Would you buy c
ısed alibi from this
man?
The more President Botha weeps crocodile tears and protests his innocence, the more suspicious appears the sudden death in an air crash of Mozambique President Samora Machel.
Only a week previously, South African military chief General Malan had been publicly boasting that Machel's regime had been driven to the brink of collapse at the hands of the ruinous campaign of economic sabotage and terrorism carried out by the South African-backed murder squads of the so-called Mozambique "National Reistance Movement" (MNR).
Yet as the news of the air crash on South African soil hit the news around the world, South African ministers were suddenly falling over themselves to pay tribute to Machel's statesmanship, "pragmatisim" and protest their own innocence.
There is no doubt that the overt and covert South African military offensive against Mozambique had taken a toll of Machel's willpower, and had forced the humiliating bi-lateral Nkomati non- aggression "pact" of 1984 in which Machel agreed to curb the activities of ANC forces within his borders - while the Pretoria regime has cynically continued to funnel weapons and cash to their mercenary MNR gunmen.
There is certainly some doubt over how much Botha actually wanted to remove the whole regime in Maputo rather than press- gang it into concessions. From a political point of view there could be no way in which the MR - which lacks any popular base of support - could take power without itself becoming immediately embroiled in an equally protracted and expensive disruptive cold war against the ousted FRELIMO forces, who would have no choice but to fight for their own physical survival. However attractive the concept of a pliable puppet government in Mozambique might appear to Pretoria, it is not a viable possibility: it would be a vast, open-ended economic and military commitment.
Botha argues he had no interest in killing off the most influential figure in the Mozambique government after he had shown himself so willing to deal with South Africa.
The political succession in Maputo can be no certainty, and the impact of a new leader could even be to make a more determined effort at finding fresh international support for a stand against Pretoria — perhaps by a turn towards the Soviet Union.
Despite Machel's earlier more radical rhetoric and early policies of nationalisation (later largely abandoned) the extent of Mozambique's "leftism" and challenge to apartheid rule has been
Botha restricted from the start by this grinding poverty in the aftermath of the FRELIMO victory over Portuguese colonialism in 1975, and in the light of the country's long- standing economic dependence upon South Africa.
Unlike Angola, which secured substantial Cuban military support in 1976 to repulse a co-ordinated attempt by CIA- South African-reactionary forces, and has been able to use oil and mineral revenues to finance extensive Cuban (and thus Russian) support since the, Mozambique ha always stood largely alone, with only the most tokenistic Soviet military or economic backing. Even the Thatcher government has recently been more supportive than Moscow.
But while the practical military challenge from Maputo to Pretoria's armed might has not been great, and the hysterical denunication of Machel as a pawn of the Kremlin has alwasy been a crude deception, there is another sense in which Mozambique, like Angola, has by its very independence played a crucial role in the development of revolutionary struggle in Southern Africa.
The guerrilla victories of FRELIMO and the MPLA that helped snap the brittle fascist regime in Portugal in 1974, and drove out the colonists from their most southerly territories in Africa, gave renewed impetus to the black struggle against the white settler regime in Rhodesia and in South Africa itself, which erupted into action in the Soweto events of 1976.
Though the Rhodesian regime was far weaker internally and internationally, and eventually unable to resist imperialist
for a deal with a much larger black majority, the South African regime
By HARRY SLOAN
has also been weakened by the existence
of black governments on each side. It has
consistently sought means to humiliate,
destabilise and if possible overturn these
governments.
South African troops and planes have
systematically violated the borders of each
of its black neighbours - and maintained
a prolonged occupation of whole areas of
Angola, partly to pursue its war against
the liberation movement in Namibia.
Fom the very outset, South African
arms and aid have backed the brutish
activities of UNITA and the MNR
movements which have developed their
own links with the South African military and political establishment, and have their own motives for pursuing the fight against
Angolan and Mozambique
governments.
There are real doubts as to the extent to which Botha can dictate the precise policies and actions of the MNR, which he has apparently attempted to restrain.
There must also be doubts whether some of South Africa's own hard-nosed army chiets would not relish the chance to pull what they see as the lynch-pin from the Mozambique regime, and notch up their most spectacular step so far in rolling back the anti-imperialist gains of 1975 whose very existence they see as a provocation.
Indeed while Botha claims without great conviction that Machel was a centrepiece of South African plans for the region, a picture is emerging of an alternative, aggressive strategy by the Pretorian racists. This would involve striking back against sanctions by seeking to impose their domination over the nominally "independent" Mozambique, which could then be used as a grand sanctions-busting "front" for South African business dealings on the world market.
As we go to press, the riddle of the crash has not been solved — but the least likely variant appears to be a genuine accident. Only time will tell if Machel was the victim of bad weather, poor engineering, a rogue guerrilla, a maverick general or a concerted Pretoria counter-offensive.
For the hard-pressed, starving and exploited black masses of Mozambique, the concluson in each case is the same.
The fight has to be stepped up to crush the vicious MNR, whose victims threaten further miseries: and it is vital to develop beyond the eclectic, populist zig-zag economic policies of Machel and the FRELIMO leadership to an economic plan controlled by the workers and poor peasants — for which solidarity and support can be developed internationally
Viewpoint
November-December