LABOUR came to power in 1997 promising that Britain's arms sales would be governed by a new moral framework. The secretive woro of aris deais would be opened up to public scrutiny, and priority would be given to human rights. Indonesia would be a test case of the new ethical foreign pol. icy, a test which it has failed.
he new government declared that it would not allow the sale of used for repression In fact, this formulation left the door open for continuing with business as usual. Campaigners would have to show not only that a regime was repressive, but also that the equipment in question was likely to be used for repression, for example by providing photographic evidence that similar equipment had been so used in the past. In practice this was difficult, considering the dangers to photographers in filming the activities of the police and armed forces. lhe Indonesian authorities denied access for journalists to large parts of East Timor and other areas of conflict.
Ministers were inclined to believe official assurances that equipment would not be used for repression They was anxious not to offend the Indonesian regime and put at risk lucrative civil and military contracts.
According to the Financial Times (August 30 1997) "oficials hope the approval of defence contracts will aso helo the interests of other sections of British industry which are bidding for billions of pounds worth of contracts linked to [the] Natuna [oil and gas fields in the South China Seal."
In 1994, while in opposition. Robin Cook stated that "Hawk aircraft have been observed or bombing runs in East Timor in most years since 1984". By 1997 his tune had changed.
The new government repeated Tory claims that there was no satIsfactory evidence Hawks had been used in East Timor. In fact there have been many eye-witness accounts of their use, backed up with admissions by Indonesian officials.
Campaigners arqued that the distinction between repressive and non-repressive equipient was irrelevant. All new equipment strengthens the armed forces and therefore puts their opponents at a disadvantage. All arms sales provide political support to the regime.
Activists demanded a full arms embargo on Indonesia. We demanded the cancellation of licences granted by the Tories. British Aerospace Hawk-209 jets with ground-attack capability. 7 Tactica water cannon made by Glover Webb, a subsidiary of GKN, 220 Land Rover general service vchicles and 50 Alvis Scorpion vehicles fitted with machine guns.
The government claimed that it would not be "realistic or practical" to revoke those licences. In fact Article 7(I) of the Export of Goods (Control) Order 1994 states that a licence may be var ied or revoked by the Secretary of State at any time.
Furthermore the government would not be liable to pay compensation unless it had been guaranteed in the terms of the licence.
So for over two years the gorernment presided over the delivery of lethal equipment to Indonesia when it was entirely veries. During this time Scorpion vehicles were filmed in use during student protests where protesters were killed (Jakarta, May 1998), and General Wiranto admitted that Hawks were flying over East Timor on "reconnaissance exercises" July 23 1999). From May | 1997 to autumn 1999 the change of government made no significant difference to licensed or to the proportion of licence applications turned down. There was however a significant reduction in the number and value of licences granted. However this was largely due to the economic crisis which hit Indonesia in 1997, which reduced the purchasing power of the Indonesian currency. This is tum meant an increased reluctance by the British government's Export Credit Guarantee Department to underwrite contracts on which Indonesia was likely to default. Up to the end of 1998 the government granted 91 licences in total, 4 for equipment in the category of "large calibre weapons". 4 in the category of "bombs, torpedoes, rockets, missiles, mines etc". 2 for "military vehicles", 33 for "aircraft and aircraft equipment", 2 for "combat vessels", i for "toxicological agents or riot control agents", 31 for "electronic equipment for military use", amongst others.
These categories are broad and they do not indicate the exact nature of the equipment in question. However some of them could clearly be used for represFrom 1994 to 1998 the Tories refused 5.9% of licence applications and Labour refused 8.4%. Most of Labour's refusals were in 1997, including a high-profile rejection of a licence for 6 armoured Land Rovers made by Courtaulds Aerospace. In 1998 Labour refused just one licence out of 4l, suggesting that, after an initial attempt to show that Labour's "ethical foreign policy" had teeth, political and economic "realities" had once agalin taken precedence. Hatok jets have been sold - and 24 of their pilots trained - under Labour Writing in the Observer (September 19 1999) Robin Cook claims that "arms sales to indonesia under this government have all bue vaninco. Last year wo license d grand total of Cl6 million of arms exports, nearly all of it spares and services for historic contracts and a mere El million for new contracts." We cannot tell whether or not he is telling the truth because, despite the government's promise to open up arms sales to public scrutiny. the information in the public domain is very patchy and impreThe government published its first "annual report" on arms sales in March 1999. For each licence the report only gives the manufacturer, the general type of equipment (which is very broad) and the number of items involved, it does not include the value of the deal.
Cook also denies that the government has given a fresh subsidy for the Hawks. However according to Hansard (December 9 1998) the government rescheduled US$167 of debt repayments relating to the Hawk deal (as part of a rescheduling package covering €240 million of public sector debt repayments).
Cook is not so keen to stress the training unat brian nas goven to Indonesian military officers. According to Private Eye (April 17 1998) seven officers from the notorious counter-insurgency force Kopassus, which has played a key role in orchestrating the present violence in cast Timor were then on a Security Studies course at Hull University. By July 1998 the RAF had trained 5 instructors and 24 pilots in fying the Hawk jets. Under the pressure of the situation in East Timor, the government exports of arms to Indonesia. A statement by Tony Blair before the 1997 General Election sheds some light on why it took so long.
"A new Labour government will ditions in which the defence industries can survive and prosper. .... A Labour government will work with the industry to win export orders."
But Labour's support for the arms trade goes beyond subservience to the arms industry and the value of arms exports to the British economy. Arms sales are an important tool for projecting British influence in the world.
They are a lever for giving British business a favourable position in markets wonowice. Ana, In tne hands of repressive regimes, they help to maintain a stable environment for British investors by defending the political status quo and suppressing any challenge from below to their exploitation of natural resources and labour and to their domination of markets
Working the strings behind Habibie, General Wiranto has been the real power ts Indonesia - with whom the West is happy to deal