rief history of the Cuban Communist
Party UNDERSTANDING events in Central America today calls for an understanding of the Cuban Revolution and of the present-day politics of fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership.
A new book on this question by JOHN LISTER has just been published (Cuba: Radical Face of Stalinism, Left View Books, £4.95). We reprint here two chapters which deal with the history and development of the Cuban Communist Party. Other chapters in the book deal with the Cuban state, its foreign and economic policies, and with the implications of the Cuban Revolution for the Marxist movement. (1) Before 1959
When the leadership of Cuba's pro-Moscow Communist (known from 1944 onwards as the Popular Socialist Party) stridently denounced Fidel Castro's guerrilla raid on the Moncada barracks in 1953, nobody would have been particularly surprised. For the bulk of its period oi existence, the CP/PSP had embraced "national unity long-term strategy
Tand opposed dependent actions which might antagonise "progressive" sections of the capitalist class.
Though Castro's strategy also looked towards the cultivation of a broad, cross-class alliance against the dictatorship, his willingness to resort to armed struggle to lend a sharp edge to demands for democratic rights and reforms flew in the Stalinist methods of passive class collaboration. It was not until Castro was plainly emerging as against Batista in the closing months of 1958 that the PSP leaders began to relax their opposition and active sabotage of the guerrilla struggle. It is therefore particularly ironic that a year later Castro should begin turning to these same Stalinists as allies in controlling the Cuban movement. Nothing in the PSP's history suggested that it had anything to contribute in advancing revolution. The Cuban CP was formed in 1925, with the merger of a number of small groupings.
Party constructing the Winning over syndicalist workers, began to move positions. 1930 Cuba, strikes in of cross-class in- from "Third Period". Moscow intervened face of the the Cuban CP, the winner in 1930. movement grew other workers' the resignation of the dictatorship. the August 3 focussed primarily From
1927 onwards its work focussed on
Cuban National Confederation of Labour (CNOC).
some anarchoParty members into some union saw mass, revolutionary supported by demonstrations, riots, and the formation of a new student directorate at work! Havana University. The CNOC called a mass strike, backed by 200,000 workers - and was outlawed. At this point the party had no more than 250-300 members, little structure, mass and policies which were a far cry shooting
Othe prescribed ultra-left sectarian orthodoxy of the Comintern's with calls for the "Bolshevisation" of
which led to a purge of opponents of the Third Period line
This realignment brought forth bitter fruit in the stormy events of 1933. In July of that year, a massive strike
outwards trom Havana bus workers, to embrace
cities and other sections of army s workers including teachers, lawyers and doctors. The central demand was
Machado
But the CP's manifesto issued on
Ton cluding economic demands - including the 8-hour day; payment of back wages; Socialist Viewpoint, No. 3, February 1985. Page 23
measures to relieve unemployment; and the cancellation of the debts of peasants and small shopkeepers. Five press lae to Me Called in he C faced by US pressure to quit, leaders of the CNOC, and offered to concede most of these economic demands — in exchange for calling off the strike. The CP leaders agreed — and publicly called for a return to
Their pleas were fortunately disregarded by strikers outraged by
Barmy y repression and the demonstrators the previous day in Havana. Three days later — with the CP still ready to do i deal — even the army demanded Me had resignation, and le Wed
country. departure followed by a growing revolutionary movement, as workers hunted down and killed hated police officers, and in some rural areas sugar mills were occupied and soviets proclaimed
In September came Batista's initial "sergeants' revolt", in which the
officers were declared dismissed, and the NCOs took over. Batista backed the nationalist President Ramon Grau San Martin, who for 4 months issued far-reaching decrees, the 8-hour day; manifestoes and laws in-
minimum wage legislation; the legalisation of all parties and unions; the right to
strike; the takeover of the US-owned electric power company; and moratorium on foreign payments. A furious US administration refused to recognise the government and sent gunboats. But the Communist Party stridently attacked the Grau government in classic Third Period language as the tatives of "the big landowners and the bourgeoisie" , and called abstractly for the immediate takeover and "all power Soviets"
Sectarian sectarian trajectory of the Third Period policy was ably summed up in the April 1934 CP Congress resolution, which explained that:
'The fundamental danger lies in the
parties of the "left" and its reformist,
Trotskyite agents...
necessary to lay down as a specific task
the unmasking of these elements and
their campaigns of demagogy."
This repudiation of any kind of united front tactic continued into 1934, when after the collapse of the Grau government, the CP in March
Ffor a General Strike. When the biggest strike of all broke out in March 1935, paralysing i martial law by president Men dieta the CP was left completely isolated. definitively turned its back on Third
politics, and embraced the Popular Front - to which Cuban CP leaders remained loyal right up and after the time of Castro's victory
The policy was set out clearly in a 1936 Central Committee resolution:
"The Cuban Revolution is at present
passing through its national phase, and
in this phase the revolutionary role
played by other strata of the population
besides the proletariat and
peasants must not be underestimated
... all strata of the population ranging
from the proletariat to the national
bourgeoisie, fraternally linked (!) by a
common interest in the liberation of
our country, can and must build a
broad popular front against the foreign
oppressors...
Within two years, the CP was to demonstrate how "broad" this front was intended to be. As Batista - the power behind Cuban since 1933 — began to look for ways of building his own power base support in the workers movement, he reached out to the CP leadership who despite their dismal record had retained and strengthened their earl positions in the labour movement. A deal based reciprocal began to take shape, Cuban CP with a dictatorship widely branded as "fascist" munist movement. In 1936, for example, the far radical Central Committee of the CP USA declared that:
"... the issue of democracy versus
a After vainly debt trust represen- proletarian munist to the dictatorship cessful. In late the still 1 1938 June resolutions, Party including working class. craven support the governments of support involving the in the Com- December from Dimitrov, adopted by the Cuban CP.
fascist dictatorship has been sharply
raised by the putsch of Colonel Batista.
trying to create a mass
base for his dictatorship by demagogic termed a
methods, he has carried out — with the
help of Wall St. backers and the sugar
Tan attack on the lawful Gomez democracy in abort deto, end
But if "demagogy" failed Batista, his cynical moves to enlist the Com-
Party to support his "fascist proved more suc1937 a CP front organisation — the Party of Revolutionary Union — was legalised. Next i mess, enestamelegan or Mas allowed to launch a daily paper bourgeoisie: Noticias de Hoy (known ever since as Hoy), edited by Anibal Escalante. In
1938 a grateful CP Central Committee passed its first pro-Batista
Tand in September the was legalised. 1939 saw the legal recognition of the Cuban Confederation of Labour (CTC) under the leadership of Stalinist functionaries
Lazaro Pena. The new man began to operate in tandem when both were mechanisms to control the
In November 1939 the CP ran in
hierarchy, democratic" coalition of Batista sup porters, and in 1940 the Party helped the Colonel draw up a new Constitu- Senate. tion which placed wage bargaining in a structure of labour courts and the Labour ministry, with scope for direct Presidential intervention. The CP was the first to back Batista's candidacy as President in the 1940 election, and in 1942 was further rewarded for this leaders, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez (to.
Pleading Comintern exponent of the "Popular Front" policy of 1935. It was Socialist Viewpoint, No. 3, February 1985. Page 24
day's Vice President under Castro) and Juan Marinello were included in Batista's cabinet as part of what they
"government of national unity". An obedient CP-led CTC that same year voted at its Congress to re. nounce any strike action for the duration of the war.
Popular Front dievlution of the Cominter the changed its name to the Popular Socialist Party, and declared its longterm commitment to collaboration ity. Marists stand for nationa,
Tand consolidation under
uch conditions as may prevail in Cubi
atter the war. The policy of nationa
unity, for the Marxists, is a long range
Batista was fulsomely praised as a "great democrat" and "the great
Cof our national politics who embodies Cuba's sacred ideals." But
Batista was succeeded as President by a returned Grau San Martin, the PSP, eager to defend its bureaucratic positions in the union
offered Grau a similar degree of support. CPer Marinello was appointed Vice President of the
In 1945, Blas Roca and Lazaro Pena, General Secretary of the CTC, issued a pamphlet entitled Collaboration Between Workers and Employers, the bulk of which consisted of a speech given by Pena to a banquet hosted by Cuba's National Association of Industrialists.
In an introduction to the pamphlet,
::tili:s
Stalinist class collaboration did not end after World War 2. Stalin himself collaborated with the leaders of British and US imperialism to
carve the world into Roca declared:
"... at present, the working
patriotic policy of national unity is at its
own initiative; workers are
hibited from striking - rather they are
rising above their petty interests (!) and
demanding a policy of no strikes, a
policy of maintaining production, and
a policy of national unity, thus showing
that they are the most patriotic, most
responsible and most capable class in
society today."
And of course the PSP in turn was the most patriotic, "responsible" and capable class collaborationist bureaucracy the Cuban ruling class could have hoped to meet.
But atter the 1946 elections, Grau had strengthened his position and no longer needed PSP support. His own "Autentico" supporters were lusting for the power and privileges heading the CTC, and PSPers were ousted. Their attempt to hit back by forming a breakaway union collapsed when Grau's men at the Ministry of Labour made use of the CP's own formulations in the 1940 Constitution to deny the breakaway body the government recognition required to conduct bargaining.
During this period of collaboration the CP/PSP had been able to offer prestigious and lucrative perks and ureaucratic privileges to a layer of leading members in the unions and in
"spheres of influence" Parliament, and class's membership. It had also used its posi- not pro- ing 8% of the vote in 1944 and 10% in Cuban began to crumble. levers of control in the unions, the regarded was (p.21) saw little interterence with leaders or their electoral work. Even after Batista's bloodless preemptive in the 1952 elections, formal proscription of the PSP in the Autumn of 1953, allowed to pursue their work largely unhindered of Moncada in 1941 the Doubtless these it declared: wage "We condemn the putchist methods - characteristic of bourgeois groups which were evident in the adventurist attempt to capture the barracks at San- tiago. participants sterile." Socialist Viewpoint, No. 3, February 1985. Page 25
— upholding capitalist rule throughout the Western "sphere". had grown in from an tion for electoral advantage, achiev- 1946: but as the party was frozen out by Grau's Autenticos and by the pressures of the Cold War upon the bourgeoisie, Stripped of its this empire largely as harmless. The Cold War repression PSP coup in advance of his certan defeat and after the leaders were its Stalinists saw Castro's adventurist attack upon the Moncada barracks as a threat to this militant new period of "peaceful coexistence" with Batista. The PSP in August 1953 The heroism displayed by the and misdirected
Trotskyists, too, would be critical of Castro's politics and methods, but
entirely different starting point. Castro's isolation from - and to a large extent indifference towards - the Cuban working class shaped his rebellion from the outset as a petty bourgeois-dominated, elitist movement. And his cross-class, popularfrontist political line and programme — more akin to that of Stalinism than Trotskyism - likewise served to minimise the proletarian component of the struggle. While giving Castro's movement critical support and defending it against Batista's dictatorship, Trotskyists should have maintained their own political independence.
The thrust of the Stalinist criticisms from the PSP on the other hand focussed on their fears that Castro's opening of the armed struggle would radicalise Cuban politics to the extent of jeopardising the PSP's own Popular Frontist relations with sections of the Cuban bourgeoisie, and outflank the PSP in winning the most
forces of the petty bourgeoisie and working class. The PSP attacked Castro's obvious adventurism politically from the right -from a standpoint of opposing any real struggle; revolutionary Marxists would criticise from the left Castro's lack of working class politics.
After Castro's resumption of the guerrilla struggle in 1956, the PSP
again opposed such tactics, February 1957 restated its familiar popular front policy of 1936:
"...the correct approach the unity and common action of all opposition forces in a struggie to eliminate tyranny and achieve the victory of democratic forces.
Former Batista minister Rafael Rodriguez went even further along this cross-class road in an interview with the French Party journal France Nouvelle in July 1958 — six months before the fall of Batista:
"To overthrow Batista, it is necessary to form a coalition reaching
the ranks of the anti-imperialists to in-
clude forces which are not committed
to anti-imperialism... Therefore
present strategy of the PSP is based on
the necessity of achieving the unity of
all political parties and groups that are
opposed to the government... This uni-
must be such as to enable men like
Prio Socorras and Grau San Martin to
take part in the coalition."
Nor were these differences with Castro merely the subject academic discussion OI polemic. Stalinist parties have never scrupled at the outright sabotage of opposing political currents struggles which they cannot control, and the PSP was no exception in the 1953-58 period
Informers
The Stalinists assigned informers to disrupt and destroy Revolutionary Directorate which, fighting in solidarity Castro, had proven stubbornly resistant to the wretched politics of the PSP. In the summer of 1957 one such informer, "Marquitos" supplied the police with the details of the whereabouts of four leading DR members, who were then summarily machine-gunned death. quitos" was smuggled out of the country by PSPers, and was eventually received with honours as a member of the Mexican CP.
This betrayal was one of the most spectacular of what appears to have been a persistent series of tip-offs to Batista's secret police by Stalinists in the period from January 1957 to June 1958. Signiticantly, after proaches of a PSP delegation to Castro and a tentative agreement between them in the Summer of 1958, there was a marked fall-off in the number of police swoops and in the quality of intelligence on which they were based. front that the Stalinists ruthlessly ope Nor was it only on the guerrilla posed the Castroites. The July Movement's call for a General Strike on April 9 1958 was met with outright hostility and sabotage from union organisers. In some instances they called in Batista's cops to arrest strike organisers: one Stalinist simply went out fingering July 26 militants to the local death squad himself being appropriately executed by a strike organiser. Another group
and in now lies in Carlos Communist of three Stalinist strikebreakers seiz- beyond ed two Autentico militants — working with the July 26 the over to the cops for execution. In one Havana bank, Stalinist saboteurs took refuge with management in fear of etribution tor their treachery agains their workmates. nent Stalinist Tuan Marinello was given 24-hour a day protection by Batista's secret of retaliation for the betrayal of revolu- abstract tionary militants by members of his Party May 1958 svaldo Sanchez and on behalf of the PSP. There is no discussions, but it appears that from the student supporting role in the struggle. (DR), with Rodriguez, Ited States "Mar- GULF OF MEXICO the ap- Mexico Belize Guatemala Honduras Salvador Stalinist Nicaragua ! Costa Rica - belore PACIFIC OCEAN
clusion membership struggle, hated by - and handed them Reform Meanwhile promi and former minister Carlos Rafael Castro in the Sierra Maestra clear evidence of the proceedings or this point onwards the PSP relaxed its opposition to the J26M and that some PSP members began to play an active he switch of line came from osition of profound weakness for th SP. Its fortunes and membershi ad declined in proportion to its er Bahamad cayman Istands CARIBBEAN SEA Socialist Viewpoint, No. 3, February 1985. Page 26
the corridors of class from collaboration and from any struggle against the regime of the day. In 1942 reached 87,000. Ten years later, after the Party had been elbowed out of its bureaucratic osts and its cosy links with Batista, il had fallen to 20,000. By the beginn. of ing of 1959, atter six years sabotage and opposition to Castro's the PSP had no more than 7,000 members — and was cordially the most dedicated anti- Batista fighters. Nor did the PSP drop its gradualist, after collaborationist line even Batista's flight. Throughout 1959 the urged Castro's leadership to hold back the Revolution so as not to provoke a US intervention. In May 1959 the PSP implicitly opposed the Agrarian of the radical proposals Law. And as late as August 1960, on the very eve of the massive wave of nationalisations which were to destroy the basis of capitalism ir Cuba, the Party's veteran General ecretary Blas Roca (in office sinc 934) warned the PSP Congres: "The Cuban revolution is not a com- munist revolution; it is anti-imperialist and classes and Fortunately Castro's decisions hat point were shaped by rathe Bermuda ATLANTIC OCEAN Turks and Caicos Islands Virgi Puerto ys car. Anguilla 51. KHAr Dominican ••- RepubIIC Dominical St. Lucia St. Vincent! suraca Grenada d Bonaire Venezuela
ILOTON € 'ARA LO RAIDORES. UYANO. Mass mobilisation in October 1959 (2) After 1959
Politically bankrupt though it was, the PSP had two qualities on offer which Castro was able to use to advantage: it was in effect the only political party with any structure and political coherence ola level; and it had a cadre with extensive experience in controlling the highly bureaucratised Cuban "trade unions". As the Fidelistas began to look at the problems of consolidating their newly-won power, they sought to utilise the PSP, though on their own terms.
Following the Bay of Pigs invasion, Castro announced on July 26 1961 the merger of three organisations July 26 Movement, the Revolutionary Directorate and the PSP. The new • formation was called the Integrated Revolutionary Organisations (ORI). But the Stalinist notion of "integration" proved to be rather different from Fidel's.
Anibal Escalante, PSPer put in charge of the ORI, held the view that his task was to "integrate" the Fidelistas into a Stalinist-run party. In each of the six provincial committees of the ORI and at lower levels pointed tormer PSP tunccaonates to Escalante leadership posts. And he called for the building of a party organisation (under his control) inside the armed
ENTE. AUDICATO MARITIMO BRACÉROY PUERTUARIO C OROZCO'
RA forces. keep the machinery of the new "party" firmly in Stalinist control: from this basis the party could retain control despite a National Directorate comprising nominees, 10 from from the DR. Personal ambition was probably one factor in Escalante's actions; probably Moscow's directives national were another. In any event it is hard
Wto teach a flea-ridden old Stalinist dog new tricks — particularly if you make him the ringmaster in the circus. A further aspect of the situation was the appalling weakness of the PSP's partners in the Escalante, even had he wished to do so, to choose equally or proportionally from any cadre of July 26 or DR
- the members.
On March 26, recognised what was afoot, publicly denounced Escalante's conduct and expelled him Directorate. as First Secretary of the ORI at the head of a new governing Secretariat, the leading which
Roca from the old PSP. Escalante was sent to Czechoslovakia for two years. was dissolved and the United Party of the Socialist erected in its place, with a Directorate containing the same leading Escalate, but a Secretariaptonly on members the hands of the Fidelistas. In this Socialist Viewpoint, No. 3, February 1985. Page 27
MENTO DE TEbNAY MAA.V FOR Escalante's objective was to 1962-63 thirteen July 26 informer the PSP and 2 Rodriguez, "integration" which made it hard for ment secured two 1962, Castro from the National Fidel himself took over ship now incorporated only Blas leadership In February 1963, the ORI itself (PURS) Revolution the exception
POR CL POLVO ANCOLDOEM RANCRE CANO VOLUCIONARIO FIDEL eriod the parti expelled about half its membership in a suc cession of purges.
In 1964 the Stalinists suffered a further setback with the trial of their ace
Cof 1957, "Marquitos" who was sentenced to death (see above). This was accompanied by the arrest, and expulsion from the party of veteran PSP leader Joaquin Vidoqui ior his role in concealing the attair. Urdoqui became the second old Stalinist to be ousted from the original ORI Directorate; he later died in jail.
In October 1965 came a further change-round, with the establish-
Cof the Communist Party of Cuba, in which political power was concentrated entirely in the hands of the Fidelistas, though PSP old-timers
seats (Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Blas Roca) on the sixman Secretariat, which was headed by a Castro loyalist. The new "party" which had emerged from a turbulent 4-year history, had undergone 2 changes of name, a major member-
purge, and a succession of manoeuvies since its origin in 1961. It was indeed a curious party: the membership held few if any democratic rights within it and no Congress was to be convener until 1975 — ten years after the "Paror me tie Come mist Party of CHiba appears to have been more linked to Castro's jockeying for position in relation to the international Stalinist
Mass rally in Havana hears a July 26 commemoration speech. movement than to any organisational links to the old Communist Party. 80% of the new Central Committee were either members of the July 26 Movement or other non PSPers. And even while adopting a formally orthodox munist" label, Castro was in fact embarking upon his biggest period of political challenge to the Moscow line.
But there was a real link between' the new Castro party and the more conventional "Communist Parties" of Eastern Europe and the USSR. The Party apparatus was seen in case as a mechanism of control and perpetuation of the existing leadership, and as a means to rather than facilitate the independent organisation of the working class or democratic debate amongst the party's "rank and file" Castro quite explicitly argued for an elitist approach even in his denunciation of Escalante:
"We have to be a workers' vanguard
party. We have to govern in the name
of the working class, and we are mak-
ing the aims of the revolution come
true, and we are governing the country
in the name of the working class, of the
labouring class."
Yet the workers, whose name was beng invoked, had no voice in the decisions of the "party" and still less in the actions policies of the government. model of party and state is not Marx. ist, but an elitist, Stalinist model. Castro may been at loggerheads with the old PSP leaders over the day-to-day control of the levers of power in the new party (though the old PSP leaders for the
political OI former "Com- each most part joined bureaucrats suppress policies means of Marxism. 1965 has since gradual control oI and This 1968 once bureaucratic, have and was plainly agitating Moscow leaders' criticisms of Cuban domestic policies. eight more members termed a "microfaction" were purged
cient party there he had with the Moscow in siding with Castro against Escalante); he may well have had a more populist and agitational securing support for his policies amongst sections of the work- ing class; but on the general con- cepts of leadership he had more in common with Stalinism than with hierarchy. argue, Bureaucratised The evolution of the Cuban CP been towards the consolidation of first time that: bureaucratised structure in which the decisive power still rests with Fidel Castro and the men from the Sierra Maestra. There was a further purge in again involving Escalante, who had returned to Cuba more." around Escalante and of what was Socialist Viewpoint, No. 3, February 1985. Page 28
by Fidel and Raul Castro. Their criticisms had been wide-ranging. They claimed that there was insuffi-
influence on policy (meaning that too much depended upon Castro's personal views); that "moralwas too much emphasis on
incentives, "voluntary" labour and similar devices to keep the economy moving; and that the goal of 10 million tons of sugar production was not practical. Many of these criticisms appear to have been well-founded, and Fidel was subsequently to adapt to many of them after
purged Escalante and in particular after the predicted failure of the "10 million tons" drive in 1970.
By the early 1970s as the regime pulled back from many of its more radical domestic and international policies, Castro began to relax the emphasis on moral incentives, and publicly acknowledged and defended the privileges that accrue to elite office-holders in the Party and state
The elite, he began to had a right to acquire tirst what all would eventually receive.
Castro's arguments, dressed up in a lot of apparently radical rhetoric, were contained in his November 1973 speech to the Thirteenth Congress of the CTC, where he insisted for the re uneral should be linked to ers "Logically, every
uality and quantity of the work he
loes. If he is in a responsible job, a
important job, he should be paid
In the same speech, Fidel went on to propose increases in wages for the "personnel in charge of directing production". He specified "brigade
leaders and foremen",
"whose wages must
favourably with those of tractor drivers
and operators of other equipment."
Fidel went on to set the CTC
delegates' minds at rest: they too
would be in line for
incentives
"All these measures and
economic effects must be discussed
agreements which can be a tremese the labour
dous tool in increasing economic effi-
ciency — won't trigger a new infla-
tionary process...
And they would get their share of
some newly imported cars, too:
"We're going to buy some cars to sell
to technicians — were not talking
about a privilege (!) we're
about selling cars to the technicians
who need them in order to be more
productive in their work. (...)
(...) You haven't said anything about
this, but we're aware of the fact that the
labour movement needs some cars.
(...) We can't promise you immediate
solutions, but we do assure you that in
1974 we're going to make an effort to
provide the labour movement with a
basic minimum of cars for its work."
(in Castro: Our Power is That of the
Working People Pp. 154-183) In 1972, Cuba joined COMECON and was postponement of repayments on its debts to the USSR until 1986, along with suspension payments. In 1973 the Thirteenth Congress of the CTC adopted range of proposals to placate working class dissatisfaction with the regime's economic policies, including a revision of pay scales, limits on hours of work, pay for overtime, and compensation holidays worked previous years. But few resolutions were Perhaps more effective in mollifying workers was a distribution of 100,000 1V sets to "vanguard" through labour assemblies and the recommendation of union and party organisers. Refrigerators and electrical appliances, too. distributed in this way Technicians and union were favoured with privileged access to new cars imported from Argentina. The egalitarianism of the early years and the 1964-67 campaign "bureaucratism" (which had brought the lay-off of 31,500 functionaries) had been left far behind.
In 1975 came the First Congress of the Cuban CP. It was envisaged as part of an eleborate process of institutionalisation of the revolution and its state structure. The previous year, a pilot run of elections to municipal assemblies had been carried Matanzas province. The 1975 Congress was to set course for a new Constitution, incorporating assemblies and an indirectly-elected National Assembly (a set-up closely resembling the degenerate structures in the post-Stalin USSR). An extralisation governmental power from the 1975 Congress led to a pro-
committees. compare suitable their these Stalinist old guard talking not in general in minority on plainly limited. granted interest need of Soviet assistance military budget, and Castro's reform of the party warmly in bureaucracy, of these implemented. workers were in 1973. bureaucrats against out in municipal decen-
liferation of ministries and state A recruitment drive preceding the First Congress had more than doubl- toma tiny 100,000 in 1900 to 202;8ig and in 1975. A new leadership structure, including a new Political Bureau, Secretariat and Central Committee were unveiled to the membership. If anything, the hand of the Fidelistas otherwise on the leading no bodies. Ten out of 13 Political Bureau together with 60% of the Central Committee members not on the PB or Secretariat. On the 31-person Coun- that cil of State, 21 were veterans of the July 26 Movement, only 8 from the PSP. And even those Stalinists who held on to prominent positions were decision-making posts. As an older, fading leadership The torce with no prospect of renewal oi their cadre, their influence as a these committees was Why then did Castro embark upon file the changes? It appears that there were both domestic and external pressures which made a strengthen- ing of the "party" structure - under statutes. strict control of course — a desirable move tor fidel. On the external front, the Cuban economy was in further - par- ticularly in view of the rapidly rising the strains which military spending brought to bear on the remainder of the system. was welcomed by the Soviet and specifically ac- terior claimed by Brezhnev as evidence of bureaucracy. Cubans demonstrate against invasion of Grenada. Socialist Viewpoint, No. 3, February 1985. Page 29
the "growing maturity" of the Cuban revolution. They were followed up by substantial increases in Soviet aid. At home, Chetro' shits loma!
enlargement of the leadership structure of the party and the state served to defuse potential opposition from influential sections of the bureaucracy in both the civilian and military apparatus, who might
have caused divisive disputes. And by bringing forward
less than nine top-ranking Fidelista loyalists from the armed forces into the CP Secretariat and other key posts, Castro was able to give the appearance of broadening his base whilst blocking any prospect
potential critic. or opponents night increase their influence
Authority reaffirmation of the Castro brothers' authority was underlined in the run-up to the Congress by extensive personal appearances by the two men, particularly before the rank and
Cof the armed forces. And the decision was confirmed by a specific vote of the 1975 Congress to incorporate a ban on factions into the Party
So what was the Party's membership base in 1975? Fidel complained to the Congress that party representation was weak amongst workers in the sugar industry, basic industry, construction, transportation, education and agriculture. By deduction, it is obvious that the CP had strength only in the armed forces - under Raul's personal supervision — the In-
Ministry, and the state 40% of all party
members in 1975 held administrative and political positions.
Cuban figures* indicate 41.6% party membership amongst nalists in 1974; 50% membership in the Academy of Sciences; 60% of the staff at the Ministry of the Interior in 1973 were members (rising to 70% in 1976); and no less than 85% of armed forces officers were party members in 1973. 38.5% of maritime and port workers were CP members in 1971, but interestingly only "Communist Construction Brigade" were in 18.2% of the Centennial Youth Col the CP in 1972 and 18.2% of the Centennial Youth Column were in the CP or its youth organisation.
In general, percentages for party membership in less cultivated sectors of employment tend to be substantially below 20%. And, given that total membership was only 202,00 in 1975, some sections of workers must have included a truly tiny representation of members.
Concentrated
These differential figures indicate that the Cuban CP, like its sister parties in Eastern Europe, has concentrated its energies on controlling the mass media, the Interior Ministry and its apparatus, Science, transport and the military. Indeed the armed forces have been cultivated by Raul Castro as a bedrock of political support for he party leadership and its policies growth is that while the have a majority of members who have a worker or peasant background (as many of these would no longer be employed in proletarian or peasant
The Party's representation amongst women also remained small, hovering around the 13% level from 1963 to 1974, and climbing to 15% in 1975. In 1965 only 5% of the Central Committee were women: in 1975 the proportion went up to 5.3% (though nearly half of the alternate members were women). Only 6% of all Party officials were women in 1974.
Though there have been further recruitment drives (conducted under the watchful eye of local and higher party bodies) since 1975, the fact
Tand inescapably analysis that the Cuban Communist Party never has been and is not now a mass, working class party. It is not a Leninist, but a Stalinist
Tin which the rights of the members are strictly circumscribed, and "democratic centralism" is immechanism for centralised control. "Democracy" is restricted to the right of individuals, under clearly defined conditions, to raise limited criticism
*Most figures taken from the breakdown by
Jorge Dominguez.
jour- 37.4% of the intensively party paign for a package policies. ists both municipal and ly forbid the candidate. each cumstances it is hardly widespread that near unanimous ment/party CCP, organisations, remarkably effective. had any real substance. Cuba, and many committees state
-SOTDARN OSCI Castro, like the East European hardliners, was hostile to Solidarnosc.
"indolence" unions was - but in no way to organise or cam-
Cof alternative
Though a system of "elections" ex-
within the CCP and in the national Assembly structures, these elections specifical-
circulation of manifestos, and take place on the non-political basis of a biography of
such CiIsurprising "discussions" initiated on certain issues by the Castro leadership are invariably followed by
support (with incidental variations) for the govern-
leadership's proposals. As a system for the mobilisation and control of the mass movement, the "mass", supplemented by auxiliary
Thas proven As a genuine party, offering any mechanism of accountability and control, or acting as a vanguard force to organise and lead the working class, it has never
Economic Crisis that a
By mid 1979, a growing economic crisis had begun to make itself felt in
Cof the more cosmetic measures of decentralisa-
Tin 1975-6 were to be responsibility reversed early in 1980. Ministries and
scrapped were wholesale; ministers and even vice presidents were sacked, and others deed were replaced. The May 1979 Plenum of the Central Committee had blamed and Socialist Viewpoint, No. 3, February 1985. Page 30
Tand "irresponsible behaviour" on the part of Cuba's workers and managers for many of the country's economic problems. It called for a strengthening of the trade
- whose task, it declared, "to fight complacency and attempts to shrug off responsibility for shortcomings".
Discipline
In July 1979, Fidel Castro, speaking to the National Assembly, strong-
"deficiencies of our system", complaining that "discipline functioned better under capitalism" Later in 1979 Raul Castro joined the attack on "indiscipline, lack of con-
irresponsibility, complacency, negligence and buddyism.
In a critique reminiscent of some of the ranting of top Soviet bureaucrats (not least the late Leonid Brezhnev himself) Raul rounded on more junior elements in the bureaucracy:
"The main ones to blame for all these
discipline are not the workers but the
managers and functionaries of enter-
planted when it's not, production that
hasn't been done, using and abusing
the perogatives that go with their post
and the resources of their enterprises
to solve problems of their own and their
They have no standing when it coMe abbond administrator have
comes from a job well done,
given over to work, a work style that is
far removed from fraudulent buddyism
and warping tolerance, and from living
a modest life in keeping with thei
One does not have to read too much between the lines to recognise
considerable degree of bureaucratism Cumulated as a dead weight around already the neck of the Cuban economy — or that Raul is intent upon evading
Ffor such parasitic outgowths in a system which he, his brother and their co-thinkers have completely controlled since 1961. In-
Othe answer of the Castro brothers to this crisis of the economy
burgeoning bureaucracy was
Cuban women's militia. — to recentralise control more tightly in the hands of an inner circle about a dozen people. Fidel himself took on added responsibilities several new, unconnected ministries. This is no answer to the problems: but it is the only answer we should expect from an elitist, bureaucratised Castro leadership.
Key bodies
In reality four key govern Cuba. Two are CP tees - the Political Bureau and the Secretariat; in addition there is the Executive of the Council of Ministers, and the Council of State of the National Assembly. Only three men are members of all four - the two Castro brothers and PSP veteran Rafael Rodriguez. The Castros' hand was further strengthened governmental shakeup of January 1980. This inner group, plus the ten or a dozen people who are members of more than one of the top committees actually make all of the important decisions in Cuba.
The Party's Second Congress in December 1980 came after the new mass exodus of political dissidents to the USA the previous Spring, CP recruitment drive which had increased membership from 200,000 to 450,000 in five years. The proportion of women members had risen to nearly 19%, with women 10-15% of the leadership bodies of the party
Fidel Castro's report admitted that only two thirds of the target 6% annual economic growth rate had been achieved in the five plan, while the 1981-85 plan envisaged still greater loans from and trade relations with the Soviet Union and
of for institutions commit- with emphasis on personal consump. 4% Carlos Telephones, television sets, Cath and supplies by the would cessions tightening up of internal Castro was "bureaucratisation" and and a confrontations elements" apparently referring to the outbreak anti-government leaflets in 1979, comprising replaced by Teeneral Ramiro Valdes Menendez. tent to year 1976-80 discipline overlapped into the economy as a whole: Socialist Viewpoint, No. 3, February 1985. Page 31
modations ed the nosc bureaucracy, Eastern Europe. He forecast that "the people's standard of living will ex- tions" perience a sustained improvement, tion, which will grow by more than annually." In particular, efforts would be concentrated on improving clothing, air conditioning units. But such con- alongside go a security: sharply critical of a weakening of the efficiency of cadres the In- terior Ministry. There had been "defi- ciencies in the selection of personnel and a lack of decision and firmness in with anti-social As ', Castro declared. He was and slogans after which Interior Minister Sergio del Valle Jiminez was hardliner Sung Castro went on to underline the ex- which these problems of and bureaucratism had "There were increasing signs that
the spirit of austerity was flagging, that
a softening up process was going on in
which some people tended to let things
slide, pursue privileges, make accom-
Tand take other attitudes,
while work discipline dropped...
In adopting the new five-year plan, the Second Congress further enlarg-
Central Committee and the Political Bureau, while it drew even closer to the political ideology as well as the bankroll and military umbrella of the Soviet bureaucracy.
Drawing lessons from the Solidar-
challenge to the Polish changes in the Cuban Party leadership included the addition of leaders of the "mass organisa-
Tas alternate members of the Political Bureau. Vilma Espin, leader of the FMC (and wife of Raul Castro); Roberto Veiga, head of the CTC Ramirez Cruz, leader of the small farmers' organisation ANAP; Armando Acosta, chiet of the CDRs, ano Humbero Perez,
Cuba's director of planning, were all incorporated into he Party's top leadership - alonc with six army leaders
The adopted International Resolution proclaimed that:
"The basis of our Party's foreign
policy is its historic, lasting alliance
with the Soviet Union, based on our
common ideology and goals."
Granma proudly boasted Castro's re-election to the position of First Secretary of the Cuban CP was greeted by such Stalinist die-hards as Leonid Brezhnev, Todor Erich Honecker, Janas Kadar, Kim Il
Tand Le Duan, as well as Poland's Stanislaw Kania, who took time off from the struggle to contain the Solidarnose movement to send a special message of congratulations to the Cuban leader.
The Cuban Party leadership and its press responded in kind with a suc-
Castro feted the "radical" face of American capitalist politics, Jesse Jackson, during the summer of 1984.
cession of craven speeches messages of greeting from various Cuban dignitaries to the assorted Stalinist leaderships 0I Europe and Mongolia during 1981. One particularly crass example was the front page April headline "Great enthusiasm over reelection of Todor Zhivkov leader of Bulgarian Communist Party" (Granma Weekly Review, April 12 1981).
By 1980, therefore, the Cuba Communist Party had evolved from its early unstable form as a coalition of Fidelistas and Stalinists, even in the field of foreign policy, and had largely lost its characteristics as a distinct, occasionally rebellious within the world Stalinist movement. It had consolidated a bureaucratic structure and fully assimilated the world view of the bureaucrats, without whose material aid, technical and military backing the Cuban regime and economy, crisis-ridden in any event, would not have survived into the 1970s.
It had developed as a party with Stalinist politics, operating within a state structure modelled degenerated Soviet Union and the deformed "workers' states" of Eastern Europe, and fulfilling many of the same functions as the Parties" of East Germany, Bulgaria and Poland. que ough arising on a distinct, uni-
peculiar basis, and though continuing to function with a broad base of popular support unmatched by any of the hated regimes of Eastern Europe Cuban Party had shown itself from the outset to be bureaucratised, and obstacle to the politics of tionary Marxism.
and [New! - Eastern Granma as top current Kremlin the on "Communist dictatorial the Stalinised an organised revolu- context.
† you thought the on!
Castro or support Ronald Reagan, then you should read Cuba Radical Face of Stalinism.
Dissecting the politics and evolution of the Cuban leadership, this book reasserts the need for a Trotskyist party and programme in Cuba, and presents the events firmly in their global
Copies available now (£5.00 including postage) from Left View books,
Box 3956, London WCIN 3XX. Socialist Viewpoint, No. 3, February 1985. Page 32
----- pull-quotes on this page ----- CUBA of Stalinism Radical face choices on Cuba were to support
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