On the Left there are all sorts of confusions about the break-up of Yugoslavia. Much of the Left has been supportive to various extents of Slobodan Milosevic. They claim that Germany deliberately set out to destroy the Yugoslav state by encouraging Slovene and Croatian secession.
This is essentially the view of Tony Benn who also makes the bizarre claim that Kosova has been "part of Yugoslavia for centuries".
Since the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes only came into being in 1918 (the name was changed to Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929) such a claim defies all historic accuracy.
Hostility to Croatian nationalism is widespread, with memories of the war time fascist Ustashe often being invoked as explanations for why Milosevic went to war with Croatia in 1991.
Among all the conflicting views on the responsibilities for the Yugoslav crisis lie two glaring omissions. Firstly it is not understood that from 1990 onwards Milosevic was intent on creating a Greater Serbia. Secondly the role of Slovenia is ignored.
To a large extent these are not even two different questions. The reality is that far from opposing Slovene secession, Milosevic welcomed and encouraged it. Only about five per cent of the population of Slovenia were Serbs. Milosevic had no interest in their fate. Consequently, when Slovenia took the first steps to independence the military intervention by the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (JNA) was very half hearted.
Not all JNA officers, of course, were in the know. Many of them still believed in a state of the South Slavs. General Adzic protested about the lack of troops available for fighting Slovene secession – to no avail.
Milosevic was certainly willing to launch brutal assaults against the much more populous Republics of Croatia and the Bosnia. Vast quantities of arms were made available to military and paramilitary formations. Heavy weapons were on hand.
There is only one possible explanation: Milosevic had no intention to keep Slovenia within Yugoslavia because it got in the way of his aim of a Greater Serbia.
The Slovene leaders engaged in a cynical manoeuvre with Milosevic which allowed them independence after a token display of hostility from Belgrade. Troops were rapidly withdrawn from Slovenia – into Croatia.
The Slovenes were almost certainly aware that Milosevic would not let Croatia go so easily. They were equally aware that if Slovenia left the Yugoslav federation Croatia would not stay.
Yet all the while the Slovenes were making preparations for their exit they did not inform President Tudjman of Croatia what they were doing. Nor did they warn him of Milosevic’s determination to build a Greater Serbia. They simply washed their hands of any responsibility.
Indeed, the evidence suggests that Tudjman had very little intention of quitting Yugoslavia – independence for him was simply a bargaining point to achieve a stronger position for Croatia within a revamped Yugoslavia.
Slovenia’s determination to leave pushed Tudjman into declaring Croatia independent.
Unfortunately for Tudjman, and even more so for millions of people throughout the former Yugoslavia, he found that Milosevic was willing to use the utmost brutality to achieve his Greater Serbia.