Syrian strategy backfires
"Any partition of federalism or communalis cantonisation or regions
For influence is unacceptable to us - us to interests l because it is a danger to us... it
This hard-hitting statement Syrian vice-president Abd al Halim Khaddam, summed up — about two years ago the historical Syrian relationship with events in Lebanon.
Since the independence Lebanon in 1943, Syria has always shown extensive interest in Lebanese aflairs. First, the formation of United Arab Republic in 1958 (union of Syria and Egypt) exacerbated the contradictions in the sectarian state, and created conditions for the civil war.
After the collapse of the Union in 1961, Syria's interests only to be rekindled by the rise of the Palestinian movement. 1970s onwards, Syria set out to play a major leadership role in the region, and sought actively to establish a greater influence over the PLO.
It intervened with regularity in Lebanon - influencing the election of 1972 and the composition of the cabinet — up to the civil war of 1975.
In the civil war, spoiling role for a long time, intervened on the eleventh hour to rescue the Maronites from a severe defeat, and turned its fire against the coalition of Lebanese "leftists" Palestinians, depriving them of a resounding victory. From there on Svria decided to play it safe and stationed a garrison force of over 40,000 troops on about Lebanon's territory.
Their presence was regulating two major contingencies: first, the rise of radical Palestinian/Muslim combination outside of Syrian control, which could bring Syria into war with Israel: and second, the hardening Lebanese fragmentation which would inevitably complicate management of Lebanese affairs and create a dangerous precendent for Syria itself.
To guard themselves against such probabilities, the presence of a whole army has proved to be only a limited success. While it was useful for in Lebanon
By JACK GOLDBERG of sectarian completely any by of the diminished,
From the after playing a
Syria and
50% of aimed at of up
Syria's keeping an eye unlock the political situation.
their political stance to suit status-quo.
will remain contradictions
Druze
Damascus.
brokered between Israel country imperialism".
advances the with other
This on unpredictable a new developments, it remained a costly operation but with little scope to solution.
For this, the Syrians had to change the the
Socialist Viewpoint No. 16 April 1987 p25 complexities of the swift-shitting conjunctures. At one time it suited them to play the role of spoilers, at others they were guardians of the
Today they have become initiators, since they have understood that they vulnerable until some measure of Lebanese stability can be established on Syrian terms; the old constitutional order was something of the past - in fact, it never worked properly, except in exacerbating the of the state and precipitating its disintegration. The time was ripe for a new constitution accepted by Christian, Muslims and alike and supported by
The turning point for the situation arose after the collapse of the US-
"May 17 agreement" and the Gemayel government. Syria claimed this as a major victory, giving it new status on the Arab stage as the only Arab confronting "Zionism and
Whatever were the real factors that created conditions for the aborgation of the agreement, Syria reaped major
- amongst them irrefutable role of arbiter of the destinies of Lebanon. Faced with a mosaic of warring factions and a de facto cantonisation, Syria needed new conditions to assert its role.
As a prelude to coax all the communal factions into line Syria operated through proxies, exploiting differences between each competing group, using one element against another to prevent a linkage powers and making it Impossible for any one single element to become too powerful.
subtle and complex manipulation has gradually pushed all the leaders towards Damascus. Pilgrimages to President Hafez al Assad have become the order of the day. Each leader had to frequently shuttle to seek advice and check out Syrian links with their rivals. From there on, Syria won its undisputed role of supreme mediator.
It then became possible to press for constitutional order which cannot be anything but a compromise
Between the Maronites' entrenched historical position and
"leftists" demands for the abolition of all concessional checks
(Below) Lebanese leader Gemayel (left) with Syria's Assad.
and balances, compromise
*National incorporating leaders.
local problem.
beleaguered with political formation.
on a ranks.
own puppet".
militia leadership.
retreated from their conditions
Syria.
different from attaining momentum.
another.
between the
Din) on the other.
the troops, maintained fundamentalists
Syria's and
Democratic Party.
areas are
Christian elements
Social of much
La needed to be which went no further than parity for all factions involved. This culminated in July 1984 in the formation of a
Unity the main
However what seemed the first measure to stabilise the Lebanese arena has proved in practice a paper exercise difficult to implement. The governmental leaders still had to trip to Damscus to resolve virtually every
They their own communities and turned increasingly to Syria, which now has a finger on the pulse of every major
In the Maronite camp, despite the Lausanne agreement with Khaddam constitutional compromise, Amin Gemayel found it difficult to stem the tide of resentment within his
Damascus him to strengthen his powers over Maronite institutions against a sturdy hard-line Maronite reaction accused him of being a
This came to a head when Samir Geagea, commander of the Lebanese forces — the most powerful Maronite
- led a rebellion, which was rapidly quashed by the Phalange
His replacement, Hobeika, was hand-picked to satisty Syria' ultimatums. However, adapting to Syria's new supremacy, the majority of Maronites have not "Federal Solution" for the Lebanese question, and have opted for an ordered retreat, playing for time until have
On the Muslim front, Syria faced and more problems. On the one hand needed to promote the growth of the newly-emerged Shiite movement to equal status with the Druze; but at the same time they sought to prevent it an one section of the Shiites against
Hence the Amal leadeship more traditional clerics, represented by vice-chair of the supreme Shiite Council Sheik Mohammed Shams adone hand fundamental Hizbollah cells on the
Inside the zone occupied by Syrian political altogether different. In the northern Tripoli region a very shaky truce was between allies Franjiyeh's Marada Party, the Syrian
Nationalist the reasonable struck
Government"
factional also were problems within encouraged which
(Bottom) Samir Geagea and Lebanese armed forces
"Syrian
Elie despite of a option deteriorated for complex it unacceptable
For this, Syria played jockeying
(the and the balance was
Sunni the of Sheik Shaaban the
Arab
The other rural controlled by three ex-president
Damascus despite a bitter fight for
Lebanese forces in a small enclave in
Marada Party and control for the Khoura in July 1984.
Party (SSNP) in
Beharre.
Both
Khoura and
SSNP are all traditional allies of
The situation in the Bequaa Valley the
Socialist Viewpoint No. 16 April 1987 p26
1s equally complex: the alignment comprises fundamentalist movements as well as Phalange forces in the town of Zahle. Again Syria acted here as a balance between the two, reflecting the new game between East and West Beirut.
While in all those instances Syria has managed successfully to keep in check the most conundrum, "the war of the camps" has proved its day of reckoning. siege of the Palestinian camps in May 1985 by the Amal militias, despite its heavy toll of dead and wounded, was a mere dress rehearsal for the onslaught of the camps last October.
For nearly 3 months, Syria's encouragement, laid seige to the camp of Rashidiye in the southern outskirts of Tyre. PLO responded by launching their biggest offensive since 1982, strategic villages east of Sidon and breaking Amal's communication and supply lines. They then used ground they gained to Amal's lift of its seige in Rashidiye.
On November 4, fighting broke out in Bourj al Barajneh refugee camp in the southern outskirts of Palestinian factions set aside their political differences battle against Amal's siege.
Throughout November, launched attack after attack on the Rashidiye camp. Ain el Hilwe and finally Myeh Myeh camps. Around the end of November, some 1,000 Palestinians pushed out of the Sidon camps and disloged Amal from the hills around the towns Maghdousheh. Despite counterattacks by Amal, Palestinian fighters held Maghdousheh became the symbol of Palestinian resistance steadfastness. Amal then went hell for leather attacking on all fronts with Bourj al Barajneh and particular receiving the full brunt of their offensive.
The death toll for November alone reached more than 500. Syria lost its grip on the situation frequently summoning warlords to Damscus to find ways of establishing balanced conditions for a ceasefire. All the different attempts at truce-making crumbled until an authoritative intervention secured a lasting December 5th.
The political fall-out of frenetic months is Syria's painful recruiting Lebanon's destiny was suddenly put into question. New appeared in the Lebanese equation. First, there had been a realignment of all the PLO factions shoulder to shoulder against This reconciliation was strengthened by background talks on an imminent reunification of the PLO and recall of the Palestine National Council.
local
Shiite inextricable
The real
Amal, with fighters capturing the negotiate
Beirut, and united in
Amal the unholy alliance of Arafat with the of
Maronite President Gemayel. On renewed
November 11, Arafat apeared on the
Beirut's Maronite TV charging that firm as
"Israel and Syria-backed Amal have conspired to and
Lebanon"
Gemayel for granting 70,000 exiled
Shatilla in despite all the by Iran ceasefire on those far-reaching:
of parameters fighting
Amal.
the
Socialist Viewpoint No. 16 April 1987 p27 that
Maronites can
The return
But
Another unpredictable feature was in oust the PLO from thanking
Amin
Syrian tanks move in Palestinians who hold Lebanese nationality the passports which they have been denied since 1982.
This alliance underscored the fact
Syria's manipulation of the explode in its face. of Arafat to Lebanon would undoubtedly upset the fine balance set by the Syrians in favour of bolstering the Sunni component of the political spectrum.
the most important development is the rise of the Hizbollah who gained considerably from the isolation of Amal. Their role in the war of the camps opened up the way for Iran to be officially involved truce making, spreading at a stroke its influence as a recognised power in the Lebanese arena.
The ability of the fundamentalists to play a bigger role in the Lebanon, as well as the increased activities of some of their underground military
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