THE DEFEAT of Slobodan Milosevic has been welcomed throughout the Balkans. Kostunica has been able to cobble together a government, including members of Milosevic's party. He has been able to remove some key figures of the previous regime from major posts. He also appears to have been able to ride out the factory occupations that forced the dismissal of some former Milosevic officials. However many issues remain unresolved, and many potential conflicts loom. GEOFF RYAN reports.
T he Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 'has been rapidly admitted to the United Nations, at the urging of US envoy Richard Holbrooke. Yet the future of the Yugoslav state is by no means assured.
Relations between Serbia and Montenegro remain cool, with Montenegrin president Milo Djukanovic demanding redefining of the relationship between the two countries. For the west, however, relations with Serbia (with a population of ten million) are of much greater importance than with six hundred thousand Montenegrins.
Holbrooke's pressure for immediate admission of Yugoslavia to UN membership was designed to head off Montenegrin demands for a separate seat in the UN. In the past Montenegrin leader Djukanovic was feted by western governments (who chose to forget his past support for Milosevic), and urged to pursue policies independent of Belgrade.
Now Milosevic has gone, the west has made it clear that all thoughts of Montenegrin independence be abandoned and Dinkanavie must subordinate himselt to Kostunica.
Significantly there have been no demands from western governments for the withdrawal of the extra troons sent to Montenegro by Milosevic on the eve of the elections that led to his downfall. The cynicism of western governments is absolutely clear.
Holbrooke also managed to press-gang Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia into abandoning attempts to link Yugoslav admission to the UN to claims for a redistribution of the assets of the old state, which were taken over by the Milosevic regime after the break-up of Yugoslavia.
The four former Yugoslav republics want their share of the assets and property held by Yugoslavia in 1990, estimated at $100 billion. Although Kostunica has taken a more conciliatory position than Milosevic, negotiations are likely to be drawn out and bitter. R elations between Bosnia and Kostunica are also strained after the Yugoslav president attended a ceremony for the reburial of the virulently nationalist and antiCommunist poet Jovan Ducic, who died in the United States in 1943.
Kostunica attended the ceremony, held at Trebinje in the Republika Srpska, at the invitation of the Serb entity's deputy president Mirko Sarovic, a member of Radovan Karadzic's party the SDS (Serbian Democratic Party).
The timing of Kostunica's visit was significant. It came immediately after a week of attacks on Muslims by Serb students in Brcko, protesting against sharing school buildings with Muslim students.
Broko was the scene of some of the worst ethnic cleansing by Serb militias in the early Kosovars press their case for independence, while nationalist Kostunica (inset) ponders his options stages of the Bosnian war. Although it was de facto part of Republika Srpska, the final status of the Brcko region was left out of the Dayton settlement. In 1999 the international arbitration commission ruled that the region should become a neutral condominium, overlapping both the Muslim-Croat federation and Republika Srpska, a decision bitterly resented by Serb nationalists, especially the organisers of Kostunica's visit to Trebinje.
The visit also came only two weeks before elections in Bosnia, in which the SDS are expected to do well in Republika Srpska. At the very least his visit will be seen as tacit support for the SDS hard-liners. T he major unresolved problem remains Kosova. Last weekend saw municipal elections. For most Kosovar Albanians the elections were not about municipal matters; they were a referendum on the status of Kosova.
The elections saw a big defeat for the two parties led by former KLA commanders, the PDK (Democratic Party of Kosova) of Hashim Thaci and the AAK (Alliance for the Future of Kosova) of Ramush Haradinaj.
The victory of Ibrahim Rugova's LDK (Democratic League of Kosova) does not, however, imply the defeat of Albanian nationalism or demands for Kosovan independence. Rugova may be more amenable to discussion and negotiation than the former KLA leaders but he is undoubtedly in favour of independence for Kosova. He did, after all, declaré Kosova independent during the Milosevic years declaration totally ignored by every single western government.
Rugova's political come-back is certainly impressive. He was effectively side lined at the end of the war br the leaders of the KLA. His party had lost large amounts of support, partly because it had failed to end Serbian rule, partly because during the war Rugova appeared on Serbian TV in discussions with Milosevic and partly because of its corruption. Rugova's victory is even more impressive because although it has been presented as a 'victory for moderation' he was not the favoured candidate of the US, which backed Thaci. No doubt unconsciously, Thaci recognised his dependence on the US in a pre-election speech in Prishtina when he declared 'You can choose between the new political class who brought the most powerful allies [NATO] to Kosova, or the old political class i.e. Rugoval which spent ten years making compromises with Milosevic.
Thaci's defeat was primarily a reaction against the corruption surrounding sections of the old KLA leadership and the involvement of some of them with criminal gangs. It also expressed a belief among many Kosovars that Rugova would be more acceptable to Belgrade, as he has spoken out in support of the rights of Kosovan Serbs and therefore more likely to be able to negotiate independence. "The US, which has no demands for independence within its borders, is currently far less hostile to Kosovar independence than the European governments, several of which do." However, by backing 'the old political class the majority of Kosovars have also called into question - in a very embryonic way certainly - not just 'the new political class' but also 'the most powerful allies' and their future role in Kosova. US support for Thaci reflects differences between the US and European governments over Kosova's future status. The US is currently far less hostile to Kosovar independence than the Europeans. The US has no demands for independence within its borders, whereas several European governments do face such pressurcs. K osovar independence would strengthen separatist demands in a number of countries. And Belgrade is of much greater importance to European governments than Prishtina. Hence European governments remain implacably opposed to independence. Holbrooke, the main architect of US policy in the Balkans, no doubt also had one eye on the US elections. A Bush victory would possibly see the withdrawal of US troops from the Balkans and a reassessment of American international priorities. By encouraging Kosovar aspirations for independence and calling for early parliamentary elections Holbrooke may well have been trying to create conditions in which it is far more difficult for the US to withdraw.
By backing Thaci, the main KLA leader, he may also have been hoping to minimise the risk of conflict between NATO troops and Kosovars who feel betrayed, since Thaci is clearly tied to 'the most powerful allies'.
The overthrow of Milosevic makes such conflicts more, not less, likely. The overwhelming majority of Kosovar Albanians have made clear their refusal to be a part of Serbia, whoever in government in Belgrade.
Their vote is a decisive rejection of UN Resolution 1244 which gives • Yugoslavia sovereignty over Kosova. It is a decisive rejection of that part of the resolution that gives Yugoslav troops the right to return to Kosova, a policy already being advocated by both Kostunica and Zoran Djindjic.
Socialist Outlook continues to support the clearly expressed wish of the majority of Kosovars for independence. It is patently obvious that the only way they will remain part of Serbia is by repression and denying them the right to self determination. It is also clear that the main role of NATO troops in the immediate future will be to deny the Kosovars the right to independence.
We call for the immediate recognition of an independent Kosova - and the withdrawal of NATO troops.