IS THIS THE END FOR
KARAMANLIS?
A special report explaining the background to recent events, from SISSI VOVOY in Athens. IN A abrupt political turn which was shocking as well as sudden, Greek Prime Minister and president of PASOK, Papandreou, on March 9 put an end to his collaboration with the president of the Konstantin Karamanlis, introducing a new chapter in the politics of his party.
Many readers of the foreign leftwing press are, we suppose, aware of the above fact. What perhaps they do not know is: Why Papandreou should make such an abrupt turn literally at the last moment? What did the collaboration between Papandreou and Karamanlis mean? And, finally, what will the impact of the new policy of PASOK be on the political situation? Why the surprise?
1985 is an election Greece. According to the time limits, there was going to be an election of the president of the Republic on March 15, chosen from Parliament according to the reactionary rules of the 1975 constitution followed by national parliamentary elections in October, where PASOK would contest for the majority of the popular vote for a new four year term.
The surface of political reality, mirrored every day in systematically striving to form public opinion, was characterised by the most unprecedented class collaboration and social consent that ever existed in Greece. PASOK, a party "socialist" in name only, had managed to betray all its electoral promises to the people, most important of them being to throw out the American bases and to pull the country out of NATO and the EECut, more impor not to mention its domestic policy. antly, PASOK had maintained cellent relations with the president of the Republic and systematically among the people the
Greece plunged into crisis the republic year for formal press
Karamanlis conception that it could and should not clash with him. The
(ALLAGI
PASOK)
had to
"careful"
steps, because socialism could not come about overnight.
insisted on its refusal' to proceed with the revision of the 1975 constitution, exabandoning another one of its eleccultivated toral promises.
Socialist Viewpoint, No. 5, April 1985. Page 10 siege"
parliament;
prime of Karmanlis.
The who
"change"
- the main slogan of proceed with argued,
PASOK had also after
Let us note here in passing that tial the 1975 constitution is not simply a bourgeois constitution. It contains certain articles giving extraordinary powers to the President, allowing
• to suspend all the articles related to democratic liberties "if there is an external or an internal danger; • to declare the country in a "state of without the consent of • to dismiss the elected goverment it he considers there is a "disharmony" between the parliamentary majority and the popular will; • to appoint anyone he likes as minister, from within OI without Parliament, for the carrying out of elections; • to refuse to sign laws or decrees that are not to his liking; and so on.
Therefore, not only had PASOK abandoned its promise to the people for a revision of the constitution but, more than that, it had declared its support for the deeply hated person right-wing party, New Democracy, was delighted at the arrival of the electoral year 1985, for two reasons. First, it had won a small part of the support PASOK had lost in the Euroelections, around 2%. This loss was mainly due to the fact that PASOK has taken the economic crisis of capitalism on its shoulders and is trying to sister seconom the obvious displeasure popular masses. The most conservative sector of the working masses, had moved from New Democracy to PASOK in 1981, are tending to return back to it now.
The second reason for right wing delight was due to the anticipated reelection of Karmanlis, who was the guarantor of bourgeois power and essential political leader and founder of this party in 1974. His reelection as President would mean that on the one hand the right wing party would continue to hold — in the last analysis — the bridle; and on the other that after the 1985 elections in which the right wing would certainly not win a majority, there would be some moment, some turning point, one OI two years, when Karamanlis would use his Presidenextraordinary powers to the
benefit of New Democracy.
The pro-Moscow Communist Party had put forward the demand for a constitutional revision half-heartedly about 8 months ago, and of course had declared its intention not to vote for Karamanlis. But it did not proceed to take up a struggle on this question because at no time did it want seriously to disturb the various balances which PASOK was creating with the right wing. The CP did not undertake any campaign on the burning question of the presidency, thus contributing greatly to the cultivation of a passive stand amongst the people, a stand of accepting decisions made at the top.
The (Eurocommunist) Communist Party (Interior), despite declaring its negative stand towards the presidency of Karmanlis, had been very much reduced to the role of guardian of the existing equilibrium. Characteristic is the fact that it had presented in the pages of its daily paper articles from its members and cadres advocating that the Party accept Karamanlis's candidature "normality".
This is only a little political map of the surface of the reality existing before March 9.
But what was happening under this surface? First of all, the most militant section of the popular masses general and the working class in particular was disgusted growing to the establishment. The all-sided integration PASOK main domestic problems are those of unemployment, at about 10%, inflation (over 20%) and the lowering of wages. The total of wageearned income has fallen siderably, mainly through the factor of unemployment, without any prospect of a reversal. The income of farmers is also fallling. The rest of the oppressed masses are dissatisfied.
The greatest factor, though, in the dissatisfaction, mainly of the political vanguard of the masses, PASOK's betrayal of its imperialist electoral promises.
Let us return again to Karamanlis, emphasising the fact that he personifies both bourgeois power and dependence upon imperialism. thermore there is a very rooted political hatred against him individually because he was the architect of the post civil-war police state, which suppressed the workers movement and democratic rights, and conducted state and para-state persecutions, against a background of the continued imprisonment and exile of thousands of militants after the civil war and the torture of left-wingers. He was the Prime Minister during the 8 year period 1955-63, which has been named the year period". He was also the inspiration of the reactionary constitution of 1975 and Prime Minister 1974-80. In other words, was the enemy of the whole of the in
Karamanlis.
by the ever workers' and peasants' movement.
relative coning expressed very widely.
also then official line, was his decision;
and anti-
MPs during even
PASOK's existence,
Furdeeply denly changed his course.
During deliberated tee meeting, bombshell.
"black 8 would decide on from
Karmanlis brainwashing
Left wingers lobby PASOK's Central Committee to urge against endorsing
Karamanlis,
As the day of March 9 was approaching, there was a growing reaction by the militant wing of PASOK against the leadership's support for the re-election of Karamanlis. And noon. this happened within the framework of a more general popular opposition to this policy which, while it did not take an active character of concrete political action, was nevertheless be-
Papandreou, who didn't hesitate to depose the whole local leadership of a provincial organisation for resisting the who had not hesitated to carry out countless expulsions of militant dissidents and the years of apparently started to think more serously about this matter a short time before March 9. Thus, since he was continuously receiving messages about the Iections within his party and amongst the people up to the last moment, he sudthe night of March 8-9 he with his closest col- and in laborators, and on the morning of March 9, when he entered the con- situation. ference room of the Central Commit-
The dropped the
Up to then the whole of Greece had been absolutely certain that the CC
Karamanlis. So while the pro-PASOKite newspapers were putting the last soap into the in tavour of Socialist Viewpoint, No. 5, April 1985. Page 11 and the right wing papers were celebrating the certain re-election of their leader as President, the whole country was shaken by the unexpected news released at
Papandreou proposed that the Central Committee endorse the High Court Judge Christos Sartzetakis very well known since 1964 for the crucial role he played as Judicial Interrogator in the exposure of the murderers of Lambrakis — as candidate President of the republic. He also proposed revision of the articles of the constitution concerning the extraordinary powers of the President. His proposals were unanimously and enthusiastically accepted with a protracted standing ovation by the same people - the CC members, who, with two exceptions, were ready to accept the candidacy of Karamalis. And while the acceptance of this abrupt turn reconfirmed the personified power of Papandreou, the content of the proposal reconfirms the immediate influence the movement has on the leadership of PASOK the last analysis on the development of the whole political
'We rediscovered OUI militancy," Papandreou said a little
*Lambrakis was a left-wing MP, thugs. assassination followed by a very big rise in the move. ment, which toppled Karamanlis a few months later. The film "Z" is based on this event. The role of Sartzetakis is also strongly presented in the film.
later to the Press. What was the meaning of collaboration?
One of the most crucial strategic questions for Papandreou since 1981, in relation to the handling of governmental power, was his relation with the President. By skillfully reminding the people and PASOK members of the existence of the President he played hide-and-seek with his socialist promises. He constantly implied radically because He exists Proceed cannot
, while every nOW and then Papandreou would surpass himself in his praises to "Him" for the "impeccable" execution of his duties. He underlined that "He is the guarantor of political normality', and implied that if we do not vote for him, socialism cannot last.
Whenever Karamanlis made clear political intervention in favour of the right wing, Papandreou put his tail between his legs and maniacly expelled all those denouncing Karamanlis. He had created, at the level of superficial appearance, movement of masochistic Karamanlis-adoring cadres and had made forgetting the past — since it was inseparably linked to Him — an official policy.
Of course Papandreou did bear in mind the possibility that Karamanlis could neutralise or even depose the government of PASOK when its majority became meagre and this is why he was consumed by some uneasiness. Based on this consideration, some peope believe his turn at the last moment did not arise from the above described reasons, but from a premeditated tactic of Papandreou to mislead his opponent and take him by surprise. But such an analysis is most probably not valid tor a question oi such importance. Only blind forces at work can cause abrupt changes of this scope.
For as long as Karamanlis maintained his position, the right wing was relatively quiet, for its power was guaranteed. The political conflict -although hard — was being maintained within the given legal and constitutional framework. Most importantly, the pople saw this as an obstacle and considered that the rest of the problems could not be resolved unless this one was got out of the way. But despite all this, as said above, the people's resistance was passive.
Karamanlis was at the same time an important guarantee for theorotec. regime as far as our transatlantic tors" were concerned. It is not simply the question of one person. It is the question of PASOK's policy of collaboration with the existing political power, which kept the imericans quite assured over the meaning of its "socialist" statements, for as long as it continued
In order to underline the importance of this collaboration, and of its termination, let us also note: • In 1967 a military dictatorship against the workers and popular mass movement was installed in Greece by • PASOK is a popular movement founded in 1974, with a very radical programme - far more radical than that of any other social-demcratic party of Europe. It grew on the basis of a militant opposition to the right wing in general and Karamanlis in under conditions of an characteristically about this period: "I made a state out of the chaos that I found." And this is true. (Let us clarify here that when we say "radical" and "militant", we are democratic parties or formations.) • PASOK has at its disposal throughout the country, such as no other social democratic party of • The unresolved democratic pro- imperialist dependence which exist in Greece mainly because oi its economic and strategic position and also because of the betrayed revolution of 1944-49 have made the movement very eruptive in every serious phase it has gone • The Communist Party had a very big strength, which is now partly absorbed by PASOK, but can be revivabrupt shifts of alignment, which can take place, with unpredictable consequences for capitalism, since such new forces would certainly not be easily accommodated inside the moulds of the CP's class concilia-
These factors and so many others made the collaboration of PASOK guarantee for the bourgeoisie.
rupture that took place on March 9 is firstly a great and clear victory of the movement against the established institutions; and it is secondly a development unpleasant consequences for the bourgeoisie in the What does the future hold?
Let us now come to the third question: what impact is the new policy of PASOK likely to have on the political situation?
The answer to this question is really difficult. We will first summarise the aims of the basic political forces involved. • The right wing seeks to achieve two goals through the present crisis: to increase its stength in the coming elections by proving that PASOK is an unreliable, catastrophic movement and that socialism (as they like to see it) is a strange fruit for the country. It also seeks to maintain the present constitution and to achieve the return of Karamalis — which is not impossible. • PASOK seeks to gain parliamentary majority plus the presidency of Sarfzetakis, together with the revision oi the constitution, in order to conSocialist Viewpoint, No. 5, April 1985. Page 12 tinue unimpeded with the other sides of its policy, that is the administering of the capitalist crisis. • The Communist Party supports the presidency of Sarizetakis and seeks something impossible a guaranteed parliamentary representation, which they hope would force Papandreou to include the CP in the government with some ministerial posts. It has declared its willingness to participate in government. • There is of course the other, the essential factor: the workers and popular movement. This has been put aside by its leaderships, which strive to solve the problems at top level, and even then as always - with absolutely antidemocratic manoeuvres. To the extent that this major political crisis was provoked by this movement, it is obvious that workers' combativity is increased. Which is, of course, an essential factor for the destabilisation of "normality" and for change in the existing balance of forces. But, in the framework of a dialectical analysis, we should not overlook the possibility that the masses may go through a period oi relative satisfaction, followed by political confidence in the leaderships.
This will depend mainly on the options to be taken by the right wing and by our American "protectors (who, by the way, reacted immediately against PASOK as soon as the news was released).
If the right wing tries to achieve its
aims with the "unorthodox" methods of political destablisation economic sabotage they have used in the past, then we are going to have not simply a reaction of the masses, but a new quality in the movement. If it chooses to let time solve the problem through the weakening of PASOK, then developments will be postponed for a little later.
We cannot risk new predictions, since Papandreou's latest turn torn to pieces all previous forecasts. The whole of the left had fallen into the trap of the collaboration between PASOK and Karamanlis, apparently underestimating the forces at work under the ground.
There is, however, something certain. The political turn closes one chapter in the history of PASOK and in our political life. This was the chapter of PASOK sharing olitical power with the right winc hrough Karamanlis. One prop of th‹ right wing within and
Thus the opposites comes closer.
unavoidable such bourgeoisie, another will has a social-democratic type. It cher type.
tolerated PASOK to date, of March 9 its shoulders.
ment which, as we policy of the
PASOK is being removed as well as mass scale.
one pretext PASOK had for the non materialisation of its programme.
become
The more clear and so the unavoidable conflict some of the
Certain "Marxist" analyses, saying that PASOK is a new party of the which in one form or administer political paign power, trom now on, forget an important "detail": that today, in a period of crisis, the bourgeoisie cannot af-
Presidency.
ford to govern through formations of needs leaderships of the Reagan and That-
Ad the sole reason it has compromise, was to try and wear it out and place the crisis on
The workers and popular moveexplained, lie be behind the political scene, will unfortunately not be able in the near future to express themselves directly with a
Socialist Viewpoint, No. 5, April 1985. Page 13 revolutionary political presence on a
But, through all these develpments, many things are going to change at a fast pace.
existing broad ex• traparliamentary left, together with
Trotskyist groupings, stood just as wrongly after PASOK's political turn as they did before it. Whilst they were preparing a camagainst Karmanlis's Ieelection, they had no concrete transitional proposal on the question of the
Whilst they were explaining how much the collaboration between PASOK and Karamanlis was an inseparable part of the policies of they explained afterwards with the same facility how the same policies are being served by the opposite move. They consider the main element of the new situation to that Papandreou made a manoeuvre in order to follow a more reactionary policy.
Such a result is certainly possible; • but it will be decided in the struggle of living forces taking place today. Those who prejudge it fatalistically are condemning only themselves. View of the Greek parliament (inset) Sartzetakis.