T he failure of the Kosova Albanian delegation to sign an agreement at the Rambouillet 'peace' talks created consternation among western leaders. The US, in particular, has used the period leading up to new talks on March 15 to put massive pressure on the Kosova Liberation Army.
Former Republican Presidential candidate Bob Dole is currently meeting some of the Albanian delegation in Macedonia, after the Milosevic government refused him a visa for Kosova. Dole's trip has the full backing of President Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Dole will be accompanied by a senior State Department official, Jim O'Brien, and a general from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. O'Brien is taking with him a document ready for signing. This calls for a three-year interim period of autonomv tor Kosova. now province of Serbia, and for the withdrawal of Serbian forces and the demilitarisation of the rebel Kosova Liberation Army.
Dole will no doubt be making it plain that the west will refuse any support for Kosovar independence and that continued support for the limited autonomy granted at Rambouillet is dependent on the KLA leadership doing what it is told. The General will, no doubt, warn of serious consequences for the KLA if it does not toe the line. Dole is largely pushing at an open door as KLA leaders have indicated a willingness to accept Paul Rhadische the terms of Rambouillet. However, most of its spokespeople are out of the country at the moment. Dole's visit is to ensure no back sliding when they have to sell the deal inside Kosova.
While Dole is in Macedonia, Madeleine Albright is proposing to break her far eastern trip to visit Nato headquarters. She will remind some of the less gung-ho European Nato leaders that they too are expected to do whatever they are told by the US. If the US decides launch airstrikes against Serbia then the Europeans will have to follow suit. Europeans will be expected to provide the bulk of Nato troops in Kosova, as envisaged by the Rambouillet plan.
The possibility of air strikes to force a few concessions will also be raised by US special envoy Richard Holbrooke, who plans to visit Milosevic in Belgrade in the near future - once the KLA has been bullied into accepting American demands.
While all this diplomatic activity is going on Milosevic has been stepping up military activity in Kosova. Serbian Hoops have recently shelled KLA positions in villages of the Mitrovica and Vushtrri area, while Serbian aircraft flew overhead. Hundreds of Albanians fled from villages along the Ciçavica massif in the municipality of Vushtrri while residents of a number of neighbourhoods in Mitrovica spent the night out, fearful of a Serbian attack on the town. Fighting has also taken place in Gjakova, Klina and in the border Processes from 1988 to 1997, wrote: "In villages of Reka e Kege region, along the Kosova-Albanian border. There have been heavy Serbian troop movements in many parts of Kosova.
Milosevic's military build up is not necessarily contrary to American plans for 'stability' in the Balkans under American leadership. In many ways it strengthens the diplomatic activity.
Dole is there to get the Albanians to drop their demand for independence and disarm. Without the KLA the Kosovars would be totally at Milosevic's mercy -hence the 'need' for Nato troops to 'protect' them. Although US politicians may deplore the current Serbian offensive it does, nevertheless, reinforce this point. Holbrooke, meanwhile, will try to convince Milosevic that his best interests are served by allowing Nato troops to ensure Kosova remains part of Serbia. Albright will add the threat of military action to make Milosevic more pliable - but also to demonstrate what could happen to the KLA if it refuses to play the US game.
Western leaders may …not like Milosevic very much but he still remains central to their plans for the region. Given that the most important Serbian opposition politicians are now in government alongside Milosevic supborters there is credible alternative to him. Hence any settlement for Kosova depends on restricting Milosevic's military capabilities but also demobilising any move towards Kosovar independence.
Milosevic of course has to oppose any deployment of Nato troops in Kosova. To fail to do so would be suicidal. Yet he may well find it useful to allow Nato troops in after some token resistance. Failure of Russia to come to his aid would provide him with the ACCOSSAV excuse. Boris Yeltsin's threats of military action to oppose Nato troops in Kosova can hardly be taken seriously -even assuming Yeltsin was sober at the time.
Nato troops would N also be welcomed by Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov. Since troops would have to enter Kosova via Macedonia Gligorov could hope to gain increased western support for his allowing Nato use of Macedonian territory. Indeed Gligorov probably understands the real aim of deploying Nato troops better than most. He is totally opposed to Kosova independence because of his problems with Macedonia's own minority Albanian population. He knows that the main role of Nato troops will be to disarm all those who continue to struggle for independence. By denying independence to Kosova, and showing they will use military force, Nato will also stop Albanian minorities in other states demanding independence for themselves.
S ections of the KLA leadership appear oblivious to the real aims of Nato. Splits have been developing. Adem Demaci, who spent 28 years in Yugoslav prisons for pro-Albanian activities, has recently resigned as political spokesperson for the KLA in protest against the willingness of sections of the leadership to abandon the demand for independence.
Western officials have publicly welcomes Demaci's resignation since they considered him major obstacle to their attempts to oppose a solution on the Kosovars. Demaci had refused to take part in and recognise the outcome of the Rambouillet talks. It remains to be seen whether Demaci and others opposed to any sell-out on independence will organise against the current civilian and military leadership. Certainly this is essential. But any movement will also have to be prepared to oppose the machinations of the west and to understand that if Nato troops do enter Kosova their main target will be those forces still fighting for Kosovar independence.