Milosevic trial rocks Balkans
The appearance of Slobodan Milosevic in the dock at the Hague was greeted with amazement by many people throughout former Yugoslavia.
They had never expected Milosevic to face trial for war crimes. Once they had recovered from the shock they expressed great joy at Milosevic being put on trial. Such sentiments among Milosevic’s victims are totally understandable. Nevertheless they are misguided.
Socialist Outlook has not taken the view that Milosevic should never face the Hague tribunal, though we did not demand that he should do so.
We have consistently argued that the rebuilding of working class unity throughout former Yugoslavia demanded that any trial of Milosevic for war crimes should take place in Serbia.
However, as I wrote in SO 44 "if the Yugoslav government did freely decide to hand over Milosevic I certainly wouldn’t advocate taking to the streets to oppose it." I also argued that "we utterly oppose any attempts by western powers to bully the Yugoslav government into handing over Milosevic."
By no stretch of the imagination could the Serbian government be said to have ‘freely decided’ to hand over Milosevic. The transfer was carried out extremely rapidly and involved highly irregular, possibly illegal, behind the scenes manoeuvres.
Moreover, the decision was taken because western powers, in particular the United States, offered massive bribes (£1 billion) in the form of aid, to the Serbian and Yugoslav governments. If Milosevic were not handed over, then the people of Serbia would be left to starve.
Milosevic’s pending trial is not, therefore, the triumph for ‘justice’ that most bourgeois journalists have claimed. On the contrary: it is a triumph for blackmail, bullying and bribery, led by the government of the United States.
The handing over of Milosevic has hardly brought stability to the region. In fact the actions of the unelected tribunal are now causing considerable instability.
Divisions between Yugoslav president Vojislav Kostunica and Serbian prime minister Zoran Djindjic have increased with, Kostunica denouncing the handing over of Milosevic while Djindjic has claimed that Kostunica went along with the decision.
In a recent article in the Belgrade daily Politika, Kostunica expressed fears that the break-up of Yugoslavia will continue and issued dire warnings against attempts to redraw boundaries throughout the Balkans, sentiments echoed by Russian president Vladimir Putin.
Although Kostunica referred specifically to Macedonia his article appeared shortly after Montenegrin president Milo Djukanovic announced he would hold a referendum on independence, probably next March.
Attempts to comply with the demands of the Hague tribunal have also had serious consequences in Croatia. Social Democratic Party prime minister Ivica Racan agreed (under protest) to the handing over of two high-ranking military figures, widely believed to be General Rahim Ademi, and retired General Ante Gotovina. Four members of the Social Liberal Party, junior partners in government, resigned in protest. Racan now faces a vote of confidence, probably on Sunday July 15.
The decision to cooperate with the Hague tribunal was, in fact, taken by the previous government of president Franjo Tudjman, (whose death possibly prevented him from being indicted as a war criminal alongside Milosevic). This has not stopped the nationalist HDZ, the party founded by Tudjman, from opposing any attempts to indict Croats.
The HDZ has been actively organising protests against the Racan government alongside veterans’ groups. Last December a massive rally was held in Split in protest against the arrest of another Croatian General.
Recently a riot took place in Split after the local football team Hajduk Split lost 2-0 to Dinamo Zagreb in a Croatian cup match. (The Zagreb team have now reverted to their traditional name after it was forcibly changed by Tudjman from the ‘too communist’ Dinamo to Croatia Zagreb).
The riot was not simply a reflection of traditional hostilities between football rivals. It had political elements. There is considerable hostility in Split, where unemployment is high, to the relatively wealthy Zagreb. The HDZ has strong support in Split and many Hajduk fans carried banners supporting the HDZ and denouncing the government.
Oddly, both sport and Split may have combined to save the Racan government. Goran Ivanisevic’s triumphant return to Split was greeted by a crowd of 150,000 people and led to the opposition deciding to call off planned anti-government demonstrations and threats to blockade road and rail links to the major holiday region of Dalmatia.
The Croatian tourist industry is only just recovering from the previous blockade of Dalmatia. Ironically that was carried out by pro-Milosevic Serbs waging war against Croatian independence.
Racan claims he is hopeful of winning the vote of confidence but this is only a temporary reprieve. The current national euphoria surrounding Ivanisevic’s Wimbledon victory will not last.
The more Racan tries to comply with the Hague tribunal the less likely his government will survive. The most likely winners of new elections are the HDZ who have pledged to tear up the limited (and never implemented) concessions made by Tudjman.
The handing over of Milosevic has also done nothing to arrest the moves to civil war in Macedonia. Milosevic, in fact, was already in prison in Serbia when fighting started in Macedonia.
Although the latest cease-fire appears to be holding, for the moment, negotiations between the Macedonian government and leaders of the Albanian minority have made little progress.
The government has rejected Albanian demands for equal status with Macedonians guaranteed in a rewritten constitution, claiming this would lead to a break-up of the country.
Like its Yugoslav and Croatian counter-parts, the Macedonian government also finds itself torn between complying with western demands and its own survival.
When they agreed to allow the withdrawal of National Liberation Army forces, the parliament in Skopje was besieged by Macedonian nationalists demanding much stronger military action against Albanian fighters.
In order to save himself President Boris Trajkovski then launched a massive military campaign against the NLA.
The net result is increased support for the NLA, a hardening of Macedonian nationalism and total lack of progress in peace talks.
While western governments have made some criticisms of Macedonian military actions these are totally hypocritical.
Macedonian troops have been trained by NATO, and NATO states have made plain their opposition to any Albanian secession.
Moreover, NATO has announced it will send troops to Macedonia only when a lasting truce has been agreed.
The main role of NATO troops will be to disarm the NLA but as the NLA are excluded from the talks it is highly unlikely they will agree to lay down their arms.
Since NATO states are unwilling to risk the lives of their own soldiers then the Macedonian army will have to do the dirty work for them. Far from reducing the risk of civil war NATO’s intervention makes it more likely.
In that situation socialists should have no hesitation in supporting the right of the Albanian minority to secede.