course, we don't have illusions that he will change his course even after confronting this solid wall of rejection to the PLO as it stands participating in the settlement. Giving concession after concession will make him weaker so that it will be difficult for him to change course even if he wanted.
It has to do with the class structure of the PLO and especially the leadership of al Fatah. Year after year new class interests were created, new links were established with the reactionary oil producing countries, millions of dollars are used to spread some sort of corruption within the PLO, a whole process of hollowing up the PLO, and turning it into organs.. just like organs of power of any other regime, like any other state. Creating this atmosphere of disappointment and despair among our people that we have no horizons to go on with our struggle, there is nothing to do except to try to save what could be saved. This is making great confusion among our people and it negatively affects the PLO and its stand.
After giving so many concessions hell get weaker. Even if he realises that he is going the wrong way, he will not be able to
Socialist Viewpoint, No. 6, June 1985. Page 20
go back. And the Arab reactionary regimes are encouraging him to give more concessions for this purpose, to make him really sink, and to make sink with him what has remained of the prestige, the credibility of the PLO. Now, Arafat hs shown so many signs of readiness to let the Jordanians with some Palestinians — maybe not members of the PLO and not putting themselves as representatives of the PLO — to enter some kind of negotiations, not necessarily direct negotiations with the Israelis, maybe with the Americans at first. Arafat and the Central committee in general are not really interested in preserving the unity and the character of the PLO. If they were really after unity, at least they could use this chance of everybody fighting against Amal and the Syrians who are trying to disarm us, to use this chance for making a positive, single positive step to encourage others to think of trying to find a way at least to forget what has taken place in the last months and the Amman agreement. On the contrary, the Central Committee has reconfirmed the Amman agreement. Now for Arafat and for the central committee of al Fatah, it seems to us that this strata of the Palestinian bourgeoisie having so many links with the Arab reaction in general; having special class interests of its own, is losing hope in the potential of the Palestinians, they are losing hope of going on with the armed struggle, they are losing hope over keeping anything unless it's in harmony with the American plans because they think that the area after 1982 has fallen to the American hegemony and dominance. So when it is a matter of new conceptions, new ideas in the head of the leadership it is not easy. It is not a matter of tactics any more, it is a new approach to the whole question. We have faced in the PLO a lot of problems in the last years, but the rightist leadership of the PLO did not really overpass the red line which separates patriots and people who are going to the other camp. But now this line has been crossed. Maybe it's early to see the results in political terms but we can already see the signs of this.
King Hussein with Egyptian President Mubarak. Syrian leader Assad (right) with President Miterrand. What do you think that the absolute maximum is that the Palestinians could get out of a negotiated settlement at the present time?
The most that could be got out of this policy is to get the Jordanian rule in part of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
The Israelis are not ready to give back all the lands occupied in 1967, they are not ready to recognise the PLO or to deal with the PLO; they are not ready to recognise the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people - something like the Allon plan of keeping some parts of the West Bank and the Gaza strip under Israeli rule with the rest of the land settled by Arabs to be given to Jordanian rule under some type of federation, not con-federation. This is the utmost that Arafat could get. The Palestinians have given tens of thousands of martyrs; they have given so much blood and
life; all their efforts and all their energy would have been wasted if they are to go back to what was on offer before 1967. If it - was for that, why not accept the 242 resolution when there were some chances to get these lands — and really there were some chances in the first years after the 1967 war to get these lands in exchange for formal peace with Isreal — without all this bloodshed and without all this destruction which has touched every single Palestinian family. While it seems that Syria and Amal are determined to see the Palestinians disarmed, efforts at mediation have been made since the start of the fighting to try and redefine new ararngements for a Palestinian presence in the Lebanon. What is the National Salvation Front looking for in these negotiations and how does it see its future relations with Syria? Socialist Viewpoint, No. 6, June 1985. Page 21
We are ready to try to find a way of defusing this tension in the Lebanon, but not at the expense of the Palestinians alone. If there will be some kind of disarming it should be every faction, and within some ararngement to give the Palestinians the chance to keep at least their cause alive and not to go back to what the Palestinians used to be before the Palestinian resistance was able to establish itself.
We are not for coming back to Lebanon the way we used to be, because we know that some negative things took place; we are not for this kind of demonstrative, show off and having armed people around with camouflage clothes, so many officers
loing nothing, spending a lot of ettort an
nergy just to show of We are against that, and we believe that the relations between the Palestinian resistance movement and the nationalist Lebanese movement should be reshaped in a way first to boost the ability of the Nationalist Lebanese movement in its struggle for a new, united Arab democratic Lebanon and secondly to give us a chance, us Palestinians, to preserve our rights, our civil rights, OuI right to pursue political activity, our right to arrange our own affairs. We can't trust the Lebanese regime as it stands now to have this type of responsibility.
We in the National Salvation Front believe that to give up our arms is to give the last thing we have to defend ourselves with. Even if we were for some reason or another convinced that the situation in Lebanon will not enable us for sometime to be a military force in Lebanon and to go on with our struggle against Israel, even if we were covinced of this, it would not be easy for us to give up our arms. We need these arms for self-defence. If everybody is armed in Lebanon, and we have so many enemies in Lebanon, how could we give up our weapons? As comrade George Habash put is quite plainly "our arms are our second home now. We can't live without our arms.
As for our relations with Syria, it should be emphasised that if the Syrians are doing what they are doing it does not mean that the only alternative in front of us is to go the way Arafat is going. As comrade Habash said when he met with the comrades that arrived from the Israeli prisons "Shame on these people who think that being in trouble with Syria will mean that we will go to Husni Mubarak or Hussein, or change our alliances, and shame on these people who think that if the Syrians are doing this it means that the Syrians are going to the other camp and are being our enemies. We are trying to find a way to repair the damage done to the alliance with the Syrians in terms of keeping this alliance, not making the gap wider." Not because we are puppets in the pocket of Syria but because we will get weaker, Syria will get weaker and everybody will lose.
But we don't think that it's easy for any leader who respects his people and repects the scarifices they have given during all these years to maintain an alliance with Syria. It's not some kind of revenge — if we are thinking in terms of revenge we would be revenging ourselves; we would be doing harm to ourselves. We will not speak of Syria as being a puppet of the imperialists or being a lackey for the Americans, but it will not be easy for us — it will take years maybe to repair the damage done in these weeks when hundreds of people were killed.
Teachers