Why Clinton was so ready to bomb Serbia

Why Clinton was so ready to bomb Serbia

Bob Wood reviews The Twisted Road to Kosovo , by Peter Gowan, in Labour Focus on Eastern Europe No 62

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the changes in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War, it seemed that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation no longer had any role to play.

NATO’s reason for being, the alleged threat from the east, no longer existed. Peter Gowan’s analysis goes a long way to explaining why NATO has re-emerged to play a major role in the Kosovo war.

Finding a new task for NATO and re-establishing American control of Europe has been at the centre of American strategy for the last ten years.

In the aftermath of 1989, there were three possible scenarios for the immediate future of Europe, east and west, Gowan argues. First, it was possible to envisage a single Europe, stretching from Russia to the Atlantic, with a single security system. French President Mitterand favoured this solution, but lacked support from Germany and also faced the active hostility of the United States.

Secondly, the European Union could extend its influence eastward, combining the move to a single currency with an independent foreign and defence policy, making NATO redundant. Russia would be allocated its own sphere of influence in the east.

Or thirdly, using NATO, Europe could be brought back under American control. With the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, NATO would act as the gatekeeper between western Europe and Russia.

By extending NATO first, the United States began to ensure the primacy of the Atlantic alliance over the European community. In conjunction with its extension, America needed to find a new agressive role for NATO.

Gowan argues, convincingly enough, that events in the Balkans following the break-up of Yugoslavia can only be properly understood in the light of the determination of the United States to ensure that the project to transform NATO was successful.

In the early nineties, the US repeatedly scuppered European initiatives (in which David Owen played a leading part), by suggesting to the Bosnian government under Izetbegovic that by waiting they could get a better deal. In the event they probably got less, but importantly the agreement finally reached at Dayton was brokered by the USA.

Then, over Kosovo, clearly unacceptable demands were placed on Milosevic at Rambouillet, including free access for NATO forces to all parts of Yugoslavia, not just Kosovo. It does not seem to me to be stretching the truth too far to suggest that the war was deliberately provoked.

The Americans needed to tie western Europe firmly into NATO, not just in theory but in practice. The new NATO has now been blooded.

Gowan’s argument is not without its weaknesses. He suggests that Serbia was targeted because Milosevic was opposed to the new global order and neo-liberalism. The privatisation of much of Yugoslavia’s industry (remember Douglas Hurd’s involvement as an advisor?) must make this doubtful.

On Gowan’s own evidence, Milosevic is a familiar type in eastern European politics since the fall of the wall, opportunistically abandoning any residual lingering socialism, and playing the nationalist card.

But in peeling away the humanitarian veneer, to reveal the cynicism, duplicity and callousness of American imperialism beneath, Peter Gowan has done us all a service.

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