Dangerous isolation for Sandinistas
By Harry Sloan THE international boycott of the in-" auguration this month of Nicaragua's first-ever democratically-elected Presdient came as no surprise. Even now, that great "democrat" Ronald Reagan is eagerly arming, organising and financing mercenary gangs fighting to restore the kind of brutal dictatorship the USA has traditionalWashington's main Western ailies sponsored in Central America. have largely gone along Reagan's campaign against the Sandinistas, with occasional gestures from France and Germany towards a "negotiated" settlement.
But the significant absence of top-level delegations from American countries, from Africa or from most of the Stalinist regimes of Eastern turope, further underlined the international isolation of the Sandinistas, and must have delighted the warmongers in the Pentagon. The inauguration ceremonies were attend. ed by heads of state from and Yugoslavia, and, at short notice, by Cuban President Fidel Castro, in a visit markedly lacking in the flourish of anti-imperialist rhetoric which coloured his last trip over four years ago.
There could scarcely be a clearer indication that the Moscow leadership, while paying token lip-service to the Nicaraguan revolution, is not prepared to offer significant extra material or military Sandinistas: certainly Ortega knows he can count on nothing like the Soviet support which helped defend the Cuban revolution of 1959
In this sense, 1985 has proved to be 'not so much a new phase as a continuation of the trends clearly visible throughout a troubled 1984. Gone are the heady days of December 1983, when Ortega was greeted by a tumultuous reception on his visit to Argentina tor the inauguration President Raul Alfonsin. met 25 heads and deputy heads of government; and the Contadora initiative for a negotiated settlement with imperialism in Central America appeared to be gathering pace, with endorsement from the United tions, the Organisation of American States and the so-called "Socialist International".
Encouraged by this show of support, the Sandinistas made a tresh proposal for a deal with the USA: they offered to halt arms purchases; to reduce the size of their army; to end their support for revolutionary
with feeble regional Latin Surinam support to the of There he movements in Central America; to foreign remove remove Salvadorean rebel leaders from Nicaragua. mirers as a "tactical" move to put the USA on the defensive and "call their Na- bluff" on the diplomatic front, these moves served largely to underline the limited political objectives and strong element of nationalism within Sandinista leadership. the failed to concessions trom the USroduce any course they military response to the
advisors; and Though hailed by many of their ad- various the And of More effective was the Sandinistas' law, "Christmas Socialist Viewpoint, No. 3, February 1985. Page 2
New President Daniel Ortega. offensive" by the contras, who by mid-January had disastrously failed to secure any "liberated zone" inside Nicaragua or even a town which
"provisional could be described as a capital". The military setbacks, and the rivalry and feuding between
"contra" leaders served further to divide Reagan's mercenary armies during 1984.
By February, it was plain that the Sandinistas were intent upon proving their democratic credentials by granting an exceptionally liberal electoral
effectively guaranteeing state finance and Parliamentary represen-
EN
TODAS tation to any party with a measurable degree of support. It was the right wing parties, nervously recognising their lack of popular support, who began agitating for a postponement of the elections. the event they were scheduled for November 4.
Immediately atter the date for the elections was confirmed, the CIA and "contra" forces began an intensified programme of military and economic sabotage, focussed upon the mining of Nicaraguan ports to interfere with vital oil imports.
Ortega flew off at the end of March to Moscow and to North Korea, presumably in hopes of securing some minesweeping equipment. If so, he returned empty-handed. even Margaret Thatcher and put pressure upon Reagan to end the mining of Nicaraguan waters, and the US Senate eventually compelled withdrawal of the "mother ship" that had been servicing the CIA layers, Ortega's meeting with Soviet Defence Minister Ustinov ended without the promise of even a single minesweeper or extra Soviet military aid of any description. point of sharpest attack, bureaucracy has repeatedly in 1984 proven itself unwilling to challenge the "right" of the USA Nicaragua in its own influence".
The following month brought continued tension, with the admission that regular US spy flights take place over Nicaragua. At the very same time, an ex-CIA agent now opposed to Reagan's policies, publicly revealed that the supply of Sandinistas to the Salvadorean guerrillas — the alleged pretext for the US funding the "contra forces" known to have dried up three years earlier — in 1981!
In June, the Sandinistas agreed to exploratory talks with the USA - and once again it was widely reported that they were prepared to renounce
ANIVERSARIO REGION I RAS ARMAS AL PUEBLO The Sandinistas have proven their regime has mass popular support. began to put tion for taking part. "advanced" destroy Nicaraguan airspace tra" and US overflights. While tion and made world came out strike military which sorely needs it. mine- massive 82% turnout, and a among the whole electorate, though Even at the the Soviet the bourgeois opposition. Ortega and the FSLN to harass mn orga cised lex "ły t" aty tradi "sphere of tional sense of the term — was to con- tinue to administer and economy reflects the fact that the majority of the (capitalist) arms from the capitalist parties and a particularly rabid along with the Catholic Church. - was mained "non-aligned" and cemented no close relations bureaucracy OI Socialist Viewpoint, No. 3, February 1985. Page 3
support for the Salvadorean fighters as part of a deal for the region. The talks came to nothing, however, as Nicaragua's most right wing parties, shrinking from the challenge of the election and under heavy pressure (and outright bribery) from the USA, the down increasingly FSLN ludicrous ultimatums as a precondi- government, A new high point of intimidation from came in August with the US threat to aircraft if they Wicarold to herSpade idas to detend There against This same scare over "Soviet MiGs" reemerged on the very night of Reagan's reelec- around the workers ponder the prospect of a US Nicaragua. against Once again the allegations proved to be false: the USSR has sent no such defensive equipment to Nicaragua - The November elections brought a to abandon clear overall majority for the Sandinistas there was a surprisingly high vote for reactionary The mandate sought and won by which Ie- "party" in any tradi- revolution. "mixed" El Salvador Honduras, "pluralist" democracy. In practical terms this economy remains ian rivate current that ownership; rae allowed to function ree press ports the to function freely Unlike Cuba at a comparable stage ot its revolution, Nicaragua has re- profile", with the Soviet Eastern Europe (hence the support from Yugoslavia),
NEVA CHESENT EN LA DEFENSA DE LA REVOLUC TODAS LA A MAS and 25% of its trade is still with the USA. The Sandinistas do not regard or describe themselves as socialists; indeed it is partly this — coupled with their cautious distance from Moscow - which has endeared them to Neil Kinnock and the reformist leaders of
"Socialist International" The correctly describe their with its new mandate the electorate, as "popular democratic" (which is more than we can say of Neil Kinnock).
Tis no doubting Ronald Reagan's bitter enmity to the Sandinistas. Nor is there any question that the international workers movement has a duty to mobilise class action to prevent the imperialist intervention and in soldiarity with the Nicaraguan people in their struggle to defend and complete the Revolution begun in 1979.
But it is open to doubt whether the FSLN's policies of openly promising
Othe other revolutionary struggles in Central America, eager"mixed" (capitalist) economy, consistently embracing a
Tand making continuous concessions to the
bourgeois parties who are in league with the contras represents the best means of defending and completing the Nicaraguan
The embattled guerrilla fighters of
Tand revolutionaries in Guatemala and Costa Rica also have good reason to question the wisdom of the Sandinistas'
policy. But the low-key presence oi fidel Castro at Ortega's swearing-in as President, and the repeated declarations that Cuba sup-
"Contadora" peace plan, and is itself looking to improve relations with Reagan's USA, all serve to underline one fact: by seeking a "low
Nicaragua is seekin‹ to avoid conflict not only with the USA but also with the USSR and Cuba.
the NUM! Confirmed speakers include PETER HEATHFIELD TONY BENN PHIL HOLT Sponsors so far include. Kings Cross ASLEF, Civil Service Miners' Support Campaign, Felixstowe Port Committee of the National Union of Seamen, Campaign Group of MPs, Fire Brigades Union, CPSA Broad Left, NALGO National Miners' Support Campaign, National Union of Seamen, Broad Left Organising Committee, Labour Briefing, Socialist Worker, Militant, Lesbians and Gays Support the Miners, C A Parsons Shop Stewards Committee TASS, Greenham Women for a Miners' Victory, News of the World/Sun Miners' Hardship Fund. Delegates: 2 per trade union organisation, 1 per other organisation. Accommodation, credentials, creche: 01-981 3289 or write to MDC c/o 31 Cranwich Rd, London N16. Amendment for Mineworkers Defence Committee February 9 Conference. The following amendment to the Con- ference statement was passed by the Group Oxford Miners Support on January 22: IT IS now crucial that the isolation of the miners strike is broken. The miners strike is now an issue of major historic proportions and the whole concerns
.... Mineworkers Defence Committee National Conference Solidarity with Saturday February 9, 11am to 5pm, at the Octagon Centre, Sheffield. JOHMTOCHER BETTY HEATHFIELD trade union and labour movement. yet the miners cannot win the strike alone. A defeat of the strike would have a serious effect on the labour movement breading dese isolation of he strike and for decades. yet every has failed opening second front (although there could still be some ac- tion in Rail and in Austin Rover over the use of the courts). This has not just been Socialist Viewpoint, No. 3, February 1985. Page 4
because of the hesitation of various trade union leaders but because it has been a Government tactic to keep the miners isolated.
We don't need here to restate OUT respect for the magnificent stand the leadership of the NUM are making against the Thatcher Government and the way they are fighting to win the strike. We don't need to restate our admiration for the rank and file miners, it is their strength and solidarity that provides the basis for winning the strike. It is on this basis that we discuss the tactics of the strike and suggest a new initiative.
The time is now long overdue for the TUC to act in support of the miners and call a general strike to ensure that the miners win. The strike is now longer than the miners lock-out of 1926. after which the trade union movement was broken in half. The consequences this time could be equally disastrous. The policy of the Government is for a total defeat of the NUM.
Under these conditions we can no longer tolerate the miners being denied the full strength and authority of the of. ficial movement by a group of rightwingers at the top who are waiting for their Peerages.
The NUM have recognised this, most importantly in the appeal made to the TUC by the special delegate conference called to consider the question of the official receiver taking control of the NUM finances. The problem was that they appealed to the General Council rather than Congress and there was no chance oi their call being answered. The General Council is not only right-wing dominated but it rests on the inadequate decisions of the September Congress which did not even discuss generalised action.
The precondition for any real chance of action by the TUC is a substantia. change in TUC policy at the level of Congress. We need to set out new parameters for the organisation of sup. port for the miners strike at the level of the TUC. The present actions around the power stations and mobilisation of general support is important but we are enied the ultimate strength of the movement which is so clearly needed at the present time.
We propose the following: • 1) That an comeened. That Congress TUC Congress should be convened. should discuss both the role of the TUC and the anti-union laws in relation to the 1982 Conference of executives and also review the support the TUC should give to the miners, particularly in light of the problems with the policy of the September congress on substitute fuel in the power stations. • 2) That the NUM should take the lead in calling for a recall Congress, backed up by a campaign throughout the trade union movement for this demand. • 3) That if a recall Congress is convened we wuld urge the NUM to put down a resolution which spelled out the implications of the situation to the movement and call for a general strike.
We believe that if such a resolution was carried (and it would have the full weight and authority of the strike behind it) the movement would respond. If the TUC leadership spelled out the situation and placed in tront of the movement the full historical implications involved in the outcome of the strike - as they did to some extent over GCHQ - there would be a response from the rank and file. This was also shown in the response to the call by the rail unions on January 17.