Chechnya
Why Putin picked up Russia's left-over war
AS MORE AND MORE evidence comes out that Russia has been responsible for war crimes in its determination to deny self-determination to the people of Chechnya, Alan Thornett looks at the issues behind the war.
Russia's current war in Chechnya is a leftover from the old Soviet Union, which became a "prison house of nations" par excellence.
The USSR consisted of 14 Union Republics, which theoretically had independence up to the right to secede, and 20 Autonomous Republics which did not.
Although the rights of the Union Republics was a sick joke in USSR under Stalinist control, once the USSR broke up, things changed dramatically.
A massive vote for independence in the Ukraine (and a crisis over the seizure of the USSR's Baltic fleet) resulted in thirteen Union Republics gaining their independence. The result was the formation of the Russian Federation inside a newly created CIS - a loose and unstable formation dominated (to the extent it could be dominated) by Russia.
Socialist Outlook not only supported the right of all the republics to secede but backed their decision to do so when this was what was democratically decided. We felt that in the concrete conditions there was no other option to exercise real self determination - despite our criticisms of many of the leaderships' involved
The only Autonomous Republic which refused to be incorporated into the Russian Federation at that time was Chechnya.
In the autumn of 1991, a few months after the August failed coup and the effective collapse of the USSR (and at the time the Union Republics, led by the Ukraine, were demanding independence) the Grozny Supreme Soviet was stormed and Dudayev took power.
Ingushetia, which had been a part of the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya, was not involved. It broke away from Chechnya and voted to remain a part of the Russian Federation.
Dudayev himself was a rather batty former Soviet air force general who commanded a wing of Soviet nuclear bombers in Estonia. It was a mark of the weakness of the Chechen national movement that Dudayev, who was a product of the Soviet system and decorated for outstanding service in Afghanistan, so rapidly became the leader of this movement.
In the event Moscow did not at this point oppose the Chechen revolution. In fact Dudayev phoned Khasbulatov, who was a Chechen and Speaker of the Russian Parliament (the first Chechnyan to hold such a position) to ask him if the tanks would be sent in from the Federal barracks.He was told no. However, Khasbulatov quickly became an opponent of the Dudayev regime, and moved a resolution in the Russian Parliament declaring it invalid. After that Chechnya was regarded by Russia as an unacceptable rogue state, and Dudayev was to be removed as soon as possible..
Why Chechnya was so different from the other Autonomous Republics is a complex question, but there are some obvious factors. The Chechens were brutally oppressed by the Stalinised USSR - as they had been under the Tsarist Empire. The national oppression of the Chechens under Stalin was extreme.
There was a massacre of Chechens in the late 1930s and in 1944 the entire Chechen nation of half a million was, along with the Ingushetes, transported at a few hours notice by Stalin lorries and cattle trucks to Kazakhstan. There they stayed in wretched conditions until they were rehabilitated by Khrushchev in 1957. A quarter of them died in the process.
But they were not alone in suffering this fate. Many of the populations of the republics of the north Caucasus were transported in the same way: the Karachais, the Kalmyks, the Balkars, the Meskhetians. All were accused by Stalin of being pro-German.
But the deportation of the Chechens was the most brutal treatment of an entire nation carried out in that region at that time. After the deportations, Chechnya ceased to exist and its territory was divided up between other republics.
In addition, discrimination against the Chechens continued throughout the post-war Soviet period. This was particularly extreme in employment and higher education. Most of the skilled and professional jobs on Grozny, and most of the best housing, as well as the party apparatus, was occupied by Russians, who were about a third of the population.
The early moves by Russia to end the Chechen rebellion failed, mainly because they were ham-fisted and underestimated the scale of the task. Consequently Russia did not launch a full invasion until the end of 1994. Yeltsin had other preoccupations before then.
Chechnya under Dudayev from 1991 until 1994 was as unstable and mafia-ridden as Russia itself, possibly more so. Presidential elections were held in October 1992 and Dudayev won 85% of the vote. Independence from Moscow was declared a month later.
Politically Chechnya was an independent state: it had made a clear declaration of independence. But in practical terms it was a strange set-up; there were no border controls, no Chechen passports, and no real state apparatus. Dudayev himself travelled abroad on a Russian passport.
Moscow imposed a trade embargo, but continued to purchase oil from Chechnya - much of it siphoned by Chechens out of Russia's own pipeline! And the Grozny football team played in the Russian league.
All the post-Soviet governments in the former Autonomous Republics were comprised of former Soviet bureaucrats transformed into nationalist and islamist regimes of various sorts. Chechnya was no different: the leaders began to grow beards and present themselves as islamic.
There are various views as to why Chechnya was not supported by the other Autonomous Republics, particularly those in the north Caucasus: Daghestan, Kabardin-Balkar and North Ossetia. Certainly these had much more pro-Moscow regimes from the outset, but there also seems to be a demographic element as well, in that Chechnya is the only one with a national majority.
Eventually Russia invaded Chechnya at the end of 1994. By this time the Dudayev regime had degenerated, its popularity was at an all time low, and Chechnya was falling apart. Yeltsin was certainly getting impatient that it still existed as a separate state. Khasbulatov was no longer in the Kremlin.
Russian Presidential elections were approaching and Yeltsin's popularity was at 10% and Russian nationalist demagogue Zhirinovsky was breathing down his neck. The person who could solve the Chechnya "problem" could be the next president of Russia.
There were also geopolitical problems. Although the Grozny oil field was running out and its refineries antiquated, the pipe line from which runs from Baku on the Caspian to Novorossiysk on the Black Sea through Grozny remains strategically important. New oil fields being opened in the Caspian would give it added importance since the existing pipeline through Grozny would be the cheapest way to get the oil through.
In February 1994 Khasbulatov returned to Chechnya, an event which led to proposals for negotiations between Dudayev and Yeltsin. This was forestalled by an assassination attempt against Dudayev.
The first Russian attack on Grozny during the summer failed as did a coup against Dudayev. But hard liners were taking over in the Kremlin around Yeltsin and all-out war eventually came in November.
In the end, the Russian army was disastrously defeated, after Grozny had fallen to them only to be retaken by the Chechens. An ad hoc army from a country with a population of less than a million defeated the army of the Russian Federation with a population of 150 million. This compounded the fragile political situation inside Russia and added to the existing demoralisation of the Russian army.
After its victory over Russia, however, Chechnya continued as before - although it was even more fragmented than previously. It was still a type of free trade zone through which all kinds of trade, most of it illegal, could find its way into the Russian Federation.
Dudayev himself was assassinated soon after the end of the war by an air to ground missile which hit his car, presumably from a Russian aircraft at high altitude.
The next invasion of Chechnya, as we know, came in 1999. It took place in the wake of the NATO war in the Balkans and under different political conditions than in 1994. Some of the reasons for the new war were the same as in 1994, and some were different.
The main factors were:
This was partly an anti-NATO war. It was a response to NATO's war in the Balkans and the humiliation which Moscow felt during and after that war. This was compounded by NATO's eastward expansion which had been angering the Yeltsin regime for several years, but had now come to fruition and had been a factor of the Balkans conflict.
There was an attempt to rebuild the morale and offensive ability of the Russian army. The Generals had been opposed to the invasion of Chechnya in 1994 but in 1999 they were fully behind it.
Yeltsin wanted to whip up great Russian chauvinism, which had weakened during the collapse of the USSR. The 1994 defeat by the Chechens had been a particular blow - honour needed to be restored.
The war against Chechnya is also aimed at the other Autonomous Republics. Although at the moment there do not seem to be any moves to independence elsewhere, it is always useful to send a warning shot across their bows to make clear the consequences if such tendencies did develop.
As in 1994, the war was motivated partly for internal political reasons. So far at least it has been useful for distracting attention from the dire economic situation in Russia itself.
Yeltsin wanted to ensure the victory of his nominee Putin in the forthcoming Presidential election. Nevertheless it is not clear that the elections - which have already been brought forward to March - will take place in an atmosphere favourable to Putin.
Certainly there has been increased reporting inside Russia of the number of casualties at the front, and the Mother's movement has been growing in strength.
The fall of Grozny took longer than Moscow hoped, and even now the fighting is not over. This war may drag on for some time, and its repercussions inside and outside Russia are not yet determined.